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ABSTRACT
Political Culture and Political Development:
An Analysis of the Institution Building Process in Iran
(May 1981)
Ali Asghar Masalehdan, 6. A., Whittier College
M.A., Kent State University, M.U.A.
, Boston University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Anwar H. Syed
This inquiry is an attempt to observe the relationship in Iran
between political culture and political development through the building
of political institutions. For political development to be initiated,
suggests Lucian Pye, three basic forces of social change--equality
,
capacity and di fferenti ation--are necessary in the society. Sociali-
zation is generally achieved through inter-generational communication,
impulse control as transfer of personal duties, and role training.
While the first two agents are regarded as primary, highly personalized,
and relatively unstructured relationships, role training is secondary
and can be influenced by the existing institutions through mass com-
munication, schools and other processes. The approach of this inquiry
assumes that 'development' in its ultimate form requires two symbiotic
elements for it to be attained and maintained. They are referred to
as 'software' and 'hardware'. 'Software' are the social prerequisites
composed of sociological, cultural, psychological and political condi-
tions which result in the production of a skilled human element.
'Hardware' are the material and physical elements that the human
vi
element utilizes to achieve the desired end--i.e., growth and develop-
ment. 'Software' is the focus of this inquiry with special attention
to norms and values that promote political development.
The inquiry is divided into three main parts. Part I deals
with political culture, the prevailing political institutions, and the
discussion of the individual in the Iranian socio-political framework.
Temporal powers in the absence of the Hiaden Imam are considered ille-
gitimate by Shiah doctrine. Conflict existed between the aspirations
of the Pahlavi monarchs for hegemony and the ulama (clergy) who see
themselves as the link between the ummah (the community of believers)
and the Hidden Imam. The domination by the Pahlavi monarchs of the
three separate but equal branches of the government, as envisioned by
the Constitution of 1906-07, left the political institutions of the
nation weak and dependent on royal grace. The Shah was thus guarantor
of performance and responsible for all shortcomings. This frustrated
the traditional balanced tension of the political web system of the
country. Consequently, the Shah was neither able to gain the support
of tne modern and thus democratic elements of the country nor legitimacy
from the traditional and religious-minded segment of the population.
A further problem facing the insufficiency of political develop-
ment in Iran was the individual himself. Famialism is seen as the main
pattern of social relationships and the basis of one's identity. The
individualism seen in Iranians is a primarily negative trait not con-
ducive to the establishment of social contracts which would promote
vii
responsible individuals. Insecurity in interpersonal relationships is
seen as a major problem facing the society.
Textbooks as socializing agents are the theme of Part II. The
educational system caused little motivation for change to a value system
conducive to political development. Lacking are rationality, objec-
tivity, personal integrity, initiative or responsibility as the end
results of the educational process. The educational system prepares
the students to exist in the prevailing socio-cul tural mold of the
nation. Despite the fair representation of entries in textbooks enumer-
ating hard work, achievement, self discipline and similar values, the
methods of teaching and learning, as well as the bulk of the entries in
the textbooks, seem to have changed little from those of the traditional
maktab system. Memorization, instead of analytical understanding seems
to prevail in schools.
Part III deals with transmission of values and norms from
parents to students. Data analysis shows that the parent and student
orientations seem to concur to a substantial degree. Parental education
seems to be the most significant determinant of student's socio-political
orientation, but has a different impact on the parent's own orientation
which at times seems to be contrary to that of the student's. Family
income and place of residence, which are influenced by parental level of
education, also somewhat influence the student's orientation. The
students and parents remain traditional in their outlook, despite even
high level of education. High level of political inefficacy and distrust
of government are found among parents and students with socio-economic
vi i i
status influencing the degree of such orientations. Female students
were found to be somewhat more open-minded and democratic in their out-
look than their male counterparts, due to the fact they are often from
better educated, more cosmopolitan and more prosperous families.
The prospects of development of 'software' in Iran suffer from
severe socio-cul tural as well as political inadequacies. To even begin
to consider the prospects of development of human resources, basic
attention must be paid to the changes vital to transformation of a
nation from traditional mode to a transitional stage.
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INTRODUCTION
Some Introductory Remarks
This present undertaking began in 1977 as an inquiry into the
prospects of political development in developing countries with
emphasis on the Iranian experience. Needless to say, the developments
of the past few years would have been an exacting and trying time for
any student of area studies whose subject evolved into new circum-
stances overnight. Although the focus of the inquiry remained
constant, new elements entered into consideration, including, but not
limited to, failure of political development in the past, the Shah's
fall and his impact on socio-political development in Iran. The scope
of the inquiry was broad to begin with, including a three-layered study
of political culture and political institutions, textbooks as social-
izing agents, and inter-generational socialization process. The
evolving issues made the undertaking into this voluminous work for
which I beg the patience of the reader.
A Framework for Analysis
With the desire for development among the emerging nations of
the world following World War II, theoretical groundwork for the
actualization of such goals began. All the approaches were different.
They were concerned with such issues as capital formation,
1
2technological change and increase in productive capacity. Clearly the
theories of development were all one dimensional in their economic
orientation and policy focus. Furthermore, they remained incognizant
of how the traditional societies functioned. Their theoretical pre-
occupation with the economic approach as means to the end and as the
only viable methodology for economic development was not shared by many,
particularly those outside the discipline. In the Middle East such
modernizing individuals as Gamal Abdul-Nasser^ of Egypt, Michel Aflag^
of Syria and Ahmad Kasravi^ of Iran thought fundamental changes
requiring social transformation were a prerequisite for development.
Total systems approach and development as a multi-dimensional process
of social change also had proponents in the west. Among economists,
Walt Rostow proposed his "stage" approach to economic development."^
Although his approach included sequential stages including "take-off
into self-sustained growth," it suffered from "disregard of the need
to isolate key behavioralistic relationships which determine the path
of the system."^
Other prominent theoreticians promoting the multi-dimensional
approach to the concept of development are Daniel Lerner,^ Edward
Shils,' Bert F. Hoselitz,° Max Millikan, and Donald Blackmer. These
academicians include political, sociological, anthropological, and
psychological, in addition to economic conditions as determinants of
total system development. Furthermore, they emphasize the development
of the above mentioned conditions as prerequisites for economic devel-
opment to reach the stage where a system can maintain self-sustaining
growth.
3Bert F. Hoselitz, as early as 1951, recognized the need for a
multifaceted approach to economic development by posing the following
questi on:
Does economic development mean only a change in certain
aspects of overt behavior, notably the acquisition of new
skills or the exercise of new forms of productive capacity,
or is it accompanied by or contingent upon more basic changes
in social relations and even the structure of value and
beliefs of a culture?"!"!
His response was that:
Economic development
. . . implies a rapid, and in a
sense, revolutionary process which, if it is to take root
in a society, must penetrate widely and deeply and hence
affects the social, structural and cultural facets of a
society. In other words, economic development consists not
merely in a change of production techniques, but also, in
the last resort, in a reorientation of some special norms
and values .... Any analysis of economic development
which is to be fruitful and complete must include a set of
propositions relating changes in production techniques to
changes in values. '2
As far as political scientists are concerned, the end result
of changes in values is a reorientation of political norms that would
be conducive to political development. With the rising interest in
political development, the academicians have elucidated on the process,
and, as a result of differences in experience and approaches, there are
numerous theories and frameworks. Lucian Pye lists 10 divergent defin-
itions and approaches to the idea of political development used by
social scientists during the last quarter of a century. Pye notes
tnat there are three themes which are basic to most of the theories of
political development.^'^ They include equality, capacity, and
differentiation.
4The theme of equality entails "mass participation and popular
involvement in political activities." This is practiced by both demo-
cratic and totalitarian systems through mass mobilization. Furthermore,
the idea of equality infers that "laws should be of a uni versalistic
nature, applicable to all and more or less impersonal in their opera-
tion." Lastly, equality assumes that "recruitment to political office
should reflect achievement standards of performance and not the
ascriptive considerations of a traditional social system."
Capacity, as the second major theme, "is related to the output
of a political system and the extent to which the political system can
affect the rest of the society and economy." Capacity is closely
associated with governmental performance and the conditions that
affect such performances. The idea of system capacity primarily
"entails the sheer magnitude, scope, and the scale of political and
governmental performances." Furthermore, it entails "effectiveness and
efficiency in the execution of public policy" and is related to
"rationality in administration and a secular orientation toward
pol i cy .
"
The final theme involves the "differentiation and specializa-
tion of structure" in a system. "Increased functional specificity of
the various political roles within the system" is an obvious result
of differentiation and specialization. Pye notes that "differentia-
tion is not fragmentation and the isolation of the different parts of
the political system but specialization based on an ultimate sense of
integration.
"
5The foregoing themes, as Pye himself suggests, do not "assert
any particular philosophical orientation or theoretical framework" but
"isolate those general characteristics of political development which
seem to be most widely held and most fundamental in the general
thinking about problems of development."^^
Thus, to initiate political development in a society, norms and
values which are held to be conducive to its realization would have to
become major forces of social change. Political or civic culture is
the environment in which agents of socialization--i
.e.
, "attitudes,
beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political
process, and which provide the underlying assumtions and rules that
govern behavior in the political system" ^^--exist.
Socialization is basically achieved through three agents:
(1) intergenerational communication; (2) impulse control, as trans-
fer of personal duties; and (3) role training. The first two agents
are regarded as primary, since they, according to Edward Dawson and
Kenneth Prewitt, are "highly personalized and relatively unstructured
relationships. "^7 Role training, however, could be influenced by the
existing institutions instilling beliefs in children through mass com-
munication, schools and other processes.
The role of socializing agents becomes instrumental in social
change when it is viewed in light of the foregoing conceptualization.
To attain a total system development, political development must also
be achieved. Its realization requires system transformation and social
6change--i.e., family, peers, school--become crucial in realization of
the desired end.
In short, the approach of this inquiry assumes that "develop-
ment" in its ultimate form requires two symbiotic elements for it to
be attained and maintained. For reason of simplicity, they will be
called software and hardware
. Software refers to social prerequisites
composed of sociological, cultural and psychological, as well as
political conditions which result in the production of a skilled human
element. Hardware, on the other hand, refers to the material and
physical elements that the human element utilizes to achieve the
desired end— i.e., economic growth. It illustrates that it is not
possible to attain economic growth without first acquiring the software
prerequisites and that the possession of software will ultimately be
translated into economic growth.
Thus, software emerges as the most crucial of the two elements.
The focus of this inquiry will be on this social element with partic-
ular attention to norms and values that promote political development.
The theoretical approach, however, does not promote a total change in
socio-cul tural and political orientations. It provides and insists on
some continuity of the traditional socio-cultural norms but with an
emphasis on rationality and objectivity within the perspective. Thus,
the inquiry will deal with software that are deemed to be preconditions
of development.
Although political development with emphasis on political
institutions and the role of socialization in the process of change are
7the main focus of this inquiry, methodological approaches used by
socio-psychological and sociological studies have been utilized to
underline their relevance to this concept of software. For example,
certain socio-psychological norms advanced by David McClelland have
been found to correlate positively with economic development. They
include: role differentiation, universal ism, and rationality in out-
look. ""^ These same norms are also put forth by Lucian Pye as the major
determinants of political development.
The Case Study .
The Iranian revolution during 1978 and early 1979 which led to
the replacement of monarchy with an Islamic Republic has been per-
ceived by many as a turn away from "modernization" and "development"
— an attempt to return the nation to the Middle Ages. Such an asser-
tion is fueled by false accounts of the planning and development
process in Iran during the past twenty-five years by the Pahlavi
regime. It is unconvincing that development and modernization could
cause revolution. It is precisely social stagnation and lack of
development that trigger uprisings and cause revolutions. To argue
that the Iranian revolution was against modernization, one must first
prove that the Shah's regime was a modernizing force. In light of the
above conceptualization, the discussions in the following chapters will
demonstrate the lack of social development, in particular political
development, which is so crucial in attaining total system development.
8It was the government's stated goal for Iran to reach the same
level of economic development as West Germany and Japan within a
quarter of a century and to become one of the five most developed
nations on the globe. Economic development, however, was perceived,
in Frances Fitzgerald's words, as "imported pieces of modern technology
--a hotel, a hospital, a steel mill-set up around the country like the
pieces on a monopoly set.''^^ The country also depended on imported
foreign managers and technicians to run and maintain these pieces of
imported technology.
On the other hand, the insufficiency of planning in the country
was caused by lack of a system of checks and balances by the legitimate
institutions whereby "all important numbers, proposals, and judgements
could be exposed to criticism before decisions were made." The insti-
tutions that could exert external influence on the process of planning
were "extremely weak" and were not given "much recognition. "^1
Furthermore, plans devised by the central government to bring the
country to the threshold of economic development were devised by a
"relatively small group of economists and engineers who had little
or no regard for the development of socio-political infra-structure.
In James A. Bill's words, "what the Shah ha(d) done, in effect, ha(d)
been to encourage enormous economic change and some social change in
order to prevent any basic political change. "^^ Thus, political and
social constraints remained on the system. The system remained
traditional and absolutist in its outlook. The political system of the
nation basically consisted of weak institutions built or maintained by
9the Shah to support and legitimize his rule. Although the country had
the oldest existing constitution in the Middle East, it, nevertheless,
was nothing more than a superflous document. It was often ignored by
the Shah or, on occasion, was utilized to serve his purposes. Although
the Constitution clearly delineated the roles of the branches of the
government with separation of the executive, legislative and judiciary
branches, the Shah personally was the omnipotent power controlling all
three branches. In short, the Iranian political process had been
signified, on the one hand, by the extreme weakness of its institutions
and, on the other, by the dominant control of the Shah of all its
actions and procedures.
None of the three themes outlined above--equal i ty , capacity
and differentiation--were maintained by the government. Instead of a
rational system of planning, there were grandiose and ostentatious
projects. The situation was best pointed out by Amir Taheri, himself
a pro-government journalist, who wrote that "an accumulation of discon-
tent with tight control, over-centralization, lack of sufficient open
debate and a general feeling that corruption and inefficiency together
with arrogance have struck bureaucracy.' The economic boom for the
few on the top had caused economic dislocation for the many on the
bottom. The economic gap between the rich and the poor was becoming
greater. The promises and hopes that had been instilled by the Shah
and the government could not be fulfilled. Instead, corruption was
rampant and the system could not be maintained effectively.
10
Although the Iranian revolution caught the West, particularly
the United States, by surprise, the general social and political dis-
content was evident as early as 1976. By 1977, even political
repression was unable to slow the rising tides of anti-government
sentiments. The revolution of 1978-79 was only the logical conclusion
to an arrogant system of government that through co-option, corruption,
and repression had withstood the growing social, political and economic
pressures. The swiftness and the ease with which the Shah's rule came
to an end showed the absence of a reliable base of power from which he
could rule, despite having been regarded as the ruler of "the island
of stability" only a year before by President Carter. The success of
the revolution, furthermore, showed the ineffectiveness of the insti-
tutions which gave lip service to democracy and the Constitution, while
simultaneously aiding the legitimacy of tne monarchy and the rule of
Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi. The control of the monarch over the
Iranian political institutions rendered them dependent and, thus, to
the polity they were illegitimate and not credible. As a result, the
existing institutions were not able to legitimize actions or processes
of the government.
In short, this present inquiry will attempt to analyze all the
relevant political institutions in respect to their impact on the
political process of the nation.
The case study of Iranian political development is further
elucidated by inquiry into the socialization process which was
attempted through textbooks. Governments have often used the
neducational system for purposes of role training and value transfer.
Since the educational system in Iran is under direct government control,
it is in a position to disseminate norms and values favorable to its
objectives through teaching materials, namely the textbooks. Text-
books are one of the best examples of such efforts, since certain
virtues or attitudes can be stressed in the form of stories, prose or
poetry. Furthermore, the analysis of the textbooks allows researchers
from the outside to observe and analyze the norms and values approved
for dissemination by the government to the students. The quality of
such values and norms in relation to the diffused support and approval
for political institutions is of particular interest to political
scientists.
As the political system attempts to intervene in the sociali-
zation process through educational systems and mass communication by
instilling highly personalized and relatively unstructured values,
norms, and beliefs in children, there is simultaneously the intergen-
erational transmission of values over which the government has no
control. Family is the agent best able to influence and instill
personalized and unstructured values in children. In the final segment
of this inquiry, attempts are made to study the values and orientations
attained by high school students after eight years of education under
the influence of socialization norms which the Ministry of Education
had emphasized in the textbooks. The analysis will display the level
of support or lack of it for the Shah's government during the rel-
atively calmer days of early 1978. This is followed by the analysis
12
of the values and orientations of the parents and the students with
and eye to finding similarities and differences between the two, and
of the influence that intergenerational transmission of values has on
the process of political change.
Contents of the Inquiry
.
This present study is divided into three main sections. Sec-
tion One deals with political institutions and is composed of three
chapters. Chapter I deals with the Iranian political culture and the
position that the institution of monarchy had attained within the
cultural framework. The chapter also deals with weaknesses and criti-
cism of the institution of monarchy. Chapter II is basically concerned
with the prevailing institutions during the Pahlavi monarchy-- their
strength and weaknesses. Chapter III discusses the concept of individ-
ualism and its place in the possible course of political developments.
Section Two is composed of two chapters and deals with the
Iranian educational system as an agent of political socialization.
Chapter IV deals with the foundation of the modern educational system
in Iran and its relevance to the process of political development.
Chapter V is basically the content analysis of elementary and grade
school Farsi texts used during the Shah's regime, with an eye to the
major norms and values implicit in the readers.
Section Three is composed of five chapters and is composed
basically of the results from the analysis of parent-student data.
Chapter VI is concerned with the theoretical framework for the analysis
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of intergenerational transmission of values. Chapter VII deals with
public policy attitudes of respondents in regard to the role of govern-
ment and the level of socio-political toleration. Chapter VIII
discusses political participation, dealing with the respondents
interest in passive and active political participation and their
level of political efficacy/inefficacy. Chapter IX consists of respon-
dents' attitudes to items delineating political trust/distrust.
Chapter X is the discussion of the socio-cul tural orientations of
the respondents and its impact on their political perspectives.
Fianlly, the discussions are concluded with a summary of the
analysis and an examination of the findings in relation to the stated
thesis.
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POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL CULTURE AND TRADITION
Political institutions have become an inseparable part of the
process of political development. In Samuel Huntington's words,
political institutions enable the more "complex and heterogeneous"
societies to maintain order and aid in establishment of the political
community. Political institutions develop as a result of competing
social conflicts and of "the gradual development of procedures and
organizational devices for resolving those disagreements." In short,
only simple societies can exist without "highly differentiated politi-
cal institutions." The more complex a society becomes, the more it
demands action and maintenance by political institutions.^ Hunting-
ton's assertion of the significance of political institutions
immediately gives away, in many modernizing societies, to a sense of
confusion and schizophrenia on the part of the political leadership.
The problem, also recognized by Huntington himself, involves the
dichotomy between the concept of constitutionalism inherent in the
development of political institutions and reformism which often is
contradictory to the will of the majority in a traditionally oriented
society. A prerequisite for modernization is consolidation of power
and creation of an effective bureaucracy. Thus, modernization not
only requires "a shift in power from regional, aristocratic, and
17
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religious groups to central secular, national institutions, but also
the centralization of authority in a single individual within those
institutions." The endeavors of a modernizing monarch, however, are
opposed by the religious and aristocratic opponents whose independence
would be seriously challenged by a strong central authority. To pre-
serve the traditional balance of power within the nation and their
privileged position, as traditional as they may be, their interests
eventually would lead them to promote modern ideals of liberty and
constitutionalism and a representative form of government whereby they
could potentially attain a position of influence vis-a-vis the monarch
and his ambitions of reform and political modernization.^
This dilemma of reformism vs. constitutionalism is not a recent
phenomenon. Huntington uses several examples, among them Alexander II
of Russia, Mahmud II of the Ottoman Empire, and Joseph II of Austria-
Hungary. These reformist leaders tried to introduce changes into their
realms by attempts to subordinate the traditional mode of the society.
Joseph II promoted secularism in place of the overwhelming influence of
the church. Among many reforms, he instituted equal protection of the
law to all, opened up the civil service to all citizens, and issued a
kind of land reform whereby the peasants would own their own lands and
keep most (70 percent) of their income.^
Mahmud II decided on centralization of the political power in
his own hands and thereby became "the sole source of authority in the
Empire."^ Such quests often led to the dispossession of power from the
traditional political sector-- i .e. , the nobility and the church groups—
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to a central national bureaucracy. Reforms from above, however, most
often proved unpopular. The opposition often took the form of a
constitutionalist movement whereby the powers of the monarch would be
restrained. Opposition to Sultan Abdulmajid, Mahmud II 's successor
and also a reformist monarch, hoped to replace "the Ottoman absolutism
with a constitutional system" and, in doing so, enlisted the support
of the clergy. It was argued that the Sultan's reforms had displaced
the traditional order and had ignored the religious laws and regula-
tions. It was also argued that the Sultan should re-establish the
representative bodies that had been abolished.
^
Tzar Alexander II confronted similar sentiments when his
reforms began to undermine the influence of the aristocracy. The
nobility asked for a national assembly with the aim of limiting imper-
ial power. In short, opposition to reforms in many instances took
the posture of "modern liberalism and traditional pluralism." Alexan-
der II opposed constitutionalism since he believed it was intended to
establish an oligarchical political system which would not have served
the interests of the serfs in Russia.'^
Huntington recognizes the dilemma of a reformist monarch who
is caught in the contradiction that while the institution of monarchy
remains highly traditional, his policies are modernizing. He pre-
scribes centralization as vital for reforms. He suggests that in the
face of an opposition by vested interests, which utilizes the combina-
tion of modern constitutionalism with traditional pluralism, a reform-
ist monarch should enlist support from both traditional and modernized
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sources. Tnree of these support sources are bureaucracy, the middle
class, and the masses of population which benefit from the reforms of
the monarch. A fourth support source, Huntington suggests, could be
from outside the boundaries of the political entity in the form of
support by a foreign government.^
Huntington's stipulations are quite interesting, particularly
due to their apparent failure in maintaining the Shah's political
fortunes. A guick glance at the Shah's political approach reveals that
he may have been moved by Huntington's prescriptions because he did
attempt to enlist the support of the middle class, the bureaucracy and
the farmers. As will be discussed, such a strategy proved largely
unsuccessful due to the socio-cul tural and political context from
which the Shah operated.
It is with an understanding of the existing problems facing the
developing nations that aspire for political development, but whose
efforts are thwarted by the traditional elements inherent in such
societies that this present inquiry attempts to search for the signif-
icance of education on development of political values that would aid
modernization. A discussion of the Iranian political system, however,
first demands a historical analysis, particularly with reference to the
impact of religion on the political process.^
Religion and Political Culture.
The impact that the ulama (Arabic word for the high clergy)
have had on modern Iran has little parallel in other Middle Eastern
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countries. UJama were instrumental in promulgation of the Constitution
of 1906-07^° and then were supportive of Mohammad-Ali Shah when he
opposed it in 1908-09 J 1 Promotion of monarchy in 1925 by the ulama,
instead of republicanism as first entertained by Reza Khan, was
essential in establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty. The ulama were
again in the forefront of Reza Shah's opposition, denouncing his
authoritarianism and anti-Islamic undertakings.
In essence, the Islamic tradition does not distinguish between
the political and religious life of the community. Mohammad was both
the political and the spiritual leader of the Moslems. The tradition
was followed by the four Rashedeen Caliphs (632-661 A.D.). the Ummay-
yeds (661-750), and the Abbassids (750-1258).^'^ Soon after Mohammad'
s
death however, a rift developed as to the "rightful" successor to the
Prophet. The Shiah espoused the institution of Imamat
,
whereby
descendants of the Prophet, through his daughter Fatima and her husband
Ali, were upheld as the legitimate heirs to the Prophet. Although many
claimants to Imamat were espoused, the doctrine that became dominant
and subsequently the state religion in Iran during the Safavid period
(1502-1722) was Ithna-ashari (belief in twelve imams). Imam is a title
for the man who is the divinely appointed guide of the community. Ali
is acknowledged as the first imam. At his death (661 A.D.), his eldest
son, Hassan, became the imam. He was succeeded at his death by his
younger brother, Hussein. Hussein's rivalry with the Ummayyed Caliph,
Yazied, and his martyrdom by the latter' s troops in Karbala in 680 is
regarded as the most significant event in Shiah history.
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Imams became "the symbol of recurring demands for Utopian
justice and equality. "^^ The succession of imams continued until Mahdi,
the twelfth imam, disappeared in infancy. In Shiah doctrine he lives
and continues as imam though he is hidden from view. This situation is
known as gheybat-e-Kobra (The Great Occulation) . ^
^
The doctrine of Occultation has had a profound impact on the
development of Shiah political philosophy. In Hamid Algar's words,
"To the Imam alone, divinely protected against sin and error, belongs
all the legitimate rule. The political vocation of the Imams was con-
tinuously frustrated and with the occultation
.
. . even the possibil-
ity of the legitimate exercise of power disappeared from the world. "^^
The Ithna-ashari doctrine, thus, legitimized no true authority while
the Imam was hidden. The "shadow of illegitimacy" bound all worldly
guests, in particular those related to government. This inescapable
and necessary illegitimacy of the state has remained the fundamental
element of Ithna-ashari political doctrine.
In short, as a result of the doctrine of Occultation, the Shiah
political culture was inherently one of lack of respect, contempt,
and/or opposition/non-cooperation towards constituted political author-
ity.
Nevertheless, there existed a justification for the existence
of temporal powers. In W. Montgomery Watt's words:
Those who believe in the hidden Imam are not required to do
anything in the immediate future, not even to work for any
particular reform. At the same time it is implied that the
regime is not perfect, and the way is left open for action
at some future date. Such an attitude might often be
politically harmless, but there lurked in it a potential
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danger A change of circumstances might suggest to the
adherents of the movement that the time for action had
come
Although the establishment of Shi 'ism as the state religion by
the Safavids in the 16th century was a contradiction in terms since
"the essense of Shi 'ism demands a minority status for its adherents who
are in opposition, often quiescent but unyielding, to de facto author-
II 2
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ity." It, nevertheless, gave rise to two fundamental elements: (1)
Iran became the homeland for the Shiah and was "inalienably associated"
with it; and (2) it served as the departure point for the existence
of ulama. Thus, under the Safavids began "an official clergy, exclu-
sively concerned with legality and jurisprudence, to such a point that
original Shi 'ism, in its essense, gnostic and theosophic, has, so to
speak, to hide itself. "^^
The ulama served a practical function as the guide in giving
direction to the community. "The ulama were," in Algar's words, "in a
limited sense, intermediaries between the community and the (Hidden)
Imam." In addition to belief in God and Prophet, shared by all Moslems,
the Shiah was required to believe in Imamat
,
presently embodied in
adherence and loyalty to the Hidden Imam. In the absense of the Hidden
Imam, the mujtahids (the most learned and pious of the ulama ) "provided
II
immediate guidance in matters of practice. Consequently, the commun-
ity divided "into those who may act according to their own judgement
( mujtahid ) and those who must accept the judgement of others
(mugallids)". ^ The concept of i jtehad (competence in religious law)
of mujtahids
,
promoted by the Usuli ulama , was opposed by the Akhbari
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school. Mhbari^were the dominant theological school from the fall
of the Safavids to early Qajar, during the 18th century. They asserted
that religious competence was within the authority of Imams. They
refuted the utility of nujtahids and vied to restrict the role of
clergy "both doctrinally and practically." The mujtahids. were charged
with using a Sunni process of rationalism, embodied in the concept of
a£l (exertion of the reason) instead of the preferred na^I (transmitted
doctrine). The Akhban controversy is the major attempt from within
the ranks of the ulama to suppress the role of the mujtahids
, particu-
larly in their function as the legitimate source of guidance and thus
the link between the Hidden Imam and the Ummah (community of
bel ievers )
.
With the exile of Mirza Mohammad, the last well known Akhbari
,
to the holy shrines in Iraq in the 1820s, the last vestige of Akhbari sm
was removed from Iran.^^ Some two decades earlier, Agha Mohammad
Baghir Behbahani (1705-1803) had uprooted the Akhbari influence from
the shrines in Iraq. The success of the Usuli ulama in suppression of
the Akhbari doctrine enabled the "institution of mujtahid to survive
and to lead the community in the period of Qajar rule." Furthermore,
the Usuli insistence on the concept of the link with the Hidden Imam
"provided for a greater flexibility of the doctrine and a living,
continuous leadership of the believers. "^^ The predominance of the
ujama in the life of the state during the Qajar period (1779-1925) was
further enhanced by the twin elements of weak Qajar monarchs whose
political power hardly reached beyond the boundaries of their
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capital, and the oft mentioned concept of '-illegitimacy of the state"
in the absence of the Hidden Imam. In fact, according to the dominant
Usuli doctrine, the monarch, like his subjects, was required "to
submit to the authoritative guidance of a mujtehid and in effect to
make the state the executive branch of ulama authority. "^8 This
theoretical duty, however, was seldom realized. Instead a tension
remained between the monarch and the ulama which at times gave way to
open hostility. This was best exemplified by the Tobacco Rebellion of
1891 when a fatwa (religious decree) was given by the nations's leading
mujtehjds against the use of tobacco in any form since it had been
given as a monopoly to a British firm.^^ The forbidding of the use of
tobacco compelled Nasser al-Din Shah to revoke the monopoly of the
Imperial Tobacco Corporation. Furthermore, the participation of the ulama
in the Constitutional Revolution is also regarded as a further attempt
by the clergy to limit the power of the monarch.
It has been only during the present century that titles have
become popular among the clergy. Prior to the Twentieth Century,
Sheikh and Mulla were the main titles used by the Shiah clergy. The
multitudes of titles and their inclusion in the names of the clergy
results in much confusion since the titles that were used by marga-
taghleed only a few decades ago are presently used by some of the more
humble clergy. The following is a somewhat general categorization of
of titles that are presently used by the Shiah clergy:
At the lower end of the scale is the mullah, an Islamic
priest or preacher. The term is also the generic name applied
to Moslem clergyman
. . . generally.
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The more learned mullahs are called hoiatole^lam
roughly meaning "vicar of Islam." They ^THiufflf^en
who have completed higher theological courses nd can Lstsome expertise in religious law.
Next comes the ayatollah or "reglection of Allah "These holy men are regarded as authorities on religiouslaw teach advanced theological courses and receive majordonations from the faithful. ^
• . .
then ayatoVlahs, multiplied so rapidly that an
'thri^^r/^'H^'^'^'j'^ appellation was required Duringthe last few decades) a few of the most learned, pios and
grand^a;^tS^?a^T'
''''' of ...tollaL^ or
Presently mMja-taghJeed are referred to as ayatollah al-ozma .
Although there still remains a dispute as who the more prominent
ayatplMs or ayatollah al-ozma are, clearly Ayatollah Khomeini and
Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shari atmadari are the most eminent among them.
The ulam have hardly been a homogeneous group. Binder has
distinguished three different orientations among the ulama during the
first two decades of the present century.
The first group adjusted their allegiance to whoever
was in power. The second group compelled the enactment of
constitutional provisions prohibiting legislation contrary
to the ruling of the general agency, as represented by five
officially designated mujtahids, and they also prevented
Reza Shah from establishing a republic. It was the third
group that became the most vigorous reformers, changing
their turbans for hats and taking government jobs, or going
into exile for extremist political activity. One of the
latter, Sayyid Zia al-Din, led the coup that eventually
put Reza Shah in power. 32
Following the abdication of Reza Shah and as a reaction to his
secular and anti-clerical policies, the ulama opted for a greater
control of the affairs of the state. The young Mohammad-Reza Shah,
eager for help and support from any quarter, cooperated with them and
it was during this period that Qum flourished as a main seat of the
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ulama, competing with holy shrines in Iraq as the center of Shiah
activity.
With the new shah in control of the political situation, his
attempts at secular modernization caused a new rift between the clergy
and the government to develop. The conflict, percipitated by the
announcement of the six point referendum, including land reforms and
emancipation of women, reached its zenith during the June 1963 riots
during which many were killed.^^ The government contended that the
clashes were caused by reactionary elements who opposed the reforms
undertaken by the government. The religions opposition, however, based
their opposition to the Shah on his dictatorial and undemocratic rule.
The reforms did in fact threaten the position and influence of the
clergy and other traditional centers of power. The reforms when imple-
mented would expand the central government's reach to all levels of
the society and thus undermine the position and influence of the
traditional forces. For example, the mandatory standardization and
use of textbooks by the Ministry of Education gave the government a
free hand in selection of topics to be included in the readers. As
such, the government gained a position of influence in effecting the
socialization process of school children. The Literacy Corps, as a
fundamental basis of the Shah's reforms, was to replace the traditional
modes of education, generally Quaranic, with a secular education. The
clergy, in the statement of Ayatollah Brujerdi , had indicated their
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opposition to land reforms. Although it was pointed out by the
supporters of the clergy that the ulama did not oppose land reforms in
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PmcMe, there was perhaps some element of fear that the vac|f
(religious endowment) lands may be included in the reforms.
Although the clergy are sometimes referred to as an institu-
tion, the term may cause some confusion, particularly when compared
to the Roman Catholic Church or even Protestant churches. As noted
above, the uiama are not a homogeneous group. They are not organized
along established hierarchical patterns with one of the ulama as the
supreme leader. The ithna::ash^ Shiah, by the virtue of UsuJl doc-
trine, which upholds the ulama as the intermediaries between the
Hidden Imam and the ummah
, establishes a foundation for ijtehad
(competence in religious law) through which the ummah is provided with
immediate guidance in religious practice. These religious guides came
to be known as marja- taghleed (source of immitation). The position
was neither appointive or elective. A marja- taghleed gained such a
status through piety and competence in Islamic law. The popular
follwing caused as a result of his puplic fame would dictate his pos-
ition as a marja- taghleed
. Such a process, however, often resulted in
the existence of several marja-taghleed at any given time. Only a few
marja- taghleed had universal preeminence, and they were acknowledged as
such by the overwhelming majority of the Ithna-ashari Shiahs as their
marja-taghleed
.
As in Qajar period, there were clergy who were courted by the
monarch and in return gave their support to the regime and its policies.
Such clergy had gathered around the Imam Jumeh of Tehran (the formal
leader of ulama in any given town who also lead the Friday prayer).
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The Pahlavi monarchs, like the Qajar monarchs, had reserved the
appointment of imMtJi^ as their perogati ve. ^5 jhe more prominent
of the ujama, however, resided in Qum and Mashad and pursued an inde-
pendent line from that of the government. Ayatollah Khomeini, one of
these ulama, bitterly opposed the Shah and the institution of monarchy.
The Shah reportedly had denounced the ulama who had resisted submission
to his rule and had called them parasites. Ayatollah Khomeini had
reacted by noting, "Am I a parasite, and men like me such as (Ayatol-
lah) Burujirdi, who was sixty thousand tumans (over $8,500) in debt
when he died, or these students who survive on a stipend of thirty
tumans (less than $5) a month? Or are you, 0 Shah, the parasite, who
has erected towering palaces and filled foreign banks with your untold
wealth?"^^
The Shah's frontal attack on the ulama was contrasted with his
frequent and well publicized trips to the holy Shiah shrines within
the country. He also travelled to the most holy of the Islamic shrines
in Mecca. A picture of him the white shroud, praying in Kg ba
, was
prominantly displayed in many shops and offices. On formal occasions
of salaam (audiences where representatives of the nation paid homage to
the Shah), the ulama were ushered in first to the royal presence to
display the high regard of the monarch for the institution of religion.
Attempts were made to represent to the public eye a cohesive bond
between the Shah and the ulama in order to legitimize the Shah's rule
as one in conformity with Shiah doctrine. Although such pretensions
became a part of the tradition of royal salaams , there never was a
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cohesion between the clergy and the court.37 The uUma participating
in salaam ceremonies were usually those who had gathered around Dr.
Imami, the Imam^JL^ of Tehran. The independent ulama kept their
distance from tne court. 38 fact, the Shah seldom visited Qum
which was only ICQ miles south of Tehran but was a stronghold of the
ulama and a center of opposition to his rule. When he fled Iran in
January 1979, it had been a full twenty years since he had been in Qum.
Modernization and Political Culture .
Nasser al-Din Shah, who ruled Iran during the second half of
the 19th Century, had made three trips to Europe and had embarked on
some measures of westernization in Iran, particularly in the early
years of his rule. The first railroad was built and the first tele-
graph lines established in Iran during his reign. He also undertook
some political changes in his administration, namely the establishment
of the first cabinet whose members were directly responsible to the
person of the Shah. The Shah was also influenced by the thought of
Mirza Malkulm Khan, whose writings and thoughts were of some influence
on the Constitutional Movement. Mirza Malkum Khan (1834-1914), born
in the Julfa district of Isfahan, spent most of his youth in Paris
studying political science. Mirza, who purportedly had converted
to Islam, after his return to Iran enjoyed the confidence of the Shah
and became a member of his dowreh (circle of confidents) .^^ Mirza
espoused political and economic reorganization of Iran along Western
lines. His modernization concepts were first spelled out in his
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^<ltlbche::i^^^ (1858). According to Hamid
Algar, the first mention of sanun (law) in its sense of law, in modern
Persian literature, was in this book. In KUabche::^^^ Mirza
Malkum attempted "to define the essential functions of the state and
to regulate the relation of its component organs." In his Daftari
Qanun (1883), Mirza proposed the codification of the Shari'a (religious
law) to make it "the law of the state in the same way" that the states
of Europe have codified their laws and drawn up a Quran for them-
selves."^^
While in Europe Mirza Malkum Khan had also learned of the
Freemasonary movements and their impact on the French Revol ution.
So, on his return to Iran he had established a 'pseudo-masonic lodge'
called Faramoush khaneh (House of Forgetful ness ) , through which he had
hoped to propagate social and political teachings. Naser al-Din Shah
was led to believe that Faramoushkaneh would result in his members
being morally bound to the throne by having sworn fidelity to the Shah
who had become the Grand Master of the lodge. By 1861, however, the
Shah had become suspicious of the aims of Mirza. Fearing the growing
number of secret societies, he forbade the continuation of the society.
Mirza's political and social activities, however, surfaced in the form
of Majma-i Adamiyat (League of Humanity) which became a center of
dissemination of news and ideas. Many leading citizens, including the
clergy, purportedly had joined this group and several were among those
elected to the first Majlis in 1906.^^
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Due to the perceived excesses of the Shah, the last decade of
the 19th Century experienced a move to curtail the authoritarian rule
of the monarch. While the religious elements feared the reforms and
Westernization that had already been undertaken by the Shah, the
liberals urged faster and more radical reforms. The Tobacco Protest,
as noted above, was the first major challenge of those who wished to
limit the powers of the Shah. The successful outcome of the challenge
set in motion a movement that bore fruit in the Constitution of
1906-07. Nikki Keddie asserts that it was exactly such threats of
Westernization or "Western-inspired secularization" that inspired the
ulama to partake in the constitutional movement, he notes that the
ulama were partly led "by their belief that it would further enhance
their power" to support a modern consti tuti on. The traditional
minded clergy, led by Sheikh Nuri
, believed that they could influence
the outcome of the constitutional movement by making Sharia a substan-
tial part of the new constitution. Keddie' s assertion, in fact,
supports Huntington's assumption, discussed earlier, which stipulates
that the traditionalist elements in countries ruled by reformist mon-
archs tend to support a constitutionalist framework embodied in the
precepts of "modern liberalism and traditional pluralism."^''
The Constitutional Movement was not free from foreign influence
while the British implicitly supported the movement, the Russians
opposed it and gave their support to the Qajar monarchs. Thus it was
of little surprise to see the Constitutionalists stage a sit-in at the
shrine in Rey in 1904 to demand the dismissal of two pro-Russian
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ministers, Amin ol-Doleh and Ala ol-Doleh, and to see the establishment
of the House of Justice. ^8 When Mozafa al-Din Shah's (1896-1907)
promises concerning liberalization were not kept, some 15,000 merchants
in July 1906 converged on the British Legation in Tehran and staged
a sit-in on its grounds. The clergy, on the other hand, undertook a
procession to the holy city of Qum. It was under such pressures that
iMozafar al-Din Shah, reluctantly, on August 5, 1906 granted a consti-
tution.
Following the success of the Constitutionalists, a rift between
the ulama and the Western- inspired Constitutionalists developed. The
dispute was briefly muted by the promulgation of the Supplementary
Fundamental Law in 1907 that recognized Shiah Islam as the state
religion and promised a council composed of five mujtahids to super-
vise over legislation to ensure that all laws passed were in accordance
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with Islam. This submission to the will of the ulama fell far short
of the expectation of such previously leading members of the Constitu-
tionalist Movement at Sheikh Fazl-ol-lah Nuri who began to turn
Mohammad Ali Shah (1907-1909) against the Constitution and Majlis.
Mohammad Ali Shah, who had become the Shah following his father's death,
sought to reinstate the authoritative rule of the kings. He had the
support of the Russians and the Russian trained Qazak soldiers of his
army. It was in June 1908, that, with the Shah's acquiescence. Colonel
Liakhov, Commander of the Qazak forces, shelled the Majlis. The coup
had the support of Sheikh Nuri and other anti-constitutionalists. It
was on the triumphant return of the Constitutionalists to Tehran in
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in 1909, and the exile of Mohammad-Al i Shah to Russia, that the Sheikh
was arrested and hanged for treason and for attempting to stop the
constitutional process in the country.
Sheikh Nuri had insisted that the constitutionalists adopt
Sharia (the Law of Islam) as the law of the state while many of the
leading ul^ama, Mulla Mahmmad-Kazem Khorasani, Mulla Abdullah
Mazandarani, and Hajji Mirza Hussein Khalili Tehrani
, all residing in
Iraq, contended that "consistent implementation of the Sharia was
impossible during the continued occulatation of the Imam."^^ 5^^.^^
Nuri considered neither the monarch nor the people as sovereign but
lent his support to Mohammad-Al i Shah when he found the nation
"threatened with Western secularism. The events during the first
decade of the Twentieth Century and the recent Iranian revolution led
by Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini have many similarities. Ayatollah
Khomeini, by his insistence on the establishment of an Islamic Republic,
has demonstrated his contempt for Western inspired secularism and his
belief that the Sharia affords tne best possible framework for an
5 3Islamic Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini's approach, however, differed from
that of Sheikh Nuri since the Ayatol 1 ah appealed to popular support for
the establishment of his "Islamic Republic," once again confirming the
stipulation that the traditional political elements vastly utilize
"modern liberalism and traditional popularism" to confront secular
socio-political movements.
In analysis of the socio-political tradition in Iran, it is
fundamental to recognize the impact of Shiah thought on the political
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perspective of the citizens. While ignoring the influence of Shiah
tradition on the political process of the country, analyses instead
often focus on the criticism of Iranians for their cynicism, basic
disloyalty to the state, resentment towards authority, anti-
intellectual ism, and scorn for conventional morality.54 Amin Banani
goes even further and criticizes "inept monarchs (who) chose to share
their power with the assembly of Shiah divines" thus leading to para-
lysis of "every source of cultural vitality and intellectual vigor in
Iran. "5^ Thus, the concenpt of "illegitimacy of state" in the absence
of the Hidden Imam seldom enters analyses of the political process in
Iran by political scientists. The monarchs during the past century
have rare^y utilized the bond between the ulama and the people for
national development schemes. Instead, they have sought to use the
ulama and religion for personal gains. In 1924-26, Reza Shah partici-
pated in mourning processions during Ashura to allay the fear of the
"^Q*""^ the public so he could accede to the throne, while Mohammad-
Reza Shah in the early parts of his reign tried to gain the favor of
the ulama for his rule by courting them. Both monarchs, however, at
the height of their power ignored the enormous support and the legiti-
macy that the ulama
,
at least the moderate ones, could give to their
rules and the support to their reforms and modernization schemes. Such
a cooperation may have been possible if the conduct of the affairs of
state had taken into consideration some Islamic-Shiah precepts.
Mohammad-Reza Shah, instead, deployed religous symbolism and a sense
of divine mission for his rule to gain legi timacy. The Shah even had
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visions of building "the faith in the way the Prophet really meant the
religion to be,"57
-g^^^.^^
^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^
between the state and religion did not lie in the Islamic precepts but
in the Shiah tradition of mina::ash^ doctrine. It is worth noting
that it is this doctrine of "illegitimacy" of temporal powers that is
related to mystic allusions which suggest "that the inner light is more
important than the law. which is described as the shell. Once the
shell is broken and the kernel is taken out, one is apt to become
somewhat careless about the care of the shell. "^^ Although Sufism has
not been confined to Iran, nevertheless, it is held as the "supreme
manifestation of the Persian mind in the religious sphere. "^^
The above analysis depicts the historical conflict between the
state and all institutions emanating from this temporal power and the
community of believers led by the ulama in the absence of the Hidden
Imam. Based on such a tradition, the Constitution of 1906-07 was only
to be tolerated but was not to replace the Laws of Islam. Such a
tolerance on the part of the community did not support nor give legit-
imacy to political institutions that would have been the natural
outcome of the implementation of the Constitution.^^ Thus, there
seemed to be a lingering contradiction between Shiah tradition and the
theories that espoused secular political development. In other words,
as long as there was no social, cultural or institutional change,
there could not be any real development of political institutions.
Despite the dichotomy between the concept of political state
and the Ithna-ashari doctrine, there is a wealth of literature on the
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conduct of statesmanship by monarchs. The most important of these are
iiasatnameh by Khawjeh Nizam-al-Mul k and Musnameh by Kaikavous ibn-
Iskandar.61 There is a strong tradition demanding responsibility from
the person of the king while exacting subordination from the community
to a "just" king. A just king was regarded as the shadow of God on
earth. Wayne Untereiner on the obligation of a ruler and the ruled
within the Iranian political perspective declares:
The primary responsibility of a good political authority
was to do 5ood things (not only political things) for thepeople (as determined by the political authority). In
return, the people would appreciate what the authority
did for them, and in consequence would support the
political authority. In order to carry out this political
responsibility, political authority must lead the people
and clarify the public will, providing the people with
supervi sed guidance and outlining popular duties . 62
Thus, the wholesale criticism of the cultural tradition of the
country for all the shortcomings of the development of political
institutions and of the citizens for their political inefficacy is
rather unjustified.^^ During the past fifty years, the activist
reformers, in Huntingtonian guise, who espoused transformation of tra-
ditional societies into modern political states, were less than sincere
in their stated goals. Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty,
upheld as a modernizing monarch by Huntington, did not attempt to
create political institutions nor did he surround himself with distin-
guished advisors. His son, Mohammad- Reza, later lamented his father's
style, noting his narrow and undistinguished circle of advisors as
"one of the few mistakes my father made."^^ Reza Shah instead accum-
ulated a fortune through a mixture of forced gifts: "cheap
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acquisitions and expropriations," mostly in land. Marvin Zonis states
that by the time of Reza Shah's abdication the royal holdings were
2,000 villages with approximately a quarter of a million peasants "in
the direct service of His Imperial Majesty ^ua landlord." Thus it was
not surprising to learn of peasant revolts following Reza Shah's abdi-
cation calling for restoration of their properties.
For a proper analysis of the need for political development in
Iran, it is essential to add the additional dimension of the present
socio-economic condition of the country. The socio-economic stratifi-
cation of the nation, accelerated during the past quarter of a century,
resulted in the expansion of the middle class and thus intensified the
demands on the political system. At the turn of the century, some 80
percent of the population lived in rural areas. Agriculture and
related works, as recently as 1960, accounted for 28 percent of the
gross domestic product. Today, half of the population live in urban
areas^9 agriculture accounts for only nine percent of the gross
domestic product, although nearly 40 percent of the national labor
force is employed in this sector.^"" The agricultural sector since 1960
has realized the slowest rate of growth per annum compared to the other
sectors of economy. While agriculture had achieved a five percent
growth rate per year between 1970 to 1976, industry, trade, constuction
and transportation had gained a growth rate of 6.6, 14.4, 15.3 and 18.4
respectively.
While income per capita had grown from $176 per year in 1960 to
over $2,000 in 1977, its distribution was far from equitable. While
farm families in places such as Baluchistan Province subsisted on $200
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per year, the wealth of the economic elite of the nation grew to
phenomenal proportions. These developments have further increased
economic stratification in the nation, resulting in different or even
opposing demands on the political system.
The middle class, or, as James A. Bill Calls it, the
"professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia," influenced by Western-style
education and secular tendencies and exposed to varying degrees of
Western philosophies, prefers a more open political system with little
of the dogma present in the traditional systems. ^4 jhis concept of
liberalism, however, is immediately confronted by at least two contra-
dictory principles; on the one hand, the concept of traditional
pluralism and the promotion of Sharia used by the ulama and their
supporters to offset Western secularism, and, on the other hand, the
authoritarian rule of kings, espoused by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
These three principles, moreover, have found a common opponent in the
Marxian ideology adhered to by the more radical elements of the intel-
ligentsia. The political history of Iran during the present century
can best be analyzed in retrospect to these four principles. The
political history of the nation, furthermore, for over half of the
period since the inception of a constitutional government in 1906, has
been manifested in the direct and personal authoritarian rule of two
monarchs, Reza Shah and Mohammad-Reza Shah. Perhaps it would be best
to discuss the development or lack of development of political insti-
tutions in relation to the political style of these two monarchs
contrasted against the political process envisioned by the constitution
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A discussion of the institution of monarchy at this juncture would
provide us with an instight for the following discussions on political
institutions.
Monarchy
.
Although a constitutional monarchy was proclaimed through the
Revolution of 1906, it remained elusive. The shahs following the
Constitutional Revolution, very much like the ones before the revolu-
tion, were eager to rule rather than to reign. Muzafar al-Din Shah
had reluctantly given in to the demands of the Constitutionalists.
Following his death in December 1906, his son, Mohammad-Ali Mirza,
became the Shah. Mohammad-Ali Shah had high religious sentiments and
was greatly influenced by the religious opponents of the Constitution.
Freedom of press led to editorials that abused and made mockery of the
Shah and his friends, agitating the sovereign and shocking his personal
vanity. Furthermore, both Russia and Britain had become restless at
the independence of the Majlis, particularly when it rejected a proposed
joint Russo-British loan in November 1906. The loan was part of a
larger scheme to bring the Iranian government under total Russo-British
control. The new Shah had appointed, as his financial advisor, Shapshal,
who was opposed to the Constitution. The Constitutionalists were sus-
picious of Mohammad-Ali Shah's aims. In anticipation of his hostility
to the Constitution, the deputies in the Majlis had asked him on three
separate occasions to swear fidelity to the Constitution.^^ The
monarch, during this 18 month period of uncertainty, had the support of
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such circles as the anti-Constitutionalist clergy, exemplified by
Sheikh Fazi-ollah Nuri, and the Qazak brigade led by Colonel Liakov.
The Shah ordered the bombardment of the Majlis building on June 3, 1908,
and thus ended the short-lived experiment with democracy. Tne ensuing
national uprising by pro-Constitution anjomans (societies), most vocal
in Tabriz, Isfahan and Guilan, finally forced the abdication of
Mohammad-Ali Shah on July 16, 1909, after a 13 month civil war which
is commonly known as "the lesser autocracy." Ahmad Mirza, Mohammad-Ali
Shah's 12 year old son, was pronounced shah and Azed ol-Mulk, the head
of the Qajar tribe, the regent. ^6 Mohammad-Ali Mirza, nevertheless,
attempted to regain the throne two years later in 1911, with support
from his brother and several loyal friends. His supporters were
defeated in a battle near Varamin and Mohammad-Ali Mirza once again
fled back to Russia where he remained.
The political turmoil beginning with the bombardment of the
Majlis building lasted well after World War I, exacerbated by foreign
intervention in Iranian internal affairs. The division of the country
into zones of influence by Brittain and Russia, the invasion of the
country by the Ottomans, and the establishment of a pro-German govern-
ment in Kermanshah in the west hardly expedited the process of govern-
ment as envisioned by the Constitution. As a result of the Bolshevik
Revolution, Russia's intervention in Iranian internal affairs was
greatly reduced. This, however, resulted in a freer hand for Britain
to intervene in Iranian domestic politics. It culminated in 1919 when
Ahmad Shah gave his support to a British proposed treaty in which Iran
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would become a colony of Britain all except in name. The treaty,
however, was withdrawn in the face of economic considerations in
Britain and international opposition to its enactment by France, the
Soviet Union and the United States. The treaty was repudiated by the
Fourth Majlis as its first order of business in 1921.
Iranian political posture took a new dimension following a coup
led by Seyyed Zia al-Din Tabataba-ye, a journalist, with help from
a Qazak brigade led by Reza Khan. Seyyed Zia became the prime minister
while Reza Khan was given the title of commander-in-Chief. Within a
few days, Reza Khan became Minister of War and thus took complete
charge of the army. Malek-ol-Shoara, a leading historian of the
period, notes that Reza Khan, prior to the coup and during its first
days, was used by Seyyed Zia and was not the power behind it as some
have suggested. '^^ Reza Khan was not even included in Seyyed Zia's
first cabinet. Nonetheless, Reza Khan soon found himself in an oppor-
tune position with the only military organization— i .e.
, the Qazak
brigade--at his disposal.''^
Seyyed Zia's reforms immediately earned him the wrath of the
aristocracy and the nobility. Within a month of his accession to
power, almost all notable people were either under arrest or in exile.
Seyyed, as a consequence, was deposed by the combined forces of those
opposed to him and sent to exile three months after the success of
coup d' etat. Reza Khan assumed the post of Minister of War in the
cabinet headed by Qavam-al-Saltaneh,^^ himself a member of the nobility.
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Reza Khan pre-occupied himself with reorganization of the army,
putting down local revolts, and expanding the central government's
authority to all parts of the country. He assumed the post of prime
minister in 1923. Ahmad Shah, following the appointment, left for
Europe from which he never returned. During the same year in Turkey,
Ata-Turk proclaimed a republic and ended Ottoman rule. Reza Khan, who
was hoping to copy the success of Ataturk, wished to establish a
republic in Iran. The clergy, in particular, opposed such a plan in
which they saw the foundation of a secular state. Finally, the Majlis,
on October 31, 1925, voted to transfer the monarchy from the Qajar to
the Pahlavi dynasty with Reza Khan as its founder.
Reza Shah was basically an uneducated soldier who had little
patience for the legal niceties of the constitutional process. In
Amin Banani's words, Reza Shah "embodied the impatience of men of
action with the endless debate of the articulate reformers and revolu-
tionaries .... He proceeded to immediate and practical goals."
Banani also notes that Reza Shah was moved by three basic desires:
(1) "A complete dedication to the cult of national ism-statism;" (2)
the "assertion of this nationalism by rapid adoption of the material
advances of the West;" and (3) "a breakdown of the traditional power
of religion and a growing tendency toward secularism." Although it is
stated that Reza Shah tried to emulate the West and adopt Western
82inspired ideals, his adoption of a Western style adminstrati ve frame-
work remained superficial. Bureaucratic achievements were due more to
fear of the Shah's wrath^^ than to a coherent and responsible
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administrative system. Those who opposed him or differed from him were
harshly dealt with.«^ Thus, the cronies that remained around Reza Shah
were rarely people of high intellectual ability and were not able to
give him a proper political-economic perspecti ve. ^5 In dealing with
the depth of political and administrative modernization in the nation,
it suffices to note that on the day of Reza Shah's forced abdication
by the invading Allied forces the administrative fabric of the nation
disintegrated.
Reza Shah's approach demonstrated his disregard for Islam and
Shiah doctrine. On a few occasions prior to becoming the Shah, in
attempts to please the devoted and gain their support, Reza Shah had
employed the institution of religion to further his goals. Following
his accession to the throne, Reza Shah's hostility to Islam and ulama
was displayed in attacks on the shrines of Qum in 1928, and of Mashad
in 1935. While in the shrine in Qum, the Queen Mother had inadver-
tently let her veil down which resulted in her denouncement by the
officiating clergy. The very next day Reza Shah, at the head of a
column of troops and two armoured cars, entered the shrine without
taking his boots off and "thrashed" the mulla. Following the forced
unveiling of women in 1935, there was an anti-government demonstration
in Mashad. When the demonstrators took refuge in the shrine, the
troops were ordered inside where many were killed. Reza Shah's dis-
regard for sanctity of holy shrines, discontinuation of many proces-
sions during the mourning month of Moharram, and discouragement of
taziyeh (religious plays) earned him the animosity of the clergy and
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the faithful. 87 His forced unveiling of women, an anti-Islamic act,
made most Iranian women housebound. The superficial nature of Reza
Shah's modernization is noted by Ann K. S. Lambton. She stated that
while Reza Shah's modernization had displaced traditional values, it
had failed to generate new values in their place. In her words, Reza
Shah had not succeeded in creating an atmosphere in which "the unim-
paired faculties of the people could find scope in effective and
creative social action. "^^
On his abdication, Reza Shah appointed Crown Prince Mohammad-
Reza as the new monarch. The allied occupation and the new Shah's
inexperience gave grounds for re-establishment of the constitutional
process and an effort was made by the Majlis to concentrate the polit-
ical power in its own hands. The British, according to Peter Avery,
had used every means possible to downgrade Reza Shah's rule and to
encourage the restoration of a constitutional monarchy. During the
occupation years, however, the occupying forces continued to pack the
Majlis with their sympathizers in their respective zones.
The Shah, meanwhile, observed and learned. His popularity had
reached its zenith following the Soviet withdrawal from the Azarbaijan
provinces in 1946, where a Soviet backed government had declared its
autonomy from the central government in Tehran. The ensuing propaganda
portrayed the return of Azarbaijan to the motherland as a result of the
Shah's efforts and of his leadership of the armed forces. The Shah's
entanglement with the Nationalists, led by Dr. Mossadegh, reversed his
popularity with the public. The problem arose when Dr. Mossadegh,
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appointed prime minister in April 1951, asked the Shah to relinquish
the post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces to him. The ambi-
guity over the details of where the power of the prime minister ended
and that of the monarch began had been a point of contention before,
during the premiership of Qavam.^l Dr. Mossadegh, with the immense
popularity gained as a result of his opposition to the Anglo- Iranian
Oil Company and its nationalization, was willing to challenge the Shah.
In fact, his disdain for the Pahlavi dynasty was well known. ^2 On his
request, the Shah had sent the Queen Mother and Princess Ashraf, the
Shah's twin sister, into exile soon after his appointment as prime
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minister. Dr. Mossadegh's popularity with the clergy and the mer-
chants began to falter following his miscalculations about the American
response to his demands and the ensuing economic downturn as the con-
flict with Britain over oil was prolonged. Meanwhile, Dr. Mossadegh,
in the eyes of many concervative circles, was becoming too close and
too dependent on the Tudeh party to stay in power.
Following the abortive coup led by the pro-Shah officers on
August 16, 1953, the Shah fled the country and most organizers of the
coup, namely General Fazl-ollah Zahedi
, went into hiding. On August
19, however, with material and planning support by the CIA, with the
help of the armed forces loyal to the Shan, and with the backing of the
mobs led by south-Tehran chagukeshan (knife wielders) paid by CIA
agents. Dr. Mossadegh's government was overthrown by night fall.^^
Although the Shah returned to a welcome in the Tehran airport on August
22, the American assistance in restoring him to the throne led him to
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be portrayed as a foreign puppet. His popularity with the public,
particularly the nationalists, took a downturn from which he never
recovered.
^-^^ ^° '^^^e by. Upon his return, the Shah spoke of the
need for social reforms. ^6 The political approach of the Shah during
the next 25 years of his rule seems to have some grounds in the model
prescribed by Samuel Huntington. As described briefly before,
Huntington prescribes four channels of support for a "modernizing"
monarch who is up against a combination of liberal-conservative oppos-
ition. Although there are some who would consider the Shah a reformer,
a greater number, perhaps, would disagree with such a contenti on.
The Shah's "reformist" policies, as will be discussed shortly, were
basically undertaken with the primary goal of making the monarchy, once
again, the dominant institution in Iran.^^ To achieve such an end, the
Shah, in the process, attained such eventualities as land reforms and
centralization of power which do coincide with the process of political
modernization from a traditional feudal is tic culture into a modern
polity. ""00
Bureaucracy
.
The first basis of support was to be the state
bureaucracy, but certainly not in the terms anticipated by Huntington
where an efficient bureaucracy was to be utilized to transform the
traditional society. The many studies on the Iranian political elite^^^
clearly indicate the accumulation of power in the state, the Shah's
ability to direct such power, and the political elite's ability to reap
material and political benefit as a result of its support for such a
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102process. The Shah's attainment of power and control resulted in a
weak cabinet, legislature and bureaucracy. For example, the Plan and
Budget Organization (PBO), which was established with much fanfare in
1949 as the national planning arm of the government to prepare develop-
ment plans, had lost much of its clout in the 1970s. The warnings of
the PBO against a high growth rate went unheeded^^^^^d when, in 1976,
a critical report from the PBO to ministries and other government
agencies was circulated, its publication was suppressed. '•O^ it was
commonly claimed within the PBO that an ovenvhelming number of projects
were "pet" projects of the court, namely the Reza Pahlavi Industrial
Complex in Shahreza, Shahestan-e Pahlavi, ""OS p^hlavi Library, ^^6
Tehran Metro. It was widely felt within the ranks of the planners
that when orders came down favoring a project, the role of PBO was to
provide justification as to why it deserved priority.^^^
Furthermore, the government bureaucracy was plagued with inse-
curity and lack of authority to deal with matters that theoretically
were their responsibility. Insecurity was caused by fear of reprisals
if certain projects or undertakings proved contradictory to the wishes
of somebody higher up, resulting in situations where nobody was wi 1 1 ing
to take responsibility for any action. ""^^ The accumulation of decision
making powers in certain quarters had made almost every action of the
bureaucracy dependent on orders from above. George Baldwin recognized
this crisis of bureaucracy in the insufficiency of the planning
process in Iran, which was caused by a lack of system of checks and
balances by the legitimate institutions whereby "all important numbers.
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proposals, and judgements could be exposed to criticism before
decisions are made." The institutions that could excert external
influence on the process of planning were "extremely weak" and were not
given much "recogni tion. " ^ 10 m fact, the bureaucracy, excluding the
military and the universities, included in its ranks some 57,000
individuals!!! with above high school education who were basically
dependent on the government for their livelihood. Through the bureau-
cracy, these individuals were given employment in order to be coopted
into the ranks of government supporters or at least to prevent them,
particularly those with a higher education level, from drifting into
the ranks of the opposi tion.
^
The inability to influence the course of events was hardly
limited to the middle ranking bureaucrats. Many high ranking individ-
uals, namely those in the cabinet, complained about the absurdities of
the cabinet meetings, since major decisions had previously been made
in audiences with the Shah. Robert Graham reports the "unedifying"
impression of a cabinet member after his first meeting with the
cabinet:
^
At my first Cabinet meeting I was very nervous, but then
I almost laughed when I saw how frivolous the whole thing
was. No one talked very much. They (the ministers) just
sat there signing documents or listened to Hoveida (the
Prime Minister). I remember one day a Minister got up
and asked something like "Why do we bother to come here
if no one discusses anything?" This created little
reaction and changed nothing.
A further weakness of the bureaucracy was caused by the Shah's
parallel government. The parallel government duplicated the ministries
and other national agencies. For example, although there was a cabinet
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post responsible for Ministry of Energy, the affairs of the National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) fell outside the limits of that ministry.
Nice was headed by a chairman and board of directors who reported
directly to the Shah. Such matters as defense and foreign policy were
the exclusive domain of the Shah. The Minister of Court, appointed by
the Shah, reported directly to the Shah and did not attend cabinet
discussions. The Minister of Court was a representative of the Shah
to the cabinent and, as such, his presence had the "royal authority
behind it." He could cancel "or overrule orders from all other bodies
or individuals in government and {officials of the ministry had)
considerable authority over the Shah's parallel government. " ^ ^
In short, the civilian bureaucracy possessed little power, if
any, to give support to the monarch against the aristocracy or, for
that matter, against any social or economic class. In fact, the
bureaucracy, due to its inability to initiate any action or to influ-
ence the political process of the nation, was rather frustrated and was
among the first groups to oppose the Shah by strikes and work slowdowns
early in the fall of 1978.^^^
The armed forces. The armed forces, during most of the Pahlavi
rule, were primarily charged with responsibility for internal secur-
116ity. Their inadequacy in defending the country against foreign
invasion was displayed in August 1941 when the Soviet and British
forces invaded the country with little challenge from Iranian armed
forces. Mohammad-Reza Shah's approach from 1953 on clearly displayed
his reliance on the armed forces to keep him in power. Loyalty to the
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person of the Shah became the highest priority of the armed forces.
"Khoda, Shah, Meehan'' (God, King and Country) became the motto of the
armed forces. The Shah had felt secure enough to elevate himself above
the "country." m the mid-1950s, the armed forces were purged of
officers who were suspected of being sympathetic to the ludeh (Commun-
ist) Party. General Zahedi
, who had led the loyal armed forces to
oust Dr. Mossadegh, was dropped in 1955 as prime minister and was
appointed as Iranian representative to the United Nations in Geneva.
The armed forces had been a source of contention to Shah's rule. The
ranks of officers, particularly at junior levels during the 1950s and
1960s, were composed mostly of men from middle class backgrounds. Such
individuals, given the middle class sympathy for the Nationalist cause,
were a source of concern for the Shah. The general staff, however,
posed a greater threat due to their influence and, in some cases, due
to regional or tribal affiliations which were independent from the
court. By the 1960s, the armed forces were stripped of officers who
had any basis of support independent from the Shah. Thus, the armed
forces were fast becoming the sole domain of the Shah.""""^ They showed
their unwavering loyalty to the Shah during the 1963 uprising by
putting it down brutal ly. As a result of this suppression, the
armed forces went down in popular esteem. Due to the dwindling number
of middle class recruits, particularly during the 1970s, the armed
forces became a haven for lov/er-middle and lower class recruits. As
the rate of migration to larger urban areas increased, the armed forces
became a source of attraction for upwardly mobile emigrants. By the
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virtue of their function as protectors of the monarchy, the armed
forces had put a distance between themselves and the Shah's opponents.
The army itself, however, was plagued with problems and inse-
curity. The high echelon of the army lined their purses with kickbacks
from foreign purchases^^^ while the middle ranking officers looked on.
The omnipresence of American advisors and the total dependence of the
Imperial Armed Forces on foreign technicians was a demoralizing experi-
ence for these proud men. During 1978, the armed forces once again
found themselves as the protectors of the Shah and his rule. Although
most of the Army remained loyal, there were signs of defection^^O
it was thought that the armed forces might collapse in the face of
prolonged civil strife.
Although during the 1970s the Iranian armed forces had been
turned into a mighty force with over 300,000 in uniform equipped with
the most advanced weapons system; this force never posed any threat to
the Shah himself. The high ranking generals were tightly controlled
and were devoted to the person of the Shah. The Shah, as commander-in-
chief, was personally involved in details of operations and promotions
above the rank of colonel. The Shah was also in control of the Iranian
equivalent of joint chiefs of staff which provided the only forum where
the three services could communicate and harmonize planning. The
intended separation of the services was to offset the potential for
any individual within the services to gain control and, thus, to be in
a position to challenge the Shah.
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In short, the organization and the goals of the armed forces
were made to coincide with the goals and ambitions of the Shah. Thus,
the institution of the armed forces was dependent on the Shah and
identified with his goals. The armed forces, by the same token, suf-
fered from the the same inadequacies as that of the institution of
monarchy. Since they, at least on the general staff, had lost all basis
of legitimacy besides the Shah, they were not able to be a moderating
influence on the opposition during periods of crisis. In fact, the
appointment of a military government in November 1978, which was done
at the urging of the high ranking generals, aggravated the political
upheaval and hastened the Shah's downfall. This was in dire contrast
to the appointment of General Razm-Ara to lead the government in 1950.
The nation then was facing constitutional problems and civilian govern-
ments, one after another, were falling. The general proved rather
popular and his programs won the approval of the Majlis by a vote of
95 to 8. The general was able to end the constitutional problems and
restore some calm to the government until he fell to an assassin's
bullet nine months later.
Although the armed forces were rewarded for their loyalty to
the Shah, the high ranking generals were courted only so long as they
served the purposes of the Shah. General Zahedi
, who had led the coup
against Dr. Mossadegh and had brought back the Shah to power, was
relieved of his post as prime minister in 1955 to make way for the
Shah's personal control of the government and the armed forces. The
most recent example was General Nematollah Nassiri who had served the
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Shah for 14 years as chief of SAVAK and who was the officer who dared
to deliver the Shah's dismissal order to Prime Minister Mossadegh on
August 13, 1953. Nassiri, who had been appointed as Ambassador to
Pakistan in 1978, was recalled by the Shah several months later to face
charges stenming from corruption and excess during his years as chief
of SAVAK. The army found that, to appease the opposition, the Shah
would go to any length to assure the survival of his regime even if it
entailed sacrificing his most loyal generals.
SAVAK (State Security and Intelligence Organization). Sazeman
-e Ettela at_VajW^^at::e, acronym SAVAK, was established in 1957 with
aid and technical assistance from the United States. During its course
of development, the Israeli intelligence service, Mosad, also assisted
SAVAK in some of its undertakings
.
s^vak was basically set up to
infiltrate the opposition groups and to nullify the enemies of the
crown. Its chief had the designation of "deputy prime minister" and
reported directly to the Shah. There were estimates of up to 90,000
SAVAK agents inside and outside the country, monitoring the activities
of potential anti-Shah elements. ""^^ As such, the security services,
including SAVAK, became pillars of the Shah's government. SAVAK
arrested suspected individuals, interrogated, tortured and then either
imprisoned or eliminated them. The civil courts had no jurisdiction
over SAVAK' s investigations. Its prosecutions were channeled through
military tribunals where the panel of judges and often the defense
counsel were all military personnel.
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In the early 1970s, SAVAK's actions under new manager.ent headed
by Parviz Sabeti (the head of Tehran Committee and the most powerful
individual after General Nassiri) became more repressive. In Robert
Graham's words, "For SAVAK there [were] only those who approvedCd] of
Mohammad-Reza Shah and those who disapproved. "^25 The security forces
harassed and imprisoned anybody who was suspected of being disloyal to
the throne. Just before the beginning of celebrations for the 2,500th
anniversary of the Persian Empire in 1971, tens of thousands of people
suspected of opposition to the celebration were arrested to spare the
Shah embarrassment during the festi vities.
The excesses of SAVAK soon became a severe liability for the
127Shah. These agencies had been employed to destroy the opposition to
the Shah wherever they were to be found. In the process, the ulama
and the bazaaris
,
as well as the students and intellectuals, were
insulted and ridiculed. The letter published in the Ettela'at of Janu-
ary 9, 1978 accusing Ayatollah Khomeini of disloyalty to the nation,
political subversion and sexual deviancies, was reportedly prepared
and submitted by SAVAK under the falsified signature of a clergyman.
The reaction against the letter was the start of the political uprising
that would cost the Shah his throne.
The Iranian bureaucracy, due to its lack of power and decision-
making prerogatives, was made inefficient and, as a result, a source
of discontent to the many educated civil servants who filled the
most important ranks of the civil service. Although the military had
become a firm source of support for the Shah's policies and guarantors
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of the Pahlavi monarchy, it could not be a useful tool in a prolonged
civil strife where the soldiers were asked constantly to shoot the
people from amongst whom they had been drafted. The military's over-
dependence on the Shah proved a further liability since it was not
capable of intervening as an independent institution, as in Turkey,
to put an end to the crisis. The excesses of the security forces put
an even further distance between the people and the Shah. The Shah's
direct control of SAVAK and other security agencies displayed the
extent to which the Shah was personally involved in the political
repression committed by the security forces in the name of national
security. These excesses earned him deep rooted public animosity.
Mj/Jdie class. In an ideal reformist situation where there is
a genuine reformist monarch, it is anticipated that the middle class
would be supportive of the king. Huntington, concurring with such an
assumption, regards the middle class as the second source which could
be utilized as a basis of support when reforms are undertaken.
The Iranian middle class, with its centers of power in bazaars and in
the universities, has long had nationalistic and reformist aspirations.
The National Front, since the days of Dr. Mossadegh, has been the
rallying point of middle class sympathies. The overthrow of Dr.
Mossadegh's government by a regime whose central figure was Shah
Mohannad-Reza could never gain their loyalty. Thus, the relationship
of the Iranian middle class and Shah Mohammad-Reza has been one of
conflict and di strust. ^ The Shah offered cabinet posts to the
leaders of the National Front during the political crisis of 1961
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under pressure from the Kennedy administration, but this was not
adequate to attract them into a coalition government while the Shah
still retained almost all his power.
The economic boom of the late 1960s, reaching its zenith
following the infusion of petro-dol lars into the economy after 1973,
did benefit the bazaar merchants. But it also resulted in the creation
of a class of nouveaujn^ composed of courtiers and those with close
connections to the court, namely the Khayyami brothers who earlier had
been minor provincial busi nessmen. ^ ^1 jhe fact that those with close
connections to the court received the preponderant benefits of the
economic boom, while the bazaar merchants were blamed by the court for
the economic ills of the country and were accused of price gauging and
hording, resulted in total alienation of the middle class.
Furthermore, as the major supporters of nationalism, the polit-
ical approach of the middle class and the Shah's political style were
in contrast. The middle class favored a European style democracy with
the Shah as a figurehead without much power and with the legislature
regaining the role it had had during the 1941-1953 era. This contra-
dicted the Shah's belief in his naked power and his disregard for
democratic procedures, as reflected in his interview with Oriana
Fallaci. He had said that:
When you don't have monarchy, you have anarchy or oligarchy
or dictatorship. Anyway, monarchy is the only way of
governing Iran ...
. To get things done you need power,
and to keep power you shouldn't have to ask permission or
advice from anyone
. . . . I can't separate the man from
the king. Before being a man, I am a king. A king whose
destiny is swayed by a mission to be accomplished. And
the rest don't count. A king means first of all duty,
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that kind of democrLyl
. \ wouldn"Al wh^at'tH
d m cr .'wir??5'' • •
-.Freedom of thought! Demo r y,ae o acy! W th five year old children going on strike and
Thus the Shah did not appease the middle class either by
responding to their political demands-i
.e.
, granting a democratic form
of government-or by placating them with the economic benefits of his
rule. The middle class turned into an opponent of the Shah. The
religious feelings of the middle class were, furthermore, with the
ulama. It was the bazaar merchants that provided the mujtahids with
funds for either theological or political purposes during the 1978
uprising. The added insult and degradation of the uiama had been salt
on the wounds of the middle class which resulted in the latter' s total
support for the uiama in opposition to the Shah.""^^
Land reforms. While attempting to win the support of the
middle class to his side in the early 1960s, the Shah also undertook
to rally the support of the lower class, namely the landless peasants
and workers. The Shah, on two occasions, had attempted agrarian
reforms by selling some of the family lands to the farmers in 1941,
soon after his accession to the throne, and by selling lands to the
government for distribution among farmers in 1951. Following the
Shah's failure to coopt the National Front into a coalition government
in 1961, the Shah appointed Dr. Ali Amini prime minister to direct
"land reforms" under the auspicies of Hassan Arsanjani, the Minister of
Agriculture, who had formulated the process and its application several
59
years beforehandJ 35 The Shah had tried to pass agrarian reforms but
had confronted bitter opposition in the Majlis which was packed with
the aristocracy and their agentsJ^G ^he aristocracy had felt that
land reforms would result in their displacement as political figures
and thus had resisted it. The Majlis was dissolved in 1962 at the
request of Dr. Amini; the Shah later resorted to a national referendum
to have the six points of his well-publicized "White Revolution"
approved. The major components of the reforms were: distribution of
land among the farmers (by the order of the Shah, the word "peasant"
was removed from Persian dictionaries); sale of shares of government
owned factories to the ex-landlords for payment of their lands (the
price of land was based on the annual tax paid to the government in
previous years); and the establishment of the Education Corps to be
sent to rural areas to establish schools and help in the improvement of
quality of life in the villages.
The first land reform law was enacted in 1960, calling for
distribution of all lands above 400 irrigated and 800 non-irrigated
hectars. The law was poorly planned and was full of loopholes that
enabled the landlords to hold on to more land. This law was amended in
1962 by what has since become known as the. land reform law. This law
permitted the landlords to keep one village. It also exempted from
distribution lands under mechanized farming, tea gardens, orchards, and
farms employing wage labor. The land was sold to share croppers who
had to pay for the land over a 15 year period. During this stage, some
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16,000 villages (one-quarter of all villages), making up 19 percent of
all arable land, was affected by the reforms.
The second stage was an apparent attempt to placate the land-
lords and in fact was a formalization of the existing status quo.^37
During this phase, "five methods of settlement were offered: sale,
division of land on the same basis as the old share cropping arrange-
ment, fixed tenancy, formation of a rural cooperative, or purchase of
the tenants rights due under the law by the landlord." Cooperatives
were under government control.
The last phase, beginning in 1967, was basically concerned with
management of farms, small and fragmented as a result of the reforms.
It undertook to group such farms into cooperatives whereby government
assistance would be possible and managable. In 1973, cooperatives were
consolidated into fewer numbers which took into consideration the man-
power limitations of the government.
With such reforms directed at the farming population of Iran,
which made up over half of the population, the Shah felt that he could
be certain of majority support for his role as a reforming king as well
as an all-powerful ruler of the nation. The Shah's approach, however,
suffered from several shortcomings. Within a few months of the enact-
ment of the land reform laws, the Shah saw and feared the increasing
power of the farmers, particularly following the National Concress of
Farmers held in Tehran in January 1963. During the congress the
farmers raised the possibility of a Peasants' Party. The high temper
of some farmers in realizing the newly instituted reforms was perhaps
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responsible for making the Shah think twice before further destroying
the traditional rural balance of power. As a result, the second stage
of the land reforms were made more palatable for the landlords J39
Furthermore, the rural communities were also a stronghold of tradition-
alism and, as such, strongly loyal to the ulama. In a conflict between
the Shah and the clergy, the government could not count on the support
of the farmers on its behalf. In addition, the farmers also suffered
from a very low level of literacy, often below 10 percent;!^^ and, due
the physical nature of the country, many farm communities were not
within easy access of seats of political power-i.e., Tehran and/or pro
vincial centers.
The land reforms also suffered from major problems. The
removal of landlords and their representatives from villages also
removed the backup they gave the farmers during a bad harvest which is
not uncommon in arid Iran. It would take several years for the govern-
ment to establish cooperatives and banks that could assist the farmers,
meanwhile the cash-short farmers had to acquire, on their own, seed,
water and plows which were formerly supplied by the landlords. The
landlords, with their knowledge of the agriculture market, also had
helped to decide on the kind and amount of crops that were to be
planted. During famine, pestilence and other catastrophies
, the
peasants "expected and received help from the landlords." The peasants
also expected the landlords' protection against the government and its
agents. Often the landlords and their representatives "intervened to
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help the peasants escape crushing tax exactions and to rescue the
peasants' sons from military conscription.
"
On several occasions following the land reforms, the agricul-
tural market experienced shortages of certain crops and overabundance
of others due to poor planning. The inefficient bureaucracy, as
already discussed, was a poor protection for farmers as was obvious in
the poor results from the Knuzistan agrobusiness. The farmers
suffered also from severe infrastructure inadequacies, such as trans-
portation and marketing facilities, resulting in an estimated $2 bil-
lion worth of agricultural crop losses each year. Furthermore, farming
profits proved far from satisfactory to the farmers who got an estima-
ted 5.5 percent of the final retail price for most of their crops. ""^^
Such gross negligence of agriculture greatly contributed to the rural-
to-urban migration during the 1970s. In the cities, wages for
unskilled workers had increased some 500 percent within five years.
This was attractive to the farmers who were absorbed mainly as con-
struction workers. The high cost of living and the huge gap between
the haves and have nots subsequently became more real as the need for
unskilled labor grew. The farmers continued flowing to the urban
centers, creating tin and cardboard shacks on vacant lots in the middle
of the urban sprawl.
In short, at the onset of the revolution, the farmers, usually
the females, the very young and very old, remained on the farms,
managing barely a minimal living. They were perhaps slightly better
off than they were in the 1950s, while the urban entrepreneurs were
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reaping financial gains at an unimaginable speed, creating a gap with
the rest of the society at a growing daily margin. The immense wealth
of a certain few contrasted against the stark destitude of those young
farmers who had come to the cities in search of a better life. This
situation did not fit with the benevolent image that the Shah had
attempted to build for himself. Consequently, the urban poor were
attracted by the ul^ and the opposition who, by 1977, once again had
become outspoken about popular grievances.
During the height of the revolution in December 1978, never-
theless, the government brought in farmers from rural areas around
Isfahan to the city to show their support for the regime. ""^"^ Such
attempts failed in comparison to the huge outpouring of people, esti-
mated in excess of a million, on Ashura (December 10, 1978) in Tehran.
The hope of utilizing the farmers as a basis of support and legitimacy
to offset the general appeal of the opposition had failed.
Support from outside. It had been common during the nineteenth-
century by those claiming the throne to enlist the support of a foreign
power. The Qajars often used Russia to back their claims. ""^^ With the
advent of nationalism in the second half of the twentieth-century, such
affiliations with a foreign power were scorned and regarded as tutelage
to foreign powers. The anglophiles and Russophiles of the Qajar period
who boasted of their connections with foreign legations^'*^ would not do
so, at least, publicly. Thus, the Shah's return to Iran with the help
of the CIA following Dr. Mossadegh's overthrow was a blow to Iranian
national pride and ego. Consequently, the Shah was viewed as the
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embodiment of American and Western interests which were seen as contra-
dictory to Iranian national interest. It is within such a framework
that Huntington prescribes support from a foreign government as the
fourth source whicn a reforming monarch can utilize. He actually uses
the American support of the Shah as an example of his contention,
neglecting the fact that the Shah's reliance on Washington was partly
responsible for his low rating with his people which eventually
resulted in his downfall
.
The reliance of a political leader on a foreign power is con-
sidered an act of weakness in the Iranian political culture. A polit-
ical leader, as discussed by Professor Norman Jacobs, is to cause pride
and respect in the eyes of foreigners .
^ ^^^^^ subservience
and tutelage of the Iranian political hierarchy, including the Shah,
to a foreign power, namely the United States, has been a source of
resentment and a reason to oppose the Shah. This dependency, to a
great extent, prevented the establishment of an independent Iranian
political posture with Iranian national interests as its primary goal.
The present rupture of relations between Iran and the United
States, following the taking of 53 hostages at the American Embassy in
Tehran by militants with the apparent blessing of Ayatollah Khomeini,
has its roots in such historical experience. The independent policy of
the Ayatollah and his opposition to foreign interference, particularly
the United States and the Soviet Union, in Iranian internal affairs
receives tremendous public support since it invokes pride and feelings
of "rubbing the nose of a superpower in dirt." The escalation of
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political conflict with the United States and the super-power's
inability to exert much influence over events in Iran, despite all the
resultant political, social and economic ill effects on Iran, has
become a caus^^elebn. The conflict's attainment of international
scope with some perceived support for the Iranian cause among some
third world countries, especially amongst Islamic revivalists, has
become a further cause of pride since the Iranian leader is being
viewed as an international leader.
Som^luritiie^^ Monarchy under the Pahlavis took a dras-
tic turn away from its traditional mold. Centralization of power in
the hands of the monarch and the destruction of the traditional national
balance of power caused political chaos that resulted in the downfall
of the institution of monarch.
The political approach of the Pahlavis aimed at establishing
the institution of monarchy as the only legitimate political institu-
tion and the "people" as the only other viable "institution." This
approach manifested itself in the so called "Shah-People Revolution"
(another name for the 1963 reforms). The Shah, in support of his
approach, asserted that:
In making revolution, the leader of the nation plays the
crucial role. A strong enlightened leader, fully com-
prehending existing condition, nurtures and develops the
idea of revolution in his mind, transfers the idea to
the people and then moves to implement it.
The document, furthermore, likens the relationship of the Shah
to the nation as that of a father to a son. The Shah stands above all
the people. He is "in the first instance teacher and spiritual leader.
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an idividual who not only builds his nation roads, bridges, dams and
ganat but also guides the spirit, thought and hearts of his people. "^^^
In short, the people play only a passive role, while the Shah generates
ideas and policies. As such, all organizations are there to serve the
Shah in the transfer of ideas from the monarch to the people and to
help to implement and operational ize such ideas.
Such an image of the Shah greatly contradicted the traditional
mold of monarchy. Traditionally, the Iranian political culture was a
"web system," composed of "a network of power relationships which
possess profound plasticity due to the balancing nature of these
tensions." In such a system, although the Shah remains the central
figure in the political structure, he shares power, depending on the
circumstances, with members of the royal family, the high ulama, the
tribal elite, the military elite, the landlords, the economic aristoc-
racy, the landless rentierelite, and/or the foreign capitalists. The
system, with its built-in safety valves such as "power reciprocity,
informality, personalism, secrecy, and insecurity" through a system of
conflict, was supported and maintained.
With the growing power of the monarch during the rule of Reza
Shah and from 1953 to 1978 under Mohammad-Reza Shah, the web system
was employed to enhance the position of the monarch rather than to
afford stability to the political structure of the nation. As dis-
cussed already, the groups that traditionally shared power with the
monarch were made dependent on royal grace. The political base of the
elite had become the person of the Shah. The Shah continued to employ
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the traditional conflict syste. to prevent any one group from gaining
excessive advantage thereby reinforcing the royal position as the
dominant one within the political structure. The political structure
of the nation, from a symbiotic relationship between the monarch and
the political elite, was reduced to a system of dependency of the
political elite on the person of the Shah. The land reforms of 1963,
for example, achieved such an end by debasing the landed aristocracy
from its traditional political power base.
The subversion of the traditional political structure by the
establishment of a structure where the institution of monarchy, or,
in reality, the person of the Shah as the only legitimate and viable
institution was not well thought out nor well executed. In the process,
the Shah had underestimated his unpopularity, particularly following
the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh, and overestimated his own capacity as
"a strong enlightened leader" who fully comprehended existing condi-
tions. The Shah apparently suffered from severe insecurity problems.
Such feelings were well revealed in his own conversations:
My father said that he wanted to improve the government
machinery to such a degree that, if he should die, the day-
to-day process of administration would operate almost auto-
matically without the need of continuous supervision from
the top. I was still rather young and perhaps not very
mature; and I took his remark as an insult. "What does he
mean?" I thought. "Does he think that if he were gone I
couldn't take over and continue his work?""150
Although he seemed an astute observer of his father's style of
rule, noting that as his father became older his circle of advisors
grew narrower and consisted of undistinguished subservients
,
Mohammad-Reza Shah, in 1963 during the June political crisis, displayed
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his limited capacity for receiving advice fro. some of his most loyal
devotees. They had come to the monarch with the best of intentions to
aid the monarchy at its dark hours. The Shah was furious at the four
for thinking of "giving" advice to the Shah. These four, including
Hussein Ala. Sardar Fakher-e Hekmat, Abdollah Entezam, and General
Morteza Yazdan-Panah
,
were rebuffed, dismissed from their positions,
and thrown into political oblivion. The insecurity of Mohammad-
Reza Shah marked the major difference in the style of kingship between
himself and Reza Shah. Walter Lacqueur notes that a great difference
between the father and the son was that "whereas no one dared to lie to
(Reza Shah), no one dared to tell the truth to (Mohammad-Reza Shah).""""
Recognizing the depth of Shi 'ism in the country, the Shah also
tried to employ religious symbolism to gain legitimacy for his rule.
On many occasions the Shah claimed divine support for his rule and the
institution of monarchy. In his book. Mission for My Country
, he
claims to have seen apparitions of Shiah saints giving their support to
him in his childhood. Furthermore, the failure of several attempts on
his life was interpreted to mean divine support for his "missions."
The Shah's person was labeled as "Shadow of God," gaining further
divine right for the role of the Shah and for the institution of mon-
archy.
Some concluding remarks
. With the socio-political tradition
of Iran, the sources of support put forth by Samuel Huntington to be
used by a "reforming monarch" and their seeming application in Iran has
proved their inadequacies. Too little attention has been paid to the
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cultural milieuof nations in formulation and application of such
proposals. Furthermore, there seemed to be a great discrepancy between
Huntington's perception of a reformist monarch and the reality of the
Shah's rule. Although certain periods of the Shah's rule may be
heralded as "reformist," the primary purpose remained the survival of
the Pahlavi regime. To attain such an end, the monarch utilized the
carrot and stick approach; the carrot heralded as "reformist" under-
takings and the stick, as SAVAK.
The Shah proclaimed the institution of monarchy as inseparable
from Iranian culture and tradition, claiming it was the true and
inherent desire of the Iranian people to be ruled by kings. ''^'^ However,
the organic and symbiotic relationship that the Shah claimed has rarely
been displayed in Iranian history despite over 2,500 years of claimed
kingship. In essence, the country remained feudalistic with an aris-
tocracy or a religious oligarchy ruling the empire. The rigid class
structure through which the aristocracy and religious nobility ruled
ancient Iran became so brittle that the Mazdakian revolt, which pro-
scribed a communistic society, nearly destroyed the social fabric of
the Sassanid Empire in the early sixth-century A.D. The destruction
of the huge Sassanid Empire finally came about when faced with the
Islamic surge that preached equality for all. The ideals of Islam had
attracted huge numbers of peasants who composed the bulk of the
empire's armies. The tiny Arab armies that were out numbered ten-to-
one were able to defeat the huge but demoralized Sassanid armies in the
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middle of the seventh century and, thus, the Sassanid Empire came to
an end.
The history of Iran is full of invasions and tribual feuds
which, every so often, resulted in the establishment of new dynasti
Following the Arab conquest of Iran it took over 800 years until
native Iranian dynasty took control of the nation. Meanwhile, the
country had been overrun by various Mongol and Turkic tribes. It was,
therefore, the military might that gained its possessor the throne of
Iran and not a popular desire by the masses to be ruled by kings.
While the kings retained titular control of the nation, it was the
local overlords that in effect controlled the nation. They had their
own administrative system, taxed the population under their control and
supplied the king with troops in times of war. These overlords had
their own dynasties and held court. As such, the system gave rise to
the concept of shah-in-shah (king of kings) that was even retained by
the last Pahlavi monarch.
During the Safavid and Qajar periods, as already noted, the
kings retained their position by a balanced tension between the insti-
tution of monarchy and the political elite. The monarchs, recognizing
the inherent weakness of the institution of monarchy, utilized support
from such quarters as the aristocracy, the ulama , the bureaucracy and
the tribes to maintain their position.
Furthermore, the Iranian experience of kingship for the past
several thousand years has been no exception since the world, for most
parts, was ruled by kings. Until recent times, the Iranian society,
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in essence, was feudal and tribal and, as such, feudal lords and chiefs
retained autonomy within their fiefdoms. With the advancement of
statism and centralized political authority, the local lords and chiefs
were replaced by governors appointed by monarchs who, as the result of
the centralization of power, had become the central authority. The
most imposing objection to the rule of kings came from the Shiah ulama
who considered all temporal authority illegitimate in the absence of
the Hidden Imam, as already has been discussed. While the ulama were
able to influence the political process of the nation during late
Safavid (1666-1732) and early Qajar periods (1779-1848), a balance
between the ulama and the political body of the nation was achieved
during early Safavid (1500-1666) and late Qajar period (1848-1907).
During the Pahlavi period (1925-1978), for the most part, the governing
political body shifted the balance of power to itself thus reducing the
influence of the ulama on the political process.
With the infiltration of democratic ideals during the past
century, there have been serious challenges to the authority of the
kings. This is exemplified in the Constitutional Revolution and in
attempts by individuals, such as Reza Khan, to establish a republic in
Iran. Therefore, it follows that the Iranian culture is no more
attracted to the institution of monarchy than most other cultures in
the world. In fact, of the last six kings in the Qajar and Pahlavi
dynasties during the past century, only Mozafar al-Din Shah (1898-1906)
had died as a king as a result of natural causes. Of the remaining
five, Naser al-Din Shah (1848-1898) was assassinated and the last four:
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Mohammad-Ali Shah (1906-1090), Ahmad Shah (1909-1925), Reza Shah
Pahlavi (1925-1941), and Mohammad-Reza Shah (1941-1979) have all abidi-
cated in the face of either internal or external opposition to their
rule. Perhaps it was the recognition of the traditional "weakness" of
the institution of monarchy that led Shah Mohammad-Reza to undertake
to establish monarchy as the dominant political institution. In doing
so, he utilized all means of propaganda including pomp and ostentation.
Although earlier he had said that there was no pride in ruling over a
hungry nation and that he would not crown himself a king unless sub-
stantial improvements were made in the citizens' lives, he crowned
himself and his wife in 1967 at the cost of millions of dollars. The
Shah's thirst for lavish and extravagant parties culminated in cele-
brations such as the 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire in 1971
at a cost of $40 million reported by the government itself. Two-
hundred million dollars was the cost claimed by the Shah's opponents.T57
The Shah's silver jubilee in 1965, the 50th anniversary of the Pahlavi
dynasty in 1976 and the 100th birthday of Reza Shah in 1978 were also
celebrated at enormous costs. There was forced participation in the
above events in forms of parades, political gatherings or even forced
donations towards the cost of festivi ties by well-to-do businessmen.
There were also such annual events as the birthdays of the Shah, Farah
and the Crown Prince; the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh; thanksgiving on
the occasion of the Shah's escaping from an assassination attempt in
1964; and the anniversary of the "White Revolution," where the public,
in particular the civil servants and industrial workers, were forced
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to participate. Furthennore, newspaper advertisements congratulating
these occasions pretended public approval and support for the Shah's
rule. To the dismay of its benefactors, such wholesale approaches had
Uttle, if any, impact on placating the public or gaining support for
the Shah's rule. There never was any doubt in the people's minds as
to the spuriousness of the events.
Furthermore, there was an attempt by the regime to connect the
Pahlavi dynasty with the ancient Persian tradition of kingship. It was
regarded as "the Pahlavi revival of the sacred kingship." As such, the
hand-picked Majlis in 1967, on the occasion of the Shah's coronation,
bestowed on him the title of Aryamehr (the Light of Aryans), which
purportedly was to reaffirm the "primordial spirit of Iran fostered by
a monarchy whose aim was to combine the continuity of the ancient
principles with modern transformations. "^58 supplemented
in March 1976 when the Majlis voted for a monarchy calendar replacing
the Islamic calendar based on the solar Hijra year. The new calendar
was based on the coronation of Cyrus the Great, 2,535 years earlier.
While the title of "Aryamehr" was regarded as a farce by tne general
public, the change of calendar was regarded as an affront to the Isamic
tradition of the nation. As such, it aroused considerable opposition.
Furthermore, a major problem facing the Iranian political
process had been the uncertainty of political direction, exacerbated
by the Shah's lack of political conviction and the lack of a coherent
political philosophy. For example, in his first book. Mission for My
Country (1961) the Shah hails a two-party political system, while in
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his most recent book, Ipwards_Jhe^^ (^975)^
applauded a single party system.
It has been said that during the early 1970s the Shah lost
sight of his intended reforms that he had begun with much fanfare a
decade earlierJ59 became more concerned with the trappings of
kingship and power, since he saw himself in the total control of the
country with his rule and position secured. However, both during his
"reform" period (1961-1971) and during his megalomania years (1971-
1978), the policies of the government became the expressed wishes of
the person of the Shah. Thus, as the Shah's mood changed so did the
process of government. It was felt that there was no need for con-
tending political institutions with which the Shah would share power
or with whom he would consult. Absence of independent political insti-
tutions served two primary purposes: it lessened the possibility of
challenge to the Shah's rule; it made the survival of the nation depen-
dent on the person of the Shah. So it was not unusual to hear, even
during the height of the uprising in 1978, serious questions regarding
the leadership of the country in the absence of the shah. The question
was serious since the 25 year authoritarian rule of the Shah, since
1953, had left the country without leaders who had political and
managerial expertise with political and national base or support. Most
of the leaders of the opposition were old and consisted of the
colleagues of Dr. Mossadegh in the National Front. They had all been
pushed out of the existing political arena for 25 years and had little,
if any, base of political support from which they could operate.
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Ayatollah Khomeini, on the other hand, had gathered an immense
following among the people and was the unquestioned leader of the
opposition. However, the Ayatollah had no administrative or managerial
experience and thus was unable to guide the nation to the shores of
political stability. In the face of the oppressive Pahlavi rule and
the deteriorating economic and political situation in late 1978. such
an arguement. however, attracted little support. All the frustrations
that had accumulated, particularly over the past 25 years, spewed out,
washing away the Pahlavi monarchy. There seemed to be little concern
for the institution of monarchy that the Shah attempted to portray as
second nature to Iranians. None of the institutions that the Shah had
manipulated or attempted to build-i.e., the legislature and the
Rastakhis Party
-were able to aid the faltering monarchy or even to
maintain their own survival. The armed forces that the Shah had so
dearly groomed, patronized, and transformed into a force to assure the
survival of the Pahlavi dynasty burst open at the seams. Nonetheless,
opposition political parties and organizations that had been severely
suppressed and punished surfaced overnight, but were unable to exert
any real influence over the course of events.
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CHAPTER II
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Although Iran boasts an ancient political tradition, none of
its present-day formal political institutions predate the Constitu-
tional Revolution of 1906. The parliament, the Judiciary, and the
executive have all been created since the inception of a constitu-
tional government. The only exception was the institution of monarchy
which was changed from that of feudal tradition to an institution of
centralized authoritarianism with increased control over the daily
affairs of the citizens.
The constitutional movement was born out of a rivalry of the
clergy and the intellectuals and the aristocracy headed by the Shah.
While the former were supported and encouraged by the British, the
latter had the blessing of the Russians.^ In other words, the consti-
tutional movement in Iran was partly due to the power rivalry to con-
trol the internal affairs of Iran which reached its zenith during the
first two decades of the twentieth century.^
The constitution, nonetheless, provided the nation with a
foundation for modern political institutions. This constitutional
process of government needs to be contrasted against the de facto
powers of the shahs which, in Robert Grahams words, well demonstrated
the "unconstitutional side" of the political process in Iran.^
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Ih e Constitution
The Belgian constitution was used as a reference for the
drafting of the 1906 Iranian constitution. The Fundamental Law pro-
vided for the election of the Majlis (National Consultative Assembly).
The Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907 was composed of more
extensive rules pertaining to the political process of the nation. It
established the religious board for review of the legislature and
separated governmental powers into three branches: legislative,
executive, and judiciary. The foundation of the constitution rested
on three principles: Shiah Islam, separation of powers and monarchy.
Article 35 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law stated that "The
sovereignty is a trust confided (as a Divine gift) by the people to the
person of the King." This reasserted the basic inviolability of
people's rights regarding the king as credible ruler only as long as
he served the interests of the community. The power of the legislature
was also curtailed by Article 2 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law
that stated that "At no time must any legal enactment of the (Majlis),
established by the favor and assistance of (the Hidden Imam), the favor
of (the Shah) of Iran, the care of (the ulama ), and the whole people of
the Iranian nation, be at variance with the sacred principles of Islam
or the laws established by (the Prophet--i
. e. , the Sharia )." The
council of five mujtehids was to act as the ultimate body to review all
laws to establish that they were not in variance with the Sharia
. The
council of five mujtehids never materialized.
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Tne Iranian constitutional system, at least in theory, was a
parliamentary system with the Majlis as the central focus of the pro-
cess. Both the proponents and the opponents of the government justi-
fied their policies by citing the legislature's support or constitu-
tional perogatives.
A truly representative political process as envisioned by the
constitution has rarely materialized since the inception of a
constitutional government in Iran. From 1906 to 1921, the Majlis was
in session for a total of less than five years (see Table II-l). The
Majlis then was turned into an obedient instrument of Reza Shah,
particularly following the 1928 elections to the Vllth Majlis. After
the brief period from 1941 to 1953 when the parliamentary process took
partial control of the political process in Iran, the Majlis, following
Dr. Mossadegh's overthrow, once again was closely controlled by the
ruling monarch, Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi.^
The constitution was amended on four occasions. To do this.
Parliament (Majlis alone until 1950; since the establishment of the
Senate in 1950, both houses), with a two-thirds majority, called for
elections for the Constituent Assembly. Its representatives were equal
to the number of members of Parliament. They had to approve any amend-
ment to the constitution by a two-thirds majority. In 1925, the
Supplementary Laws were amended to change the monarchy from the Qajar
dynasty to the Pahlavi dynasty. In 1949, some procedural changes were
made del ineating the election of the Senate and the Shah's right to
dissolve the Majlis and/or the Senate. An amendment in 1957 increased
the number of deputies fro. ,36 to 200. extended the te™ of the
MajUs from two to four years, and determined the quorun, as half of
the membership of the Majlis. The Supplementary Laws were further
amended to give the Shah a suspensive veto over financial bills passed
by the Hajlis Which had the right to approve the national budget.
The fourth and last amendment dealt with Supplementary Laws
regarding the regency. The amendment made the Queen the regent. She
was to have formed a council to execute the royal duties until the
crown prince reached the age of twenty. Along with the above amend-
ments, there were also changes in the electoral laws pertaining to the
length of the terms of the Senate and the Majlis with an increase in
the number of deputies in the Najlis based on the most recent popula-
tion census.
The last three amendments were made to enhance the royal
perogatives vis-a-vis the Majlis. The changes were made in the legis-
lative periods when the Shah enjoyed overwhelming support among Majlis
deputies. The legal and extralegal powers of the monarch included
appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, general staff of the
armed forces and half of the senators. The Shah was also commander-
in-chief of the armed forces and, thus, could declare war, make peace
and negotiate treaties. He could also dissolve the parliament, call
for new elections, and reject the national budget approved by the
Majlis unless overridden by a three-fourths majority.
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Legislature
From the inception of constitutional government until 1921,
the Majlis sat for a total of five years. It convened from 1906 to
1908, but upon the bombardment of the Majlis by Mohammad-Ali Shah, it
was dissolved and the constitution was abrogated.^ A new Majlis was
convened on October 28, 1909 and sat until a coup d'etat against the
Second Majlis on December 24, 1911 when it refused the request of
Samsam al-Saltaneh cabinent to comply with the Russian ultimatum^
demanding the dismissal of Morgan Shuster, an American financial
advisor hired by Iran, along with an apology for interference with a
contigent of Russian troops guarding the house of Shoa al-Saltaneh, an
Iranian in exile in Russia, by gendarmes under orders from Shuster.
The Third Majlis was convened three years later in November 1914.
dissolving a year later in the face of fear that the pressure of the
Majlis seriously perturbed the British and Russian legations.^
In short, the political turmoil that began as a result of the
Russo-British intervention in the internal affairs of Iran retarded the
nation's consi tutional development. Following the Russo-British agree-
ment in 1907, which divided Iran into zones of influence, the two powers
developed a parallel approach to Iranian affairs that did not include
constitutional government which the British had earlier supported.^
The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the economic hardship in Britain
following the First World War afforded Iranians some respite from
foreign intervention and domination.
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The emergence of Reza Khan in 1921, his success in quelling the
prevailing political disturbances all across the country, and the
establishment of a centrailized administrative authority in Tehran
hrought about some measure of political tranquillity. The elections
for the Fourth Majlis had been in the works for many months. It
finally convened in February 1921. The role of the Majlis became
important in Reza Khan's consolidation of power, although he soon began
to develop a contempt and distrust for the Majlis.^ He employed the
Majlis to meet his aims, but he was not sympathetic to the ideals of
constitutional democracy or legal procedure. Reza Khan had hoped to
establish a republic in Iran on the same theme as that of the new
republic being formed by Ataturk in Turkey.^" As noted earlier, how-
ever, the clergy persuaded Reza Khan to seek a change from the Qajar
dynasty to his own family instead," on fears that republicanism would
spread secularism. The Majlis by its first amendment to the constitu-
tion, in 1925, transferred the monarchy from the Qajar dynasty to the
Pahlavi dynasty.
Although there was some opposition to Reza Khan in the Majlis,
namely by Seyyed Hassan Modaress^^ and Mohammad Mossadegh J ^ Reza Khan's
control over the Majlis was strengthened following each election. With
the elections for the Vllth Majlis in 1928, the parliament had turned
into an institution of virtual tutelage dedicated to legitimizing Reza
Shah's rule. Opposition figures such as Modaress were prevented from
being elected to the Majlis; Mossadegh took refuge among the tribes in
the south. The Majlis remained a political backwater for the monarch
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until 1941, When he was forced to abdicate the throne by the Allies on
the suspicion of his German sympathies J'*
The rule of parliament was strengthened in 1941, partly due to
the Allied presence. They tried to influence the course of political
process through legitimate channels by establishing political parties
favorable to them. Iradeh Melli (National Will) Party, headed by
Seyyed Ziaaldin Tabatabai, supported the British'^ the Tudeh (Mass)
Party (communist orientation) supported the Soviet Union's perspec-
tive. Both the British and the Soviets attempted to use the parlia-
mentary process to gain further advantages. The Russians were
interested in oil concessions and. as later revealed, in political and
territorial gains in northern and northwestern Iran. The British were
interested in maintaining and extending their influence in southern
Iran, particularly in the oil fields and territories close to the
British colonial territories in South Asia. The Majlis, however, had
attained a very nationalistic posture as displayed by the measures
undertaken by It between 1941 and 1953. Among its major accomplishments
were: (1) adoption of a law in 1944 which forbade the government to
negotiate or grant any oil concession without the prior approval and
subsequent ratification by the Majlis; (2) repudiation, by an almost
unanimous vote in 1947, of an oil concession granted by the then prime
minister, Qavvam, to the Soviet Union; and most importantly, (3)
nationalization of the oil industry in Iran in 1951. This last act
left a lasting impact on the Iranian political situation, in particular,
and on the Middle Eastern political posture, in general.'^
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During this period the Majlis also began to exercise the pre-
rogative, first exercised in 1910 by Nasir al-Mulk, the first regent
for the
.1„or Aha.ad Shah, of being consulted before a prime minister
was appointed. 18 The constitution had, In fact, given the right of
selection of the prime minister and members of the cabinet to the
Shah. 19 Unlike the British parliamentary system, the members of the
cabinet were not to be selected from amongst the deputies in the
20Majlis. In effect, a Majlis deputy could not retain his seat after
becoming a member of the cabinet. This was intended to separate the
legislative and executive branches of government. Ministers had the
primary responsibility for introducing bills in the Majlis,^! but the
bills still had to receive the prior approval of the cabinet. ^2
Deputies also could initiate legislation. One such piece of legisla-
tion that has gained fame was the Oil Nationalization Act, sponsored
by Dr. Mossadegh and his colleagues in the XVIth Majlis (1950).
Following the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh's government in 1953,
martial law was proclaimed and General Fazl-ollah Zahedi was appointed
prime minister. The Majlis was dissolved in December and new elections
were called for in early 1954. With martial law in full force, General
Zahedi was in total control of the government while the anti-Shah
elements were in hiding, in jails, or in exile. The XVIIIth session of
the Majlis (1954-56) contained no known anti-Shah elements nor any
sympathizers of Dr. Mossadegh and his National Front. All subsequent
parliamentary elections, particularly in Tehran and larger cities, were
controlled by the government. Thus, deputies favorable to the
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govern„.nt were "elected." I„
.ural areas and smaller cities where
the landed aristocracy and the tribes had a controlling Influence, the
deputies to the Hajlls were elected fro™ amongst the aristocracy or
those loyal to the..^* Although the posture of the Hajlls remained
conservative, It was not within the total control of the governn^nt
For example, the Majlis refused on several occasions to ratify the land
reform bill which had the Shah's support or to revise it In a way that
was anything but land "reform. "^^
Although the constitution had provided for a Senate, elec-
tions for the first Senate were not held until 1950. The 1949 Consti-
tuent Assembly provided for an electoral procedure of electing the
Senate. The membership of the Senate was composed of 60 senators;
half of whom were to be elected with the remaining to be appointed by
the Shah. From Tehran, 15 were elected and 15 appointed with the
remaining apportioned to the provinces. Although the Senate lacked
the constitutional prerogatives of the Majlis, the monarch anticipated
an increased control over the legislature particularly through his
appointment of half the senators.
The period of 1953 to 1963 was basically a period during which
the Shah assumed more control of the government. He attempted to con-
trol the Majlis while, at the same time, to project a semblance of
democratic rule through the establishment of a two-party political
system. The experiment in democracy failed due to the overzealousness
of Dr. Manuchehr Igbal
, the then prime minister, who rigged the
elections for his own benefit, and to the general government policy
96
29
of not permitting the Nationalists to seek election to the Majlis
The ensuing e.barass.ent over the election procedure resulted i„ the
Shah's dissolution of the XXth Hajlis (1960) three months after its
election with a call for new elections. The new Majlis (1961) was also
dissolved a few months later by the Shah at the request of Dr. Ali
Amini, the then prime minister, who saw the Majlis as an obstacle to
his reformist approach. New elections were not scheduled. This was
in clear violation of the constitution. ^0
Dr. Amini had confronted staunch opposition in the Hajlis
toward his reformist legislation, particularly the land reform bill.
As already noted, the legislation would have eventually resulted in the
transfer to the peasants of the land owned by the landed aristocracy
who were immensely influential in the Majlis, either directly or
through their agents. 3' Aside from the economic impact of the land
reforms, its political consequences were feared. The displacement of
the landlords from their traditional strongholds in rural areas and
smaller towns would also cost them their long-held political influence.
Thus, the land reforms, aside from the reformist objectives, intended
to centralize power in the hands of the central government in Tehran. ^2
It was this latter objective that raised fear among the aristocracy
and also among the ulama who saw a further increase in the totalitarian
powers of the Shah. Although Dr. Amini and his Minister of Agriculture,
Hassan Arsanjani, were moved by reformist intentions, their land reforms,
in political terms, could not but lead to an increase in the power of
the central government. Dr. Amini objected to the domination of the
political process by the Shah and hoped to ,i.u the monarch's admin-
istrative prerogatives, but he was relieved of his post in July 1962
Mr. Arsanjani, however. «as retained to pursue the course of land
reforn,. Opposition to the Shah's undertakings was also vehement among
tribes, particularly the Qashgales who fought government control for
two years before being subdued In 1964.
The XXth Hajlis (1961) saw the end of an era in Iranian parlia-
"lentary history. With the displacement of the power of the landed
aristocracy, the authority of tne central government was extended to
all parts of the country. Elections for the XXIst Majlis (1963-67)
were held in October 1963. Most deputies joined the newly formed Iran
Novin (New Iran) Party, founded by Hassa^Al 1 Mansur. a young rising
politician, and his colleagues, with the blessings of the Shah. A few
deputies retained their affiliation with Mardom Party which took the
role of the opposition. ^3 A few months later. Mansur was appointed
prime minister, and thus the Iran Novin era that would last for some
13 years began.
A comparison of the percentages of the landlords in the Majlis
during the pre-1963 sessions of Majlis and the XXIInd Majlis (1967-71)
best describes the impact of land reforms on the legislative process in
Iran. While some 50 percent of the deputies during the first 20
sessions of the Majlis came from landlord backgrounds, the level
dropped to less than 25 percent in the XXIst and the XXIInd Majlis
34sessions. The government, by manipulating the party system and the
electoral process, was able to control access to the Majlis and the
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senate and. thus, to reduce the parlla^ntary process to the legitimi-
zation of the policies of the monarch's government. It was only i„
such a forum that it was possible to legislate a bill giving
..pio^^tic
-munity to American military personnel and their families. The bill
was ratified by the Majlis within a few hours after its submission by
the government in October 1964. It was the outrage against the enact-
ment of this bill that finally resulted in the banishment of Ayatollah
Khomeini, who vehemently and actively opposed it, to exile.^S jhe
passage of the aforementioned bill clearly represents the extent to
which the Majlis had been turned into a subordinate branch of the
executive. Such submission to executive power was unparallelled in
other parliamentary periods, perhaps with the exception of the period
from 1928 to 1941 under Reza Shah. Reza Shah, however, was moved by
nationalistic aspirations to end foreign capitulatory rights 1n Iran
granted during the Qajar period.
On the inauguration of the single party process in 1975, the
government sponsored political parties, Iran Novin and Mardom, along
with the government sanctioned parties. Pan Iranist and Iranian with a
total of four deputies in the XXIIIrd Majlis, dissolved their respective
political parties and joined the new Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party.
In 1978, with the political turmoil well underway, there were
movements within the Majlis indicating an emerging opposition to the
government. In June the Pan Iranists revived their old party and
resigned from Rastakhiz.^'' Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, an independent from
Tabriz, along with a few others also resigned from Rastakhiz.
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Nevertheless, most deputies remained loyal to the Shah to the end, as
was reflected in the over^vhelming approval of the military government's
program to restore order. 38 The Majlis, however, was experiencing
emotion-packed days like those of 1941-1953 as genuinely heated debates
became a part of parliamentary process.
Despite these debates, the Majlis remained in the service of
the Shah.^O The call for the dissolution of the Majlis and for freely
contested elections went unheeded. Despite the vote of confidence
given to Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar's government, as prime minister he had
a very shaky month-long rule which finally toppled in the face of
popular agitation and political opposition from forces loyal to Aya-
tollan Khomeini. With the success of the Islamic Revolution came the
end of the Majlis as provided for by the Constitution of 1906-07.
Although the parliament in Iran existed on paper for three-
quarters of a century, in actuality parliamentary rule existed barely
in excess of a decade. The legislature was prevented from establishing
a tradition of independence from which it could seek equality with the
other branches of the government, particularly the executive. The
Majlis was dominated by the aristocracy, particularly the landlords.
After the emergence of Reza Khan and his domination of the administra-
tion of the government, the Majlis for a time was the only arena which
could effectively challenge his authority and control. With the 1928
election, Reza Shah effectively muted the Majlis and gained total
control. Aside from sheer force in subduing the opposition, particu-
larly the Qajars, he cultivated their loyalties in marrying a Qajar.
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The lineage of Iranian aristocracy, better known as the "thousand
fan,„y ... is traced back to the fa„,i,ies of tribal khans; Qashqaies
Bakhtiaries and. of course. Qajars/^ Qajars. who ruled Iran for son.
150 years, incorporated other lesser tribes into the ruling elite durinc
their rule. The tribal elites had control over the fortunes of their
respective tribes and were the unquestioned
.asters of their traditional
tribal territory that, in some instances, included all or parts of
several provinces. The khans and their children, particularly the sons,
had high levels of education (the sons were often sent to Europe or the
united States for education). They lived in the urban centers closest
to their tribal domain (Qashqaie khans lived in their mansions in
Shiraz while the Bakhtiary khans lived in Isfahan). The khans were
recognized as the legitimate power by their respective tribesmen. The
common tribesmen, in contrast to their khans, were illiterate and
extremely poor, even by Iranian standards.
Aside from tribal khans, a major portion of the farming lands
were owned by landlords who had moved to cities in years past but
still had kept control of villages owned by their families. Some such
holdings included several hundred villages and thousands of peasants
--the Alam family holdings in South Khorasan for example. The landlords
rarely visited their holdings but were represented by their agents who
collected royalties. As noted already, this system had its benefits as
well as its shortcomings. ''2 In sum, both the khans and the landlords
had a controlling influence over their respective peoples. As such,
they or their representatives gained access to the parliament. As a
101
TABliE 1
Chronology of National Consultative Assembly (Majlis)
First Majlis
Second Majlis
Third Majlis
Fourth Majlis
Fifth Majlis
Sixth Majlis
Seventh Majlis
Eighth Majlis
Ninth Majlis
Tenth Majlis
Eleventh Majlis
Twelfth Majlis
hirteenth Majlis
ourteenth Majlis (1)
ifteenth Majlis
Sixteenth Majlis
Seventeenth Majlis
ighteenth Majlis
"ineteenth Majlis (2)
wentieth Majlis (3)
wenty-First Majlis
wenty-Second Majlis
wenty-Third Majlis
wen ty- Fourth Majlis
Date inaugurated Date dissolved
August 7, 1906
November 17, 1909
December 6, 1914
June 21, 1921
January 1924
July 6, 1926
October 6, 1928
December 15, 1930
March 15, 1933
June 4, 1935
September 11, 1938
October 27, 1939
November 12, 1941
(1944)
July 15, 1947
February 1950
April 27, 1952
March 15, 1954
May 31, 1956
August 27, 1960
February 21, 1961
October 1963
October 6, 1967
September 1971
September 1975
June 23, 1908
December 24, 1911
November 1915
June 1923
February 1926
May 1928
September 1930
February 1933
March 1935
June 12, 1937
September 1939
October 1941
(1943)
March 12, 1946
August 7, 1949
February 1952
December 19, 1953
April 1956
June 1960
October 1960
May 9, 1961
September 1967
August 1971
August 1975
February 1979
certain condi^nn^M Fourteenth Majlis were conducted under
in far? ^
"^^'"-^ P'^^P^^ elections were held, and,
Majlis!'
''o^^teenth Majlis was a continuation of the Thirteenth
(2) The term of the Majlis was extended from 2 to 4 years.
TwpntHlh°M!-v """fr^
impropriety and rigging in the elections for theent eth Majlis, the elections of June-July 1960 were nullified and
new elections were held in January-February 1961
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result, for n.uch of its life, the
.ajlis remained within the domain
Of the landed aristocracy in their battle to safeguard their privileged
position Vis-a-vis the ruling monarchs. In essence, the Iranian
parliament, for much of its life, was neither a forum to legitimize the
traditional pluralism nor to institute democratic reforms. Despite the
reformist claims of Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi from 1962-1978, he used the
legislature to broaden his power base by eliminating any challenge from
the Majlis in order, he felt, to ensure stability and durability for
Himself and his dynasty. This was a further step in instituting a
political system where all political power emanated from tne throne.
In effect, the Shan became the only viable institution.
fplitical Parties
Political parties in Iran are a product of constitutional
government, emerging for the first time in the Second Majlis in 1910.
The idea of political parties, in fact a political division in the
Majlis, was promoted by Nasir al-Mulk, the first regent for the minor
Ahmad Shah, who was fond of the British Parliamentary system. As a
result, the Majlis was organized into two political groupings. Democrats
and Ettedallion (the moderates). The Democrats were the minority with
some 20 deputies joining their ranks. There had been some political
groupings previously in the fight against Mohammad-Ali Shah for safe-
guarding the constitution. The Democrats had their foundation in the
ranks of the liberals in Tabriz and the workers in the Baku oil fields
in Russian Azarbaijan who had become acquainted with socialist
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theories.^ The Ettedallion were supported by ™ore moderate elements
such as the Bakhtlary Khans, Ephrai™ Khan, the Armenian constitution-
alist, and his comrade-in-arms, Sephadar Azam, who assumed premiership
following^their victory over anti-Constitutionalists led by Mohammad-
Ali Shah.
•'either party, however, had a Western style party
organization. Thus, as the fate of the Majlis fluctuated so did that
of the parties. With the dissolution of the Majlis in November 1915,
the issue of political parties subsided for six years until the elec-
tions of 1921.
Dowreh.^^. Traditionally, the political process in Iran has been
influenced by a system of dowreh.45 D^wreh^ which literally means
circle, is basically a gathering of a number of individuals, between
10 to 15, who share similar interests. Dowrehs serve economic, social
and cultural, as well as political purposes. Although dowrehs exist
among middle class as well as upper class individuals, the ones with
elite membership, of course, are more powerful and wield more political
clout. Members of dowrehs meet regularly, usually once a week or once
every other week. The political dowrehs meet to discuss and exchange infor-
mation regarding prevailing political events. As such, the dowreh
system acts as a channel for dissemination of political news and rumors.
The most significant function of dowreh
, however, is that when a
member is elevated to a politically important position, "there exists
a long established coterie of fellow elites who can be called upon to
fill" other positions attached to the member's new post.^^ Sometimes
a few members of a dowreh are better known or are economically or
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politically more po«erf.l than other members. Such dowrehs are usually
referred to by the „a.e of that influential person or persons. Dowrehs
criss-cross social and political lines. For example, there are dowrehs
representing graduates of a certain foreign university or country. The
membership within a dpwreh remains fairly constant and meetings are
limited to the dowrel^ members. At ti^s the activities of a dow^
are shouded in secrecy.
Although the dowreh system is informal and limited in member-
ship it, nevertheless, wields much influence on the Iranian political
process. M. M. Balfour explained the role of the dowreh at the turn
of the century by noting that "In practice the country is run
.
.
. by
small rings of politicians cooperating with a powerful and corrupt
bureaucracy, whose aim is to enrich themselves so far as possible before
a turn of the political wheel brings their term of office to an end."47
Members of a dpwreh usually belong to the same generation and have a
similar educational background. By having their membership in different
positions within the political structure, the members are assured of
being able to utilize the system for "purposes of mutual welfare."
As noted earlier, there are social and cultural dowrehs as
well. An individual can be a member of several dowrehs
. As such, the
dpwreh provides "multiple association membership," facilitates "contact
with diversity of individuals within and without the elite," and
establishes a system of "reciprocal obligations with as many individuals
representing as diverse sectors of Iranian life as possible. "^^
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The dowreh system was part of the Qajar system; the Qajar kings
were themselves members of the dowrehs.^^ After the transfer of
monarchy from the Qajar dynasty to the Pahlavi dynasty, the dowreh
system retained its influence on the political structure. Even today,
the dpwr^eh system remains influential. Members of dj^wrehs, through
their informal system, assist each other in obtaining positions of
influence in the system. A recent example displaying the importance of
the dowreh system was that, upon the ascendancy of Hassan-Ali Mansur
in 1964 to premiership, members of his cabinet or gained influential
posts in the government.50 Aside from controlling the cabinet, members
of Mansur'
s
d_pwreh also formed the nucleus of Iran Novin (New Iran)
Party which became the dominant political party from 1964-1975. Dowreh
system earlier had also provided the foundation of Mardom (People)
Party, formed in 1957 by Assadollah Alam, a very close confidant of the
Shah, out of the former's dowreh. The Mardom Party remained influen-
tial in the Majlis until 1975 when all parties were dissolved in favor
of a single party-system.
As such, the dowreh system has served as the first stage for
the development of a political party, whereby the membership has been
broadened and opened to the public. However, such a transition served
mainly the political ambitions of the original members who strove for
greater political role by establishing their own political parties.
Such parties also helped to legitimize the political ambitions of the
aspirants. As a consequence, most Iranian political parties remained
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devoid of grassroots support, with the
.ajor exception of the Tudeh
Party.
Powreh system has remained strong within the Iranian political
tradition since it directly benefits the close-knit membership, whereas,
in political parties the individual political gains have to be shared
by a greatly expanded membership and an individual's political actions
and gains become public knowledge. This is contrary to the desires of
most Iranians who prefer secrecy and privacy to maximize their gains.
Nonetheless, the historical analysis of political parties in Iran
reveals a transformation from dowreh to party when such transformations
were deemed useful; otherwise, the dowreh system was retained.
^°Iili^^L£ar^^ D^3p.^^ significance of
the dowreh in the political process of Iran, parties have assumed a
certain significance also. The importance of the party has been due to
the composition of its leadership or to its political ideology. From
1957 until 1978, however, the parties were formed by the government to
give it a sense of legitimacy and an aura of democracy. The Tudeh
(masses) party, with communist ideology, nonetheless, had remained the
best organized political party with a coherent ideology, relying on
"intellectuals and popular agi tiation. "^^
With the opening of the IVth Majlis in 1921, some elements from
the Democratic Party and Ettedalion formed a Socialist Party. Soon,
however, there was a factionalism within the new party between the
younger members who favored Marxism and a close relationship with the
Soviet Union and the second group, who were older and distrusted both
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the Russians and the British. Thus, while the fo^er group found a new
Socialist Party, the latter became known as the Ettedalion. The Ette-
dalion was able to gain a majority in the Vth MajUs which opened In
1923. The Majlis, until 1928. witnessed intense rivalry between the
two parties. The Ettedalion had fallen under the control of the clergy
led by Seyyed Hassan Moddaress. Reza Shah, who had a deep suspicion of
the parliamentary system.S^ by 1928 had gained complete control of the
electoral procedure and thus had turned the Majlis into his virtual
domain.
Reza Shah banned political parties of any kind after 1928.
Nevertheless, there were underground political movements: Communists
led by Dr. Arani and Facscists led by Dr. Jahansuz. Both groups were
uncovered; their members were arrested; and several, along with Dr.
Arani, died in the process.
^^l^^i^^i^^lMeL^^ Following Reza Shah's abdication
in 1941, several parties appeared on the political scene, publishing
newspapers and seeking representation in the Majlis. They represented
divergent political perspectives and, as in many other developing
countries, they were built around one or a few well-known politicians.
It was the personality, philosophy and/or the conviction of the party
leader or leaders that attracted followers. In other words, political
parties became vehicles for the advancement of the politician's goals
and ambitions. The rise or decline of the fortunes of the political
leader directly affected the future of the political party. The Tudeh
Party was an exception. It is most often cited as an example of the
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most effective political party in the Middle East due to its tight
organization and its coherent ideology. The Tudeh "attempted to aggre-
gate through its own organization, and was truly conspi ratorial
.
Its organizational structure was used as a model by other parties as
divergent as Qavvam's Democrat-e Iran Party and Alam's Mardom Party.
During this period political parties were constitutional,
liberal or nationalistic in outlook while a few were surrogates of the
occupying forces (British and Soviets). The beginning of this period
is symbolized by the activities of the Tudeh, supported by the Soviet
Union, and the Iradeh Melli (National Will) Party, led by Seyyed Zia
al-Din Tabatabai which was established with the blessings of the
British to counter the Tudeh.
JMJ[udehJ^ The Tudeh Party has its roots in the Social-
ist movement in Iran which dates back to the first decade of the
present century. Among its early supporters was Iskadar Mirza (later
Iraj Iskandari), a Qajar prince. Prior to any organized Marxist
political party, there had been labor movements in many parts of the
country, initiated mainly by Iranians who worked in the border regions
of Russia, particularly in the Baku oil fields. m the IVth Majlis,
the Socialist Party (Ejtemayoun Amiyoun) which represented some Marxist
sentiments, developed a link with communist-inspired labor organizations
and supported their strikes. Following Reza Shah's accession to the
throne, all political parties were suppressed. Dr. Arani , a physician,
is credited with the establishment of the Communist Party in Iran.^^
Following his return to Iran from Berlin in the early 1930s, he founded
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his group, composed ™inly of students and professionals «1th sympa-
thies for Marxian Ideals. Dr. Arani and 52 of his colleagues were
-rested In 1937 and tried under the 1931 Act forbidding co„™un1st
activities. All were sentenced to long prison terms and Dr. Arani
reportedly was murdered in nrUnn 57 _u a prison. The Communist Party reemerged as
the Tudeh Party in January 1942 as a result of the ''new wartime democ-
racy" which was enjoyed following the occupation of the country by the
Allies in 1941. The leadership of the Tudeh consisted mostly of those
members of the Communist Party who had just been freed from prison.
The Party was also joined by others, naaely Seyyed Jaffar Pishevarl,
who later gained fame as a result of his position in the Azarbaijan
separatist movement in 1945-46.
The Tudeh had an organization similar to other communist
parties with a Central Executive Committee and a Control Commission. ^8
The party operated several papers and had subsidiary organizations for
students, women, workers, and peasants. It also collaborated with
other political groups such as the Anti-Fascist Society in the
communist-oriented United Front.^^ The Tudeh, however, avoided revolu-
tionary rhetoric. "Its platform included all the essential features of
traditional liberalism"; there was no mention of collectivization or
nationalization of private properties. The party, nonetheless,
remained strongest in the Russian zone of occupation. The Tudeh, for
the first time, gained eight seats in the XlVth Majlis, inaugurated in
early 1944.^0 The Tudeh faced its first challenges from within its own
ranks, when, with Soviet support, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, the
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provincia, a™s of the T.deh 1n Azerbaijan, and the Kurdish Democratic
Party (K..elah) in Kurdistan announced the autonomy of their respective
regions in 1945. The Azerbaijan De„»cratic Party, under the leadership
of Pishevari. in September declared Azerbaijan an autonon»us state In
December, he severed relations with the central government in Tehran
and declared the separation of Azerbaijan.61 The Kurdish separatist
.novement. centered in the Mahabad Republic, was led by Qazi Mohammad,
elected as its president.
The blow to the communist movement, in general, and to the
Tudeh, in particular, was severe. The party's central committee in
Tehran, however, tried to keep its distance from the separatist move-
ments. Nevertheless, the party had appeared as the covert front for
Soviet ambitions in Iran which brought back to attention the imperial-
ist Tzarist aims of reaching the warm waters of the Indian Ocean
through Iran. Such a process was seen to be undertaken through dis-
memberment of the nation through separatist movement under the guise
of the Tudeh. In Cottam's words, many Tudeh members for the first time
understood that "the objectives of Iranian nationalism and international
communism were inherently contradictory."" As a result, many of the
Tudeh membership split and established their own separate organizations
or cooperated with other leftist groups. Khalil Maleki was one such
individual who joined Qavvam's Iran Democratic Party, later joined by
Dr. Muzafar Baqai who finally established his own Third Force Party, a
Titoist association.
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The Tudeh, following the Azarbaijan and Kurdistan affairs
was reduced in influence and prestige. With the assassination attempt
on the Shah in 1949 blamed on it. its activities were prohibited and
™de illegal." Tudeh activities, however, continued underground,
resurfacing in the early 1950s with increased anti-British agitation
centered on the issue of nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com-
pany. In ™id-1953. Dr. Mossadegh used the Tudeh and its organization
to counter the rightist and pro-monarchist activities against his
government. The Tudeh was allowed a public demonstration on July 21.
1n the Majlis square where the sa^ morning the National Front had held
their meeting. The Tudeh attracted between 50.000 to 100.000 people-
five to ten times more than the National Front.65 Once again the Tudeh
had shown its political strength and vitality.
Following the abortive coup led by pro-Shah officers on August
16, the Shah fled the country and most organizers of the coup, including
General Zahedi
.
went into hiding. From a historical perspective, the
greatest mistake took place when the Tudeh turned out mobs who pulled
down Reza Shah's statues and "raised red flags over the city." In
Guilan Province, the Tudeh elements took control of the government.
Suddenly the Tudeh had emerged as the chief threat to Dr. Mossadegh's
government, which was ironic because he had thought that he was
employing the Tudeh to further his own aims. He struck back on August
18 by ordering the dispersal of the Tudeh mobs. Within a few hours
the Tudeh as in retreat.
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'-^^S-^^^^!^°mcmi^PmL. I„ 1945, Ahmad Qavvan, (Qavvam al-
Saltaneh) established the Iran Democratic Party during his premiership
The main objective of this party «as to sustain Qavvam's premiership.
It established a central committee with nine members and had a youth
and women's organization connected with It. Almost all the politicians
of any consequence had joined the ranks of the Iran Democratic Party
with the exception of Dr. Mossadegh, who was seen as a "bull In a
china shop." Politicians with close connection to the Court were also
avoided. Ahmad Qavvam Invited the Tudeh and the Iran Party to join
the Iran Democratic Party in a coalition. The coalition was seen as
an attempt on Qavvam's part to weaken the Tudeh Party and to help him
to pack the Majl1s,68 the elections for which had been delayed since
early 1946 by a legislative rule that forbade holding of elections so
long as there remained foreign troops 1n Iran.^^ This legal bind had
left the nation without a parliament for almost a year and a half until
the elections for the XVth Majlis were concluded in July 1947. The
absence of a legislative assembly gave Qavvam a freer hand in the con-
ducting of affairs of state, particularly In his negotiations with the
Soviet Union regarding the affairs of Azarbaijan.
Three Tudeh members joined Qavvam In his 1946 cabinet to dis-
play good faith and an eagerness to work closely with the Soviet Union
in resolving the conflict over Azarbaijan and to give Qavvam a show of
continued support for the oil agreement with the Soviet Union which
needed the ratification of the Majlis whose elections were postponed
until all Soviet troops were removed from Iranian soil. In the
113
elections of 1947, 85 out of 136 deputies were affiliated with Qavva^'s
Iran Democratic Party, the rest going mostly to the candidates of the
court who were elected following the army's entrance to Azarbaijan
after the Soviet withdrawal. Qavvam's control over the Majlis, however,
declined sharply when his acquiescence to the Soviet demands were made
public. Qavvam had worked out an agreement with the Soviets, including
a 51 percent share in an oil concession to them in northern Iran.^^
This was in dire contrast to the Majlis guidelines that forbade any
such talks prior to an approval by the Majlis. The Russo-Iranian Oil
agreement was rejected by a vote of 100 to 2. A subsequent vote of no
confidence resulted in the resignation of Qavvam as prime minister and
the appointment of Ebrahim Hakimy on December 27, 1947 as the new
premier.
Iran Party
.
The Iran Party was formed primarily as an engin-
eers association in 1941. In 1943, at the urging of Alahyar Saleh, an
engineer-politician and later a prominent figure in the National Front,
it became a political party and adopted its name. Due to its composi-
tion from the ranks of the educated and intellectuals, it was a valu-
able ally for those advocating radical reforms and modernization. The
party joined Qavvam in a coalition with the Tudeh. Although the coali-
tion was shortlived, the Iran Party attained prominence. 7'' It joined
other parties in the National Front led by Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh,
advocating radical reforms, nationalism, and nationalization of the
oil industry.
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'-^^^^^^^^^^^J^^J^i^^^^^^ With the decline of
Qavva™ and his party,
.any new political parties ca.e into being «hose
leaders had been his associates. Ba.ai established the Toilers Party
He had been elected to the XVth Hajlis (1947-49) under the banner of
Qavvam's Iran Democratic Party, but he split with Qavva. a year later
to for. the Organization for Supervising the Freedom of Elections in
his native Kerman in preparation for the elections for the XVIth Majlis
in 1950. After his election this organization was changed to Organiza-
tion for Supervising the Implementation of the Law. Following Dr.
Mossadegh's accession to premiership, Baqai brought together all his
political organizations under the Tollers Party and later joined Dr.
Mossadegh's National Front coalition.
The Toilers Party is an example of the middle class parties
that were used as vehicles of personal interests. Contrasted with the
Toilers Party is the case of organizations such as the Iran Party that
represented class interests. Leonard Binder notes that the platforms
of the Toilers Party and Iran Party "were essentially programs rather
than reasoned systems of values," and, as such, they were similar. The
Tollers Party, under the leadership of Dr. Baqai and his personal
approach, attempted "to achieve power through cooperation and bargaining
with existing, even traditional, leaders of groups or interests. "'^
Such an approach, however, resulted in the distrust of Dr. Baqai and
some of his associates In the Toilers Party by Dr. Mossadegh. The
friction resulted in a split in the Toilers Party, resulting in the
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formation of a new group called the Third Force under the leadership
of Khali 1 Maleki.
M^:ii^ce.^^j^^
Khalil Maleki had been a
member of the original Communist Party, Jailed and suppressed under
Reza Shah. Following the establishment of the Tudeh by the remnants of
the communist group, Maleki had become a member of the Tudeh. However,
he broke with Tudeh and established the Iranian Socialist Society as
the only "true" communist party in Iran. The Socialist Society was
dissolved upon Soviet opposition to Maleki 's claim. Maleki subsequently
joined Dr. Baqai and gained prominence through the latter's political
organization. Upon the split, Maleki expounded on the nature of his
party's anti-communism and its promotion of "Nehru Socialism,"
"Titoism," and "West European Socialism." After a brief detention
following the Shah's return to power, Maleki resumed his anti-communist
activities mainly by translating articles for his journal. ^3
PilLliarmts. Historically, the Pan-Iranists have been divided
into two groups. Hezb-e Mellat-e Iran (Iranian Nation's Party) led by
Dariush Foruhar was formed from the followers of Dr. Jahansuz and was
basically anti-communist. Its rank and file was composed of members
of bazaar guilds and small merchants. This group cooperated with
Dr. Mossadegh and until 1979 was part of the National Front.
The second group, under the leadership of Dr. Munshizadeh, grew
out of Sumka (National Socialist Workers Party of Iran). The party
opposed the Tudeh, but it also criticized Dr. Mossadegh and cooperated
with the Court. Sumka reportedly had a working relationship with
116
General Zahedi and some other right-wing generals. Su.ka was banned
along with all other parties, during General Zahedi ^s peremiership.
It was asked, however, to participate in the Shah's birthday celebra-
tions in 1954 by putting a wreath on Reza Shah's grave.
The Sumka split into several factions during the 1950s. Arya
Party was formed by the Sepher brothers as a result of an internal
dispute. It later joined the Mardum (People) Party. Another group,
led by Abbas Amini, split from the party, calling itself Feday-e
Iranshah (sacrifices for Shah) Party in 1956. Another group led by
Dr. Fazl-ollah Sadr left the party in 1967 and formed the Iranian Party.
The remnants of the party are presently known as Pan Iranists, led by
Mr. Mohsen Pezeshkpour who had been a deputy in the Majlis from 1964
until 1978.
The Sumka ideology was patterned after the Nazi Party in
Germany "glorifying the struggle for power above all else, stressing
racialism, attacking capitalism and imperialism, (and) attacking democ-
racy."^^
Fundamentalists
,. Two groups that gained national prominence
in the late 1940s and early 1950s were Fedaeyan-e Islam and Mjuahedeen-e
Islam. 77 jhe former, led by Navvab Safavi
,
gained fame by the assassina-
ation of Premier Haj Ali Razmara in 1951 and other political violence
including assassinations and attempted assassinations. 7^ The group,
although underground, remained active during the 1950s and 1960s as
seen by the attempted assassination of Premier Hussein Ala in 1955 and
the assassination of Premier Hassan-Ali Mansur in 1965. The Fedaeyan
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-s an fundamentalist g.oup. They were also motivated by
nat1o„al1s.
"seeMng to p.Hf, the Persian language and
.unite the
t-1an-SM.ite lands as well as to establish an Isla.ic go™
under an Imam.'"^^
The Mujahedeen-e Isla. was led by Sha.s Qanat-abadi and had
Close association with Mulla Kashani. a
.ember of the clergy and a
Ma,l,s deputy. Li,e the Fedaeyan, the Mujahedeen were also national-
istic and fundamentalists. The two groups cooperated for a short
While, but the opposition of the Fedaeyan to the traditional clergy,
of which Kashani was one, led to their eventual split.80 The
Mujahedeen was basically a political organization built by Safavi and
nurtured by Kashani to further their ai.s of pan-Islamism. With the
break between Dr. Mossadegh and Mulla Kashani. brought about by the
former's heavy reliance on the Tudeh to accomplish his goals, the
coalition between the National Front and the Mujahedeen was severed
and the latter, as a viable political group, was nullified.
^^^i^5naLFm]juyet^^ Following the decline of
Qavvam's Iran Democratic Party, many of its members joined Dr. Mossa-
degh in the National Front: Dr. Shayegan, Hussein Makki, and Amir
Alaee among many. The National Front was a coalition of several
political parties, including the Iran Party, Toilers Party, The Third
Force Party, and the Pan Iranists led by Darisuh Foruhar. The National
Front coalition was composed of elements representing all social classes
and all segments of the body politic including right and left, upper-
class and lower-class, professionals and farmers, as well as clergy and
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secular. The front was composed of political le..» •'^3ders united behind
'
- political pre.o.i.nce of Z
—
.... --ossaae..
,
a. ,eco.e the personification Of the iran-
*™n^ for political independence and national di.nit,. M such
ne was accepted and truqtori h„ ,
increasing public as an 'abso-lutely trustworthy leader who deserved their wholehearted and
-critical support... The
..symbolic leadership., of Or. Hossadegh and
e formation of political groupings behind him gave the National Pront
the Vitality for it to become the dominant political factor from 1951
to 1953. The groups represented in the National Pront ranged from the
and, ideologically, the center-left dominated the political perspec-
tive. The disparate nature of the front, however, made possible only
the broadest and most general policy platforms.
In sum. the political parties of this period, for the most
part, remained short-lived and as the political fortune of its leader/
leaders declined so did the party. Thus, only a few of the parties of
this period lasted more than a few years. The main exceptions were the
Tudeh and the National Front, both of which went underground following
the overthrow of Mossadegh. Patterns of membership and support differed
greatly. While party discipline and organized cell-structure prevailed
in the Tudeh Party, others, such as the fundamentalist groups, had
loose organizations and a changing pattern of affiliation. The National
Front, due to its broad scope of affiliation, had the largest national
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ot.e. pa..es
.enected cuss an.
,„,e.ests, 1„
;
— -1.es Of pe.o„al po^lca, amnions
Effect,ve
^..e.shlp
.ost parties was so^he.e between a few
'
hundred to a few thniiQ;inH -.--pousand. If even that, at the high point of their
popularity.
'^^-^^^^^^-^^^i^^^^Mi^ Following the fan o.Dr Hossa
an political parties, even those friendl, to the court, were
suppressed,
.either prl^
.master Zahedl (1953-1955) nor HusseinAU (1955-195;) were friendl, towards the Idea of formation of politi-
cal parties. The Tudeh was severely repressed. Following the
uncovering of an alleged ring of over 500 Tudeh sympathisers within
the ranks of the armed forces, the Tudeh's resistance had hro.en down
and Its organization was 1n d1sarra..83
^^^^
the country and regrouped 1„ Eastern Europe with East Berlin as their
center of political activities. Although son. Tudeh elements remained
active among Iranian student organizations in the West, their signifl-
cance was negligible.
J^^^J*!^Mm^s:(stm. Beginning in 1957, two political parties
were forced by the Shah's closest aides, Asadolla Alam and Dr. Manuchehr
Eqbal, at the urging of the United States. The former na^d his party
Mardum (People), while the latter called his Melliyoun (Nationalists).
Since Dr. Eqbal had been appointed prime minister in 1957. his party
became the government party while Mardum remained the opposition. In
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the Shah's own words thp pc+^^kt uestablishment of these parties was "helped
Of sent™ desire on the pan of the Americans andy ' "-«"1-er-t.pe of democracy (l„
.ve an air Of democrat th'
;
—
-eain..es.ste.
.as con-trolled by the Shah since he was the fln,i ,
,
.
authority who approved the
I'st Of candidates for the Majlis elections. «4
Neither party had any grassroots support and their memberships
-tly consisted, i„ the one case, of the members of Alam's dowreh
Civil servants Who. by
Hen.youn party, had hoped to advance their positions within the ,ov-e-nt.sa
,,,,,3
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^
Of course" parties. The two parties, nevertheless, were supposed tohave some ideological differences. Mardum represented itself as a
-formist party favoring land reforms,
"labor welfare, e.ual rights for
women, and social insurance." The Melliyoun. on the other hand
represented a more traditional mode of the country with its ran^ and
f'le dependent on individuals who enjoyed much influence and access to
sources of power within the establishment. Its ideology differed
little from that of Mardum, but it stressed free medical service, labor
benefits, purification of the Persian language, and "physical exercise
and scouting. "^7
Corruption and ballot box rigging i„ the 1960 elections, mostly
as a result of Dr. Eqbal's excesses, led the Shah to nullify the elec-
tions. 88 Dr. Eqbal's prompt resignation was asked and new elections
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--.o.eMa„U.o.Kas.a.-
e.c.ons
.o. XX.
:'^^-r^^^^^'^'^^------ee,ec.o.a..,,.
e .oHa P.SS to CO..
.e e,ection p.cess. T.e opposU.on
.e.
the occasion as an opportunity to increase its activities ^0 The
-tlonai Pront revived its activities ana
.e,a its W.est post-,S53
e.onstration in ,,a,. The Pront also „eico.. to its ran.s «eh.at-eA-di Iran (Freedo. Hove„,ent oMran)
, ,ed by Hehdl Bazargan and
Ayatollah Nah.oud Tale.hanl.^l The Preedo. Hove.ent was a coalition
Of activists
.ith ,s,a.ic orientation with a polltica, 5ase a^ong thebazaans, clergy and students.
With the resignation of Dr. A^ini fro™ premiership in ,962 the
new.y appointed premier, AsadoHah Ala™, proposed a coalition gove^n-
-t to the National front. The proposition fel, through when the gap
between the Shah and the National front proved unbridgeable.^^
On^dj^nnanljart^s^ following the January 1953 refer-
endum approving the Shah sponsored ^asures which becan,e known as the
White Revolution," a government sponsored congress of Free Hen and
Won,en of Iran was inaugurated in Tehran. This congress beca^ the
foundation of the Iran Novin (New Iran) Party. led by Hassan-Ali Hansur
and the members of his dowreh. Some 85 percent of the deputies of the
XXIst Majlis that had been opened in October promptly joined the new
party with the remaining going to Alam's Mardum Party, functioning
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"
as t.e „,i„o.u. pan.. I.e. also t..ee deputies f.o. tHe
'--"--Mc. .a. r.an1an claims to Ba..e,„ isUn.s and
IT' " " - - p'-o™.
-.p.nica, Pames „e.es™ and we.e not a„o„e. to co.etefor seats 1n either house of parliament.
The dominance of Iran Novin in the Iranian political process
lasted for
,2 .ears under the leadership of A^ir Ahhas Hoveida who he-
ca.e the pri,„e minister in 1965 after the assassination of Mansur
O^^in, this period the Shah was able to manipulate the Iranian political
process including the legislature through the party and, thus, to
legislate his own policies. However, the public remained indifferent
and apathetic to the political process devised by the Shah. Voter
turnout at elections was scant and those who participated did so often
under pressure from their supervisors at government or factory Jobs
During the late 1960s and the 1970s extremist attacks on the
government, in the for. of guerrilla operations, began to appear with
increased frequency. Although the police and SAVAK were able to
neutralize the guerrilla operations to a great extent, they were never
effectively neutralized.
UiM^Jm^Lllstem. In the face of growing opposition to
his increasingly oppressive rule, the Shah, in order to broaden the
base of support for his rule, envisioned politicizing the whole adult
population of the country and to involve everybody in the political
process. This approach was based on the assumption that the silent
majority, particularly the working class and the farmers, supported his
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-t.e po,U,ca, process, he cou,. offset the cHtlcls. of the oppos-
U,on. Rasta.h1z-e MeHi (National Resurgence) Pan., 1„ Ha.ch ,975
beca.e the on,, offlca,,. sanctioned polUIca, pan. 1„ the count./
An other previous,, sanctioned panies were dissolved and Joined the
-ks Of the new part.. The political phllosoph. of Rasta.hiz was
based on three fundamentals:
"The Shah-People Revolution" (The White
Revolution,; the Institution of anarch, as an Inseparable pan of the
lran,an soclo-poHtlcal s.ste.; and adherence to the constitution of
1906-07. Within this framework. It was envisioned that diverse politi-
cal opinion could be formed so long as the funda^ntal principles were
adhered to. The part, was Intended as a pennanent Institution and
membership 1„ the part, was seen as an Indication of lo.alt. to the
".onarch..94
^hus the Shah had declared that "Ever.one must be man
enough to clarlf. his position In this countr.. He either approves of
the conditions or he does not." Therefore, an Iranian not joining the
Rastakhiz Part, was rejecting the principles set fonh and was regarded
by the Shah as a "traitor who should be In an Iranian prison, or should
leave the countr.."^^
^he Iranian press actual,, carried repons on
one person who opted to leave the country. Therefore, the assumption
was that a,l who had remained were lo.al to the principles of the
Rastakhiz Part.. Neighborhood branches of the part, were set up a„
over the country. B. ,976, there were 7,289 urban and ,3,578 rural
.nits of the part, with some 2.4 million ambers. sUce membership
in the part, was rumored to be compulsor., man. had actuall. joined
for fear of reprisals and attendance at meetings was ver. poor.
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The organizational apparatus of the party mc.ed at Us head
With 25 members. Some of the party leader, h.n . .Md s had had experience in
party organization as members of thp t,.h ^
_ , ,
"^'"^ly Mohammad Baheri andMahmoud Jafarian.
^ anticipation of divergent oolif 1 •p litical views and to
contro, s.ch
.lews, two ,ead1n,
.ethers o. the
.ove^ent,
.a^sheed
A™.e,ar and Hushang Ansarl, were designated respective,, as the
leaders of the Progressive'' and Constructive', wings of the part.
under the auspices of the party, elections were held in August 1975
-
wMch onl. the candidates of the Rasta.hiz Part, would compete for
seats.
The economic problems of 1977. with rising unemployment, ra.-
Pant inflation and shortage of raw materials and food stuffs, on top
Of the ever increasing gap between the poor and the rich, was straining
the political structure as well. Oa.sheed Amuzegar, previously the
leader of the Progressi ve^^ wing i„ the party which believed that 'too
h^gh Of a price should not be paid for economic development,^^ was as.ed
to for. a cabinet. Hoveida. after 13 years of premiership, the longest
the constitutional history of Iran, resigned. Amuzegar^s appoint-
^nt. although he was a reform minded technocrat, was a disappointment
for many. Public opinion had been made ready for the appointment of a
prime minister who would not be connected with the Shah and his polit-
ical apparatus. The rumors had persistently namd All Amini. the one
time prime minister from 1961-62 as the probable candidate.
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The Change in the govern^nt 1„ 1977 coincided with the
-;;-----a.te..
_,enc. in
..ington With his p.o.se
o-.poiic.
-ncidin, With Ca.e.s election to the p^sidenc.
-
also a
.elative
..edo. of p.ss in
5ec« one ot the
.>st targets
.0. c.ticis. h. the p.ss. The polit-
ical alienation and indignation that had heen
..wing as the
.esult 0.
the establishment of a single political pan,,
.ased on pHnciples
-cn gene.all, had little s.ppo.t fro. the p.hlic, h.st into the open
Even the Shah himself c.tici.ed the pan. fo. its co.^ption, ineffi-
'
c-ncy and deviation f.o. his goals and ambitions. Howeve., it was
Rastakhiz ticket, declared their Independence from the party "
the end of the year, the number of Majlis deputies who challenged the
government and Its policies had reached two dozen.^^
,,,,
revolutionary fervor, the Shah and the institution of the Rastakhiz
Party that he had built and had envisioned to endure beyond his life-
time crumbled before him.
LMel_sumMri. This brief history of Iranian political
parties clearly Indicates that, while gaining control of the institu-
tions of government, the Shah was not Interested in political parties
that would have had grassroots support. I.e., parties that would
develop from the public need for a vehicle of political expression.
The parties since 1957 had been created by the governn^nt and given a
philosophical framework based on support for the Shah, with attempts
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vehicles of public political expressions ThP„
or Ipnif .
P^-essi . ey never gained popularityMegu^cy.th the public. The parties that had grassroots support
« the national Pront and Tudeh, were suppressed, it is inte
est,ng to note that the Shah, i„ January 1979, relied on a
.e.her of
the National Pront, Dr. Shahpour Ba.htiar. to save the monarchy. By
the ti.e Of Hoha^ad-Reza Shah's abdication in January 1979, so.e 100
political parties and groups had co.e into existence vying for polit-
F-t, were Just emerging fro. underground, *reas.
.any other parties
had just been founded.
Media
The recent experience of the „,edia has been similar to that of
other institutions. Just as there was freedom of expression in the
niedia during the periods of relative political freedom, nan^ly ,941-53,
so the „,edia was controlled by the authoritarian rule very much like
the political parties and other political institutions.
Mnteij^. The press, newspapers and magazines were introduced to
Iran early in the 19th century. During the Constitutional Revolution,
the press was greatly responsible for disseminating democratic ideals
and principles that resulted in the adoption of the Constitution of
1906-07.
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The press suffered fro. t.e autho.1tan-a„ and repressive rule
PollticaMroups and parties. For exa.ple, durin, this period the
T.de. Part, and Its affiliate organizations puMlshed so.e ,0 separate
newspapers or magazines with t-i,„9 . Wu the coup against Dr. Mossadegh and the
-rn 0. Shah to power, an the newspapers and magazines associatedUh the political groups that had supported Dr.
.ossadegh were
.anned
only a few Independents, namely Ke^ ^nd Ettel^.^, remained In oper-
ation. The content of these papers, however, was controlled and
censored.
The censorship and unreliability of news, especially domestic
rendered the press Ineffective as a vehicle of news reporting
,n
fact, the most popular pages of the two leading evening Tehran papers^ and EtteW. were the obituary and the classified sections.
'
The 1963 Press Laws greatly reduced the number of newspapers
and and news magazines thus further undermining the effectiveness of
the press. The law forbade the publication of newspapers with circula-
tion of less than 3,000 copies and magazines with less than 5,000. In
1970, an optimistic estimate of press circulation In Iran Included
200,000 copies of dally newspapers, 50,000 copies of weekly newspapers,
200,000 copies of weekly magazines. 20,000 copies of monthly magazines,
and 30,000 copies of almanacs.
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The newspapers, however servpH n
i.f. '
P'^'P^^^ 0^ disseminatinqinformation on new policiec; ^nr^ .
^
directives
^^th the establishment of the Rastakhiz Party a n^n r , ew morning dailv
appropriately called Rastakhiz as it was th. f.- •official newspaper of thpparty, was added to the short list of Iranian
1n a very short ti^
''"^
' " spokes-
a Of the
,o.ern™ent that its editorials and news releases were carefully read by the interpst^H „ u-,
Placed government
urncials would resort tnto the newspaper as their primary source of
-formation and guidelines for new government policies
«nh increased economic problems and desparate urban problems.
-spapers criticizing government officials but never reaching the
^IS^est Officials. By
.id-l.;a, when the revolution was well unde.ay
-^"cism Of highly placed individuals.
.„y close confidants of the
'
Shan, began to appear in the papers ;tin .-h. Still there was no direct criti-
cism of the Shah or the roval fam^i,, tuy family. There even was some support for
the Shah. Who. according to the then highly respected editor of the
independent Kho^,
,3ghar Amirani. had been misled by the
corrupt Officials of the government. Soon after this assertion in an
was a large drop in sales. However, with relative freedom and relaxa-
tion of censorship on the press, circulation of daily papers such as
MMH and EtMl,^ reached a million copies a day. Following the
demonstrations in Tehran on November 4 and 5, the Shah installed a
130
military government headed by the armed forces' chief of staff. General
Azhari. With the imposition of censorship and curtailment of press
rights that had been guaranteed by the outgoing prime minister Sharief-
Emami, the press went on strike and the majority of the newspapers,
including Keyhan and Ettela'at
,
did not publish for two months, until
January 6, 1979 when Shahpour Bakhtiar's government was installed. ""^^
In 1967, following the reorganization of the Ministry of Edu-
cation, a new ministry called Ministry of Arts and Culture, headed by
Mehrdad Pahlbod, the Shah's brother-in-law, was established. This
ministry, along with Ministry of Information and Tourism, was delegated
power over publication of newspapers, magazines and books. Many books
waited for years at the Ministry of Arts and Culture to be approved for
publication. Those that did, obviously applauded the government's
perspective. Often there would be so much of a book deleted in order
to get the government's approval that the authors would forego the
publication of the book. Those writers who had dared to make any direct
or even indirect criticism of the Shah were harshly dealt with, often
with torture and imprisonment. As a result, very few books dealing
with the socio-political situation in Iran were approved for publica-
tion. The book publishing industry in Iran was in a bleak state. Few
books ever went beyond the first printing. Anything over 3,000 copies
was regarded as a best seller. Most of the 1,500 titles published in
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Iran during 1976-77 were on literary and religious subjects. In
short, the interested public had little opportunity to read expository
works on socio-political issues.
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The classical tradition of poetry remained a vehicle for some
to express their political frustrations and thus to communicate with
those who searched for elusive meanings. Reza Barahani
, an Iranian
writer and poet, notes that "Iranian poetry is full of double-and-
tripled-tongued metaphors. One meaning opens the secrets of repression
to the people; the other conceals them from the curious eyes of the
censors. Thus, the new school of Iranian poetry is written on one hand
from the viewpoint of the people and on the other from that of the
police." Furthermore, Iranian writers go through "ingenious methods
to get permission from the government censors" to publish their books.
Barahani, for example, concedes that he wrote a whole piece on "the
situation of repression in the country and simply signed it Bertolt
Brecht." The piece was published without any problems since Brecht was
on the approved list.^^-^
In contrast, 1978 experienced a tremendous boom in the sale of
books, mostly the previously banned books by both Iranian and foreign
writers. Sidewalk book stalls sprouted all over Tehran and all major
cities, offering books on social and political, as well as critical
literary works. Although many books were being pirated, there was a
flourishing book publishing business, with many books going into second
and third printings in a matter of one year. The Iranians, who only
five years before were reading an average of less than 30 seconds of
1 04books per year, had turned into avid readers of all kinds of publi-
cations, including newspapers, magazines and books.
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ElectronlcjTigdia. Although the first radio station in Iran was estab-
lished in 1940, many Iranians still tuned into the stations in the
neighboring countries, Turkey and the Soviet Union. The program of
the first radio station in Iran was most devoted to the praise of Reza
Shah and his modernizing achievements. The radio system in Iran, since
its establishment, has been state owned and operated. Thus, it always
has been the instrument of government policies and propaganda. The
radio networks broadcast the government version of the news. It also
had programs geared towards farmers and workers along with general
entertainment.
The National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT), in the late
1970s, had a transmitting station in all major cities with some pro-
grams in the local languages and dialects. The country was also
covered by two 2,000 kilowatt stations. Among major Asian nations,
after Japan, Iran had the highest number of radio receivers per capita
(see TABLE 3). Thus, the radio networks were becoming an increasingly
TABLE 3
The number of radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants in some
Asian countries*
Bahrein (1974) 412 Iraq (1974) 116
Hong Kong (1975) 574 Japan (1975) 465
India (1974) 25 Kuwait (1974) 231
Iran (1974) 249 Lebanon (1974) 474
*Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook: 1976, Table 217,
p. 944.
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effective means of communication in the country. Despite the revolu-
tionary fervor and relaxation of press censorship, the radio networks,
except on a few occasions, never achieved the freedom to disseminate
news which the press had during most of 1978. A large portion of radio
listeners, during the 1978 uprising, listened to the British Broad-
casting Company (BBC) programs in Farsi to learn of the events in Iran
and to get a firsthand report of the political developments, particu-
larly in the absence of newspapers during the military government of
General Azhari in November and December 1978. Since the 1950s, two
radio stations, Paik-e Iran and Radio Melli-e Iran, both Soviet
sponsored, had been broadcasting news to Iranian listeners on a daily
basis. These stations, however, ended their activities following the
improvement of Iranian relations with the Soviet Union and were both
off the air by 1976.
The first television station in Iran began operation in 1958.
Within a short time another station in Abadan, southwestern Iran, began
operations. These two private stations, along with an American Armed
Forces Radio and Television station, were the only television stations
in the country until the mid-1960s. Although the two stations were
private, nevertheless, their broadcasts, especially the news programs,
were controlled by the government. The government, under the auspices
of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, set up television stations
in Tehran and other major cities and soon brought under its control
both of the privately owned stations. The American stations, radio and
television, however, continued their independent course until 1977 when
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they were taken over by NIRT. The programming of these stations, how-
ever, remained in English and was basically intended for the foreign
community residing in Iran.
Television broadcasting, despite having been in private hands
for several years, remained a tool of government propaganda. Like the
radio networks, it never achieved a respectable position as a reliable
source of domestic news so far as the public was concerned. The
entertainment programs of the television stations were mostly of a
foreign nature, mainly American. The domestically produced programs,
although dealing critically with certain social problems, nevertheless,
avoided prevailing political issues. The television media, particularly
during the last decade, was used effectively as a propaganda medium.
The evening news, news shows and special shows were used to publicize
the policies of the government and its achievements and to praise the
Shah and the benefits of his reforms for the nation, and thus attempted
to gain support for his rule. Furthermore, on occasion some philosoph-
ical debates would be conducted on the air to display the openness of
the television media as a vehicle for dissemination of ideas. The
debates, howe\/er, would center on issues least relevant to the on-going
problems of the country. According to the government's plan, by the
end of the 1970s, the television medium would have covered some 70 per-
cent of the population of the country, and thus would have been an
effective medium of communication.
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S umma ry
With the centralization of authority in Tehran achieved by
Reza Shah and the supremacy of monarch over other institutions, a new
era in the Iranian political process began. Despite the stipulations
in the Constitution of 1906-07 dividing the government into three
separate but equal branches, the executive, led by Reza Shah and later
by Mohammad-Reza Shah, manipulated the legislature and the judiciary.
The decade following the Allied occupation of Iran with Reza Shah
deposed saw rule of law brought back to the country. However, with
the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh's government in 1953, the political
power reverted back to the hands of the monarch, with other institu-
tions, once again, subjugated to the policies of the court. The
dominance of the institution of monarchy, naturally, meant the weakness
of other institutions. Contributing to the inability of the legisla-
ture and political parties to withstand the pressures of the monarchy
was the use of such institutions by individuals for personal purposes.
Political parties were mainly vehicles of the personal ambitions of one
or more politicians. Such parties lacked organization, discipline, and
coherent ideology. The legislature, furthermore, functioned as an arena
for political power brokers and political opportunists, landed aristoc-
racy who dominated the Majlis through the 1950s. Although at times
moved by nationalist aspirations, the Majlis deputies represented a
more traditional cross-section of the country and resisted changes that
would cause any weakening of their traditional power bases. The con-
flict between the Shah and the legislature was resolved, with the
136
former in total control, when the Shah led land reforms that debased
the landed aristocracy, thus changing the Shah from an authoritarian
ruler to a totalitarian one. This re-established the power of the
Shah over all other political institutions. The Shah, nonetheless,
retained "democratic-looking" institutions to be able to laud himself
as a liberal-minded monarch who utilized a constitutional process in
running the affairs of the state. Only a shell remained of the consti-
tutional political system of the nation after the monarch had destroyed
or weakened other contending institutions, thus making the monarchy the
pervasuve institution. No thought was given to the prospect that per-
haps there lurked a danger for the monarchy in a weakened constitutional
process where the inadequacies of the political institutions did not
allow them to withstand political threats from within. As such, the
Rastakhiz Party and the legislature were in no position to come to the
aid of the monarchy at its darkest hour.
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CHAPTER III
INDIVIDUALISM AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Like so many attributes of Iranian society, the political ideal
of the nation and its religious sentiments are in contrast and antip-
athy to each other. The traditional political ideal calls for a strong
and benevolent leader, while Shiah doctrine holds all temporal powers
illegitimate. This contrast is reflected in the outlook of the members
of the society who are torn between these two opposing traditions.
Although one feeling may win out as the overriding reality for a time,
the other twin, nonetheless, lingers on until the time for its rise to
political supremacy comes. Many regard Shi 'ism as a philosophical out-
come of the Iranian cultural tradition which is estranged from the
rational-political world as a result of a history that has been filled
with phsyical insecurities resulting from Mongol
, Turkic and Afghan
invasions, to name but a few, coupled with natural catastrophies such
as disease, earthquake and drought. These have rendered the average
Iranian a very insecure person who feels that the course of his life is
generally out of his control. Depending on myth, magic and fate serve
as an escape from the harsh realities of the world. The result is a
person turned inside. Since God is held to be just, therefore, one
has no fear of relegating oneself unto His hands. The earthly life may
be harsh but it is believed to be only a testing ground to prove one's
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devotion to the Creator. Piety and communion with God take precedence
over one's relationships with fellow beings. Mysticism is a natural
outgrowth of this metaphysical and nonrational philosophy. Disregard
for temporalities, as already noted, render all things related to them
as superfluous and unnecessary, including the political apparatus. The
only legitimate political authority that matters is belief in the
Hidden Imam whose return is sought to bring justice to the world.
Thus the individual is on his own without any attachments or
responsibilities to political authority or to society in general. His
responsibility is to his family, both immediate and extended. Disregard
for society in general influences the development/lack of development
of political institutions in the country. For example, the formation
of political parties, the bureaucracy, the cabinet, and even the per-
sonal and dictatorial rule of the kings with the power emanating from
the top of the pyramid are all by-products of this self-centeredness
ingrained in Iranian political culture. This individualism, as observed
by experts on Iran, namely Sir Percy Sikes,^ Leonard Binder,^ Richard
Cottam,^ Marvin Zonis,"^ James A. Bill,^ and William Forbis,^ does not
include the positive connotations that are associated with development
in Western industrial societies. The attributes of Iranian individual-
ism are feelings of rejection, uniqueness, anxiety, self-condemnation
and mistrust, perceptions of the world as dangerous and hostile, general
pessimism, and an individualistic trend. These eight sub-syndromes
that Zonis has detected in general Iranian behavior are part of Abraham
Maslow's 14 subsyndromes of personal insecurity.'^ Zonis thus concludes
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that it is personal insecurity that has helped to shape the Iranian
mind and outlook.^ This feeling of insecurity, in turn, has had an
immense influence on the process of political socialization.
A theoretical insight in to individualism
. A differentiation is made
between individualism as the property of individual and individualism
as a group quality. Robert Lane defines an individualistic society as
one in which "individualism prevails and where the control over behavior
and thought is vested in the individual relatively more than in customs,
tradition and consensus (as is the case in primitive and traditional
societies) and relatively more than in authority (as in command econ-
omies and authoritarian societies)." He then distinguishes between
two types of individualism. Functional individualism enables an indi-
vidual to function adequately in an individualistic society--i .e. , "to
energize and coordinate the tasks which sucn societies usually set for
themselves." The other type is developmental individualism which is
"not only separate from the evaluation of the group but which, in
accord with much humanistic thought, gives priority to the individual
over the group and its code of practices." This last kind represents
"a conviction that the ultimate value lies in the development of the
individual to his full powers." Functional individualism, on the other
hand, implies that properties are developed because "they are functional
to any society where neither tradition nor authority serves as an
adequate guide to behavior." In short, in functional individualism man
is perceived as the means, whereas, man is seen as the end in develop-
g
mental individualism.
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Individualism, in the above modes, is not a product of ancient
cultures but is traced back only to the Renaissance, Reformation and
the rise of the industrial revolution. The social contracts, beginning
in the 17th century, also gave a new perspective to the individual.
They valued individuals separately and thus the individual was viewed
as subject rather than object. Finally, Lane contends, "the idea of
social contracts served to break the grip of the customary order for
it implied that people can create their own institutions, and it led
to the concept of popular sovereignty thrusting responsibilities back
upon individuals." The individual as seen through the social contract,
however, was a functional one and had not reached the developmental
stage as yet.
Unlike the traditional cultures where routines for coordination
and achievement of communal goals are developed and authoritarian
societies where hierarchy and command are utilized for similar pur-
poses, in individualistic societies, according to Robert Lane, the
individual is required to take on some of the functions which tradition
and command achieve in these other two kinds of societies. However, to
undertake such a task, certain cognitive, motivational, emotional, and
behavioral properties are required of the individual who must also
develop the ability to think for himself. Thinking for oneself requires
freedom. It also requires "cognitive complexity." In other words,
since decisions in an individualistic society are placed on the indi-
vidual, a notion of self- awareness is required.^^ Self-aware individ-
uals, according to Witkin, are aware of needs, feelings and attributes.
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recognized as their own and as distinct from those of othersJ^ As a
result, when a society demands rational analysis, the wholes are
broken down into parts and these parts are combined into new realities
where a different "field independent cognitive style" is developed.
In this cognitive style, the individual has the sense of self as a
distinctly separate part of the environment.^^
Socio-psychological reasearch reveals that since an individ-
ualistic society would be competitive and therefore often upleasant,
it would result in agonizing comparisons betwen the self and others.
This would most likely inspire ambition, causing frutrations when
goals can't be reached. "Deindividuation," a state where individual
identity is over-shadowed by the environment (a situation promulgated
in traditional and authoritarian societies), on the other hand, hinders
or prevents an individual from "facing contradictions between his
opinion or norms and his behavior; he is not required to face internal
discrepancies."^^
An end result of an individualistic society is thought to be
egoism, selfishness and narcissism. Pride, envy and generally inflated
self-concern are said to be the natural outcome of a society that
encourages the individual to think for himself as free from the rest of
the community. There are also those, among them Eric Fromm, who argue
that self-awareness will cause the growth and development of the indi-
vidual resulting in a search for a higher moral code reaching for self-
1 s
respect instead of self-love." Supporting Fromm' s contention,
Abraham Maslow believes that the "growth instinct, once released, will
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make for a better version of man, a version not only compatible with
but a condition for human society. "^^
Robert Lane, citing several sociological studies, notes that
although it is true that man is in harmony with nature when he is
embedded in a community, it is also instinctive that he would want to
control his own environment.'''' Supporting Lane's contentions, Richard
deCharms notes that "man's primary motivational propensity is to be
effective in producing change in his environment."^^ Motive satisfac-
tion, however, is dependent on three conditions. These are:
1. The motive must be aroused or released by a culture which
legitimizes it
2. The individual must believe that he is, in fact, the agent
of his own powers, the origin of his own acts and not the pawn of fate
3. He must perceive that his acts make a difference, that
outcomes are contingent on what he does. Like most motives, it is
therefore associated with appropriate cognition. 19
It is obvious that internal controls, or "pro-social behavior,"
is required of an individual in an individualistic society. As noted
above, absence of self-monitoring cognition would lead into the
supremacy of deadly sins--i.e., lust, envy, avarice, hate--in such a
society. An idealistic individual would be cognizant of the fact that
it is his actions (and not that of others) which can be responsible and
influence the pain or lack of pain in another. These internal controls
are obviously taught and learned through social conditioning and are
20
not naturally imbedded in human ego.
Having satisfied the requirements laid out above: thinking for
himself, using his freedom to control his environment, bringing his
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environment, bringing his emotional self under control, the individual
is ready to take up his position in an individualistic society. This
view is supported by Philip Slater, who feels that everyone should
pursue autonomously his own destiny. Also supporting the contention
that assuming responsibility for one's own fate is the central focus
of individualism, Codorcet had predicted that in time people "would
approach a condition in which everyone will have the knowledge neces-
sary to conduct himself in the ordinary affairs of life according to
the light of his own reason
. . . (and) become able to find the means
of providing for his own needs
. . .
."22 l^^^ regards this state of
mind as "self-reliance."
Having satisfied the personality requirements for determining
one's own destiny, the individual also becomes faced with problems
arising out of authority. Most individuals accept the control of
authority as legitimate and thus give up their own sense of moral
responsibility and their self-censoring mechanisms. Abdication of
one's sense of moral principles to authority. Lane argues, is part of
functional individualism which encourages the authority to become the
external moral force. Since law and order is relatively uncoerced in
developmental individualism, the individual has incorporated his sense
of responsibility into his principles of moral reasoning. Although not
directly related to our discussion, it should be noted that Lane feels
that economic rewards in a free market society would reinforce such
behavior by the individual.
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Interpersonal relations, as the last category of individual
responsibility, have to be governed by mutual trust. With removal of
cultural and traditional restraints as the motivating elements, the
individual is left without a coordinating device to control his inter-
personal relationships. Social contracts, in their traditional meaning,
are not the socilization mechanism required. According to Lane, "con-
ditions of relative abundance and the reinforcement of trusting
behavior by appropriate rewards throughout one's life" in a nurturant
family are the preferred mechanism. "Scarcity leads to mistrust,"
Lane argues, "because one may not survive, for example, waiting your
turn; the goods will give out before your turn comes around. "^^ Many
studies have found mistrust to be common in traditional societies.
Eric Erikson notes that the first lesson in child socialization must
be to learn to trust.
Abraham Maslow, as noted in the earlier parts of this chapter,
contends that an individual would be in a condition to actualize his
full potential only if he has satisfied his physiological and safety
71
needs and has gained a feeling of self-esteem and "belongi ngness .
"
Personal insecurity weighs heavily since it can prevent an individual
from trusting others and thus from forming interpersonal relations.
It should be pointed out that functional individualism serves
as a significant transition point on the way to developmental individ-
ualism. Individualism, in the first instance, requires people to think
for themselves although it is neither deep nor broad based. It also
demands that the individual be self-aware and know his desires but not
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his needs and values which are necessary in developing a reliable
identity. It further demands an individual to work for himself either
egotistically or deveopmental ly
.
In short, Robert Lane describes an individualistic society as
one which:
. . .
releases and legitimizes men's desires to control
their own environment, that is, to resist external control
for better or worse; it requires them to master and use
their emotions, but may direct them into narrower channels-
It encourages men to take responsibility for their own
fate, but it is deficient in encouraging a similar sense
of responsibility for their own acts; it requires that men
trust each other, but not that they love each other. 29
Individualism in Iranian social context
. Iranian social behavior has
been called excessively individualistic, portraying Iranians as dis-
honest and pessimistic with even a national schizophrenia brought about,
as already noted above, by the dichotomy between the Persian heritage
and Shiah Islam. The theoretical presentation above, put forth by
Robert Lane, refutes, if not dismisses, such contentions that Iranian
society is individualistic. Thus, to consider Iranian social behavior
as individualistic, at best, is misleading. As Ralph Patai correctly
puts it, Iranian national character, like that of the rest of the Middle
East, is based on family rather than individual as a unit. Family is
the central focus of all social organizations and demands loyalty over
individual desires. Familial ism is the backbone of the culture with
all social organizations such as clans, tribes and villages regarded as
mere extensions of fami 1 ies. It is believed that the larger social
aggregates in actuality are functioning families that have for countless
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generations consisted of the descendants of one male through the male
31line. In urban Iran, for example, se.yyeds (descendants of Prophet
Mohammad through his daughter Fatima) still claim lineage credit by
adding the title seyyed to the beginning of their names and distin-
guishing themselves by wearing a black turban if they happen to be
clergy. It is also common that they refer to each other as "cousins."
The impact of familial ism and its extended and aggregated forms
is of great significance to the political institutions of Iran and the
Middle East. The idea of Arab nationalism, for example, easily crossed
national borders and became the rallying point for Arabs who believed
in a common heritage divided by artificial borders. The mythical con-
cept that all Arabs had a common ancestry, in Esmael , son of Abraham,
certainly helped to bind the Arab brotherhood together, at least in
theory. Due to ethnic diversity in Iran, however, Iranian nationalism
has emerged slowly. Cottam admits some limitations on Iranian
nationalism as a political determinant, since for 15 years, 1963 to
1978, the Shah was able to rule by satisfying the demands of broad
sections of the political and economic elite for influence and mater-
32
ial goods. In contrast, the "aggregated family" in the form of tribes
and minorities have periodically challenged the authority of the cen-
tral government. The Azarbaijan autonomous republic of 1946-47, the
Kurdish republic of the same period and Qashaqai tribal uprisings in
the early 1960s are the best illustrations of such feelings of extended
familial ism forming the foundation of political and social institutions
in Iran. Since the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian government has
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faced the furor of "extended fami 1 ial ism" in a more violent form from
the Kurds, Turkomans, Baluchis, Arabs, and tribes such as Qashqais.
Iranian history during the present century has witnessed an upsurge
in tribalism and regionalism whenever the power and the authority of
the central government has declined. Cases in point are 1908-1921,
1941-1947, and post 1978, during which tribal uprisings and calls for
autonomy reached a new level with the central government in disarray.
Power struggles between tribes and ethnic groups which also have their
own tribal and clan organizations, on the one hand, and the central
government, on the other, testify to the fact that family and its aggre-
gated extensions still form the basis of Iranian society. Nationhood
remains a superimposed concept for people who tnink of their family as
the most basic social unit. Such concepts were promoted even by the
modernizing educational system. Grade school textbooks of a decade
ago had a story where a father handed his feuding sons a bunch of twigs
tied together with a rope and asked each of them to break the bunch.
None of the five strong sons could break the bunch. The feeble old
father broke the twigs by untying the rope and breaking the twigs one
by one. The story depicted the significance and necessity of unity
among family members, particularly among the males who traditionally
are the decision makers of the family with responsibility lying in
them. The same concept extends to the extended family. As an old
Middle Eastern proverb says, "I and my cousins against the world: I
and my brothers against my cousins; I against my brother."
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Although the aforementioned social traits are the cultural
framework of the region and perhaps the inclination of the majority of
its inhabitants, many of the elite of the country do not subscribe to
various of these behavioral attitudes. The study of the Iranian elite
has revealed this segment of the society, although very small, to be
almost Western in their social attitudes and behavior. For example,
statistical analysis of Maslow's insecurity syndrome, referred to
earlier in this chapter, among the Iranian elite proved to be almost
similar to that of the average American studied. The Iranian elite,
as revealed by the data, was highly educated and had had extensive
exposure to Western soci o-cul tural norms. With the stress on
Westernization since the turn of the century and an educational system
that has promoted Western norms and ideals, sometimes in conjunction
with traditional Iranian cultural norms, the growing Westernized Iranian
public has been caught between two contradictory socio-cul tural forces.
The Islamic Revolution is perhaps the epitome of this conflict, partic-
ularly for those who have been under constant Western influence.
It is those people who are in a transitional stage from tradi-
tional Iranian values and norms to more individualistic Western norms
who are the most alienated. While they have not been able to totally
adopt Western norms and values, they have, nevertheless, been loosened
from their traditional value system. The dilemma of "transitional
Iranian man" was recognized and studied by the sociologists. During the
seventies, there was an explosion of sociological studies nurtured by a
school of thought that sought to appeal to the emotional side of man.
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In Iran among the leading proponents of this school of humanism was
Ehsan Naraghi, the director of Iran's Institute for Educational and
Scientific Research and Planning. He thought that support for Western-
ization of "body and soul" was losing ground among Iranian intellec-
tuals since it was too objective and rational to satisfy the human
needs. In a paper presented at the Persepolis symposium, Naraghi had
asked the question:"^^
Why should cultures like ours in which man is considered
in all his aspects be deprived of all their substance by
following a so-called rational course at the end of which
lies the vast expanse of the non-rational and the impossi-
bility of receiving an answer to our questions? Why should
this wealth of feeling and emotions which has reached us
after centuries of tradition and mystical-poetic experience
and which is one of the outstanding features of the Iranian
personality in history have to be considered as something
shameful and subjective that we must rid ourselves of.
Naraghi concluded by noting that:
If only for our survival, we cannot do without science
and technology in order to make the best possible use of our
resources and enable our people to accede to material well-
being in conditions of dignity and equity. However, this does
not mean that we regard this material well-being as the sole
objective or bestow on it the same forms as it assumes in the
West
. . . Our principal concern might be to interrogate other
societies on their various experiences.
For the majority. Westernization and modernization during the
Pahlavi era was only skin deep with a desire for superfluous trappings
of the West. Modernization had manifested itself in fondness for
luxury homes, cars and European designer clothes. Western institu-
tional norms such as freedom of speech, press, elections, or even an
effective bureaucracy were non-existent. As a university student
related during the height of the revolution in December 1978:
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(The Shah) kept telling us we were a great people
but all he did was copy the damn Europeans ....'**
Despite the Shah's pronouncements on "the Great Civiliza-
tion," (the Iranian) culture was moribund with few books
published, no new buildings to compare with the great
works of Shah Abbas in the 17th century, no musical or
theatrical life. Instead, there were a few imported art
festivals, a few skyscrapers in the Bauhaus mode, St.
Laurent dresses and Gucci shoes for the women of northern
Tehran, and Levis and boots for the girls in the shops
and universities. 36
Iranian frustrations over this unedited importation of Western
values and norms were also reflected in the literary works of recent
Iranian writers. Jalal Al -Ahmad in his famous work, Gharb-zadegi
(Westomania)
,
bitterly attacked the Iranian submission to the "machine."
Al -Ahmad wrote:
Our whole existence has to be tailored to the height
and size of the machine. If the person who has made the
machine is now rebelling against it and feeling its
oppressive force, we who have become the servants thereof
do not even show signs of complaint. We even put on airs.
And this is what I mean by "Westomania." My main conten-
tion is that we have not been able to preserve our own
original cultural identity in the face of invasion by the
machine, but have in fact given away completely . 37
By 1978, even those who had espoused the line of government for
many years were complaining of excessive Westernization. Amir Taheri
,
editor of the daily Keyh an , called the phenomenon "Westoxication,"
proposing that, whereas the Arabs, Mongols and Turks had not been able
to culturally conquer Iran, the West was being successful in its
attempts to undermine Iranian culture.
Naraghi saw the political turmoil of 1978 to be the result of
Increased production of consumer goods, coupled with insatiable desire
for Western way of life, and the breakdown of traditional social
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relations that were the pillars of Iranian society, resulting in
increased intervention of government in people's lives. According to
Naraghi, traditional Iranian political culture prescribes a just king,
not a king who would push them on the road to Westernization without
the consent of the people. As a result of the "royalty ordained"
national goals which kept the population in the dark about their imple-
mentation with resort to oppression and coercion, there was
non- involvement of the people in the affairs of the nation. With the
realities hidden from the people, political turmoil was unavoidable."^^
Underlying all these criticisms of Westernization is the
belief by Iranians that their culture is one of the most unique in the
world. Such an assumption is shared by almost all. The ex-king,
Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, saw this uniqueness in 2,500 years of Iranian
monarchy while Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution,
sees it in his revolution which has legitimacy in the Shiah doctrine
which is believed to be the only hope for the oppressed people of the
world. The more common citizens pride themselves in a glorious past
and a rich literary history. Cross-nationally, they compare themselves
to the Europeans and not to the geographically closer developing
countries. The Indo-European heritage of the nation is seen as a link
with Europe though the nation is positioned in the heart of the Middle
East. Cultural and social relations with the neighboring countries,
particularly the Arab countries, has been almost non-existent, while
there has been a profusion of cultural and social exchange with the
West.
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This feeling of uniqueness, as claimed by Abraham Maslow, is
perhaps the result of insecurity borne by Iranians during the past 160
years due to defeats by European powers and an inability to sustain
the ancient glory. Fall-back on the past history and a glorious cul-
ture, portrayed even more gloriously by the surrounding myths, has been
the mechanism by which Iranians have tried to maintain their pride
during a difficult transition period in which they are trying to estab-
lish their place, once again, among the reputable nations of the world.
Although Iranians on the surface boast about their cultural
heritage, in reality, they are torn between opposing versions of it.
This is the conflict between Iranian nationalism, inherent in the
ancient history and tradition, and Shiah Islam. It is no small problem,
as Forbis correctly notes, that many Iranians are torn between opposing
emotions even when naming a child. Should the child have a Moslem,
and therefore an Arabic name, or should he have a Persian, and there-
fore, a non-Moslem name?^° Thus, the conflict in Iranian society is not
so much between classes, tribes, ethnic groups, or religious groups but
within the individual. In Forbis' words, "One half of Iranian past is
at war with the other half, and modern Iranians, seeking identity, are
torn in two directions." The effect of this cultural schizophrenia,
perhaps, is a feeling of not belonging to the society at large. History
has taught the Iranian to look out for his own and his family's inter-
ests. The people in positions of power and authority are distrusted
since they also are thought to be looking out for their own interests.
It is not without reason that social justice is the most stressed value
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in Iranian culture. Since all men are thought to be looking out for
their own interests, it is difficult for them to be just. Authority
is thus sought out to mediate justly between the opposing interests.
It is no coincidence that Shiah Islam adds justice as the fourth
attribute of God while Sunni Islam has not taken the ascription as a
foundation of the religion. By the same logic, the tradition of
Persian kingship declares that "a lust king is the shadow of God on
earth." Justice, therefore, is the highest responsibility of the
authority. Shiah mythology claims that the Prophet said that "it had
been a honor to have been born during the reign of a just king"--ref-
erence to Khosrow I (531-579), also known as Anooshiravan the Just.
To make certain that his subordinates performed their duties effectively
and efficiently and that justice was done to his subjects, Cyrus the
Great (580-529 B.C.) employed spies to report to him of the performance
of his sartraps (governors). The myths have it that Shah Abbas the
Great (1571-1629) bedecked himself in dervish clothing and travelled
among his subjects inquiring about their problems and the inadequacies
of his administration in order to correct them.
Tales that relate justice and fairness dominate a good portion
of Iranian literature. The Golestan of Saadi (1213-1292), in partic-
ular, is filled with fables exemplifying this theme. Justice is also
a theme stressed in Siassat-Nameh (Book of Politics) by Khawjeh Nezam
al-Mulk and Qabus-Nameh by Kaikavous Ibn-Iskandar, both written in the
eleventh century as guidebooks for kings. Reflecting back on the
literary tradition of Iran, it is safe to note that the theme of justice
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men
is the most pronounced attribute noted in relationships between
The thirst for justice seemed to abound in a culture that has period-
ically been ravaged by disease, foreign invasion, massacre, despotic
kings, wicked governors, untrustworthy neighbors, and chronic banditry
on the roads.
The sense of insecurity and pessimism over time has also merged
with religious tradition of the nation. In Norman Jacobs' words:
The Iranian religious heritage, not abstractly in its
own right, but in so far as can be related to social
behavior by inference, has coincided with a pessimistic
view of this world and this life, and with a feeling of
hopelessness or at least insecurity before a destiny the
individual never feels competent he can control. For
Iranian individualism is a sign of distruct, even fear,
of one's fellow men in society, and is not a sign of
a self-discipline born of confidence in one's ability
to act successfully and rewardingly in social relation-
ships. Subsequently, society primarily is of negative
interest to the Iranians and its prescriptions are more
to be avoided than to be manipulated positively or
challenged to serve one's rational interests. 41
Jacobs distinguishes five basic cultural traits that are
responsible for the present social value prevalent in Iran: (1) the
rules made by men can not be trusted and relied upon; (2) there is no
point in trying to develop morals for the society as a whole since
honesty and integrity on such levels do not exist; (3) when faced with
temptation, it is more useful to withdraw than to overcome with self-
discipline or social change; (4) the insecurity of social relationships
negates the ability to plan for the future; and (5) fate denies control
of one ' s 1 i fe .
'^^
If the development of mysticism is in anyway related to cultural
and environmental conditioning, the Iranian culture had the correct
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ingredients to nurture a flourishing mystic tradition, conceptualized
through Sufism. Ravaged by a hostile physical environment, the Iranian
mind created a metaphysical paradise, seen in poems of Attar, Mulavi,
Hafez and many others, and sought harmony with the Creator through
exaltation. Sufism allowed the individual mind to reach a "stage
where man could see nothing but God." Escape from the physical world
was the natural outcome of this abounding insecurity where man was
seen as unable to produce a major impact on his physical surroundings.
This is even today verbalized as: "History tells the Iranians that
you always lose in the end," as was noted by Mahmoud Ziai, a deputy in
43the last Pahlavi Majlis. As Zonis has pointed out, this sense of
pessimism abounds among Iranians. Distrust in fellow man and the
belief that gismat (fate) is more often unfavorable than not have had
their impact on making Iranians reserved, non-committal and unenter-
prising.
Iranian architecture is a vivid reflection of the insecurity
of its people, their isolation from outside and the dominance of the
concept of family on the traditional society. The houses are surrounded
with high walls and are usually located off narrow lanes. Inside they
usually have a foyer just beyond the main door where non- family male
visitors and strangers are admitted. The larger houses are divided
into two parts: bi rouni , where visitors are received and which is also
the official quarters of the male head of the household; and andarouni ,
where the females and children live. No male, except first of kin, is
usually received here. This system dominated the Iranian residential
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architecture until the turn of the century. Although Reza Shah was
partly responsible for giving a new look to major cities, including
spacious official buildings, city parks, and wide tree-lined avenues,
the acceptance of Western mode of architecture was partly due to the
increased feeling of security brought about by the centralization of
authority and annihilation of bandits and banditry. As the streets in
towns and the roads outside the cities were made safe to travel, the
physical insecurity of the population was reduced. The walls and gates
around cities and villages were first to go. Furthermore, there was
no need for narrow and winding lanes to keep the pillaging bandits out
of a neighborhood or high walls to keep the attackers from reaching
the inner sanctuary of the house.
The relative security following the ascendancy of the first
Pahlavi, Reza Shah, to power reduced the phsyical insecurity of the
individual but new demands were soon made on the government, such as
"security from arbitrary arrest, from dismissal from their occupation
without due cause, from financial manipulation and economic confiscation
by the government or the elite."^^ The political institutions set up
and operated by the Pahlavis were able to offer little of this latter
type of security. The physical insecurity of the pre-Pahlavi period
was transformed into a perception of cynicism and social injustice,
45
even by the elite, during this period. Zonis relates his encounter
with the Iranian elite and their perception of national problems. One
had noted that "To become outstanding in any field of endeavor in Iran
requires an appetite for corruption and a taste for personal decay."
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The perception of corruption became even more widespread following the
four- fold increase in oil income beginning in October 1973. Corruption,
of course, was nothing new. It had often thrived in the country, par-
ticularly during the Qajar period (1779-1925). With the economic
developments during the 1960s and increased oil income during the
1970s, the amount of money on hand was unsurpassed in the history of
the nation. The gross national product rose from around $7 billion in
1965 to almost $70 billion in 1975, or almost 10 times that of a decade
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ago. With an increase in the money supply, the appetite for greater
capital accumulation grew at an even faster rate. Since the wealth of
the country was controlled by one man, the Shah, those close to him
became even more influential in the disbursement of funds while lining
their own coffers with untold millions. It was believed by the public
that, for a major business to succeed, it was necessary to offer shares
to the members of the royal family or influential courtiters. It was
as a result of the royal family's influence pedalling that the Shah,
in the fall of 1978, in the face of growing political strife, barred
his family members and their respective businesses from doing any
transactions with the government. The remedy was too late. Although
the great bulk of the population had benefited from the oil boom, the
overwhelming proportion had gone to those well-placed families on the
top. The gap between rich and poor had gotten wider. The visibility
of upper class wealth as seen in their cars, luxury mansions, and
exclusive boutiques was too omnipresent for the general population to
ignore. The most disillusioned segment of the society was the middle
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class bazaar merchants. With the economic downturn in 1977 and a war
on inflation, the bazaaris became the whipping boys of the society.
While the royal family and those connected to the court continuea to
reap huge profits in their respective business dealings and the corrup-
tion in high places continued, the bazaaris were harassed and accused
of profiteering and hoarding. As a result, their resentment of the
government and its policies began to surface. Bazaaris have tradi-
tionally been the backbone of the Iranian economy. As such, they have
played a significant social and political as well as economic role in
the history of the nation. Loose class structure has made upward
mobility possible. Many of the upper-class families of recent years,
like Sabet, Ladjevardi
, Nemazi , and Khayami
, have moved up from middle-
class ranks to their present status only since World War II. Indi-
vidual effort, creativity and achievement are traditionally encouraged
and appreciated even though such dynamics usually are family-centered
with family members encouraged to participate in further enhancing the
undertaking.
Post-war years, as noted above, provided a rather opportune
period for many ambitious and hardworking individuals to forge ahead
and progress. The Years 1963-1973 were a period, in particular, of
sustained economic and industrial growth which provided an even more
conducive arena for personal and familial advancement. The real growth
of the economy was amongst the highest in the world, partly due to
increased oil revenue, but mainly as a result of intensive and
agressive economic growth. The Third (1963-1967) and Fourth (1968-1972)
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economic plans had attained most of their stated objectives. These
plans depended on oil revenues for about 62 percent of their invest-
ments, whereas the Fifth Plan (1973-1977) depended on oil revenues for
80 percent. Between 1963 and 1973, the private sector became increas-
ingly more interested in investments in large scale industry. The number
of large industrial units grew from 694 in 1956 to 1,191 in 1961. By
1966 their numbers had risen to 3,661 units and again jumped to 5,651
48by 1972. In short, the period provided a rather secure epoch for
flourishing economic growth. The private sector was a significant
partner in this economic growth spurt. Many leading private corpora-
tions, as noted above, were products of individuals from lower or
middle income background who had a modicum of initiative. The partic-
ular characteristic of these businesses was the tendency with which
they had been kept within close-knit family groups. This, as already
noted above, is mainly due to the security that family provides. In
Norman Jacobs' words: "The Iranian family is . . . the^ sole surviving
source of security, cooperative mutuality, succor, and selfless social
action in Iranian society." This intra-fami 1 ial bond is contrasted
against the general society where self-interest in interpersonal
relationships dominates. The security that familial interaction pro-
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vides is mainly due to the known behavior of family members.
Jacobs' sociological study of interpersonal relationships among
Iranians has further revealed that social action in Iran suffers from
the following inadequacies: (1) Interpersonal relationships work most
effectively, if at all, under authoritarian conditions, for a very
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limited time with limited goals and with limited number of partici-
pants; (2) That there is no basis for "establishing reasonable trust
and reciprocal, calculable self-interest in social acti ons--that is,
the confidence that self-interest and other interests operating in the
same direction are productive."; and (3) Rigidity in interpersonal
relationships. These result in the "inability to understand that
intellect is more than the cultivation of rote mastery of the concrete,
and that intellect is not nurtured only through the accumulative,
additive knowledge of age and experience." The belief that "the
concrete only, in and of itself, is what really matters, tends to
associate whatever absolute values the Iranian has inevitably with
(existing) concrete ways of doijig^ tJiin^s. "^'^
To cope with the above shortcomings in interpersonal relation-
ships, the individual Iranian has developed "mechanisms" that, in
Jacobs' words, "make life bearable." These mechanisms include: (1)
Acting within two distinct worlds--"a world of absolute ethical stan-
dards (the inner-self) and a world of no ethical standards (the outer-
self)
. . .
."; (2) Responding negatively to the challenges of his
environment, the individual chooses the path of escapism, through
different means, instead of acting positively and improving the quality
of the society; (3) Most Iranians do not see themselves in a position
to reform the system, and hence they hope "to make the existing system
of patterns work for (themselves) by being as clever as possible."; and
(4) Resignation and withdrawl, nonetheless, do not pacify the individ-
ual. In contrast, the frustrations arising from the prevailing
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relationships, more often than not, result in "aggression, open hos-
tility, and even violence." This agression "is both a personalized
and irrational attack upon the obvious frustrations of Iranian society;
subsequently, violence does not offer any constructive, positive
solutions to the interpersonal problems which provoked the violence in
the first place. "^^
In summarizing the interpersonal relationship of Iranians,
Jacobs believes that long-term commitments are avoided since ever
present chances of disaster are here and now. More importantly, it is
believed that no one "in Iran is about to reshape his environment in
a way that long-range commitments ever will be feasible." "Hence too
many Iranians are convinced that long-range commitment can realize the
Utopia of development only in heaven as far as Iran is concerned,
although it may exist on earth in other societies . "^^
Some concluding remarks
. Socio-economic observations made by Norman
Jacobs complement the political observations of Marvin Zonis in regards
to the concept of "underdeveloped" social man in Iran. The average
Iranian, due to environmental conditioning of the past, suffers from
social and personal insecurity. With social and economic developments
of this present century, such insecurities, however, seemed less tan-
gible and rather irrational. The social conditions under the Pahlavis,
at least, provided for a period some semblance of personal-physical,
if not psychological, security. The poverty and ignorance of the past,
in the form of scarcity of resources which were partly responsible
for the added dimensions of insecurity, were largely muted during the
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years. Based on such an assumption, it could have been argued that
the individual, in due time, as a result of relatively abundant
resources, would have developed a trusting behavior leading to the
emergence of a secure individual. This secure individual is the basic
ingredient of all political institutions. As long as there is no
security, trust and belief that self-interest and other interests can
cooperate in the same direction, all political instituions are only a
facade. For institutions to be self-generating and serve the interests
of all individuals, social contracts must be laid down and abided by.
The socio-psychological studies of Iranians do not show such inclina-
tions as of yet on the part of the general public. It is suggested
that the Iranian society needs to develop the interpersonal behaviors
that are seen as the apriori requirements needed for transition onto
the threshold of functional individualism. This, in turn, would
supply the individuals with necessary properties to develop their
potentials, including political institutions that would aid in coordin-
ating and accomplishing their communal goals.
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PART II
TEXTBOOKS AS SOCIALIZING AGENTS
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CHAPTER IV
EDUCATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN
As discussed in some detail in the beginning of the Introduc-
tory Chapter, Lucian Pye posits three key elements for the attainment
of political development: equality, capacity and differentiation.
These key elements can be studied in a culture through the analysis of
values and norms that pertain to such principles as equality, trust,
rationality and planning, collectivity and role specification. These
principles supplied by Pye closely correspond to others offered by
David McClelland which also contributed to the perspective of and the
analytical framework of this study. The association between political
development and other aspects of cultural change provide a dynamic view
of continuity and change in the political system. In Pye's words:
The concept of political culture also provides a useful
basis for examining the links between social and economic
factors and political performance. Through the socializa-
tion process which sustains and shapes the political culture
of each generation, we can observe the impact of not only
the explicitly political but also all the relevant non-
political behavior. In so investigating the social and
economic parameters of the political culture, we can come
to grips with the historically significant issues about
the relationships between economic development and the
prospects for stable political change.!
The dynamic link between political development and economic
factors, as asserted by Lucian Pye, is also held to be important by
2
Robert Lane, as discussed in the last chapter, and David McClelland.
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It is based on such assertions that such values as work ana compti ti ve-
ness with material rewards encouraging impersonal cooperation are
linked to cultural change which in turn influence political develop-
ment. Nonetheless, there are limits and constraints as to the speed
and degree at which it is possible to initiate policies of change in a
political culture. Pye notes, however, that "we must be impressed with
the potency of education in creating the attitudes and values essential
for national development.""^
Education is regarded as one of the more significant vehicles
of development. Robert Ward, in his observation of Japanese society,
held that the educational preparation of a sizable portion of a pop-
ulation was a basic requirement for modernization of political cul-
4
ture. Educational institutions, as revealed by Dunkwart Rustow in his
study of cultural change in Turkey, proved most durable and fruitful
during the transitional change in the nineteeth century whereas others,
such as the army, the centralized tax system and the Constitution, were
overcome by problems and inadequacies.^ It is with such conceptual
premises that this inquiry, as noted in the previous chapters, intends
to approach the subject of political development in Iran.
It is difficult to overstate the impact of education and
schooling where it is supervised by government and its curricula is
loaded with systematic and explicit political indoctrination. Robert
Ward, in observing the Japanese educational system from 1868 to 1945,
notes the great degree to which "moral" courses played a role in pri-
mry and secondary school curricula. The emphasis, for example, in
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R. P. Dore's words, was on the extent to which "the Imperial Institu-
tion (became) the fount and origin of all morality."'^ Similar level
of indoctrination was evident in the school curricula in Egypt during
President Nasser's rule. In Leonard Binder's words: "... especially
in the primary and secondary schools, efforts were made to develop a
strong loyalty to the regime, to President Nasser, and to the religion
g
of Islam." The intent is to give a picture of the society in its
ideal state. The intended result is that:
(The student) will begin to recognize the disparity between
the two sets of standards to which he is exposed and will
gradually adjust his external behavior in accordance with
the demands of his school environment rather than solely
in terms of his father's representational behavior. He
will gradually learn to recognize the same national sym-
bols when repeated on the radio, in the press, and in
public speeches. He will become accustomed to partici-
pating in group demonstrations and generally become
acquainted with the duties of an educated citizen in a
modernizing oligarchy.
9
For some time schools have become associated with or even have
been relegated the responsibility of character development. Thus the
purposes of schooling were thought to be "to develop the head, the heart,
and the hand." Although the terminology in recent years has been
changed, the basic concepts have remained pretty much intact. There
are, however, substantial differences between the educational approach
in the developed societies as contrasted against the developing world.
The former has adopted an experimental psychological approach with such
objectives as practical experience for conduct development, encouraging
participation in circumstances where the student will learn correct
behavior. The latter is still very much pre-occupied with character
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development through moral stories, proverbs, and the study of lives
of great men whom the students could emulate.^
Consequently, the developmental approaches of the textbook
writers can be ascertained by the analysis of these books to find the
prevailing tendencies. Thus, it is no surprise that content analysis
of textbooks in recent years has provided a fertile ground for social
scientists. Their assumption has been that there is a definite link
between cultural values and the potential for development. Those
cultures that possess certain values that are favorable towards devel-
opment ought to be more successful in becoming developed than those
cultures that do not possess such values. Inquiries into folktales,
proverbs, and similar cultural expressions are used to measure the
values that are stressed in a culture.
In recent years, governments and education boards have made
a conscious effort to promote values and norms in school texts that
they find favorable to their orientation. Thus, the underlying assump-
tion is that values favorable to certain policies are able to be trans-
mitted via textbooks to the students.
It is based on this assumption that this section of this
inquiry is undertaken. Since it was the professed policy of the
Pahlavi regime to "modernize" the country, it is assumed that one can
look into the educational materials that were used in Iran and find
values and norms that stress modernization being transmitted to the
students. This is particularly so due to the fact that the Iranian
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students were being educated in an environment in which the government
had a high level of influence and control.
A close relationship between political system maintenance and
the role of education has existed in modern Iran. During the late
nineteenth century, with travel to Europe becoming more of a possi-
bility, some of the children of the elite and aristocracy were sent to
Europe for higher education, while others received their higher educa-
tion in Iran at Dar al-Fonoun (House of Sciences), established in 1851.
The graduates of Dar al-Fonoun and the returning students from Europe
filled high positions in the government, and administrations of the
Qajar kings. Until the emergence of Reza Khan in 1921, the elite and
their children comprised almost all the Western-educated Iranians.
Following the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1907, the middle class
began to grow and thus the sheer numbers of their children who acquired
a Western-style education grew.
After ascendency to power, Reza Khan sent many students to
Europe, particularly France, for higher education. The students mostly
came from the middle class, a few from the lower-middle class. These
individuals owed their allegiance to Reza Shah and were placed in
important administrative, professional and legal positions upon their
return to the country. As such, a new breed of technocrats who were
not members of the traditional aristocracy were introduced into the
ranks of the political elite. Thus, education became an instrument
enabling one to become a member of the elite. The point was not lost
to Iranians. Soon there was stiff competition for the limited number
178
of admissions to Tehran University that had opened in 1937. Many
students also pursued their higher education in the European and
American institutions of higher learning. Today, there are as many
Iranian students enrolled in colleges and universities outside the
country as there are in the country.
The indications are that the educational system functioned for
dual purposes. It provided a professional education that often was
intended as an entry visa to the ranks of the elite. Both groups,
however, by and large, depended on the government for their respective
endeavors. The Shah personally supervised movements of all individuals
in high government positions. Positions would be bestowed on individ-
uals for their services or to coopt them into the system. With the
Shah's virtual control of all major industries and educational institu-
tions, in addition to bureaucracies, there were few places for the
counter-elite to find any meaningful employment where they could remain
outside the government's sphere of influence. Thus, the educated had
to be either pro-government or apolitical to survive and remain immune
from harassment in the Iranian socio-political environment. This fact
is a major reason for the enormous "brain drain" of Iranian profession-
als to Europe and the United States during the 1950s, 1960s and the
early 1970s.
For the purpose of more indepth analysis, the role of education
in modern Iranian history will be dealt with in the following sequence:
(1) Education as an instrument to promote socio-cul tural norms;
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(2) Education as an instrument of the regime for political system main-
tenance; and (3) Education as an instrument of political development.
E ducation as an instrument of socio-cultura! norms
. The impact of
Islamic attributes, whether real or imagined, have been of immense
importance to the Iranian educational system. In Shiah Islam, which
is the dominant branch in Iran, education is considered to be the
teachings of moral knowledge. Norman Jacobs contends that "This asso-
ciation between moral knowledge and education persisted, even after
education formally was disassociated from religion; that is, at the
time when religious values came to affect education only in diffused
form."^^ The impact of religion on the educational system and its
values, according to Jacobs, was five fold: (1) All learnings that
promoted "religious perfectibility" were desired and those that were
not considered to be so, at best, were regarded to be of "secondary
interest"; (2) With the introduction of secular curriculum into reli-
gious schools and with the establishment of secular schools in the
twentieth century there were few, if any, qualitative modifications
in the process of learning; (3) Despite the apparent modernization of
the education process, "acquisition of morality" remained the basic
concern of the educational system; (4) Since religious education had
been considered as the proper preparation for statecraft, the associa-
tion has been carried over to secular education also, thus it came to
be considered the proper preparation for statecraft; (5) Lastly, secular
education was regarded primarily as a way to gain access to the "Iranian
12
spirit" more than as a way of gaining empirical skills.
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The dynamic relationship between religion and politics is very
visible in Iran. Furthermore, religious prescriptions govern all
facets of life. However, many long held beliefs are also adopted to
reflect religious values that in fact have no Koranic basis. Thus,
the term religion acquires wider perspective and includes norms and
values that reflect cultural traits.
Lack of intellectual and rational attitudes within the whole
Iranian society, in general, and within the educational institutions,
in particular, has been the subject of criticism by Iranians and non-
Iranians alike. In this vein, the educational system actually prepared
the student very well to cope with the society. Abstract educational
theory would expect the system to encourage intellectual and rational
attitudes. From this viewpoint, the Iranian educational system was
a failure. The result of the existing system was:
the "educated man" who, primarily, although not exclusively,
is a political animal, who is a good memorizer, who speaks
well, but not concretely, who is quick to copy and serve
those in authority, who tends to talk rather than to act,
who hates to make decisions, who is not utilitarian, who is
not objective, who cannot operate effectively in a critical
environment, who does not necessarily understand what he
accepts, who cannot analyze his responsibilities, who is
not adaptable as far as work and the positive environment
are concerned (but only as far as maneuvering people is
concerned), and finally who basically is insecure and mal-
adjusted to any of his occupational demands and consequently,
unproducti ve--i n brief, an individual who is the very
antithesis of the kind of educated or sophisticated indi-
vidual required to participate in, let alone, create and
develop, a rational, self-generating economic system. 13
Richard W. Gable, who also has studied the impact of culture
on Iranian institutions, notes that many of these traits influence the
Iranian pattern of administrative behavior. These, combined with the
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pattern of Iranian individualism discussed earlier, create an adminis-
trative bureaucracy whose decision-making patterns are unplanned,
illogical, fatalistic, centralized, and lacking in delegation of author-
ity. In short, it is a system which is dominated by subjectivity and
traditionalism.
Consequently, almost all educational reforms that were initiated
at junior or senior levels at the Ministry of Education were doomed to
failure. Many of these reforms were attentive merely to the formal
structure of the institution in question with little regard for the
dynamics involved or to actual conditions. This is best demonstrated
in the recent educational devolution" in which the 5-3-4 concept (5
years of elementary, 3 years of guidance, 4 years of high school edu-
cation in place of the traditional system of 6 years of elementary,
and 6 years of high school, divided into 3 years of first and 3 years
of second cycle) was adopted. Many of the science and math textbooks
were rewritten with the intent of making students think rather than
memorize. The teachers in many cases did not receive adequate prepara-
tion to deal with this basic change in approach. The students were
still required to memorize rather than to understand. Moreover, few
counselors were available to assist the teachers or the students in
the planning of their programs. Furthermore, the new concept had not
1
5
been "analyzed in terms of practicality, costs, and benefits."
Meaningful changes in the educational system were impossible
within the existing framework due to major bottlenecks in coordination,
implementation, cooperation, and planning. These patterns are closely
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related to political and cultural conditions J ^ Any reforms, including
educational, have to include the total society within their scope
Education as an instrument of the regime to promote political system
maintenance. When Reza Shah came to power, the elite was composed of
individuals from families that had had close contact and relations
with the deposed Qajar dynasty. Thus, Reza Shah created a new elite
that owed its allegiance solely to him. The incoming elite was com-
posed mostly of professionals, technocrats and army officers whose
education and training was their hall mark of entry into the new status,
Education took a new dimension, and soon there was stiff com-
petition for entry into the newly founded Tehran University. With the
great public demand for education just after the Second World War,
educational institutions expanded greatly. As a result, the number of
graduates at all levels soon began to exceed the government's absorp-
tive capacity. The high school graduates, in particular, had a
difficult task since there were few jobs available and only about 11
to 16 percent of them could gain admission to Iranian universities.^^
The entrance to an Iranian university was not based only on the aca-
demic record of a student. Marvin Zonis relates his meeting with an
Iranian who had been influential in formulating higher education
policies. He said that:
Orders had come from above to restrict entrance to Iranian
universities. He was to make higher education more expensive
while raising the minimum entrance examination grade considered
necessary for admission. Thus access to higher education would
be limited to those students who had the most at stake in
maintaining the present system. 18
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The result was the obvious admission of those students who were com-
mitted to maintaining the status quo.
Despite such a policy, the Iranian universities continued as
major centers of opposition to the government. The process of selec-
tion had its flaws. Many children of the elite were instrumental in
anti-government agitation. Furthermore, the incoming students were
soon politicized and coopted into the student activist groups on campus.
Following the infusion of petro-dol 1 ars beginning in 1973, a
shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers developed. In 1975, the
government adopted a new educational policy by which secondary educa-
tion (grades 9 through 12)) and college education at all public educa-
tional institutions that had carried little tuition (approximately $15
per year at high schools; $300 at universities) were to charge extremely
high fees (approximately $300 at high schools; $3,000 per year at
universities). However, the students would have been exempt from paying
these exorbitant tuitions if they pledged government service of one
year for every year of high school free of tuition; two years for
every year at college level. The jobs and their locations were desig-
nated by the government for which a government salary was paid.
Although some who had the financial means opted for tuition payment
rather than a pledge to work for the government, most did not have a
choice. Their only choice was between no education or a pledge to work
for the government at a government appointed position and location at
the low government salary. Although the measure supposedly was desig-
nated to lure educated individuals into government service in locations
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that most would not have opted for, it also gave the government control
over the individual's destiny for the duration of the obligation years.
A student who had received four years of high school and four years of
college education through the pledge system would have had to serve 12
years to fulfill his pledge of obligations. If such a system had
matured, it would have been a punishing experience for the political
activists who had opted for the pledge system during their school
years.
The government's control over education was not limited to
financial considerations. Since the early 1960s, the government had
established direct control over the content of textbooks from first
through twelfth grade. Prior to this time, schools had been given the
choice of selection from amongst the available texts in the market.
However, since 1960 the Ministry of Education has taken over the
writing, editting and publishing of all school texts. The significance
of textbooks as a socializing agent was not lost on the government. As
will be seen in the next chapter, the Farsi readers, particularly at
the elementary school level, were turned into instruments of cooption
into a value system in which several entries held the Shah and his
family in high esteem and praised his undertakings. The high school
students were not immune from such a process either. By the end of the
decade, the students enrolled in high schools had to study the text of
the White Revolution as an academic subject.
The students also served as an instrument of government show-
manship. Aside from lining the streets during parades for major
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political events or for visits by friendly heads of states; students
performed sports shows on the birthdays of the Shah, Shahbanou (Queen)
and Crown Prince in Tehran's main sports field. The students were also
encouraged to join the Boy or Girl Scouts as another means of sociali-
zation. The royal family took a particular interest in the Scouts'
movement and the Shah was the titular head of the Iranian Scout Organi-
zation. The government had gone further in 1975 by promoting the
formation of a youth vanguard for the Rastakhiz (National Resurgence)
Party which would have been recruited from amongst the high school
students.
The Education Corps has been another institution through which
the political values promoted by the regime were to be inculcated to
rural inhabitants. The promoters of the Education Corps have praised
the undertaking as a major modernizing scheme. Its success in improve-
ment of educational, economic, and health conditions in villages has
also accompanied changes favorable to the regime in political orienta-
tion among tribes and villagers. The political objectives of Corpsmen
as viewed by the government were as follows:
In order to inculcate the spirit of national unity,
the people in the isolated villages and of the migrating
tribes who speak different dialects and who have different
customs and mores should be led to the feeling that they
belong to the nation. The national ties must be strength-
ened. Knowledge of the past national contributions to the
development of world civilization and visions of the future
participation in national and international development are
important facets of the Education Corps training. 19
The objection here certainly is not aimed at creation of a
national feeling among the citizens but at the displacement of
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traditional systems by a newer system that at best was inadequate.
From the onset of the land reforms in 1963, the village system hier-
archy based on landlords and their representatives and their selected
kadkhoda (village administrator) was displaced. The villages that were
lucky enough to receive a Corpsman got to elect their kadkhoda, under
the Corpsmen's supervision, and even got to elect members to the
village House of Justice. Otherwise, the village elections were
embroiled in clan and tribal feuds.
The Corpsmen, based on the formula of its establishment, were
all recent high school graduates. They had received four months of
training, almost 70 percent of which was devoted to military subjects.^'
These youth, many of whom were rather idealistic, were given the task
of "transforming a peasant into a farmer." Inexperience and inadequate
training were hardly the only problems facing the Corpsmen. They also
suffered from the traditional distrust of outsiders by the villagers.
This was coupled with the reverence the villagers had for old age--
which these corpsmen lacked. The short period of stay--at most 20
months--was another added shortcoming.
The most vital contribution of the Education Corpsmen, however,
was their regular teaching of classes to rural children. Although
there were classes for adults, the attendance ratio for such classes
was lower. The textbooks that the rural children read were basically
the same as the ones that the students in urban areas read. Little
provision was made in the books to adapt them to the rural, physcial,
or cultural environment that differs so drastically from one region of
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Iran to the next. There were but a few items in the elementary text-
books that depicted life in rural areas.
Another problem facing the rural students was the fact that
very few secondary schools existed in rural areas. Although almost
50 percent of Iranians live in rural areas (places with less than 5,000
inhabitants), almost all the secondary schools are located in urban
areas. The level of literacy in some villages is less than 5 percent,
although the national average is 40 percent.
As discussed before, aside from wealth, education has been
looked upon as the major vehicle of upward social mobility by many
Iranians.^^ The government recognized this fact by promoting the edu-
cated as individuals who would "occupy the directing position in the
country. "23 j^e educated, particularly those with a university educa-
tion, represented a very small segment of the Iranian population. This
small segment, moreover, had been gaining significance as the Iranian
economy grew and there was a higher demand for their skills. The sig-
nificance of their presence in the Iranian society was not lost on
the Shah. He had become increasingly more involved in all facets of
higher education. Furthermore, as Zonis points out, the Shah's most
significant undertaking as far as the educated elite were concerned
was his allocation of positions to these individuals. This in turn
made it possible for the Shah to maintain his power because the educa-
24
ted elite then owed their loyalty to the person of the Shah.
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Education as an ins trument of political development
. Political
development, as a component of the general theory of development,
involves the building of institutions. The presence of references to
political institutions and citizenship role in school texts, therefore,
would indicate a desire by the government to bring about a political
change through means of education. The frequency of references to
political institutions would, theoreti cal ly, reveal the extent to which
the government hoped to induce norms that were favorable to the ideals
of political development and promotion of civic training among students.
Attempts by the government to use school textbooks as a means
of political socialization is not a recent phenomena. When the modern
educational system was adopted in Iran by Reza Shah in the 1920s, one
of the main ambitions was secularization of education. Although there
had been several secular schools, their numbers and the number of
students were extremely limited. Reza Shah had hoped that with the
introduction of Western style education he would be able to create a
"modern" Iran, emulating European countries. The emphasis was typically
put on the structure with little attention paid to the dynamics of
modern education. Furthermore, Reza Shah's hopes of "Westernization"
were over-powered by his despotism. He was more interested in self-
aggrandizement and had little commitment to the goal of "democratiza-
25
tion or modernization."
Educational institutions were used to promote secular education
to establish a scientific and Western-oriented foundation for the
future development of the nation. The courses of instruction for the
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elementary school included Persian, arithmetic, geography, history,
and physical education. The secondary school curriculum included
subjects in natural sciences, geometry, algebra and mathematics, and
foreign languages. Soon other subjects were added to both elementary
and secondary school curriculum. As discussed previously, this "mod-
ern" educational system was built on the existing cultural foundation
that molded the new system after the old fashion. Emphasis was put on
the passing of exams to enable a student to attain the desired end--
i.e., the diploma. In short, the educational system conceived by Reza
Shah had retained the "traditionalistic orientation." Amin Banani
notes that with the introduction of modern education "the group
recitation-for-memorization method of the maktab was discarded. Reli-
ance upon memorization, however, continued. "^^ This superficial method
of learning is still widely practiced, and the method is not limited
only to the students. The teachers often read aloud from the textbooks
or their notes in the class. This method of memorization is not limited
to Persian poetry and prose. It also includes mathematical and scien-
tific principles. It is obvious why this method of lea>^ning is referred
to as "parrot-like." This modern education system has been criticized
for having produced "many superficially educated people, maladjusted
and filled with undistinguished facts which they were incapable of
applying in everyday life."
Higher education, when obtained abroad, was perceived to under-
take any possible task, and thus to be able to work in any possible
capacity. As an example, the managing director of the National Iranian
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Oil Company for several years was a French-educated physician. Further-
more, a distinguished engineer and head of Tehran Polytechnique Insti-
tute for over a decade served as Speaker of Majlis. The distinguising
factor about such individuals was their loyalty to the person of the
monarch and not their ability as distinguished managers or politicians.
Although education served as a requirement for entry into the ranks of
the political elites, it was loyalty to the regime that assured a post
in the cabinet or other rewarding positions. A similar feeling was
put forth by Ali -Mohammad Kardan who wrote:
The job of revising the school progarm was entrusted,
for the most parts, to individuals who had been trained
in France. Their blind imitation of the French system
of education, and even more, their limited understanding
of the purpose of education, severely damaged Iranian
education. They had knowledge per se more than its
applicability, theory more than practice, and the lec-
ture method in preference to the laboratory approach ...
The result was a secondary curriculum extremely broad
in subject matter but unrelated to the life experience
of the students. 28
The above observation is no less true of present-day Iranian
education. The progress in the last quarter of a century has been the
structural change from the 6-3-3 concept to the 5-3-4, which in theory
demands even greater emphasis on the understanding of the principles
of natural and physical sciences. Nevertheless, the mechanics of the
system, as of present, are still based on the tradition of rote
learning and memorization.
It is obvious that a change in the educational system can not
be achieved without basic changes in the total system. In essence,
any change in the educational system of the country and its
prerequisites demands a change in the political-cultural mili
question posed, therefore, is if the willingness of the new regime
Iran to undertake a policy of change of such magnitude exists.
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CHAPTER V
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF TEXTBOOKS
Children's stories have often been used to measure the motiva-
tion level within a culture for "achievement," "development," or
"modernization." The assumption has been that the culture would
function as a framework for "development." Cultural norms are trans-
ferred from one generation to another through many means of which
stories, be they oral or written, are only one. The presence of folk-
tales in all cultures provides an empirical foundation for comparison.
Folktales are a vivid and apparent part of any culture. They "reflect
the motives and values of the culture in the way they are told or in
their themes or plots" in a way that is both interesting and uninten-
tionally instructive.^
The interest in stories, so far as this inquiry is concerned,
is limited to the entries that have been selected for publication in
the school texts. It is not unusual to find folktales that convey two
contradictory values of the same culture. This is particularly true in
a culture that has had an unbroken and a written tradition for a few
thousand years. Certainly the prevailing philosophical and moral
patterns in different periods of the history have left their imprints
on the national cultural tradition of Iran. Thus, norms and values
that are of contradictory nature are abundant in the cultural heritage
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of the nation. Thus, this huge pool of folktales, proverbs, and anec-
dotes provide a resource with varying philosophical perspectives.
This offers the different administrations the opportunity to select
stories that are deemed appropriate and culturally relevant. The
selection of entries that appeared in the textbooks during the Shah's
regime were certainly in accordance with such a premise. A department
within the Ministry of Education, Sazeman-e Ketabhay-e Darsi-e Iran
(Textbooks Department of Iran) has been responsible for the editing and
publishing of all Iranian school texts since 1960. The entries in the
textbooks are there with the government's approval or, at the least,
its tolerance. Many of the entries are from classical Persian litera-
ture and have been an integral part of education in Iran for genera-
tions. Examples are stories from Bustan and Golestan by Saadi , fables
from Kalikh va Dimneh
, and poetry by Firdousi. Some entries are there
by the design of the textbook writers. These promote modern values
such as cooperation, hard work, and achievement. Finally, some entries
are deliberately included as acts of political indoctrination through
which the government hoped to instill values favorable to its legitimi-
zation and preservation.
Although "political development" is often mentioned in the
course of this present inquiry, nonetheless, the idea of political
development, as is evident from the entries in the texts, was never
held by the Pahlavi regime to be an important facet of development.
Instead, economic development was promoted by the government to be the
most important goal to be achieved. It was envisioned by the Shah that
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in 25 years Iran would achieve a similar economic status to that
of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. He referred to this
9oal as Tamadon-e Bozorg (the Great Civilization). In the face of
indadequacies, problems, and bottlenecks confronting his ambitious
and unrealistic goals, the Shah soon retreated from liis earlier remarks
and professed that in 25 years Iran will reach the gates of the great
Civilization. The point, however, is that economic development was
held in high esteem, while other facets of development, including
political development, were either totally or partially ignored.
McClelland lists 14 values that are purportedly of some influ-
ence on economic development (see Table 11). Of these, three have been
confirmed-- traditional interaction pressure less frequent; ego's
relation to others more often contractual; impersonal cooperation
pressure more often of a material sort--and two have been partially
indirectly conf i rmed--peer pressure for interaction more frequent;
deceipt and magic as instrumental acts less frequent with hard work
2
and intelligence more frequent.
Pye, as discussed in the previous chapter, postulates that
there is a close relationship between economic and political develop-
ment. Thus, many of the values that promote economic development also
promote political development. Pye presents three themes which are
seen as essential to political development: equality, capacity and
differentiation and specialization. These coincide with certain of
McClelland's variables: equality with universalistic versus
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particularistic norms; capacity with rationality, planning and order-
liness; differentiation and specialization with specificity vs. dif-
fuseness of role relations.^
Specificity vs. diffuseness or role relations, according to the
social theorists, stresses contract rather than status. According to
McClelland, "traditional societies are often characterized ... as
consisting of diffuse network(s) of relationships that individuals have
with each other which are not functionally specific , not entered into
with a specific objective to be accomplished on each side."^
Rationality, planning and orderliness are regarded by Max
Weber to be the prime determinants of economic development. It is
contented that systems "which stress rationality in planning ought to
be able to adapt to ... a system of production more readily and move
ahead more rapidly." Rational values are thought to include hard work,
intelligence and planning as opposed to the irrational, involving magic,
chance and belief in fate.
Universal ism vs. particularism is the dichotomy between the
concept of equality before the law for all which is believed to promote
development and the concept of status distinction which is believed to
be a deferent to development.
The content analysis of textbooks which follows will attempt
to ascertain if these values are present. The presence or absence of
these values postulated affects the ability of the textbooks to aid in
the creation of a "software" which is a prerequisite for development.
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Educational system in Iran
. Until 1971, the Iranian school system was
based on the 6-3-3 concept of which the first six years were devoted to
elementary education. The high school was divided into two three-year
cycles. The first cycle was a general introductory discipline in which
students were introduced to physical and natural sciences, literature,
social sciences and fine arts. The second cycle was more specialized
and was divided into branches such as mathematics, natural sciences,
social sciences and literature, with home economics for girls. There
were also specialized schools for music, commerce and technical
training. The Ministry of Education by 1971 began to phase out this
system and replaced it with the new 5-3-3 concept. As a result of the
Ramsar Educational Conference in 1975, an additional year was added to
the high school which made the system into a 5-3-4 concept. It was
envisioned that the first five years would function as elementary edu-
cation after which tne student would take a general exam to determine
whether he should continue on to guidance school or not. The guidance
level, which is three years, aims to identify the students who have the
capacity and wish to continue their education, and also to determine
their abilities and interests so they can be guided to the professions
that they are best suited for. A series of examinations at the end of
the three years would determine the future schooling of the students.
Those who pass the necessary examinations would be guided either to
further academic education or into technical or professional fields.
High school curriculum is divided into either a four-year aca-
demic program or a two-year or a four-year technical-vocational program,
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depending on the capabilities of the student. The academic program,
for the first two years, consists of general subjects and the last two
years are specialized in mathematics and physical sciences, natural
sciences or social sciences. Every year there is a nationwide examin-
ation, administered by the Ministry of Education, to determine the
capabilities of the twelfth-graders, based on which a high school
diploma is granted to the passing students.
Elementary and guidance school textbooks . As noted at the beginning of
this inquiry, since the focus of the analysis for which the question-
naires were drafted were high school students, it was deemed appropriate
to content analyze the books that presumably would have transmitted the
"system" norms to the students during their earlier years of education.
Therefore, the content analysis is limited to the Farsi readers for the
first through the eighth grade.
Traditionally the Farsi reader has been the bulwark of moral
and socio-cul tural teaching to the students in forms of prose and
poetry. The present-day Farsi readers have replaced books such as
Bustan and Golestan by Saadi and Kalileh va Demneh , which were the
backbones of the traditional maktab education system, and were very
concerned with teachings of moral codes of conduct in addition to the
basic reading and writing skills. The present-day Farsi readers include
many entries from the above books, plus items from other famous Iranian
books of prose and poetry, along with translations from foreign, mainly
European, sources. Among the famous Iranian poets, Firdousi and his
book Shahnameh (Book of Kings) receive the most attention, since
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nationalism, patriotism and bravery, in addition to moral codes of
conduct, are frequent subjects dealt with by Firdousi's emphasis on
Iranian monarchy. In it the national and cultural heritage of Iran are
portrayed as unique and superior to that of others.
For the first three years of elementary school, the Farsi
readers function as both a literature and a social science book. From
fourth grade on there are books that are specifically devoted to
sciences and social sciences. These books, however, are devoid of
moral teachings; they discuss mechanical information which has little
value so far as political development is concerned. Little attention
is paid to the analysis and criticism of the prevailing Iranian socio-
political institutions in the real sense of the word. The Farsi
readers, on the other hand, are full of stories, proverbs and anecdotes
that relate concepts that are very much a part of everyday life. Thus,
it was deemed more relevant to limit the analysis only to the Farsi
readers. Besides functioning as the main literature book, the readers
are used for dictation, poems from them are assigned for memorization,
and they are used as guides for the writing of compositions. As a
result, the Farsi readers are directly or indirectly involved in up to
one-quarter of the subjects, particularly in the elementary schools.
The role of the Farsi readers diminishes to some extent in the guidance
school with the introduction of many new subjects, such as algebra,
geometry, cnemistry, physics, natural sciences, and foreign languages.
Some of the Farsi readers, as will be observed in the following
analysis, do in fact include items that were categorized as "civic
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training" and "political indoctrination" along with the more customary
moral value enforcement.
The first grade Farsi reader is divided into two basic seg-
ments. The first segment deals with the teaching of letters, word
composition, and sentence structure. Although there are expressed words
that could conceivably be coded to represent certain values, the thrust
is word introduction not plot or meaning. Therefore, the first segment
of the first grade Farsi readers was excluded from content analysis.
The second segment, which is composed of seventeen entries, is included
in the content analysis. There are an average of 37 entries in the
readers for grades two to eight.
It should also be noted that only the written material has been
used in the analysis. There were many drawings, especially in the
elementary textbooks, that were very expressive in relating the stories
and in transmission of certain concepts via visual effects. Further-
more, all the textbooks for the years prior to 1976 had, in this order,
photographs of the Shah, the queen, the crown prince, and the Shah's
twin sister, Ashraf, who was the titular head of the Imperial Organiza-
tion for Social Services. From 1976 on, however, only the Shah's
photograph appeared at the beginning of school textbooks.
Each lesson in the Farsi readers, aside from the main entry, is
supplemented by a section composed of vocabulary, questions, and exer-
cises. The elementary readers, in addition, have a grammar supplement.
It is assumed that the intention, aside from teaching of vocabulary and
202
grammar, is to make the students analyze and understand the concepts
implicit in each lesson.
A framework for content analysis
. In the previous pages some values
thought to be related to economic as well as political development were
introduced. As noted, this analysis will attempt to ascertain if the
textbooks convey these values to the students. The general framework
for the content analysis is borrowed from the study by Richard W.
Wilson. Some changes were made in the categories suggested by Wilson
(Appendix 2, Table 2) to conform the outline to the Iranian case
study.
The content analysis of each entry was based on seven param-
eters. The include: (1) type of story; (2) main participant; (3) main
moral theme; (4) authority figure stressed; (5) attitude of the author-
ity; (6) hierarchical social order; and (7) whether contemporary setting
or not. Of course, not all the entries could be categorized on all
these parameters. Some entries that discussed, for example, "practical
knowledge" or "know your country" could not be categorized under
parameters 2 through 7.
Four Iranians, with at least a bachelors degree, with profes-
sional backgrounds in economics, education, and sociology, who were all
very well versed in the English language, were asked to analyze the
content of each entry and codify them according to the above mentioned
categories and enter their decisions on a prepared sheet that was
supplied to them with titles and classifications all in English. There
were a certain number of entries that included two or more stories. In
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such cases, each story was analyzed and codified separately. The
entries varied greatly in length; some were pages long, while others
were only several lines. Some were prose and poetry; others discussed
science and technology; other, practical matters. In general, in the
lower grades, entries were shorter, while in the guidance school the
entries were much longer.
In the final stage, all results were gathered and compared.
The responses that had a 75 percent agreement (3 out of 4) on codifi-
cation were included in the final stage. In a few cases, where there
was a 50 percent agreement (2 out of 4) on an entry, my own content
analysis of that particular item was used in computations. If, as a
result, majority was achieved, the results were entered in the final
analysis.
In general there was little disagreement on the codification,
especially since sub-categories for each level were supplied to each
codifier, along with a broader definition of each sub-category. This
was particularly important in the case of "main moral theme," since
each item had to be defined in broader terms. The definitions for the
themes are as follows:
Respect: obedience, deference, politeness and filiality
Self-discipline: responsibleness , orderliness, value of time
Achievement: value of learning, perseverance, competitiveness,
wi 1 1 i ngness to work
Value of intelligence: using one's head to solve problems
Affect: kindness, love, gratitude, forgiveness
Patriotism: love for country or culture
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Group and cooperation: helpfulness, loyalty, cohesiveness
Bravery: courage
The remaining sub-categories for other levels are self-
explanatory and there is no need for their repetition here.
Analysis
Type of entries
.
This category is divided into eight sub-categories
and one "miscellaneous." The eight sub-categories are: political
institutions and civic training; political indoctrination; nationalism;
sports, health and safety; practical knowledge and know your country;
education, science, and technology; moralistic, including religion; and
arts, culture and folklore.
In the analysis of the data (see Table 4), it was found that
the entries dealing with moralistic subjects made up 40 percent of all
the entries. The number of such entries were fewer in the elementary
readers, while in the guidance readers the numbers had increased.
Moralistic items made up 30 percent of the total in the elementary
readers, while they composed 55 percent of the total in guidance
readers. This is expected, since, as noted earlier, the Farsi readers
function as the main vehicle by which moral codes are taught to the
students. The heavy emphasis on the classical books which promote
moralistic behavior, such as Gol^stan and Bustan of Saadi , are examples
of such a process. As we shall see later, many different moral values
are conveyed to the students with certain norms receiving more emphasis.
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Entries that dealt with practical matters, such as "letter
writing" and "know your country," which were descriptions of major
Iranian cities, made up 26 percent of all entries in the elementary
schools, whereas, there were only three entries dealing with such sub-
jects in the guidance school readers. Traveling and vacationing are
not institutionalized in Iran as they are in the West.^ Therefore, the
government had included a description of major Iranian cities for the
elementary students to broaden their view of their nation, and thus
provide them with a more cohesive feeling of belonging to the nation
of Iran.
Entries dealing with political institutions composed a substan-
tial portion of the first- to third-grade readers. None of these
entries, however, directly dealt with political institutions as such.
There was no mention of the Majlis, the cabinet, political parties, or
the Constitution. The entries that are codified as dealing with
political symbols and institutions, for example, included such subjects
as saluting the national flag. There was also a village scene where a
boy views the results of the benefits from the reforms undertaken by
the Literacy and Rural Development Corpsmen. There was also an entry
that dealt with the election of class representatives. This was as
far as any of the readers went in dealing with a subject that involved
a democratic process, thus giving a semblance of civic training to the
students.
The sub-category of "political indoctrination" included such
subjects as promotion of the monarchy and the royal family, particularly
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TABLE 4
Analysis of Types of Entries for Grades 1 to 8
Types of entries 1
g
2
r a
3
d e
4 5 6 7 8
average
% n
Political institutions
& civic training 18% 1 h 11°/ Oo/oh -DO/o/o 0 0/ /I "70/ / 1 o ^
Political indoctrina-
tion 12 D cD oo o Oo 00 1 c\\3.2- (9j
National ism 6 c0 cD ii OO 8.2 (23)
Sports, health &
safety 7 8 _ 2.1 (6)
Practical knowledge &
know your country 41 LI cc. CI lb O c.D 1 C 1 / /I c \ib.l ^4b)
Education, science &
technology 8 8 5 8 17 6.1 (17)
Moralistic including
rel igion 24 29 27 31 41 71 54 42 40.9 (114)
Arts, Culture &
folklore 10 18 19 15 13 9 19 14.0 (39)
Others (*) 15 3 3 5 3 3 3 4.7 (13)
total % 101% 100% 100% 100% 99% 101% 100% 101% 100%
n (17) (41) (37) (37) (39) (38) (35) (36) (279)
(*) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be
codified.
the Shah, the Shahbanou (queen) and Crown Prince Reza. Also included
in this sub-category are discussions of the Shah-People Revolution
(also referred to as the White Revolution). The achievements of the
Pahlavi period under Mohammad-Reza Shah are also included in this sub-
category. There were a total of nine such entries in these textbooks
which made up about three percent of the total entries. There seemed
to have been more emphasis on the Shah and his family during the first
few years of the schooling. Fifth grade and eighth grade textbooks had
no direct references to the Shah and his family or reforms undertaken
by him; there was one entry each for grades four, six and seven.
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There were 23 entries, or over eight percent of all entries,
that dealt with nationalism. More recent articles on the subject of
nationalism were supplemented by poetry from Shahnameh that deals with
mythical Iranian national heroes. Although Shahnameh has always been
a favorite book with Iranians, nevertheless, it has received more
attention than before as an object of rising nationalistic feelings.
As Firdousi himself put it, Shahnameh was a means by which Iranian
national feelings and cultural heritage were resurrected after three
centuries of Arab domination following the Arab conquest of Iran in
642 A.D. Thus, Shahnameh was used to promote Iranian nationalism,
patriotism and bravery. It also helped to give a cohesive feeling of
nationalism to the present-day citizens of Iran, among whom ethnic,
tribal and linguistic differences are considerable. Nationalism, as a
subject, received great attention during eighth grade, making up 28
percent of the total entries for that year.
Subjects discussing the importance of education or the signif-
icance of scientific and technological innovations made up six percent
of the entries. Many of the items were in poetry, praising the impor-
tance of education. Others dealing with scientific and technological
innovations dealt with both Western and Iranian achievements. Abu-Ali
Sina (Avicina) and Razi were among the prominent classical Iranian
scholars mentioned. The Wright Brothers, Bell, Edison, the history of
film making, paper and printing, and Madame Curie were among the sub-
jects that were included.
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Introduction to arts, culture and folklore has retained a
consistently prominent position in the readers from second to eighth
grade. Excerpts from European, Japanese, American-Indian and Austral-
ian Aborigine folktales are even included in the readers. There were
a total of 39 entries, or 14 percent of the total, that were codified
to have dealt with this sub-category.
The subject of health, sports and safety received the least
attention. There were a total of 6 entries, 3 each for second and
fifth grades, that dealt with this subject. The entries were about
such topics as permanent teeth replacing baby teeth, history of sports
during the Safavid period, and the story of the Olympics. There was no
emphasis on health education, which is very important in a culture that
o
has its high share of taboo and superstition.
Schools have traditionally ignored sports. Individual sports
such as wrestling and weightl ifting have been popular and have been
pursued outside the school environment. Iranians have done well in
international competition in these sports. Team sports which ought to
encourage cooperation and role specificity are played in Iran, not as
a cohesive group, but as a number of individuals. Iranian soccer teams
have had a success in international soccer competition even though the
sport has been played based on individual initiative rather than team
cooperation. An example of this is that Iranian soccer players become
proficient at dribbling the ball but not at passing.^
Main participant . As noted in the previous chapter, individualism is
a cultural characteristic of Iranians. This kind of individualism.
209
however, has been criticized for having produced individuals who are
egotistic, self-centered, and rather selfish. Self-reliance, self-
perfection, and self-esteem are rarely displayed as Iranian individual
traits. Although Iranian literature is full of stories and historical
accounts enumerating personal achievements with such individuals held
in high moral esteem, nevertheless, the socio-political environment,
at least in the past two centuries, has not been conducive to the
development of such attitudes.
The analysis of Farsi readers reveals that entries promoting
or having an individual as its main participant had a clear majority.
A total of 149 entries, or almost 54 percent of all entries, had an
individual as the main participant. There was also an increase in
the number of entries with individual as the main participant as the
grade-level increased (see Table 5).
Although the institution of the family is the most respected
and the most effective means of communication in Iranian culture, it
received the lowest attention. Stories that had family as the main
participant were present only up to grade three with one further entry
in grade five. There was a total absence of entries with family as the
main participant in guidance school readers.
Despite the lack of attention given to the family, the group
as the central participant in entries was steadily about 20 percent
all the way from the second to the eighth grade. There were a total
of 55 entries with group as the central participant. As noted earlier,
many social scientists believe that collectivity is one of the major
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TABLE 5
Analysis of Main Participant for Entries for Grades 1 to 8
Main participant 1 2 3
g r a
4
d e
5
s
6 7 8 % n
Individual
Family
Group
Others (a)
43%
14
14
29
49%
22
24
5
49%
22
16
14
59%
24
18
68%
4
25
4
78%
22
71%
23
6
71% 62.0 (149)
- 7.0 (18)
29 23.0 (55)
- 7.0 (18)
total %
n
100%
(7)
100%
(37)
100%
(37)
100%
(34)
100%
(28)
100%
(36)
100%
(31)
100% 99.0
(31) (240)
Not relevant (b) (10) (4) (3) (11) (2) (4) (5) (39)
(a) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be
codified.
(b) These items are made up of entries where there were no actual
participation by any individual.
norms that could aid in the development of an environment conducive to
political, as well as economic development. It seems that the authors
of the Farsi readers were aware of the impact of collectivity and thus
a fair portion of the entries had topics promoting group and collective
undertakings.
Lack of collective action or group cooperation is legendary in
Iranian history. Many attribute the Iranian lack of success in the
Irano-Afghan war of 1837 over the city of Herat to the lack of coopera-
tion and coordination among the Iranian generals J ^ It is said that
each general wished to capture the city on his own and claim the victory
for himself. This episode is also supported by other similar accounts
detailing lack of group cooperation among Iranians. Jacobs relates
the story of Nasser Khosrow, the medieval Iranian poet-philosopher.
211
Nasser Khosrow had raised the ire of the clergy for
certain anti-religious sentiments in his writings, and
the religious leaders organized a party to kill him.
When the party came to his house, Nasser Khosrow offered
to submit if the party would nominate a single individual
to kill him. Each member of the party, eager for the
prestige to be gained by the killing of the famous
Nasser Khosrow, disputed who would be the one to carry
out the decision. In the anticipated confusion, the
clever Nasser Khosrow escaped. 12
Many entries relate tales of betrayal. Given the Iranian
1 o
fear of betrayal, this emphasis is not unexpected.
Thus, the prominence of entries with an individual as the main
participant is only a cultural extension. As we shall see later, the
stories in the readers have tried to emphasize an individualism that
promotes a societal sense of responsibility as well as commitment to
self-preservation, which is a far cry from the negative individualism
that was discussed above.
Main moral theme . As noted earlier, not all of the entries dealt with
subjects that had an explicit moral theme. Especially in the first
three readers, some entries dealt with "practical knowledge," know your
country," and technical and mechanical information.
The most emphasized theme in all the readers was achievement
and hard work. A total of 63 entries, or 25 percent of the total
entries were devoted to these two themes. Entries from both the Iran-
ian and foreign sources were used to promote achievement and hard work.
Except for the first two grades, where there was more emphasis on
respect and self-discipline, achievement was the most prominent theme
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TABLE 6
Analysis of the Main Moral theme of Entries for Grades 1 to 8
Main moral thpmp 1 0c 00
g r a
n4
u e
0
s
cD
-7
7 8 % n
ResDPrtI « v« <J k/ \« v« u
•J 0/0 1 1 °/ 1 9°/LC/o •50/J/o 0/0 0 Of3/0 6.0 (17)
Self discipline 19 6 3 12 6 18 14 11.0 (27)
Achievement &
1 lu 1 U WU 1 J\ 1
1
1 Q0 1 Q /I n on 0
1
31 26 34 25.0 (63)
Value of intelligence 8 3 3 6 6 3 4.0 (10)
Affect and
thoughtfulness 22 8 12 6 18 19 15 3 12.0 (30)
Patriotism 11 17 12 14 18 14 15 20 15.0 (39)
Group & cooperation 14 9 11 6 8 3 7.0 (18)
Bravery 3 16 9 9 6 6 11 8.0 (20)
Others (a) 11 9 11 6 11 18 11 11.0 (27)
total % 99% 99% 98% 100% 101% 101% 101% 99% 100%
n (9) (36) (32) (35) (34) (36) (34) (35) (251)
Not relevant (b) (8) (5) (5) (2) (5) (2) (1) (1) (28)
(a) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be
codified.
(b) This row indicates the number of entries for each grade that
was deemed to have no moral theme present.
in the textbooks. The Wright brothers, Hans Christian Anderson, Hellen
Keller, Madame Curie, Leonardo Da Vinci
,
Magellan, Captain Scott, Amund-
sen and Richard Byrd are some of the foreign achievers mentioned in
the readers. The famous Iranian achievers of middle ages, such as
Avici na, Khayyam, Abu-Reyhan-e Biruni, and Khawjeh Nassir-e Tusi , as
14
well as the more recent personalities such as Hussein Behzad and
Jabar Baghcheban,^^ are also mentioned. The biographies of these
individuals are supplemented with poetry and prose from works of Saadi
,
Attar, and Nezamie. Although sometimes the stories relate Sufi philos-
ophy and have spiritual conotations, nevertheless, attainment of goals
213
through hard work is prominently displayed. Modern poetry and prose
by writers such as Jalal Al-Ahmad^^ and Parviz-e Natel-e Khanlari^^
promote achivement and hard work as an end in itself. Kahnlari relates
the story of the eagle and the crow, where the crow has no self-respect
and derives satisfaction from the least desirable worldly materials.
The eagle, on the other hand, has to fly high and try hard to get his
share of the hunt. Although the crow lives longer than the eagle, the
eagle's life is filled with challenge, goals and ambitions that are
high and above those that the crow expects from himself.
Another entry which promotes achivement but is filled with
Sufi symbolism, philosophy and the approach to the spiritual ultimate
is the story S imorgh by Attar, the medieval Persian Sufi poet. The
story describes the search of birds for their leader Simorgh , a legen-
dary bird, also mentioned in Shahnameh , where he raised Zal , Rustam's
father. Most of the birds either die or relinguish their pursuit,
since it involved hard work and a painful journey, along with separa-
tion from readily available pleasures. Of all the birds, only thirty
reached their destiny, finding no sign of their expected leader. How-
ever, when they looked at themselves, they saw thirty birds (Farsi's
translation of thirty birds is sie morgh ) , and realized that through
challenges and perseverance, they had become the ultimate in themselves.
To promote group cooperation for achievement, the authors of
the textbooks have relied on present-day stories or descriptions of
foreign cooperative actions. Rochdale collective experience in England
is portrayed as the fruit of cooperative action among citizens. The
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beneficial results from the cooperation between a crow, a tree, a
stream and a farmer which result in the formation of a new town are
depicted in a folktale.
Patriotism is the second most common theme in the readers.
Items from classical Persian literature and modern-day writings are
used to emphasize this theme. Thirty-nine entries, which account for
15 percent of the total items, deal with patriotism as the main theme.
The emphasis on patriotism is almost equally present in all the readers,
making up between 11 to 20 percent of the entries in each reader.
Patriotism is usually treated as an extension of love for the
nation. Historical events highlighting patriotism are usually used to
promote the theme. In some cases, however, patriotism is mixed with
love for the institution of monarchy, support for the Shah and his
family, and reforms undertaken by the Shah--i.e., the White Revolution.
Often achievements by ancient Iranian kings and contributions made by
Iranian civilization to world civilization are used as a basis of
patriotic themes. Sometimes patriotism and bravery are mixed to achieve
the maximum effect. Self-sacrifice of Iranian soldiers and generals
against Greeks, Mongols and other invaders of the "motherland" are
used to emphsize the significance of bravery and patriotism.
There were a total of 30 entries that dealt with affect and
thoughtful ness, about 12 percent of the total items. Aside from the
eighth grade reader, where there was only one entry dealing with the
theme, there were two in the fourth grade reader and the remaining
readers had three or more entries each dealing with "affect." Readers
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for fifth and sixth grades had the highest number of items dealing with
"affect" and "thoughtful ness .
"
The objects of affect and kindness were not limited to mankind.
Animals were also objects of kindness and love. Once again, the entries
were often borrowed from classical Persian literature. Many were in
the form of poetry, from such classical poets as Saadi , Nezami and such
modern poets as Bahar. Recent examples of human kindness, such as
Albert Schweitzer, were reflected in the readers.
Entries promoting bravery and courage made up eight percent of
the total. There were entries discussing bravery in all grades except
the first grade. Many of the items were drawn, once again, from
classical Persian literature or from historical events. There were
also several examples from Western lore in the readers. The courage
and bravery by William Tell and Peter, the little Dutch boy, who pre-
vented a dike breaking by putting his finger in a leaking hole, thus
saving his hometown, were noted. A recent example of Iranian courage
and bravery was exhibited in the story of the shepherd who, on seeing
fallen rocks on railroad tracks at night, made a torch from his clothing
and thus saved the lives of many passengers on the train. These stories
are but a few of the entries used in the readers to promote bravery in
the students.
Besides several excerpts from Shahnameh describing the courage
and bravery of its heroes, there were stories relating the bravery of
Iranians in battles against foreign invaders. The Iranian resistance
against the Mongol invaders is a favorite topic.
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Bravery is promoted in a micro and a macro sense. Bravery and
courage within peer group and family, as well as heroism against
foreign invaders is applauded.
Sub-categories of respect, group and cooperation each made up
seven percent of the entries. Over half of the entries in the first
grade reader had respect as their central moral theme. However, there
was a decline in attention given to respect as the grade level
increased. There were no items with respect as the central theme in
the sixth or seventh grade readers. There was only one item in the
eighth grade reader with respect as the main moral theme. The objects
of respect are varied. They include God and religious figures; the
Shah and the royal family; and of course, parents and family members.
Group and cooperation themes also received varied attention.
There were no items dealing with cooperation in either the first grade
reader or the eighth grade reader. There was one entry with cooperation
as the central theme in the seventh grade reader. Most of the discus-
sions in the previous categories dealing with individualism, emphasizing
the impact of individualism in Iranian culture, are also relevant here.
Kalileh va Demneh , the classical Indian literary book that uses animals
as its main actors, is one of the few sources for the classical stories
on group work and cooperation that is utilized in the readers. The
story of the first cooperative in Rochdale, England is another of the
highlights for this theme.
The fewest number of entries, based on our classification, were
used in discussing the "value of intelligence." There were 10 items
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altogether, at least one entry for each grade, except for the first
and seventh grades which had none.
There were also items dealing with "love of life," "fate,"
"universalism," and "arrogance" in the readers. Since the number of
such items were few, they were all grouped and categorized as "others"
in the classification.
Authority figure stressed
. About 70 percent of all the entries had a
central authority figure. The most common authority figures were indi-
viduals with national and political prominence, most of whom were kings,
governors or persons with high administrative positions. This was
rather expected since many of the entries were drawn from classical
literature as was noted earlier. Shahnameh
, Golestan and Bustan also
supply a substantial portion of the guidance school entries. Of the
total of 109 entries in the guidance school Farsi readers, 45 entries,
or 42 percent, were direct excerpts from classical Persian literature.
Saadi's works got the highest attention. They included 10 items, six
of which were from Golestan (combination of prose and poetry) and four
from Bustan (exclusively poetry). Saadi's works are almost all moral
teachings which are usually related in the form of stories, many from
his extensive travels in the Islamic world of the thirteenth century.
Firdowsi's work, Shahnameh , received the second highest attention with
eight items. Although there are implicit moral teachings in Shahnameh ,
the work is the account of mythical Iranian kings with Rustam, a brave,
moral and very strong contender, as the hero. The work details Rustam'
s
bravery, patriotism and service to the Iranian monarchs. Firdowsi was
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TABLE 7
The Main Authority Figure Stressed in Entries for Grades 1 to 8
Authority figure grades
stressed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3% 6% 7% 7% 10% 14%
15 9 7 5
6 7 7
21 9 14 14 3 14 6
21 12 4 3 5 6
24 6 25 19 10 29
4 3
21 25 25 42 43 47
6 6 7 3
6 4 14 3 10 6
9 15 25 4 13 6
%
Hotter " if f " « « - d^)
-
- - - 60 hli
Other family members
-
-
- 3*0(6iElders
- (23Educational
- - 8.0 15Peer
-
?a a
_ 9j; in m on ir n :!;;;(
Police
-
- - -
- - 1 0 (2)
Kings, princes, rulers - \ )
men of power & wealth 25 - 27 0 (53)
The Shah & his family 25 - - . 5*0 (g)
Religious, incl. God 37 - 7*0 (14
Others (a) 12 - ll'.O (22)
total % 99% 99% 101% 100% 100% 99% 101% 100% 102.0%
n (8) (33) (32) (29) (28) (31) (21) (17) (198)
Not relevant (b) (9) (8) (5) (8) (11) (7) (14) (19) (81)
(a) Includes entries that as a result of disagreement could not be
codified.
(b) This row indicates the number of entries for each grade that
had no central authority figure present.
a favorite with the Pahlavi regime since his teachings of patriotism
and promotion of monarchy corresponded with the regime's ideals, and
thus his work was used (or misused) to promote the institution and
legitimacy of monarchy.
There are also four excerpts from Siasatnameh (Book of Politics)
of Khawjeh Nassir Tousi and Qabus-Nameh of Kaikavos ibn-Iskandar both of
which were written in the twelfth century. Both books are concerned
with moral teachings written for the attention of the royalty of this
period to assist them in governing. There are also two items each from
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MlMu^Oemneh and Mante5_at,Iair of Attar, details of which were
discussed earlier. The rest of the entries were from individual
classic writers and poets
The entries in the elementary readers are less sophisticated
and are sometimes simplified versions of stories from classical Persian
literature. These simplified stories have kept their implied moral
teachings intact.
Items with peers as the main authority figures are thought to
be a positive educational reinforcement among the children. McClelland
includes "peer pressure for interaction" among norms which are thought
to be important for achievement. As noted previously, the hypothesis
for this theory has been partially indirectly confirmed and is one of
the items noted under the general heading of "collectivity." McClelland
notes that "peer collectivity
. . . more successfully forces the indi-
vidual into line in the more rapidly developing countries. "^^ Further-
more, it is also found that even among the more economically successful
authoritarian societies, there is greater peer orientation. Thus, peer
collectivity has been suggested to be an orientation which is quite
helpful to development. The development of peer collectivity is as
valuable to socio-political development of a nation as it is to its
economic development.
Some 15 percent of the entries, or 30 of them, had peers as
their central authority figure. Some of these, as usual, were drawn
from the classical literature, but most were from recent writings by
Iranian and foreign writers. The attention paid to peers as the main
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authority figure was rather uneven throughout the readers. There were
no items with peer as the authority figure in the readers for first and
fourth grade. On the other hand, one-fourth of the entries in second,
fifth and eighth grade readers had peers as the main authority figure.
Elders occupy an important socioK:ultural position in Iranian
society. They are revered and respect for them is urged. Also, a
great deal of emphasis is put on advice from elders due to their longer
life experience. Thus, elders traditionally have served as a major
source of authority in Iranian literature and folklore. It is, there-
fore, not surprising to find that 23 entries, or 12 percent of all the
items, have elders as the main authority figure. In some of the
stories even the rulers turn to elders for advice, which is usually
benefi ci al
.
Educational figures, such as teachers and school principals,
also received a fair share of emphasis as the main authority figure in
the entries. A total of 15 entries, or eight percent of the items, had
educational figures as the main authority image. However, there were
fewer entries with such authority figures in the guidance school
readers. There were none in the first and fifth grade readers either.
The second grade reader had educational authorities as its main figures
in one-fifth of the entries. There was a decreasing emphasis on educa-
tional figures in third and fourth grade readers. Most of the materials
dealing with educational figures as the main authority are of recent
nature. They mostly deal with classroom situations and/or with educa-
tional matters.
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Although almost all the elders and politically prominent indi-
viduals were male, there were male and female individuals performing
as the educational figure of authority. As it has been noted often,
the classical literature supplies most of the materials, especially for
the guidance school readers. Since classical Persian literature is
extremely male oriented, females, as figures of authority, are almost
absent. Women are rarely mentioned in Shahnameh, except when there is
a love scene or the discussion involves a wife, mother, or daughter of
the actor. The major exception is the story of Bahram-e Gur (Sassanid
King) and Azadeh, who, through perseverance, is able to teach the king
that "achievement is the end result of perseverance and hard work."
Religious figures, such as the Prophet Mohammad, other Biblical
prophets. Imams (successors to the Prophet, beginning with Ali) and
God, make up seven percent of the total entries. As a norm, all the
readers begin with praise for God in their first entry in which God's
aid and assistance for achievement and success is sought. The only
reader which had no direct reference to God or other religious figures
was the second grade reader. On the other hand, more than one- third,
or 37 percent of all the items in the first grade reader had God or
religious personalities as the main figures of authority. Biographies
of the religious personalities or Koranic descriptions of events such
as Noah's ark and the flood supply most of such religious figures of
authori ty.
Some 30 entries, or 16 percent of all items had a family member
as the main authority figure. Of that total, seven percent, or 13
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items, had the father as the main authority figure, while five percent,
or n items, stressed mother. Other family members, such as siblings
and grandparents, made up only three percent of the total authority
figures in the readers.
Mothers, as main authority figures, are stressed more in the
elementary school readers, particularly during the first few grades.
Fathers, on the other hand, are stressed more in the guidance school
readers as the main figure of authority. There are no mentions of any
family member as an authority figure in the eighth grade reader.
Fathers are usually dealt with as individuals with strength, wisdom and
also as a source of guidance. However, there were also items showing
the support that children could give to their families and the inter-
dependence of family members on each other. Mothers are usually
depicted as a source of love, kindness and self-sacrificing for their
families, particularly to their children.
There were two entries each in first through fourth grade
readers that had the Shah and his family as the main figures of author-
ity. There was also one item in the sixth grade reader discussing the
Shah's childhood as depicted in his book. Mission For My County
. There
was no mention of the Shah or his family in the fifth, seventh and
eighth grade readers. The items with the Shah and his family as the
main authority figures discussed the Shah, his wife and their children,
particularly Crown Prince Reza. The items dealt with their achieve-
ments, contributions to the welfare of the nation, and sought respect
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and love for them. There was also one entry that dealt exclusively
with the accomplishments of Reza Shah.
There were two items that had the police-as it is institu-
tionalized today-as the central authority figure. These items dealt
with the observance of traffic regulations and depicted policemen as
benevolent and helpful. Of the two items, one was in the fifth grade
and the other in the sixth grade reader, making up one percent of the
total entries.
Mmude_^LjuMlon^ The sub-categories dividing this classificati
are benevolence, non-benevolence and neutral. In all the readers,
except the fifth grade, the majority of items had the main authority
figure as a benevolent person. Some two-thirds of all the items
had a benevolent individual as the main authority figure. The remain-
ing entries were divided between those with either non-benevolent or
neutral attitudes. The entries, particularly in the first four
readers, had fewer authority figures with non-benevolent attitudes than
in the next four years. Even the entries with non-benevolent authority
figures are themselves reinforcing a positive moral theme by depicting
negative consequences. The story of the shepherd who cried wolf is a
good example of this mode of teaching (see Table 8).
Hierarchical social order
. Very few of the entries in the elementary
school readers had a hierarchical social order implicit in them. Over
85 percent of the readers from second to fifth grade had no hierarchical
social order present. There were five entries in the first grade reader
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TABLE 8
The Attitude of Authority Streesed in Entries for Grades 1 to 8
Attitudes of authority
'—Spades "
stressed 1 2 3 4 5 ^ ^ ^ ^
No^b:i:v"o^ant t \f f;' if if taNeutral (a) 17 3^ 2^ ^ 'I 'I \\ |36)
total % 100% 100% 101% 100% 99% 100% 100% 99% 99 0%
(6) (33) (35) (29) (28) (31) (20) (17) (197)
No authority
present (b) (11) (8) (2) (8) (11) (7) (15) (20) (82)
codified^"^^^^^^
entries that as a result of disagreement could not be
(b) This row indicates the number of entries for each grade that wasdeemed to have no authoritative attitude stressed.
that were relevant to this classification, three of which dealt with
religious hierarchy and the monarchy.
The presence of classical literature, which is often influenced
by hierarchical social order, in the guidance school readers gave rise
to the number of items with hierarchical social order explicit in them.
At the most, one- third of all the entries had an explicit social order.
The table below (Table 9) displays the increasing number of items
where hierarchical social order is present and rather explicit as the
grade level increases.
Social stratification is still very much a part of Iranian
social structure. The often talked about hezar famil (thousand family)
is a socio-economic class that has dominated the affairs of tne nation
at least since the late eighteenth century. Their significance and
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TABLE 9
Hierarchical social
order 1 2 3
G r a
4
d e
5
s
6 7 8 % n1
1
Present
Not present
60%
40
6%
94
7%
93
14%
86
14%
86
23%
77
33%
67
34%
66
19.0
81.0
(43)
(182)
total %
n
100%
(5)
100%
(32)
100%
(30)
100%
(32)
100%
(35)
100%
(36)
100%
(27)
100%
(30)
100%
(225)
Not relevant (a) (12) (9) (7) (5) (4) (3) (8) (7) (54)
nr.A-^' A A it ^".^'^'^^ ^"^^ ^s a rcsu 1 1 of disagreement could not be
them
that had no hierarchical social order present in
influence on the economic and political affairs of revolutionary Iran,
however, cannot be determined as of yet.
The social class system, which was so much a part of Iranian
life in pre- Islamic Iran, had its influence on the Iranian Constitution
of 1906, when the class system was recognized as a basis for parliamen-
tary representation with all classes electing their deputies to the
Majlis. Although class basis for parliamentary election was soon
abolished, it is no coincidence that hierarchical social order is an
integral part of classical Persian literature and is often depicted in
school texts, particularly in the guidance school readers.
Contemporary setting
. Students are able to relate more easily to
entries with contemporary settings. Items depicted in setting of the
distant past or of more fairy-tale than real life experience are
thought to be of little help, if any, to students in the development
of the senses and the concepts that would be helpful in real life
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TABLE 10
Setting [ ] 7^~V~^~t~^.
'
^ ^ 5 6 7 8 % n
Contempora ry i oo% 100% 64% 71% 49% 377 ?v/ iqo/ n n.r.^Non-contemporary
. . 36 29 tV IV 77 II' Ito ^(sgj
total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%n (6) (28) (33) (28) (35) (28) (22) (22) (199)j;o^^anlMa)_Jl^ (4) (9) (4) (n) (13) (15) (go)
situations. As Table 10 shows, the setting of most entries in the first
four years are contemporary, while the majority of the entries in the
last four years are not.
Of course, the nature of classical literature, particularly
present in the guidance school, aids the high proportion of items set
in non-contemporary situations. Also, biographies of famous men,
poets, inventors, explorers, artists and scientists all add to the
number of items that have taken place in the past. All settings taking
place in the nineteenth century and before have been regarded as not
contemporary for the sake of analysis here.
However, most of the items, as shown in Table 10 above, have a
contemporary setting. All the items in the first and second grade
readers are set in a contemporary situation, while less than one-fifth
of all the items in the eighth grade reader are set in contemporary
ci rcumstances.
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s™ar^. As the data analysis shows, the average Iranian student in
his eight years of elementary and guidance school education has been
exposed to varying themes in his Farsi readers. Certain moral values
are stressed while some others are less apparent. Achievement and hard
work, for example, receive a proportionately high representation in
the readers, while group work and cooperation leading to achievement
are very much neglected. Love of country, as reflected in patriotism,
also receives a very high representation in the Farsi textbooks. Some
of the entries promoting bravery also have a fair amount of patriotism
implicit in them.
Most of the items delineated by McClelland to have an influence
on economic development are present in the readers. The five norms
that were outlined to have a proven or indirectly proven impact on
economic development are all included in the readers. The institu-
tional norms, such as respect and friendship, are also well represented,
making up almost one-fifth of the total entries. As noted above, group
activity and cooperation do not receive the prominence that they
require. There are many entries, however, that stress the significance
of rationality, planning and orderliness. There are few items that
deal either with specificity, role relation or impersonal cooperation.
Almost totally absent are civic training in its present-day
context. There are no discussions of the role of government, its
responsibility to a modern polity, or the public's obligations to the
government. There are no discussions of the Iranian constitution, the
parliament, the cabinet, or any other civil or military institution.
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In short, the Farsi readers attempt no citizenship training. Although
there is a social science text in the three years of guidance school,
it also attempts to present factual information without much elabora-
tion on the concepts, such as what gave rise to the promulgation of
the Constitution of 1906-07.
So far as the authority figures present in the entries, the
traditional sources of authority, such as kings, governors, vaziers
(ministers), elders, and parents are very much the norm. They contrib-
ute most of the authority figures present in some classical literary
works, are but a recent concept in modern Persian literature. Tradi-
tionally, the emphasis has been on hierarchical social order which has
very much been part of Iranian life and, as was apparent above, is very
much present in modern-day Persian textbooks.
The Farsi readers perform a many faceted educational task.
Although their primary purpose is to teach the Persian alphabet,
writing, vocabulary and grammar in the elementary school, and to provide
a basic introduction to classical Persian literature in the guidance
school, their mission, nevertheless, is influenced by other objectives.
Historically, Persian literature has served as a moral and philosophi-
cal vehicle. Moral and philosophical teachings still compose the most
significant portion of the readers that were analyzed here. Excerpts
from classical Persian literature, along with modern Persian literature,
compose the majority of the items present in the readers. This is not
surprising, since the readers are primarily intended to introduce the
students to Persian literature.
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Another task of books that deal with teachings of mores and
values is their relevance to the present-day needs of men. A major
shortcoming of the readers stems from the fact that certain norms and
values which, as suggested earlier, are crucial to development of socio-
political and economic institutions have received little attention.
For example, too little attention is paid to collective activity for
purposes of communal good. In light of the discussions detailing the
negative form of "individualism" and its impact on the perceptions of
each individual, the subject of collectivity demands more rigorous
attention. The socio-cultural notion of individualism, as represented
in the textbooks, has to be moderated. Too often, the individual as
the champion and prodigy remains the central attention of the entries.
Too frequently survival of an individual is portrayed as dependent on
his wit and intelligence since those around him, often striving and
competing for realization of their own personal interests, are indif-
ferent, if not hostile, to his interests.
Furthermore, the notion of individualism is supported by the
phiolosophical tradition implicit in Sufism and displayed in classical
Persian literature. The emphasis on the individual attempt for ulti-
mate perfection has been in a large part responsible for the omni-
presence of "individualism" in the Iranian mind. Thus, the literature,
in general, and the Farsi readers, in particular, are an extension of
the Iranian socio-cultural tradition.
The shortcoming of the Iranian cultural tradition, on the other
hand, has not been compensated to an effective degree by the inclusion
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of new innovative entries or stories from foreign literary sources.
Although there is a wide representation of foreign literary works in
the readers with items from Tolstoy, Victor Hugo, Schiller, H. C.
Anderson, Moliere and Nehru, and biographies of famous men and women
such as Magellan, DaVinci, Albert Schweitzer, Alexander Graham Bell,
Thomas Edison, Helen Keller and the Wright brothers, the spirit of group
work and collective action is lacking.
Family activity, which is the only group activity that serves
as a source of support for most Iranians, receives very little atten-
tion. Family bonds, especially at a time of industrialization and
very active urbanization which undermines such bonds, need to be
further affirmed and supported.
The readers also perform as a major vehicle for politicaliza-
tion in the forms of nationalism, patriotism and political indoctrina-
tion. Many of the items classified under "know you country" also
serve to create a national identify in the students, thus making about
one-fourth of all entries in the readers related to political sociali-
zation. Individualism and de-emphasis of group action means that
values needed for development of political institutions are missing,
since all such activities require cooperative action. Furthermore,
the subject of political institutions and citizenship roles are totally
ignored. No discussions of political institutions, such as the Majlis,
political parties, the system of justice, labor organizations, or the
army is available in any of the readers, although these institutions
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or
were created or promoted by the Pahlavi regime to serve its purposes
and to help to legitimize its rule.
The values and norms present in the readers greatly emphasi
themes that are either of little relevance to political development
are in contrast to the ideals of political modernization and develop-
ment. The case in point is the emphasis on individual action and de-
emphasis on collective action. Furthermore, institutional norms seem
to predominate in the textbooks, while such norms as universalism or
"salience of nature" are rather absent.
The attention paid to the development of achievement oriented
norms, while ignoring development of institutions to perform as the
infra-structure of a developed society, is a classic example of the
"modernization" that was envisioned by the Shah. Modernization to the
Shah had been pieces of highly sophisticated technology, imported from
abroad and maintained by foreign experts, while having no real relevance
to the needs and lives of Iranians. These show pieces served as the
Shah's vision of modernization. The school readers are another manifes-
tation of such modernizating visions. While attention is paid to
achievement oriented themes, the contradictory traditional foundation
which perpetuates the cultural framework is also retained. Thus, in a
sense, attempts are made to impose modern and developed values on a
foundation which is basically alien to such themes.
In short, it could be noted that the second Pahlavi monarch,
like the first, had little interest in the development of the nation,
be it economic or political. Like his father, Mahammad Reza Pahlavi
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was more interested in self-aggrandizement than in modernizing the
state.
A student's relationship to his or her environment, however,
is not bound just to the textbooks that he or she reads and has to pass
exams on. Peer groups, mass communication, teacher-student relation-
ship, and most important of all, the parent-student relationship serve
as further vehicles of socialization and politicization. The next
section. Part III, deals with comparison of student-parent values and
perhaps will offer an added dimension by which some suggestions could
be made as to the impact of the textbooks on the students, on one hand,
and the influence of parent's values on the students, on the other hand,
in determining the direction of socialization and political learning
among students.
FOOTNOTES
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/There are both economic and cultural reasons for it. Sincethe majority of Iranians have no cash savings, vacationing is consid-
?raditionanv°'?h''''ri'^ '/''^^ ^^o can afford itI ionally, the well-to-do, during the summer seasons, moved to more
0 '?:n? d onf ^°Fo
^^?,--^^',-here they either owned'^an o'rcS
or re te ne. r example, the rich Tehranis took up summer residencein Shemiran, on the foothills of Alburz, 10 miles to the north It
was this same class, and the expanding middle class, that now could
afford either travelling to the beaches on the Caspian or to foreign
resort areas for vacations.
^'c y
g
It is not unusual to find many Iranian youth in their 20s thatknow very little about biological matters involving the opposite sex
LT/^u^!;^^^ astounded to find out from a 21 year old Iranian youththat he had never heard or known about a woman's monthly period.
9
^'^most all Iranian schools lack sport facilities at the barest
level. Most scnools only have a few hundred square yards of playground
that are used as playing ground, recreation area, and, when needed, as
either volleyball or basketball courts. The ground is either asphalt
or of cement tiles, which make falling a hazardous eventuality. There
are a few sports fields that are used by some of the schools in the more
prosperous neighborhoods. The government, in the past two summer
Olympics and the Asian Olympics, spent a fortune to promote sports at
home and abroad, but the results, particularly at the Mexico City Olym-
pics, were disastrous. The sports had only been attended to at the
post-high school amateur level. The schools, on the other hand, were
on their own. Neighborhood alleyways and streets performed as sports
arenas for the youth. Such elements as danger of being run over by
cars and unsupervised training certainly were not conducive to the kind
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of training that would result in impressive showings in international
h^7trr°"- " l^^^ ^^""^'^t^y Education decided IhTt spor?sad to have a higher place in the Iranian educati onal system So itwas decided that all students had to perform calisthenics evervmorni no
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^^See Chapter III for discussions on individualism.
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^Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Prince-ton University Press, 1971) p. 214.
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Norman Jacobs, The Sociology of Development: Iran as a case
study (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 252.
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^^Ibid.
^^A modern painter who revived the art of miniature painting.
1
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The founder of a school for deaf and mute in Iran.
^^A modern novelist and author whose progressive writings are
highly respected.
^^A modern poet-educationalist and one-time Minister of Education.
1 o
Items from classical poets such as Anvari
, Farokhi , Ibn-e Yamin,
Jami
,
Nasser Khosrow, Nesami and modern poets such as Bahar, Dehkhoda,
Foroughi, Naderpour, Parvin Etesami
,
Shahriyar, Soratgar are included
in the readers.
^^McClelland, p. 187.
20Among extravagant items are nuclear reactors, Pahlavi Library
with the most sophisticated equipment to get any material in any library
in the world in a few hours (see Iran Almanac and Book of Facts: 1976
,
p. 127), while there is chronic shortage of readers and absence of regu-
lar libraries in most major cities. Also, Kish Resort Island in the
Persian Gulf, paid for by revenues from National Iranian Oil Company,
constructed for foreign tourists during the winter months for vacation,
gambling and duty free shopping. Iranians were not allowed to the
island and needed a special permit and clearance to visit it.
PART III
Ali Masalehdan
PART III
PARENTS AS SOCIALIZING AGENTS
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CHAPTER VI
INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS
The family, as the first socializing institution, is perhaps
the most crucial source of values and norms taught to children. The
family's role in socialization is important for the deliberate teaching
of values and, paradoxically, for the lack of transmission of values
and norms. Dawson and Prewitt note that two main factors are responsi-
ble for the importance of the family role in socialization process.
First, in the child's early years when his political self is forming,
the family is a major influence and in many cases the only influence.
Second, the child develops relationships with his family which are among
the most important and emotionally intense he will ever have.^
The family's impact on the process of political socialization
of its members is achieved through several means. The family may
transmit values and norms to its children through direct teaching or
indoctrination methods. The family also influences the development of
the children's personalities and of their non-political social orien-
tations and values. Moreover, the family is a major influence on the
child's basic self-identification. Finally, the political outlook of
those in the family is affected by a network of social and economic
p
relationships.
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The family, as a primary socializing agent, cannot be con-
trolled or manipulated by centralized agencies and is able to transmit
political values or to abstain from transmitting them at its will.3 The
significance of family impact on political socialization was noted by
the Greenstein and the Easton-Hess studies, showing the feeling of
national identification and loyalty developed by children prior to
their enrollment in schools.^
In traditional societies, in the absence of formalized polit-
ical institutions, the impact of family on the process of political
socialization is amplified. While one would expect to find a greater
similarity in societal norms and values adhered to by parents and chil-
dren in the traditional societies, in the transitional societies where
there is a rapid change in the process of socialization, the difference
between the parental values and norms and that of their children could
be expected to be greater.^
As noted earlier, the partental interest or, as Dawson and
Prewitt have noted, the parental lack of interest has significant impact
on the development of political participation and political interest in
children.^ Political interest or the lack of it is of crucial impor-
tance in the process of socialization in any society. The political
socialization militated by the family is usually not executed in a
conscious manner. The parents do not usually plan or intend in any
systematic way to transfer these values. The political socialization
of the children occurs as a by-product of the interactions of the
family. Furthermore, the family seldom thinks of political training
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as one of its tasks7 It is on rare occasions that there is a delib-
erate intention by the family to instill political values in children.
Such a situation exists to the dismay of political leadership, partic-
ularly in the authoritarian political systems where the centralized
political authorities seek to have total control over the "process
and contents of political learning. They wish to ensure that the
family would transmit only the "right" political and social norms and
would refrain from injecting the "wrong" norms to the children. Of
course, with the severe limitations on the power of any authoritarian
government to control the transmission of values from parents to
children, the role of family as a very important socializing agent
remains formidable.
Socio-cultural norms
.
While the primary focus in this study of the
intergenerational socialization process is the similarities and differ-
ences between the parents and students, an analysis of norms and value
associated with the orientations of both groups is also undertaken.
These norms, termed "socio-cultural variables," measure a wide spectrum
of social behavior. They are selected because of their presumed asso-
ciation with the general concept of development. These items are
borrowed from the "Four Country Study," reported in David McClelland's
The Achieving Society
. The utilization of the following socio-cultural
variables in this section of the inquiry will create a comparable basis
for the comparative analysis of the value coding schemes used for the
textbook analysis with an eye to the fundamental socio-cultural traits
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which are present in the Iranian culture and which may influence the
political orientation of the respondents, (see Table 11).^
Jraditional interaction pressure . Traditional values are
defined in Parsonian terms as "force(s) for conformity which (are)
highly generalized, super individual, persistent over time, and
supplying to the actor a set of rules for his behavior. "''0 There are
four items in the questionnaire dealing with traditionalism, divided
into two segments: respect and friendship. The following two vari-
ables deal with respect. While variable 19 measures the level of
respect for parents, variable 25 is an indicator of the level of respect
for elders.
Variable 19: There is hardly anybody lower than a person who
does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for
his parents.
Variable 25: Respect is due an older man, no matter what kind
of a person he is.
The level of friendship, as a tradi ti onal mode of behavior, is
measured by the following two items:
Variable 27: Real friendship is permanent friendship; friends
don't change with circumstances.
Variable 39: Ho sane and decent person would ever think of
hurting a close friend.
Universal ism vs. particularism
. The Parsonian contention is
that having the attitude that "all (are) equal before the law," aids
political development. Values promoting "status distinction among the
the protagonists" tend to supress the ideal of universalism which aims
in development of a "code of law which applies equally to all indi-
viduals."^^ Particularism is thought to be a detriment to development.
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Two items in the questionnaire measured this mode of behavior. They
are:
Variable 24: There are some people like great artists and
musicians who can be forgiven for not being
siderate of others, kind to poor, etc
Variable 34: A man with money cannot really learn how to
behave among dignified people if he has not had
the proper upbringing.
Conectivi ty vs. self-orientation
. Parsons argues that the
value systems where collectivi ty-i .e.
, the group, society, nation,
etc.
--is put above the goals promoting personal interests are instru-
mental in political development. Two measures are proposed for delin-
eating collectivity. Interaction under pressure from peers and modes
of cooperation are suggested as "the extent to which pressure for
conformity came from peers or the generalized others. "^"^ The two
statements measuring peer pressure are:
Variable 20: The negative opinion of others often keeps me
from seeing a movie or a play that I had planned
to attend.
Variable 28: My political opinion is not easily swayed by
what I read in the newspapers.
The second measurement of collectivity is described as "the
extent to which motives for cooperation were selfish. "^^ The items
measuring levels of collectivity among the respondents were:
Variable 22: There is no satisfaction in any good without a
companion.
Variable 45: It is better to go without something than to ask
for a favor.
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McClelland contends that modern industrialized societies
require a "greater degree of public coordination" than was previously
required by lower levels of technology.""^
Rationality and planning vs. determinism . Rationality and
planning are regarded by Weber to be prime determinants of development.
It is contended that systems "which stress rationality and planning
ought to be able to adapt to ... a system of production more readily
and move ahead more rapidly.-^^ ^^^.^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ .^^^^^^
hard work, intelligence and planning as opposed to irrational, involving
magic, chance and belief in fate. Items measuring hard work in the
questionnaire are:
Variable 32: I set difficult goals for myself which I attempt
to reach.
Variable 36: I work hard at everything I undertake until I am
satisfied with the results.
Variable 46: I often do something just to prove to myself that
I can do it.
Items measuring planning in the questionnaire are:
Variable 17: When a man is born, the success he is going to
have is already in the cards, so he might as well
accept it and not fight against it.
Variable 43: Planning only makes a person unhappy since plans
hardly ever work out anyway.
Variable 44: Nowadays, with the world condition the way it is,
the wise person lives for today and lets tomorrow
take care of itself.
Although the next item was originally intended for measurement
of risk taking behavior, due to the composition of the question
and the cultural framework of the country, it actually measured the
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TABLE 11
Relations of
^^^^^J^s
to Socio-Cultural Variables Thought to beot Importance for Economic Development
Social variables thought to be"
important for economic develop-
ment ^
1. 'Modern' vs. 'traditional'
social structure.
(a) Universal is tic vs. particu-
laristic norms,
(b) Specifity vs. diffuseness
of role relations.
(c) Achieved vs. ascribed status
(d) Collectivity vs. self-
orientation.
2. Affective neutrality (asceti-
cism, thrift).
3. Rationality, planning, orderli
ness.
4. Man over nature, optimism,
belief in progress.
5. Material needs over other
concerns.
Corresponding items which should
'
characterize more rapidly growing
economies.
1.
2.
*
3.
5t
6.
7.
Institutional (traditional) in-
teraction pressure less frequent
Peer status of 'ego" more fre-
quent (a society of equals).
Ego's relation to others more
often 'contractual' (e.g. moti-
vated with an outcome).
Achieved status more frequent :
ascribed status less frequent !
Peer pressure for interaction
more frequent
.
Self-interest, self-esteem and
nurturance less frequent as
motive for interaction.
Impulse control and/or punish-
ment for impulse expression
+ more frequent .
8. Deceit and magic as instrumental
acts less frequent ; hard work
and 'intelligence' more frequent
9. Fate and magic as influence on
ego less frequent
.
10. Man over nature more frequent
.
11. Ego's action more often
successful
.
12. Biological needs more frequent
as a motive for 'ego'
.
13. Material reward more frequent
as means of exerting interac-
^
tion pressure.
4. Impersonal cooperation pressure
more often of a material sort.
* Hypothesis confirmed.
+ Hypothesis indirectly or partly confirmed
This table in its entirety has been borrowed from David McClelland,
The Achieving Society, (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961), p. 173, Table
5.4
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respondents' attitude on "chance." Therefore, it is included in this
category indicating deterministic behavior. It state that:
Variable 37: I enjoy a race or a game when I bet on it.
Iin£ortance of time. R.H. Knapp and many others have stressed the
significance of time in assessing the level of achievement. Those
with high level of achievement tend to stress the significance of time.
Although in the "Four Country Study" no significant relationship
between importance of time and level of achievement was found, never-
theless, the question was included in this inquiry. The item measuring
importance of time states:
Variable 29: It would irritate me very much to have a watch or
a clock which was off by several minutes everyday.
Impulse control. Weber contends that this mode of behavior,
a key characteristic of Protestantism, displayed in the forms of "hard
work, savings, asceticism, and renunciation of worldly pleasures," is
instrumental in business expansion. Thus, it is argued that the
"nations which were developing rapidly would stress the importance of
controlling one's impulses."^'' Impulse control is measured by the
following item:
Variable 16: If you get bad news, it is better to hide what
you feel and behave as if you don't care.
Respect for children
. This category is actually intended to
denote child-rearing attitudes, emphasizing parental attitudes with
stress on the importance of self-reliance and "of an individual's
finding out things on his own, and that they are often better when they
1 R
are on their own."'° Self-reliance is assumed to be a value that would
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promote high achievement. As in "importance of time," little evidence
has been found to support the assumption that self-reliance in children
actually promotes achievement. Nevertheless, the item is included in
the questionnaire for purposes of analysis. It states that:
Variable 33: A child should never be asked to do anything
unless he is first told why he is asked to do it.
Political attitude. The examination of political orientation of
parents and students is undertaken with respect to several basic pos-
tures. The questions in this inquiry are the general items which are
often used in the study of political character of individuals. They
include political participation, public policy orientation, political
efficacy and political trust and distrust in the government.
Political participation
. This segment of the study is divided
into passive and active political participation. Each category is
measured by two items. Those indicating passive political participa-
tion are:
Variable 12: Some people often listen to the news on radio or
television, how about you?
Variable 13: Some people often read newspaper and magazine
articles about socio-political events in our
country, how about you?
Items measuring active political participation are:
Variable 14: Some people often think about the political and
economic condition of our country, how about you?
Variable 15: Some people often talk about the political and
economic issues of our country with their friends,
how about you?
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^^^^-li^JoIle^L^I^^ This segment is also divided into
two sections. They include role of the government and socio-political
tolerance. Variables measuring the extent to which an individual
believes the government should have a role include:
Variable 18: The government should have plenty of power andinfluence over people's lives.
Variable 21: The government should give money and food to the
unemployed.
Items measuring socio-political toleration are:
Variable 26: Our socio-political system should be a blue-print
for all other nations in the world.
Variable 41: If a person wanted to make a speech against
religion in this community, he should be al lowed.
Political efficacy. Political efficacy is defined as an indi-
vidual's responsiveness to political system functions. In other words,
a politically efficacious individual will indicate that the government
is responsive to his demands, whereas, an inefficacious individual will
be cynical of the government. Two items are used to measure the extent
of political efficacy. They are:
Variable 23: Sometimes politics and government seem so compli-
cated that a person like me cannot really under-
stand what is going on.
Variable 31: Over the years, the government has paid no
attention to what people like me think when it
decides what to do.
Political trust/distrust . Items indicating both political
trust and distrust in the government are used. The items indicating
political trust are:
Variable 40: The government usually knows what is best for
people.
246
Variable 42: People running the government are smart people
who usually know what they are doing.
Items measuring the level of political distrust in the govern-
ment are:
Variable 30: The government is pretty much influenced by a fewbig interests looking out for themselves.
Variable 35: I think the government wastes needlessly a lot
of the money we pay in taxes.
Variable 38: I think some people in the government are crooked.
Focus of the analysis
.
The study of parent-student similarities and
differences will be pursued on several different levels. While there
will be a primary attention paid to the impact of socio-economic
variables on parent-student orientation, the impact of political con-
victions on the shaping of further political orientation of the
respondents also will be analyzed. Finally, an analysis of relation-
ships between soci o-cul tural norms and parent student political orien-
tations will be undertaken. In all these three levels, particular
attention will be paid to the similarities and differences between the
two samples.
FOOTNOTES
(Boston!''m9) MHlcaUMallzaUon
2
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^Ibid., p. 122
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''ibid.
, p. 122.
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CHAPTER VII
PUBLIC POLICY ORIENTATION
A major portion of this study was undertaken during the year
preceding the establishment of the Islamic Republic. That year saw a
chaotic socio-political situation with four cabinet changes, martial
law in most major cities and a breakdown of the socio-economic status
quo. Although there was limited toleration of political expression,
there was also increased fear of the government security agency, SAVAK.
To establish the necessary trust in this research by the respondents
during the fast moving events of the revolutionary upsurge proved to
be a cumbersome task. Consequently, general questions regarding socio-
political outlook were used rather than questions relating to specific
situations. These general questions were designed to measure sets of
norms that are long lived, not relating only to the present situation
but to the general expectations of the respondents as to how the system
ought to be. One set of questions, relating to the socio-political
tolerance of the individual and to his preference for what role the
government should have in his life, relates to public policy issues
that cut across the recent revolution.
The study of public policy orientation among the students is
significant since it provides "an indication of the likelihood and the
direction of change along major policy dimensions."^ Furthermore, the
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orientations of the incoming generation could provide a clue as to the
longevity of socio-political controversies. One should also note the
impact of issues on the forming of broader political attitudes.
None of the questions used concerning public policy attitudes
could be regarded as very controversial. It was thought that controver-
sial questions, particularly ones seeking responses related to the Shah
or the performance of the government, might result either in a high
percentage of no responses or perhaps some falsified answers to save
the respondent from a possible fear of harassment by the securi ty forces
.
As noted in Appendix II, only about 15 percent of all Iranians
of high school age, or 24 percent of the urban population of high school
age, ever go to high school. This segment of the population, as evi-
denced during the revolution, is highly politicized, and has become in-
creasingly vocal about the socio-political situation in Iran. ^ Our sample
of parents was selected from among student parents who are almost all
urban dwellers. Their level of education and income is above the
national average, and it is assumed they also have reasonably well
informed attitudes and knowledge of public policy issues.
Role of the Government
In this chapter, the variables related to socio-political
tolerance/intolerance, and to the role and scope of government in every
day life will be examined. Variable 18, "The government should have
plenty of power and influence over people's lives," and variable 21,
"The government should give money and food to the unemployed," measure
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what students and parents feel should be the role of government.
Variable 26, "Our socio-political system should be a blueprint for all
other nations in the world," and variable 41, "If a person wanted to
make a speech against religion in this community, he should be allowed."
measure how politically tolerant parents and students are.
Along with analyzing the political orientations, these items
also extract the prevailing modes of behavior that may contribute to
or impede the process of political development. For example, there is
a prevailing feeling, supported by the data, that the government should
provide goods and services to the general public. Such was not expected
a century or even a few decades ago. These demands aid in creation of
a society where slowly government control over and involvement in the
life of the individual increases. Needless to say, as the transitional
society inches its way onto the threshold of modernization, popular
demands are aggregated through institutions and these political insti-
tutions become the essence of the process of political development.
Parent-student comparison
. On the set of issues dealing with govern-
ment's role, students follow the pattern of parent preference, seemingly,
to a great extent. Both students and parents overwhelmingly agree with
greater influence by government over the affairs of people. This
finding was puzzling when compared to previous studies that have
reported a great deal of political cynicism amonst Iranians.^ On the
other hand, other studies have shown support for political authority
when such authorities have lead the people and acted according to the
public will.^ If the data in Table 12 is taken into consideration in
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TABLE 12
Parents and Students Attitudes on Public Policy Issues
Issue
Agree
%
Disagree
%
total
"L n10 1
1
Variable 18: "The government should
have plenty of power and influence
over people's lives."
(Jul C 1 1 Co
Students
83
81
17
19
100 (167)
100 (601)
Variable 21: "The government should
give money and food to the
unemployed.
"
pu 1 ClI
Students
58
62
42
38
100 (168)
100 (611)
Variable 26: "Our socio-political
system should be a blue-print for
all other nations in the world."
parents
students
77
79
23
21
100 (162)
100 (606)
Variable 41: "If a person wanted
to make a speech against religion
in this community he should be
allowed."
parents
students
28
53
72
47
100 (151)
100 (589)
light of recent events and the overwhelming support for the inception
of the Islamic Republic, it can be argued that the cynicism found, for
example, by Zonis was against the unpopular Pahlavi regime and not
against the institution of government itself.
In all, students and parents displayed similar tendencies to
favor government power and influence over their lives. However, as is
evident in the following diagram (Fig. 1), while 28 percent of students
strongly agreed (+3) with variable 18, thirty-eight percent of the
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Figure 1
Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 18 i
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parents had a similar attitude, thus displaying a more assertive paren-
tal view on the issue. Such a tendency, as will be seen throughout
this chapter, is displayed by parents on all issues--i .e. , the parents
tend to strongly agree (+3) or disagree (-3) more often than the
students. The degree of difference on the other points of this con-
tinuum diminish, resulting in proportions in which the student and
parent tabulations are almost identical when viewed in an agree-disagree
dichotomy.
As Table 13 and Fig. 1 indicate, a vast majority of parents and
students agreed with variable 18, stating that "government should have
power and influence over people's lives." In cross-tabulation of the
socio-economic status of the students with variable 18, it was found
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that the male students favored a greater government role than the
female students (gamma =
.263). The trend points to an attitudinal
difference between the male and female students that will often be
observed. The data suggests that the orientation of female students is
towards somewhat less government control than that of the male students.
The difference between the male and female high school students is
inherent in the social posture of the female students in Iran. As
noted in Appendix II (Table 42)
,
only one-thi rd of students attending
high schools in Iran are female. Most Iranian parents allow their
daughters to acquire grade school education; fewer allow them to
progress as far as the middle school or guidance level. Since learning
to perform the duties of being wife and mother are considered to be
the primary goal of a young female, schooling is not felt to be
especially important.
It is mostly among the educated and more modern families that
high school education is accepted to be equally important for both male
and female. Consequently, the female students, particularly in the
high school level, usually come from a more educated background than
male students. Thus, it is a statement of fact that the female students
are more often open and broad-minded than their male counterparts. The
impact of familial education on the student's orientation will be ob-
served in the next two chapters.
The parent's level of education had a significant association
with the student's preference for government control (gamma = .337).
Although even those with a high level of parental education still
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overwhelmingly approved of a greater role for the government, neverthe-
less, there was an evident trend indicating that those students whose
fathers had had a high level of education favored less government
control (74 percent) than those students whose fathers had had no
education (91 percent).
Mothers' education was also significantly associated with
students' attitude to variable 18 (gamma =
.332). This trend was
expected since, generally, a higher level of education results in a
broader socio-political outlook whereby an individual seeks to partici-
pate in the political process that determines policies of the state.
The oven^helming support for a government with power and influence over
people's lives, as indicated earlier, is a manifestation of traditional
political desire whereby the people are supportive of a "supervised
guidance and outlining (of) popular duties."^
The student's family income was also a significant factor,
associating with variable 18 (gamma =
.296); those students from high
income families favored less government control than those from low
income families. Since family income itself tends to depend on parent's
level of education, i.e., those with high education had high income and
those with low education had low income (gamma = .548 for parent sample;
gamma = .472 for student sample), the same general premise influencing
education would also apply here. An additional explanation could be
that these poor, who are also less educated, want to have more access
to the material well-being which they think the government can and
should provide. The better educated, who have higher incomes, are less
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inclined to support government intervention in their affairs, since,
in providing services to the needy, the government will have to tax
them. Those parents with a high level of education and income don't
need the government's help to find jobs and would be less likely to
support government programs that supply employment to the poor.
For the parents, the data analysis revealed that only the
family income had a significant association with the parents' response
to variable 18 (gamma =
.239). The cross-tabulation also suggested
a slight trend where, as in the case of the student sample, those with
higher income level favored less government control than those with
lower income. Sti 1 1, three-quarters of both students and parents with
high income agreed with government power and influence over people's
lives. As noted above, the cultural tradition orients both parents and
students from varying education and economic backgrounds towards this
political orientation.
The level of cosmopolitanism, which measures the respondent's
degree of urbanization, associated at a significant level with student's
attitude toward government control (gamma = -.261). Those with the
highest degree of urbanization--i .e. , residents of Tehran--agreed less
with government control (77 percent) than those from low cosmopolitan
areas--i.e., towns between 10,000 to 25,000 population— (97 percent).
The same did not hold true for the parent sample, which actually showed
no distinctive pattern. The lack of influence of cosmopolitanism on
parents, in this case and other cases to be followed, is the result of
many factors such as length of residency in present place of residence.
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TABLE 13
Cross-Tabulation of "Government
Socio-Economic
Status
u g power and influence over DeoolP"Variable 18 with Socio-Economic Status
"Government should have plenty of power andinfluence over people's lives."
Agree
parents
students
Sex male
female
(parents) x^p= 1.45; df = 1; p =
(students) = 6.14; df = 1; p
81%
91
22; phi ^
.01; phi
11; gamma =
.10; gamma =
85%
77
.427
.263
high
medium
low
ather' s
.evel of
Education
.
(Ij no education
(parents) x^^= 3.42; df = 3; p =
(students) x = 17.5; df = 3; p
82
90
91
74%
71
82
86
.33; V =
.14; gamma = .260
.0006; V =
.17; gamma = .337
Mother'
s
Level of
high
medium
low
no education
2
Education
(students) x^ = 16.1; df
70
79
88
- 3; p = .001; V = .16; gamma = .332
amily
ncome
Level
high
medium
low
{parents) x^,= 6.62; df = 2; p =
(students) x"^ = 12.5; df = 2; p
76%
84
87
,036; V =
.019; V =
,20; gamma =
.15; gamma
79
87
239
.296
1- highest 79% 77%
Level of 2 90 81
Cosmopol- 3 88 84
itanism 4 85 97
5- lowest 75 81
(parents) x^ = 2.92; df = 4; p = .57; V = .13; gamma = -.041
(students) x = 13.8; df = 4; p = .008; V = .15; gamma = -.260
(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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place of birth, and migratory history. For example, 34 percent of the
responding parents were residents of Tehran, yet only 15 percent had
actually been born there. Moreover, 9 percent of responding parents
lived in places that were termed "least cosmopol itan"-i
.e.
, places
with less than 10,000 population-while some 22 percent had been born
there. Therefore, a high level of rural to urban migration amongst
the parent sample made the category of cosmopolitanism of little value
in analyzing its impact on the variables.
The student sample, however, was much less transitory than the
parent sample. As evidenced by the data, 81 percent of those who
lived in Tehran at the time of this inquiry were born there. Student
migration in other parts of the country was also minimal. Thus, as we
can observe in this case and many other cases to be followed, the level
of cosmopolitanism proves to be an influential variable in the analysis
of student orientation. In many developing countries, where usually
one or a few cities become the focus of all major socio-political and
economic activities, the rest of the nation usually suffers neglect.
In Iran, where the capital city, Tehran, has taken the appearance of a
Western-style cosmopolitan hub with 15 percent of the nation's popula-
tion, the rest of the country, including small and medium size towns,
remains eons away. To empasize the disparity of cosmopolitanism in
Iran, let it suffice to note that in 1970-71, three out of eight univer-
sities in Iran were located in Tehran with 78 percent of the total
university enrollment.^ Furthermore, of the 20 daily newspapers pub-
lished in Iran in 1971, 13 were put out in Tehran with over 95 percent
258
Figure 2
Comparison of Parent-Student Responses
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of the total national circulation.^ It is with such a background that
the impact of cosmopolitanism in attitude orientation of the responding
students is stressed.
In variable 21, dealing with government's role, although a few
more of the students favored government aid to the unemployed tnan the
parents, the difference was not significant. As the graph (Fig. 2)
shows, the parent-student attitudes were rather similar except in the
somewhat agree (+1) category, where 13 percent of the students agreed
with government aid to the unemployed, whereas only 9 percent of the
parents did the same, resulting in an overall difference of four percent
for parent-student response to variable 21, which is not considered
signi ficant.
259
The student's sex associated at a significant level with
variable 21 (gamma =
.210). While 70 percent of the female students
approved of government aid, only 56 percent of the male students
responded similarly (Table 14). As indicated above, the attitudinal
difference between male and female students is most likely the result
of higher level of parental education among the female students. Thus,
finding the female students, on the average, more sympathetic to
government aid for the unemployed than the male students is a function
of a broader perspective brought about by the higher level of familial
education.
Father's level of education was significant, as expected, in
shaping student's attitude (gamma =
-.195). It is assumed that high
level of education is often credited with higher level of socio-
political interest and broader perspective, whereas low level of educa-
tion, particularly impoverished parental education, results in a narrow
and parochial perspective in the students. Supporting such an assump-
tion, we find that of those students whose fathers had had high level
of education, 83 percent approved of government aid to unemployed,
whereas of those students whose fathers had had no education, only 58
percent did the same (Table 14).
Mother's education was also significant (gamma = -.206). Of
those students whose mother had had a high level of education, 78 per-
cent approved of aid for unemployed, whereas of those students whose
mother had had no education, only 44 percent did the same.
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TABLE 14
Socio-Economic
"Government should give money and food to
the unemployed."
Status Agree
parents students
Sex ^^^^
female
56%
55
56%
70
(parents) x^p= .776; df - 1
(students) x^ = 10.87; df =
, p = .378; phi = .083; gamma =
-.209
1; p = .001; phi = .137; gamma = .210
Cross-Tabulation of "Government aid to the unemployed'
Variable 21 with Socio-Economic Status
Father'
s
Level of
Education
(1)
medium
low
no education
47%
56
55
66
83%
66
60
58
(parents) x p= .873; df = 3; p =
(students) x = 11.56; df = 3; p
.832; V = .072; gamma = .035
=
.009; V = .140; gamma = -.195
Mother '
Level of
Education
high
medium
low
no education
78%
73
64
56
(students) x^= 8.68; df = 3; p = .034; V = .120; gamma = -.206
Fami ly
Income
Level
high
medium
low
54%
56
63
64%
63
59
(parents)
(students)
x^P= 1.04; df =
x"^ = 1.44; df
2; p =
= 2; p =
.594; V =
.485; V =
.080; gamma =
.049; gamma =
.126
.304
Level of
Cosmopol-
itanism
1- high
2
3
4
5- low
65%
48
67
60
25
70%
54
55
51
44
(parents) x p= 10.2; df = 4; p =
(students) x = 22.04; df = 4; p
037; V = .246; gamma = .204
=
.0002; V = .190; gamma = .304
(1) For parents' columr\ the
mother's level of education when
"Father's Level of Education" is the
she was the respondent.
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Cosmopolitanism proved to have significant association with
variable 21 for both parents (gamma =
.204) and students (gannna -
.304),
Students in the most cosmopolitan aroa-i.e., Tehran-agreed 70 percent
with govern.,^nt aid to the unemployed, while only 44 percent of those
in the least cosmopolitan areas thought that the government should aid
the unemployed. A similar trend was also evident among the parents
(Table 14). Such a tendency is perhaps the result of acute unemploy-
ment or job insecurity which is present in major urban areas, while
the problem facing rural areas is under-employment. Farmers and their
families lack any major source of income in seasons when they are not
preoccupied by farming (weaving rugs and geljms is an exception in some
areas and basically is the preoccupation of the females and children).
Socio-Poli tical Tolerance
The second set of variables dealing with public policy issues,
by virtue of their composition, also measured the level of socio-
political tolerance of both students and parents, including political
fanaticism and religious zeal. It is in variable 41, "If a person
wanted to make a speech against religion in this community he should be
allowed," that the greatest diversity between student and parent
responses is discovered, while in variable 26, "Our socio-political
system should be a blueprint for all other nations in the world,"
both samples concur.
Parent-student comparison
. As the next diagram (Fig. 3) shows, the
varying degrees of disagreement on the issue of political chauvinism
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Figure 3
Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 26 in aSix-Level Continuum
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seem to be nearnly identical for both parents and students. On the
a^ree side, however, some differences begin to emerge. Fewer students
agree strongly (+3) with variable 26 than do parents; while more
students agree somewhat (+1) with the issue than do parents. This
signifies the fact that students are somewhat less forceful in their
level of political intolerance than are parents, despite the fact that
both groups are vastly intolerant.
The cross-tabulation and association analysis reveals that the
female students are somewhat politically tolerant than the male
students (gamma = .215). As will be seen below, since high level of
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education results in higher level of political tolerance (also deduced
by Jennings and Niemi),^ the impact of parent's education on the
students becomes a significant factor.
The analysis of cross-tabulation data suggests that the father's
education is an important factor influencing student orientation
(gamma = .227). Of those students whose fathers had had a high level
of education, 66 percent agreed with the issue regarding political
intolerance. On the other hand, of those students whose fathers had
had no education, 85 percent agreed that "our socio-political system
should be a blueprint for all other nations," displaying a high level
of political chauvinism. In short, those with high education are
more politically tolerant than those with low level of education.
The cross-tabulation of mother's level of education with vari-
able 26 also suggested a similar trend to that of the father's educa-
tion (gamma = .220). Of students whose mothers had had no education,
83 percent agreed with variable 26, compared to 66 percent of the
students whose mothers had had some high school education.
As concurred by Jennings and Niemi in their study of American
students and parents, "individuals with narrow, parochial outlook
strongly (agree) that everyone else should adopt (their) system, while
those with a broader perspective apparently recognize some of the diffi-
culties inherent in so sweeping a judgement."^ Although in the Jennings
and Niemi study only 54 percent of the students agreed with the state-
ment identical to the one in variable 26, seventy-nine percent of the
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students in our study agreed with the statement, displaying a much
greater political intolerance.
Parent's education level proved of no significance in deter-
mining their own posture in regard to variable 26, as it had failed
to do so in the previous two variables-i
.e.
, variables 18 and 21. It
seems that a parent's education is of more consequence in determining
his child's orientation than his own. This pattern is very likely the
result of greater socio-cul tural conditioning on parents which lessens
the impact of education except where a very high level of education has
been obtained.
The level of cosmopolitanism that proved significant in deter-
mining the student's attitude on the two issues dealing with the role
of the government displayed no tangible bearing in relation to this
issue.
Variable 41, dealing with attitudes towards tolerance, was
seen as rather controversial by respondents. More than 11 percent of
parents and six percent of students, the largest number for both groups,
refused to answer the question. The question stated that "If a person
wanted to make a speech in this community against religion, he should
be allowed." Some may have been incensed or even outraged by the
question. Since Iran is a country where 97 percent of the population
is Muslim with 90 percent of them belonging to the Shiah sect, there is
a general consensus on religion. Even those who do not consider them-
selves practicing Muslims seldom criticize the religion. Therefore,
criticising the religion, let alone speaking against it, seems to be
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TABLE 15
Cross-Tabulation
"f^O-^ocio-poinical syste. is the best in the «orld"variable 26 with Socio-Economic Status
Socio-Economic
Status
"Our socio-political system should be a
blue-print for all other nations in the
world."
Agree
parents students
Sex ^^^^
female
(parents) x^p=
.050; df = 1 ; p =
(students) = 4.37; df = 1; p
76%
80
82%
75
,822; phi =
.035; gamma =
-.106
.036; phi =
.089; gamma =
.215
high
medium
low
no education
Father
'
s
Level of
Education
(1)
2(parents) x ^= 4.28; df = 3; p =
(students) x = 8.92; df = 3; p
65%
82
79
80
66%
75
80
85
232; V = .166; gamma = .184
.03; V = .123; gamma = .227
Mother's
Level of
Education
high
medium
low
no education
71%
66
80
83
(students) x^ = 9.41; df = 3; p = .024; V = .127; gamma = .220
-ami ly
Income
Level
high
medium
low
75%
69
85
75%
82
80
(parents)
(students)
x^P= 4.25; df =
x^ = 3.1; df =
2; p =
2; p =
.119; V =
.212; V =
.164; gamma =
.073; gamma =
.207
.099
Level of
Cosmopol-
itanism
1- high
2
3
4
5- low
75%
67
84
76
87
78%
75
82
81
78
(parents) x p= 3.19; df = 4; p =
(students) x = 1.32; df = 4; p
522; V = .140; gamma = -.121
.858; V = .047; gamma = -.044
(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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rather an extreme undertaking. Thus, this question seems to measure
more than simply an attitude towards a policy issue. It measures,
perhaps, an extreme level of tolerance/intolerance of freedom of expres-
sion. It also could measure the level of acquisition of secular norms
in one's attitudes and orientation.
The results of the analysis of the data were most interesting.
While there were some anticipated findings, there were some that were
unexpected. As the next diagram (Fig. 4) shows, the differences
between student and parent orientations were phenomenal. While 44
percent of parents disagreed stron^lx (-3) with the issue regarding
religious intolerance, only 22 percent of the students, or half as many,
did the same. In short, while only 28 percent of parents agreed in
varying degrees with the issue, 53 percent of the students, or almost
twice as many, did the same. This item has shown the greatest dispar-
ity in parent-student orientation so far. The level of parent-student
difference in response to the previous items was four percent on vari-
able 21 and two percent each on variables 18 and 26, while the differ-
ence on this issue is a rather impressive 25 percentage points (see
Table 12). What could be the source of such a great difference in
atti tudes
.
Father's education level, in contrast to the earlier items,
offered no significant association, although the chi-square probability
was significant at .008 level. The data suggested that those students
whose fathers had had a middle school level of education--i .e. , some
high school education--were the most tolerant, whereas, those with
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Figure 4
Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 41 in a
Six-Level Continuum
50
parents
40 \
.30 ^
.20
"
V
.10
-3
disagree
-2
-1 +1 +2 +3
agree
fathers who had had no education were more tolerant than those with
either fathers with low level or high level education. This finding
posed certain difficulties. It is apparent that, despite the generally
accepted rule that as the level of education increases so does the
level of tolerance, the data here posed some exceptions to the rule.
In their research, Jennings and Niemi found the question of religious
tolerance causing significant differences in their samples of American
parents and students. They, however, observed a pattern of positive
correlation between higher level of education and religious tolerance.
They also noticed that the parent-student differences were greatest
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TABLE 16
Cross-Tabulation of "Socio-rel igious toleration"
Variable 41 with Socio-Economic Status
Socio-Economic
"If a person wanted to make a speech
against religion in this community he
should be allowed."
Status
Agree
parents students
Sex
female
(parents) x p= .014; df = 1; p =
(students) x"" = 2.41; df = 1 ; p =
29% 440^
26 51
904; phi =
.028; gamma = .078
.120; phi =
.067; gamma = -.135
Father's ^'^^ 25% 370^
Level of f^^"^^ 28 59
Education ^ 27 43
no education 37 48
(parents) x^2=
-853; df = 3; p = .836; V = .075; gamma = .082
(students) X = 11.6; df = 3; p = .008; V = .143; gamma = -.070
Mother'
s
Level of
Education
high
medium
low
no education
29%
54
48
44
(students) x^ = 1.66; df = 3; p = .647; V = .05; gamma = -.089
Family
Income
Level
high
medium
low
33%
22
26
49%
49
45
(parents)
(students)
x^P= 1.20; df =
x^ = 1.36; df
= 2; p =
= 2; p
=
.547; V =
=
.505; V
=
.090; gamma =
=
.049; gamma =
-.089
-.073
Level of
Cosmopol-
itanism
1-high
2
3
4
5-low
30%
26
27
26
37
51%
45
47
35
36
(parents)
(students)
/r,= 1.0; df =
x = 7.05; df
4; p =
= 4; p
.908; V =
=
.133; V
.081 ; gamma = -
=
.109; gamma =
.008
.162
(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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between those with lowest parental education level and smallest
between those with a high education level m the analysis of this
present data, however, no such findings were revealed. In fact, it
was found that the greatest differences between the parent and student
data on the question of religious tolerance was between those with
middle level education-i
. e. , some high school education-and the
smallest differences were between those with either no education or a
high level of education, 11 and 12 percent respectively (see Table 17).
However, there is a marked increase in level of religious tolerance
from parents to students in all levels.
To explain the source of religious tolerance/intolerance,
perhaps, the data should be viewed in several segments with attempts
made to explain the factors influencing each strata of the sample
rather than attempting to make sweeping generalizations. It is surmised
here that the higher level of religious intolerance among the students
and parents with high level of education is perhaps the result of the
association made between the institution of religion and political
activisim in Iran in past few years, particularly during the period
leading to the Iranian revolution. Religion had become the only insti-
tution through which the people could voice their opposition to the
policies of the government. More and more, with the suppression of
polticial opposition, the educated took advantage of this situation
and the institution of religion became a symbol of opposition to the
government. To speak out against religion, therefore, to many was to
speak against the people and the popular sentiments and for the
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government. Many of the educated, who were amongst the most vocal of
the opposition, as witnessed throughout the political turmoil of
1978-79, displayed a less tolerant attitude about permitting speech
against religion, as is reflected in the case of the question in our
questionnaire. This, perhaps, is the major factor contributing to the
confusion around the fact that many of those with a high level of edu-
cation indicated a lesser tolerance than those with a low level of
education or no education at all.
In factor analysis of the data, which will be discussed in
detail in Chapter IX, a major factor contributing to religious intol-
erance among parents was traditionalism and adherence to traditional
values. This segment of the population manifested itself in respect
for family and friends (variables 19, 27 and 39, indexed respectively
at
.454, .263 and
.597), social class (variable 34, indexed at
.401),
and individualism (variable 45, indexed at
.280), while religious
intolerance, variable 41, was indexed at .289 (see Fig. 14). The factor
analysis of the student data, in addition to the association between
religious intolerance
,
variable 41 (indexed at .234) and traditionalism
(variables 17, 19, 24 and 25), suggested a relationship between politi-
cal factors and intolerance. The same factor matrix indexed religious
tolerance with political tolerance (variable 26) at .398, with political
inefficacy (variable 31) at .553, and with political distrust (variables
35, 38, 40 and 42) respectively at .699, .487, .627 and 662. Also
related were high parental education and high family income (see Fig.
15). Thus, it could be surmised that in certain segments of the student
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population sinnlar indications to that of the Jennings and Nie.i study
where high level of parental education increases level of religious
tolerance, are to be found. However, traditional values and orienta-
tions seem to be the dominant factor, particularly among parents,
causing a higher level of intolerance.
Although the question in variable 41 was constructed purely to
measure religious toleration and the impact of variables such as edu-
cation, income and cosmopolitanism on the orientation of and the
similarities and differences between parents and students, the events
that led to the Iranian revolution were already in the works and, as
we see, influenced, at least, the responses of those with a higher
level of education to this question. It is presumed that if the above
question were put to test in November/ December 1978, shortly before
the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran from France, rather than the
spring of 1978 when most of the questionnaires were actually completed,
there would have been a much greater association between religious
intolerance, as a political statement against the Shah and his rule,
and political distrust.
It was apparent that many with a high level of education, as
early as the spring of 1978, were displaying anti-government sentiments
by supporting the religious establishment and the clergy. To find such
a pattern developing was interesting and exciting, yet our original
question and expectations remained somewhat unanswered. With the avail-
able responses, however, one cannot measure the long-term question of
religious tolerance, although it seems that traditionalism and
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paroch1al1s. encourage religious intolerance. A widespread
.argin
between parent-student orientations, nevertheless, is evident fro. the
data, such a wide disparity, one could surmise, despite the political
underpinnings, is a reflection of differing orientations between the
parents and the students.
we
on
Summary. In three out of four issues discussed in this chapter,
find basic similarities between student and parent orientations
public policy issues. The similarities at first sight looked rather
impressive. A more indepth analysis of the data, however, showed that
the students differed substantially on at least one issue and to a
significant degree on two others. The students tended basically to be
less forceful in their attitudes and to follow a less resolute pattern
of behavior than the parents. For example, as the graphs indicate on
all issues in this chapter, there was a smaller percentage of students
than parents at either end of the graphs responding either agreed
Itron^l^ (+3) or djsaareed^tr^^ (-3) to the questions.
Level of education of parents seems to be the most significant
variable influencing the student's behavior, while it is of little
consequences for the parents themelves. In many cases there seems to
be a similar level of agreement between parents who have a high level
of education and the students whose fathers have had a high level of
education. However, as the father's level of education decreases, a
gap between parent's and student's responses begins to emerge. Further-
more, we also discover that students whose fathers have no education
tend to respond more efficaciously--i
.e. , to give support to the
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govern.ent-tha„ those parents who had had no education. On the other
hand, «e find that often the students whose fathers have a high level
Of education tend to be as open-minded or
.ore so, on the issues, than
the parents. This finding is similar to Jennings' and Niemi's findings
Where, as noted earlier, the education level tends to enhance one's
interest and involvement in socio-political endeavors. In short, it
is expected that education would provide a fairly reliable prediction
of attitudes and orientations.
Generally, as the father's education level decreases, the
student's response becomes more close-minded and a gap that exists
between the student and the parent responses begins to merge until,
seemingly, the students whose fathers had had no education display
responses more close-minded than parents who had had no education. The
largest gap between parent and student responses was between students
whose fathers had had a moderate level of education and the parents who
had had a moderate level of education. An exception was on the issue
of government aid to unemployed where the largest difference was between
the students whose fathers had had a high level of education and the
parents who had had a high level of education. This attests to the
fact that as the level of education of the parent sample rose, they
displayed a reduced desire for government to aid the unemployed. Never-
theless, the children of highly educated parents remained strong pro-
ponents of government aid to the unemployed. The disparity in the
parent-student attitude on this issue is perhaps partly due to the
presense of idealism among the students. Furthermore, the need for
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social security a™,ng the least educated of the parents who usually
labor in unskilled professions is higher than a™,ng those with higher
level of education whose skills are direly needed in the country. The
parents' attitudes could also be motivated by the fact of their obli-
gations to self and fa.ily. This would be in contrast to issues such
as aid to the unemployed, which concerns itself with altruistic
societal issues. Individualism, as discussed in earlier chapters,
has its bias in the cultural tradition of the country. In a society
where n.ost are motivated by self-serving interests, attempts are made
to secure a rewarding position within the society, and little attention
is given to group needs. The above assumptions are thus held to be
responsible for the difference in parent-student orientation. With
support from Marshall Meyer's study of the Harvard students in the
midst of the Vietnam crisis, it could be surmised that situations and
events could and do radicalize students to an extent that results in
students dissociating their views from that of their parents." Such
disparities in the parent-student orientation is referred to as "gener-
ation gap." The data here suggests such gaps on two of the items-aid to
the unemployed and the issue of religious toleration.
Although on these two issues (variables 23 and 41). students
have been shown to be more open-minded than their parents, on the
question dealing with whether the "Iranian socio-political system
should become a blueprint for all other nations." the students were,
generally, less open-minded than the parents. As the level of father's
and mother's education rose, the students gave more liberal responses.
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TABLE 17
Changes in 'Liberal' Responses from Parents to Students
c
o
(T3
U
change
%
Variable 18: "The government should (not) have plenty of powerand influence over people's lives.''
high
medium
low
no education
25% (9)
18 (11)
10 (5)
14 (3)
26% (12)
29 (40)
18 (50)
9 (10)
(parents) x2= 3.4; df = 3; p = .33; gamma =
.260(students)
= 17.5; df ^ 3; p = .0006; gamm^ =
.337
+1
+11
+8
-5
Variable 21: "The government should give money'and'food'to'the"
unemployed."
47% (17) 83% (40)
56 (35) 66 (93)
55 (27) 60 (173)
' =vju^,auiu[i 66 (14) 58 (66)
parents)
= .873; df = 3; p = .832; gamma = .035
!:!!^?!"!!^ ^ = 11-56; df = 3; p = .009; gamma = -.195
high
^
I
medium
^ low
^
I no ed cat on
+36
+10
+5
-8
O)
>
Variable 26: "Our socio-political system should (not) be'a'blJe
print for all other nations in the world."
cu
-M
Ll_
high
medium
low
no education
(parents) x^p= 4.28; df = 3; p =
(students) x^ = 9.92; df = 3; p =
35% (13)
18 (10)
21 (10)
20 (4)
34% (16)
25 (35)
20 (56)
15 (17)
232; gamma
.03; gamma
-1
+7
-1
-5
184
227
Variable 41: "If a person wanted to make a speech against reli-
gion in this community he should be allowed."
high
medium
low
no education
2
25% (7) 37% (17) +12
28 (17) 59 (82) +31
27 (13) 43 (120) +16
37 (6) 48 (51) +11
(parents) x^^= .853;' df = 3; p = .836; gamma = .082
(students) x = 11.66; df = 3; p = .008; gamma = -.070
(l)For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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disagreeing with their systen, becoming a blueprint for a„ other
nations. Nevertheless, the level of change fro. parents to students
renamed negative (see Table 17). except for those students «hose
parents had had high school education, students co.ing fro. fa.lHes
"here the fathers have had high school education see. to be a rather
unique segment. The rate of change In open-.lnded responses fro.
parents to students was the greatest a.ong the., except In the case of
variable 21. It see.s that, generally, the students coming fro. this
group, for reason or another, have the environment conducive to the
widest change and difference fro. that of the parents with si.ilar
education level. Reasons for such a contrariety cannot be discerned
fro. this data; only speculation could be .ade.
A somewhat more indepth evaluation of the data reveals that the
size of the city of residence (cosmopolitanism), generally, is quite
Significant and often is associated with the respondent's attitude.
Although, due to technical difficulties explained earlier, the parents'
data for cosmopolitanism could not be relied on, the data for the
students, however, was significantly related with variables 18 and 21.
In variables 26 and 41. the items dealing with intolerance and chauvin-
ism, however, a different kind of relationship is revealed. The data
suggests that the parents and students who reside in cities labeled
"second level cosmopol itan"-1
.e.
. cities with population of 100,000
to 1.000,000-were less in favor of the item suggesting that "our socio-
political system become a blueprint for all other nations," than the
remaining groups in the sample. Some 76 percent of the parent sample
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and 57 percent of the student sample for this category were residents
of the city of Tabriz in northwest Iran. The population of this city
and the whole northwest region of Iran, ethnically and linguistically,
is different than the rest of the Iranians. There have been demands
for autonomy in this region in the past, most recently during 1945-46.
Therefore, it could be assumed that the underlying feeling of beinfl
different could be responsible for a somewhat lower level of political,
intolerance for both parents and students in this category, which sub-
sequently affects the outcome of the data for level of cosmopolitanism.
In short, similarities or near similarities suggested by the
data represented in Table 12 in the subsequent analysis appears to be
of little relevance. There are great diversities in the parent-student
orientations enhanced by many factors, namely the parental education
and level of cosmopolitanism. The parents' orientations seem to be
affected little by the variables that affect the student's attitudes.
It is suggested that parental orientations are the result of a more
complex set of variables and circumstances reinforced by longer exposure
to socio-cultural traits of the environment which they are part of.
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CHAPTER VIII
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
It is purposed here that the deceptive facade put up by the
government to display popular support for the regime, as described
earlier, resulted in further cynicism and alienation of the public
rather than in gaining support for the regime. The implications of
this proposal will be demonstrated in this chapter.
The citizenship role in Iran, unlike in Western democracies,
did not appear in the forms of membership in or affiliation with polit-
ical groups, voting regularity, or even participation in civic respon-
sibilities. There were a few who were members of political groups or
organizations like the National Front, the Tudeh Party, or the
Confederation of Iranian Students which were all "illegal." Membership
in such organizations was punished by imprisonment. Voting in elections
was often not a result of one's affinity for a certain political party
or individual but a duty imposed on citizens, mainly those who were
civil servants or factory workers since they were led to believe that
they had to show their voter registration cards to receive their
salaries. Civic responsibilities seldom took forms of political partic-
ipation, instead they were often conducted within one's neighborhood,
motivated by religious and moral duties. Thus, it is improper to use
the mold developed to study political participation in the West for the
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purpose of this inquiry. For analysis purpose, political alienation,
general political interest, and level of political efficacy will be
used as measures of the citizenship role. The measures will be used
in three levels: passive, active and political efficacy. Passive
measures will basically deal with the individual's interest in listening
to news on the radio, watching it on television or reading it in news-
papers and magazines. Active measures will be attitudes such as
thinking about politics or talking about it with others. Lastly,
political efficacy will measure one's responsiveness to political
system functions.
Passive Measures
This category is measured by two variables: variable 11, "Some
people often listen to news on radio or television, how about you?" and
variable 12, "Some people often read newspaper and magazine articles
about political, economic and social matters, how about you?". Although
listening to, watching or reading about news in newspapers and magazines
does not constitute an act of political participation, nevertheless, it
displays a level of interest in the affairs of the country or of the
world.
An analysis of the association between these two measures with
indicators of active measures---"talking about politics" and "thinking
about politics"--confirmed a significant relationship between these
two types of measures. Therefore, it can be assumed that these
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TABLE 18
Passive participation
frequency
variables
often
%
sometimes
%
seldom
%
total
Variable 12: "Some people often
listen to news on radio or tele-
vision, how about you?"
parents 81%
students 71
2%
4
17%
25
100% (168)
100% (622^
Variable 13: "Some people often
read newspapers and magazine
articles about political, eco-
nomic and social matters, how
about you?"
parents 67%
students 65
9%
14
24%
21
100% (145)
100% (621)
indicators will be useful, even under the circumstances, in measuring
political interest among both parents and students.
The media, as discussed in Chapter II, was greatly handicapped
by governmental controls. Perhaps it was an indication of such controls
and a perception of the unreliability of the news that resulted in no
association between a student's education and his parent's education
in regard to the habit of listening to news (see Table 19).
Table 19 suggests a rather significant difference between par-
ents' and students' habits of listening to the news. Parents listen to
news more often than students. On the other hand, there seems to be
little difference between parents' and students' habits of reading news-
paper and magazine articles about political matters. Further breakdown
of the data reveals some important differences between the two samples.
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TABLE 19
^'aH;M.'']r'°".^'c"^^^^^"^'"9 to news",
___J^_nable 12, with Socio-Economic Status
Socio-Economic
Status
vision^'hS,^' k'"'!"" "^^^ °" the radio or tele.VTST , how about you? I listen to it:
often
parents students
Sex male
female
sometimes
parents
83%
71
students
seldom
parents
15%
26
77% 2% 3%
f . 2
63 3 6
parents) x ^= 2.66; df = 2- d = ?fi- v - ion
(students) x2 = 13.65; df = 2 p = 6oi.~V* I'J™ ^ '^^^
Father's '^^'5'? 91%
Level of ^^^^^f" 87
Education , 76
(2) no education 52
f'^^'—-^-^
-^.= 17.?- Hf = ^. r. - nnn. w
qamma =
-.483
qamma =
-.035
students
20%
31
65% 3% 4%
77 3
69 4 6
71 5 3
13
20
43
f^l 7 Z\ 2" QT = b; p = .008; V = .226-(students) x^ = 3.63; df = 6; p = .73^ V =
.067;
31%
20
26
26
Mother's "^^^
Level of
Education
,r no education
(students) x = 4.7; df
100%
76
71
70
- 6; p = .57; V =
.063; qamma =
-.099
20%
25
25
87
69
72%
70
72
Family hiqh
Income medium
Level low
(parents) x^^= 9.23; df = 4; p = .05; V
(students) x = 3.5; df = 4; p = .45; V
1-hiqh
Level of 2
Cosmopol- 3
itanism 4
5-low
..2 _
3%
8
3
.168; qamma
.072; qamma
70% 65% 4% 6%
90 80 1
76 76 3
88 78 2 2
94 89 6 3
= 8; p = .12; V = .195; qamma = -
= 8; p = .025; V = .106; qamma =
10%
15
27
-.418
-.003
26%
10
24
10
.353
-.268
25%
23
25
29%
19
21
20
8
(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education"
mother s level of education when she was the respondent.
is the
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^^^i^^^JMmi^news. The data in Table 19 reveals that male
students listened to news more often than female students. The chi-
square probability was significant at .001 level. A significant asso-
ciation between a student's habit of listening to news and gender was
also revealed (gamma = .319). Among parents there was an association
between level of education and frequency of listening to news (gamma -
-483). Gender was also significantly associated with "listening to
news" in the parents" sample with male parents having this habit more
often than female parents (gamma =
.336).
Among the student respondents, the chi-square probability for
fathers' education level and frequency of listening to news was not
significant.
The analysis of the parent data suggested that parents with
higher levels of education more frequently had the habit of listening
to news. The data suggested that almost all the parents with high
education level listened to news while only half of the parents with
no education indicated a similar habit (gamma =
.483).
The family income of the parents was of significance in deter-
mining whether they listened to news often. The chi-square probability
was significant at .05 level, but as indicated by gamma, there was no
significant relationship between income level and habit of listening
to news among parents. The cross-tabulation revealed that there was
the tendency among the low income parents to listen to news less often
than other income groups.
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The level of cosmopolitanism was significant for students with
ch1-square probability at .025 level. The students in all areas, as
suggested by the data, relied heavily on radio and television as their
major source of news. However, the students from smaller towns and
rural areas used electronic media more often than those from Tehran.
While 65 percent of the students from Tehran Indicated that they often
listened to news on radio and television, some 89 percent did so in
rural areas. The fact of printed news and Information sources being
less available in smaller towns and rural areas was an obvious reason
for the popularity of electronic media as a source of information in
smaller towns and rural areas.
In summary, the data suggested that the male students tended
to listen to news on radio and television more often than female
students. Furthermore, while the higher the parent's education level,
the higher their frequency of listening to news, education level of
parents had little impact on the student's likelihood of listening to
the news. The data also indicated that as the level of cosmopolitanism
decreased there was an apparent increase in frequency of listening to
the news among students.
Habit of reading newspapers
. The variable dealing with the habit of
reading newspaper and magazine articles about political, economic and
social matters, according to the data (Table 20), revealed that more
male parents showed an interest in reading newspapers than did female
parents. The probability of chi-square was significant at .009 level.
The relationship of these items also proved to be significant
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TABLE 20
v7Ha^lP^n'''°;.°c
"'"^'^"9 newspapers-
ariable 13, with Socio-Economic Status
Sex
Socio-Economic
Status
cles about political, social and economic
matters, how about you?" I read them"
often
parents students
sometimes
parents
male
female
.2
students
61%
48
seldom
parents
^8% 9% 13% 30%
62 3 14 48
parents x^.= 4.82; df = 2: d = nnq- v - i7i
(students) x2 = 3.12; df = 2-^ = 2?' \l - nl ' ^ '^^^xc, ui ^, p - .^1, V -
.07; gamma =
.131
students
19%
24
ather's 83%
Level of f ^i'^'" 71
Education ^ 47
(2) no education
79%
76
61
53
11%
10
6
12%
12
14
15
6%
19
47
(parents) x 53.8; df = 6- d = nnnn- \i - /in/i
(students) x2 = 24.7; df = 6 0 = QOol i- A\ ^™ ^ ''^'^^-^-z. UI 0, p - .UUU4, V -
.143; gamma =
-.302
8%
12
25
32
Mother's
.evel of
iducation
high
medium
low
no education -
^ = 26.8; df
100%
84
67
55
13
18
(_students) X = = 6; p = .0002; V =
.149; gamma = -,
21
27
320
amily
tncome
evel
high
medium
low
11% 12% 12%
64 66 8 17 28
2
39 57 7 13 54
Is?uden1s/x2=_22.0;
df = 4; p = .0002; V =
.260; gamma = -.510( t dents) X
- 18.7; df = 4; p = .0009; V = ,124; gamma = -.245
1-high
-evel of 2
[^osmopol- 3
itanism 4
5- low
(parents) x2= 5.87; df = 8; p = .66; V = .133; gamma =
(students) X = 11.7; df = 8; p = .16; V = .097; gamma =
64% 70% 4% 11%
55 57 10 16
54 61 12 19
60 55 5 16
56 64 19 14
33%
35
33
35
25
,039
.156
17
29
19%
27
21
30
22
(1) For parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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(gamma
= .295). The cross-tabulation showed a rather substantial gap
(13 percent) between the male and female parents' habits of reading
newspapers. Such a difference, understandably, was the direct result
of a lower rate of literacy among female parents.
The level of education had a significant impact on the parent's
and the student's habit of reading newspapers. Father's education
level was significant and instrumental in influencing student's interest
in reading newspapers and magazines (gamma =
.302). Mother's education
level was also a significant factor influencing the student's interest
in reading newspapers (ganma =
.320).
The association between parent's education level and the habit
of reading newspapers and magazines was very significant (gamma =
.670).
The chi-square probability was significant at .0000 level, revealing
that 83 percent of parents with high level of education often read
newspapers, while 47 percent of those with lower level of education
did the same. The finding, however, was only a demonstration of the
fact that the educated read more often than those with less education.
The family income level was also significant for both parents
and students in relation to their habit of reading newspapers and
magazines for political news. While the chi-square probability for the
students was significant at .0009 level, for the parents it was signif-
icant at .0002 level. Of those parents from high income level, 76
percent indicated that they often read newspapers, while 39 percent of
those from low income level responded in a similar manner. Of the
students from high income families, 74 percent indicated that they
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often read newspapers and magazines, while 57 percent from low inco„«
families did the sa«. Certainly, since level of education and Income
are interdependent, and analysis of the two items showed an association
significant at gamma =
.548, among parents, therefore, such a relation-
ship was expected.
Level of cosmopolitanism proved of no significance when analyzed
against either the student's or the parent's habit of reading about
political matters in the printed news media.
farent::^^
The items denoting
"passive" political interest seemingly measured similar attitudes.
Listening to news and reading newspapers were associated at very sig-
nificant levels: for the parents, gamma was
.808; and for the students,
gamma was .479. This indicated that those interested in the news
utilized both electronic and printed media as their sources. This was
particularly evident, as reflected in the data, among the parents.
The analysis showed that gender was a significant variable
among parents in regard to reading newspapers, while the student data
indicated that the male students listened to news more often than the
female students. Parent's level of education seemed to influence both
parents themselves and students in regard to reading newspapers, and
parents themselves in regard to listening to electronic media. All
students relied more often on printed news media than parents, with the
exception of parents with high education level. It is assumed that if
and when these students would attain a similar level of higfi education
themselves, ther^' would bo an increase in their habit of reading
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printed material for their source of information regarding political,
social and economic matters.
The family income level was significant for both parents and
students in determining their attitudes about reading newspapers. On
the other hand, income level proved of no significance for either
sample in determining their interest in listening to news. Further-
more, while cosmopolitanism was significant in determining level of
interest in listening to news for the students, it failed to attain
significance in regard to reading newspapers.
In short, one could note that while education and family income
were all influential in bringing about an interest in both parents and
students in regard to reading newspapers, they did not aid in frequency
of listening to news, due to the basic differences in the nature of
these two media. From the analysis of the data, it seemed that these
two measures were perhaps suggestive of general political interest
among both parents and students regardless of their political perspec-
tive. It seemed that the educated parents relied on reading material
as well as electronic media as their sources of political information.
On the other hand, while higher parental education caused more use of
printed media among the students, the same was not true in regard to
electronic media.
Active Measures
Active measures of political interest were measured, for the
purpose of this study, by the following two items: "thinking about
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politics" and "talking about politics." There may have been some
procedural and built-in flaws in the questionnaire. For example, when
the word politics entered the questionnaire, it may have given rise to
some degree of suspiciousness and uncertainty in some respondents.
They probably were not certain how confidentially their answers would
be treated. There may even have been suspicions in their minds that
the questionnaire had been devised by the government to find out about
their political beliefs, thoughts and habits. The significant associ-
ation between these two measures and with passive measures,^ however,
suggested that there was a great deal of consistency in both the parent
and student data. As noted earlier, the respondents were given assur-
ances that the data was for research purposes and that there was no
interest in knowing the identity of the individual respondents. Names
and addresses of the respondents were not asked for nor collected.
Also, it may be significant to keep in mind that the time of this ques-
tionnaire coincided with some relative relaxation of the press and
freedom of expression.
Over half of both parents and students noted that they never
think or talk about politics! Only one out of three students, and one
out of four parents indicated that they often thought or talked about
politics (see Table 21). The data suggested an extremely high associa-
tion between those who thought and those who talked about politics;
gamma was .885 for parents and .774 for students, both highly signifi-
cant.
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TABLE 21
Parent-Student Comparison on 'Active' Political Measures
Active political
participation measures
frequency
often
%
sometimes
°l10
seldom
%
total
% n
Variable 14: "Some people often
think about political and eco-
nomic condition of our country,
how about you?"
parents
students
26%
35
17%
15
57% 100% (166)
50 100% (617)
Variable 15: "Some people talk
about political and economic
issues facing our contry, how
about you?"
parents
students
26%
34
11%
14
63% 100% (167)
52 100% (621)
The cross-tabulation of the data revealed some attitude differ-
ences resulting from the sex of the responding parents. Male parents
thought and talked more often about politics than female parents, a
likely result of higher level of education among the male parents. The
chi-square probability was .002 for thinking about politics and .06 for
talking about politics with parent's sex, gamma at .622 and .447 respec-
tively, indicating a very significant association. The chi-square prob-
ability did not emerge as significant for student's sex with either
measure.
The higher frequency of talking and thinking about politics
among male parents is in part due to a higher level of education among
them, as the cross-tabulations in Tables 22 and 23 suggested. Further-
more, the patriarchial nature of Iranian culture also contributed to
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their increased level of contact with and Interest In socio-political
1 ssues
The parent's education level did associate significantly with
their habit of talking about politics (gamma -
.419) and thinking about
politics (gan^a
- .334). The cross-tabulation suggested that those
parents who had a higher level of education talked and thought more
often about politics than those who had a lower level of education.
Of those parents who had a high level of education, 44 percent talked
often and 40 percent thought often about politics, while of those
parents who had a low level of education, 23 percent often talked and
29 percent often thought about politics. Parent's education level was
also of some significance in determining student's orientation. There
was an association, with gamma at .275 and
.286, respectively, for both
thinking about politics and talking about politics with father's level
of education. Of those students whose father had a high level of edu-
cation, 58 percent talked and 56 percent thought often about politics,
whereas of those students whose fathers had no education 23 percent
talked and 21 percent thought often about politics.
Mother's education level, as suggested by the data, was also
significant. The chi-square probability was .003, and gamma reflected
the association between mother's level of education with thinking and
talking about politics at .216 and .229 respectively.
The data also suggested that the rate of change in orientation
from parents to students coming from similar educational backgrounds
was lowest among students whose fathers had a low level of education
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TABLE 22
Cross-Tabulation of "Thinking about politics"
Variable 14, with Socio-Economic Status
'
Socio-Economic
Status
"Some people often think about political and
economic condition of our country, how about
you?" I think about it:
often
parents students
sometimes
parents students
seldom
parents students,
Sex male
female
31%
9
(parents) x^p= 12.1; df = 2; ,
(students) = 3.88; df = 2; p
P =
32% 18% 16% 50% •JC/o
39 8 13 83 48
=
.002; V = .270; qamma = .622
=
.14; V =
.08; qamma = -
.101
56% 26% 12% 34% 31%
43 13 15 61 41
33 17 14 54 53
21 10 16 90 62
=
.005; V = .236; qamma = -.334
=
.001; V = .147; gamma = -.275
86% 14%
47 20% 33
35 16 49
28 13 57
=
.003; V = .128; qamma = -.216
45% 16% 14% 47% 16%
35 17 17 49 48
28 15 14 72 59
Father's
^''f.
40%
Level of f '^^'^"^ 26
Education ^ 29
no education --
(parents) x^^= 18.5; df = 6; p =
(students) = 25.9; df = 6; p
Mother
'
s
Level of
Education
high
medium
low
no education -
.2(students) = 19.5; df = 6; p
Family
Income
Level
high
medium
low
37%
34
13
(parents) x ^= 10.5; df = 4; p =
(students) x = 16.0; df = 6; p
.03; V = .181; gamma = -.330
=
.003; V = .115; gamma = -.221
1-high
Level of 2
Cosmopol- 3
itanism 4
5- low
2(parents) x ^= 2i
14% 38% 10% 12% 75% 50%
40 41 15 15 45 43
30 31 9 14 61 55
30 35 20 21 50 44^
40 14 47 31 13 54
= 8; p = .001; V = .281; gamma = -.336
= 8; p = .02; V = .121; gamma = .050
(1) For parents' column, th
mother's level of education when
e "Father's Level of Education"
she was the respondent.
is the
293
(Table 24). The students coming from families wi,ere the fathers had
no education had the highest rate of change compared to their fathers.
The difference was partly due to the fact that none of the parents
with "no education" had indicated a high interest in thinking or
talking about politics. Despite the lowest level of active political
interest among the students coming from those of "no education" back-
ground, with 21 percent thinking and 23 percent talking about politics,
the gap was considerable enough
, resulting in the greatest change in
orientation from parents to students coming from similar educational
backgrounds.
It is apparent that a higher level of education often resulted
in a broader socio-political perspective, giving an impetus to both
parents and students for "active" political participation. The result
was a higher level of political discourse among parents with higher
level of education and among students coming from similar educational
backgrounds, who by the virtue of their own education and by the
exposure to a higher level of activism in families where parents have
high level of education, became more conditioned to political action.
The data in Tables 21 and 22 also suggested that as the income
level among families rose so did the level of political thinking and
discourse. Of parents with high income level, 37 percent thought
often about politics and 36 percent talked often about politics,
whereas, of parents who had low income, 13 percent thought and talked
about politics. The students from all three income levels were more
active than the parents. Of students from high income groups, 45
TABLE 23
Cross-Tabulation of "Talking about politics."
Variable 15, with Socio-Economic Status
Socio-Economic
Status
Some people often liin[bout political aTiTiTo-
nomic issues of our country with their friendshow about you?" I talk about thoiir
ol Lcfi
Sex male
fema 1
e
pa rcnL'o
30%
14
^^tudents
33%
34
'iOmetime'
parents
12%
6
students
14%
15
'->C' I doiii
parents student:;
(parents) x^^= 5.56; df = 2; p = .06; V = 182- qamma -(students) x2=.42;df = 2;p^.8i;v--:526; :::::
58% 53%
80 50
.447
-.033
44% 29%
60 44
67 55
95 65
-.419
"=
-.286
Father's ^^^h 44%
Level of f ^^^"^ 27
Education , 23
no education --
58%
41
30
23
13
10
5
12%
15
15
12
(parents) X ^= 16.9; df = 6; p = .01; V =
.225; gamma =(students) x^ = 28.3; df = 6; p = .0001 ; V = .i53'; gamma
Mother's '^^^
Level of ^^^^""^
lowEducation
no education
56%
50
33
28
22%
14
15
14
Students) X = 19.5; df = 6; p = .003; V = .127; gamma = -.229
22%
36
53
58
Fami ly
I ncome
Level
high
medium
low
2
36%
32
13
36%
33
32
14%
8
12
18%
17
11
(parents) X ^= 10.1; df = 4; p = .04; V =
.175; gamma
(i>Ludents) x = 7.5; df = 4; p = .11; V =
.079; gamma
60
75
335
109
46%
49
59
1-high
Level of 2
Cosmopol- 3
i tan ism 4
5- low
(parents) x^p= 12.0;
(students) x - 8.3;
19% 34% 9%
43 29 5
24 38 6
27 33 15
33 31 27
= 8; p = .15; V = .189;
= 8; p = .40; V = .081;
14% 72% 51%
22 52 48
9 70 53
11 57 56
22 40 47
gamma = -.179
gamma = .015
(i) lor parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education" is the
mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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ing
percent thought often about politics, while 28 percent fro. low inco^
level did Similarly. There was an increase of 15 percent from parents
to students of the low income families in their attitude of thinki,
about politics, as a measure of their "active" political interest.
Chi-square probability for the student data with respect to talking
about politics failed to reach a significant level (see Table 22).
The analysis of variables "thinking about politics" and "talking about
politics" with family income supported a significant relationship with
gamma at
.330 and
.335, respectively, for thinking and talking about
politics among the parents, while failing to display any significant
association with regard to the student data.
Cosmopolitanism failed to suggest any pattern of association
with the respondent's frequency of "talking about politics." The
probability of chi-square, however, was significant for both parents
and students in regard to thinking about politics and level of cosmo-
politanism. The parent data suggested an association significant with
gamma at -.336 level. While 14 percent of parents from Tehran noted
that they often thought about politics, some 40 percent rural areas
and small towns indicated a similar habit. In general, however, the
respondents from all areas, excluding Tehran, indicated a high level of
"active" political interest.
Political thinking, it was hoped, would be a better measurement
of political interest. Since it was assumed that while one did not
necessarily report indulging himself in political discussions which
supposedly could have had undesireable consequences, he would,
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TABLE 24
Ra te of Change from parents_^^^^ on 'Active' Measures
Independent
variable
O)
>
O)
S-
(T3
Q.
4- ta
o o
a
iLuIJ^n/n^" political and economicssues of our country with my friends."
high
medium
low
no education
parents
% n
44% (16)
27 (17)
23 (11)
students
% n
58% (28)
41 (59)
30 (86)
23 (27)
change
%
+14
+14
+7
+23
"I often think about political and economic'issues facing our country."
high
medium
low
no education
40% (14)
26 (16)
29 (14)
56% (27)
43 (60)
33 (92)
21 (25)
+16
+17
+4
+21
nonetheless, reveal a degree of politicalization or lack of it by
responding to this question. Though the pattern of political thinking
was supposedly of little cause for concern with the authorities, the
responses we received for this question closely resembled the responses
to the item denoting political discussion. As noted, there was a high
measure of association for parents (gamma =
.885) and for the students
(gamma =
.774) with the two measures of "active" political interest.
In short, those who thought often about politics also often talked about
it.
The level of parent's education, as well as income, influenced
significantly the student's frequency of political thinking. One
finding, however, stressed the importance of high family income on
student's level of political thinking, while not attaining a significant
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level as to their frequency of talking about politics. The data
revealed that a greater rate of students from high or low income fam-
ilies showed interest in thinking about politics than parents with
those income levels (see Table 23).
The data analysis also suggests some similarities and, in fact,
some dissimilarities between parents and students from similar back-
grounds. Students, in both cases, seemed to be more interested in
politics and, therefore, more politicized than parents. Although
gender did not seem to have a significant influence on student orien-
tation, male parents, were interested in politics at twice the rate of
female parents. Parent's education exerted a great influence on
student's orientation, and was also associated, at a significant level,
with their habit of talking and thinking about politics. Tables 22 and
23 suggested a high frequency of talking and thinking about politics
among those parents who had a high level of education. Those with mod-
erate or low level of education, as suggested by the data, seemed to
have a similar orientation regarding "active" political participation.
The most probable cause of such a differentiation, perhaps, was implicit
in the nature of higher educational institutions of Iran. Historically,
Iranian colleges and universities have been centers of political acti-
visim. The graduates of such institutions, by the same token, after
graduation would very likely continue to express at least some of their
socio-political concerns. The result, as the data suggests, is a
higher level of "active" political interest among those with high
education--i .e.
, at least some college education.
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Figure 5. Scatter plot indicating the impact of education
on parents "passive" and "active" orientations.
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To further illustrate the relationship of passive and active
habits with socio-economic status and political indicators, the results
from the factor analysis of the parent and the student data was
utilized here. The factor analysis indicated two factors with polit-
ical interest as the main factor for both parents and students,
significant at above 1.0 Eigenvalue.
The first factor was characterized by the impact of education
on levels of political interest. This factor indicated that the
parents who had a very low education level, a low income level, and
many children in their families seldom listened to news or read news-
papers and magazines concerning the socio-political and economic affairs
of the country. They also seldom spoke or thought about political
matters. These parents, furthermore, favored government influence and
power over their lives. They also indicated a low level of efficacy,
agreeing that they did not understand what was going on in the govern-
ment since it was so complicated (see Fig. 5).
The students from this background also factored along the same
basic line with little differentiation from parents. The students
whose parents had a low education level, a low income level, and had
many children in their families seldom read newspapers and magazines
and seldom talked or thought about political matters. These students,
moreover, favored a political system that greatly influenced citizens'
lives. They indicated that all other countries in the world should
adopt their socio-political system as a blueprint. These same students
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Figure 6. Scatter plot indicating the impact of education
on students "passive" and "active" orientations.
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had a high level of trust in the government and did not think that the
government should aid the unemployed (see Fig. 6).
The factor analysis, in short, supported the previous assump-
tion that While level of education was highly associated with active
and passive political interest in both parents and students, there was
little association between education and active or passive political
interests with political attitude and orientation. The relationship
of the political variables with the other factors in the tables were
too weak to be regarded as a basis for any fundamental discussion.
The second fact dealt with the habit of political interest and
the impact of age. This factor was shared by both samples. It simply
suggested that the male parents who were younger and had fewer children
often thought and talked about politics. This factor for parents,
however, was devoid of any political implications. It just suggested
that active political interest was higher among parents who had small
families, with youth as the overriding factor. Perhaps it was
the youthful political interest, without any support by other factors
such as education, that made this important.
The student index suggested that the students in upper grades
more often had "passive" and "active" political interests than those
in lower grades. As they got to higher classes they listened to news
and read newspapers more. They also thought and talked about politics.
The student factor index, however, was loaded by one political indica-
tor. The analysis suggested that these students were rather effica-
cious, in that they indicated that the government paid attention
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to people's needs. It could only be surmised that these efficacious
students were upwardly mobile individuals who hoped to gain advantage
by positive response to government demands. They hoped to be recruited
into the political system, therefore, they were somewhat receptive to
system demands.
Political Efficacy
As the third measure of political interest, political efficacy
is thought to function as an indicator of individual's responsiveness
to political system functions. Thus, a politically efficacious indi-
vidual will report a government to be responsive to his or her efforts
and demands, whereas, a politically inefficacious individual is cynical
of the political system. A politically efficacious individual would
most likely subscribe to the system norms, and, as Easton and Dennis
have argued, they would in effect support the system.^
The two questions (see Table 25) used for this part of the
inquiry have often been used by researchers for measurement of political
efficacy. The level of political efficacy found in this study does not
resemble other studies, namely the Easton and Dennis^ or the Jennings
and Niemi studies.^ Both of these studies reported a higher level of
political efficacy among students than parents. However, in this
inquiry, as indicated in Table 25, the students resemble their parents
closely in their level of political efficacy. Of course, one should
not closely compare studies done in a society with a high level of
perceived role of citizen participation in political functions of the
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TABLE 25
Parent-Student Comparison on Levels of Political Efficacy
Eff i cacy/ i neff i cacy
indicators
frequency
agree
( i nef fi cacy)
disagree
(efficacy)
total
Variable 23: "Sometimes politics
and government seem so compli-
cated that a person like me can
not really understand what is
going on."
parents
students
80%
82
20%
18
100% (i6o;
100% (599;
Variable 31: "Over the years, the
government has paid no attention
to what people like me think
when it decides what to do."
parents
students
58%
54
42%
46
100% (162'
100% (584;
society to Iran under the Pahlavis. As is suggested by the high numbers
of inefficacious respondents in both samples, political efficacy in
Iran functioned as the level of support/lack of support for the govern-
ment.
Politics are complicated
. As Table 25 suggests, the level of agreement
between parents and students on both issues is rather similar, which
may indicate a parent-student similarity on the issue. However, as
Fig. 7 reveals, there are some differences on the parent-student
responses when measured on a six-level continuum. While a substantially
higher percentage of parents strongly agree (+3) that "politics are
complicated" than students, more students somewhat agree (+1) with the
issue than parents. This indicates a more determined level of political
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Figure 7
Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 23 in aSix Level Continuum
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efficacy among parents than students, although our first data (Table 25)
did not reveal such a trend.
The cross-tabulation of variable 23, "Sometimes politics and
government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really
understand what is going on," with socio-economic status of parents and
student's parents revealing some similarities between the two samples.
There is no strong association between father's education and student's
level of political efficacy (gamma - -.195), although the chi-square
probability was significant at .009 level. The level of income associ-
ated at a significant level (gamma = .456) with political efficacy/
inefficacy among the parents. Furthermore, the level of cosmopolitanism
failed to indicate any significant relationship with the parent sample.
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while there was a significant association between the size of student's
place of residence and attitude towards this item (gamma =
.309). As
the size of their city of residence grew, there was a decline in level
of political efficacy (see Table 26).
The relationship of high level of cosmopolitanism with low
level of political efficacy was expected, though, at first glance, it
contradicted our primary assumptions. It was earlier surmised that
higher family income would result in higher level of political efficacy.
Thus, assuming that since those in the more cosmopolitan areas have
higher level of income and those in smaller towns and rural areas have
lower income, the students in least cosmopolitan areas, by the same
token, were expected to be less efficacious. The cross-tabulation of
family income with variable 23, however, did not produce a significant
chi-square probability and, as such, could not aid in any generaliza-
tion. The following explanation, while not negating the previous
assumption, will aid in understanding the relationship between cosmo-
politanism and political efficacy. The attitude could be related to
the respondent's interaction with or their assumptions about the func-
tions of the political system they know best; that is, the local govern-
ment. Although the Iranian political system under the Pahlavis was
highly centralized and almost all orders were generated in Tehran, most
students, who were not in everyday contact with government bureaucracy
and the havoc of big city life, were familiar with a smaller administra-
tion, where channels of authority were more distinct and visible, and,
thus, easier to digest and relate to. It would, therefore, allow one
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TABLE 26
Cross-Tabulation of "Government and politics are complicated '
_______J)^nable 23), with Socio-Economic Status
Socio- Economic
Status
i>ometimes pontics and government sliHTl^
complicated that a person like me cannot
really understand what is going on "
Agree (political inefficacy)
parents students
Sex f 79% (100) 790^ (254)female 80 (28) 94 (235)
{sL'de^?l/x2^1n'Rf ? ~- '''' P^^' = -'''-^ 9amma = -.206( tudents) X
- 10.87; df = 1; p = .001; piii =
.137; gamma = -.280
Father's ^^9*? 66% (23) 74% (35)
Level of f^^""^ 82 (47) 85 (119
Education ^ 80 (39) 83 (235
(1) "0 education 95 (19) 81 (90)
(parents) x2= 73; df = 3; p = .06; V =
.213; gamma = .323(students) X = 11.6; df = 3; p = .009; V = .140; gamma = -.195
Mother's ^'^^^ " 71% (5)
Level of f^^"'" " 85 (73)
Education ^ " 85 (214)
no education
- 78 (185)
(students) X = 8.7; df = 3; p = .03; V = .120; gamma = -.206
Family high 67% (32) 78% (146)
Income medium 78 (40) 84 (141
Level low 90 (54) 82 (187
(parents) x^= 8.8; df = 2; p = .01; V = .236; gamma = .456
(students) x = 1.44; df = 2; p = .48; V = .049; gamma = -.079
, , ^
J-high 75% (39) 85% (285)
Level of 2 81 (17) 83 (55
Cosmopol- 3 81 (26) 79 (77)
itanism 4 87 (34) 75 (48)
5-low 69 (11) 67 (24)
(parents) x^ = 3.4; df = 4; p = .48; V = .146; gamma = -.089
(students) x = 22.0; df = 4; p = .0002; V = .190; gamma = .304
(l)For the parent's column, the "Father's Level of Education" is
the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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to gain a semblance of efficacy, particularly since the question in
variable 23 was centered around the complexity of visible political
and administrative posture. By the same token, life in a city like
Tehran with all the everyday concerns of a hectic captial city, with
most channels of authority rather blurred, plus the higher level of
politicalizationcoupledwith lesser level of political visibility caused
by the sheer number of high school students, would only serve as
fertile ground for political inefficacy.
The students whose fathers had a high education level displayed
a high level of political efficacy. Another significant find was that
the students whose fathers and mothers had no education displayed a
higher level of political efficacy than those students whose parents
had a low or moderate level of education. Furthermore, the increase in
level of political efficacy from parents to students among the no edu-
cation group was enormous, while there was a decline in level of
political efficacy from parents to students among the other segments.
The orientation pattern, in some ways, resembled the associa-
tion found earlier in the measures of active political interest. With
little knowledge about the workings of the political system among
parents with no education, and some semblance of system recognition
among students who have some high school education, the wide gap
between the parents with no education and the students whose parents
had no education is understandable.
The family income level was related at a significant level with
variable 23 among the parents. The cross -tabulation suggested that
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those with a higher level of income were nK,re efficacious than those
with lower Income levels. Of the parents with high incor^, 33 percent
agreed with variable 23, whereas 10 percent of those with low income
did the same.
In short, some anticipated patterns were suggested by the
analysis. Among parents, a high level of education and a high level of
income were associated with a decreased level of political inefficacy.
The same pattern, however, was not displayed by the students. A
basically similar trend was indicated by Jennings and Niemi when they
administered the same question to their sample of parents and students.
^
The higher level of efficacy among the more educated parents, as sug-
gested by variable 23, was the result of their education, which gave
them a better understanding of what is going on in the government. The
reverse is true for those with less education. The students, who all
had basically similar levels of education, indicated a generally similar
level of efficacy, except when overwhelmed by high parental education.
It also seems that certain students who resided in less cosmo-
politan areas, motivated by upward mobility, became more responsive to
the political system demands and thus were less inefficacious than those
from more cosmopolitan areas.
Cross -tabulation of variable 23 with the measures of passive
and active political interest along with items denoting levels of
political trust or distrust were thought to give a better understanding
of the impact or relationship of political ef ficacy/i neff i cacy to the
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TABLE 27
Cross-Tabulation of 'Political Inefficacy,' Variable 2^ with d •
and Di^trusTpob-ticar Ue^f
'^'^
Passive, active,
trust and distrust
variables
"Sometimes pol i tTHi~^^d~^^^^iF?irent seem socomp icated that a person like me cannot
really understand what is going on."
Agree
(inefficacy)
parents students
Disagree
(efficacy)
parents students
Variable 12:
Listening to
news
often
sometimes
sel dom
71% 91% 72%^565
18 24 3 23
total 100% (127) 100% (488) 100% (32) 100% (110)
l^)'^^'^: : I: I : ifr,' = 'H^'^ ^amma - -.123J A ,HH, QT p - .80; V = .086; gamma =
.074
Variable 13: often 58% 66% 66%"""
Reading news- sometimes 8 14 9
papers seldom 34 20 25
total 100% (125) 100% (486) 100% (32)
[s?MdPnt^' 2- 1:49;
df = 2; p = .48; V = .124; gamma =
-.061( tudents) X = 2.82; df = 2; p = .23; V = .093; gamma = .038
66%
10
24
100% (110
Variable 14: often
Thinking about sometimes
politics seldom
total
2
30% 34% 21%
15 16 21
55 50 58
100% (124) 100% (488) 100% (33)
(parents) 1 83; df = 2; p = .40; V = .194; gamma = .019(students) X = 6.18; df = 2; p = .04; V = .164; gamma = .065
41%
9
50
100% (109)
Variable 15:
Talking about
pel itics
often
sometimes
seldom
total
28% 34%
11 16 9
61 50 66
100% (127) 100% (488) 100% (32)
;parents)^x
^= .39;^df = 2; p = .85; V = .043; gamma = .010
p = .20; V = .125; gamma = .059
44%
11
45
100% (109)
students) x = 3.23; df = 2;
Variable 30: agree 66% 71% 45%
Big business disagree 34 29 55
influences gov't total 100% (125) 100% (478) 100% (33)
parents) x^ = 3.66; df = 1; p = .055; phi = .168; r = .168; p
students) x = 11.2; df = 1 ; p = .0008; phi = .143; r = .143;
46
100% (108)
=
.017
p = .0003
continued in next page
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TABLE 27 (Continued)
Gov't wastes our disagree 48 45 50
tax money total 100% (120) 100% (470) 100% (33) 100% (102)
parents) X
= .7; df = 1; p = .41; phi =
.083; r = 083- p = 153(students)_x^_= 6.5; df = 1; p = .01; phi =
.ui; , l^'^h; p ^ 004
Variable 38: agree 86% 82% 67% 66%"""Some people in disagree 14 18 33 ^4gov't are crooked total 100% (125) 100% (471) 100% (33) 100% (102)
(students) X
- 12.8; df = 1 ; p = .0003; phi =
.155; r =
.155; p = 0001
Variable 40: agree 80% 71% 97%" ^00^
Gov't knows what disagree 20 29 3 31is best for people total 100% (119) 100% (479) 100% (30) 100% (105)
(parents) X = 3.7; df = 1; p = .053; phi =
.181; r =
-.181; p = 014(students) =
.22; df = 1; p = .64; phi = .024,' r =
.024; p = .28
Variable 42: agree 72% 65% 83% 71%People in the disagree 28 35 17 29gov't are smart total 100% (118) 100% (474) 100% (29) 100% (106)
(parents) X = .89; df = 1; p = .34; phi = .097; r =
-.097; p = .12(students) X = 1.04; df = 1; p = .31; phi = .047; r =
-.047; p = .13
political orientations of our samples, and to distinguish differences,
if any, between parent and student populations.
Levels of political efficacy, as measured by variable 23, did
not relate at significant levels with either passive or active political
participation measures, as indicated by "listening to news," "reading
newspapers," "talking and thinking about politics." Chi-square analysis
resulted in below significant probability for all the cross-tabulations
of parent data, except for frequency of listening to news (p = .035).
The data failed to display a significant association between frequency
of listening to news and variable 23. There was a somewhat similar
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outcome from the analysis of the student data. Chi-square probability
was only significant for cross-tabulation of "thinking about politics"
and variable 23 (p = .04), once again with no significant association
as indicated by gamma. In short, there were no significant relation-
ships between political inefficacy, as indicated by variable 23, and
passive or active political participation measures.
The levels of political trust/distrust, which will be dealt
with in detail in Chapter IX, were the next control items in the
analysis of efficacy. Variables 30, 35 and 38 indicated distrust in
the government while variables 40 and 42 indicated levels of trust in
the government. (Throughout this discussion refer to Table 27.)
The inefficacious respondents, both parents and students, as
suggested by the data, had less trust in the government than the
efficacious respondents. The analysis of the parent data did not
reveal any major association between political trust/distrust and
political efficacy at levels considered significant. Of the five
analyses based on Pearson' s correlation, none attatined a level of .005
which was regarded in this discussion as significant.
In variable 30, "The government was influenced by a few big
interests," the data indicated a chi-square probability significant at
.0008 level, with Pearson's correlation also significant at .0003
level for the student sample with political efficacy— i .e.
, variable
23. Of the efficacious students, 54 percent agreed with variable 30,
while of the inefficacious students, 71 percent did the same. There
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was an Increase of 17 percent in level of distrust from efficacious
to inefficacious students.
In variable 35, "The government is wasting the taxpayers-
money," the student data revealed a chi-square probability significant
at
.01 level, with Pearson's correlation also significant at .004 level
(see Table 27). The cross-tabulation of the student data suggested
that there was an increase in level of distrust in government from
efficacious to inefficacious students. Of the efficacious students,
40 percent agreed with the statement, whereas, of the inefficacious,
55 percent did the same.
In variable 38, "Some people in the government are crooked,"
the analysis revealed that the chi-square probability was significant
at
.025 level for parents and at .0003 level for students, with
Pearson's correlations also significant at .0001 level for the latter.
Although the Pearsons correlation for the parent data failed to attain
the .005 level, nonetheless, based on measurement of association indi-
cated by gamma, the relationship was significant (gamma =
.496). Based
on the cross-tabulation of the efficacious students, 66 percent agreed
with the statement in variable 38, while 82 percent of the inefficacious
agreed. There was an increase of 16 percent in distrust of government
from efficacious to inefficacious students. Of the efficacious parents,
67 percent agreed with variable 38, while 86 percent of the ineffica-
cious did the same. There was an increase of 19 percent in level of
government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious parents.
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Of the two items dealing with political trust, the only one
with significant chi-square probability in the parent data was between
variable 40, "The government knows what is best for people," and vari-
able 23, at .053 level. The correlation analysis for this table also
failed to reach the anticipated level of significance. Based on the
analysis of cross-tabulation, however, it was indicated that of the
efficacious parents, 97 percent agreed with the statement, whereas, of
the inefficacious, 80 percent did the same; a decline of 17 percent in
level of government support from efficacious to inefficacious parents.
In the last item dealing with political trust, variable 42,
"The people running the government are smart," the data ceased to
indicate any significant chi-square probability for either sample.
In summary, neither set of data revealed any strong 1 i nks between
political efficacy and "passive" political interest. There were also
no major associations between political efficacy and "active" political
interest. The data, however, suggested significant relationships
between political distrust and political inefficacy, particularly among
the students. In short, the data supported the earlier assumptions
that politically efficacious individuals more often will subscribe to
system norms and have a higher level of trust in government, while the
politically inefficacious individuals will behave in an opposite manner.
Government pays no attention
. The second item in this section dealing
with political efficacy/inefficacy was variable 31, "Over the years, the
government has paid no attention to what people like me think when it
decides what to do." This item, like the previous one, has often been
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used in research to measure the level of political efficacy. This item,
as seen in Table 25, received a more efficacious response than variable
23 since it made a more forceful and less ambiguous suggestion that
indicated a more indepth feeling between the individual and system func-
tions. Without any pretense, the statement attempted to engage the
respondent in a situation whereby his or her ascription to system norms
could be measured. Perhaps it was for this reason that the two varia-
bles, variable 23 and 31, did not even correlate (p- .119) in the
parent data. Thus, it could be assumed that the two variables were not
measuring exactly the same attitudes. The assumption was that variable
31, as suggested above, measured a higher level of political efficacy/
inefficacy, perhaps coupled with some measure of political trust/
distrust in the government.
The level of political efficacy, and, therefore, support for
system norms, as suggested by this item (see Fig. 5), was higher than
in variable 23. Some 42 percent of parents and 46 percent of students
responded efficaciously as measured by variable 31, in contrast to 20
and 18 percent respectively, as measured by variable 23. The students
responded to this question in a slightly more efficacious manner than
did the parents, whereas, the parents responded somewhat more effica-
ciously to variable 23. In either case, the differences between the
two groups were minimal and did not seem to be statistically signifi-
cant. Furthermore, as Fig. 8 shows, when the two groups were compared
in a six-level continuum, the similarities between the two samples were
rather striking.
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Figure 8
Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 31 i
Six Level Continuum
,30 parents
.20
/ \-A \ ^/' \\
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The data analysis, however, indicated some basic dissimilar-
ities. While the chi-square probability for the cross-tabulation of
student's gender with variable 31 was significant at .05 level, it
failed to display any significant association between the two (gamma
=
-.170). The cross-tabulation, however, suggested that male students
were slightly more efficacious than female students. Of the female
students, 59 percent gave efficacious responses, while 51 percent of
the male students did the same. The explanation put forth previously
as to the higher percentage of female students from families with a
higher level of education was credited with a pronounced orientation
among female students resulting in a higher level of inefficacy among
the male students, since higher level of parental education, as will
318
TABLE 28
Cross-Tabulation of "Government pays no attention to people '(Variable 31), with Socio-Economic Status
'
Socio-Economic
Status
"Oyer the years, the government has paid no
attention to what people like me think when
It decides what to do."
Agree (political inefficacy)
parents students
Sex f1^ 61% (79) 51% (159)female 48 (16) 59 (159)
(parents) X = 1 16; df = 1 ; p = .28; phi = .10; gamma = .244(students) X = 3.86; df = 1; p = .055; phi =
.085; gamma = -.170
Father's ^""^ 71% (25) 74% (34)
Level of f^^""^ 54 (33) 58 (79)
Education ^ 52 (25) 50 (135)
(1) "0 education 63 (12) 55 (60)
(parents) x^2= ^-^^i df = 3; p = .27; V = .154; gamma = -.130
(students) X = 10.1; df = 3; p = .02; V = .134; gamma = -.137
Mother's
Level of
Education
high
medium
low
no education
57% (4)
64 (54)
57 (141)
48 (111)
(students) x^ = 7.4; df = 3; p = .06; V = .114; gamma = .192
Family
Income
Level
high
medium
low
57% (27)
62 (32)
57 (34)
60% (110)
57 (92)
47 (106)
(parents)
(students)
x^P= .30; df = 2; p =
X = 7.0; df = 2; p
=
.86; V =
=
.03; V =
.043; gamma =
.111; gamma
-.018
=
-.177
1- high 53% (29) 61% (209)
Level of 2 67 (14) 55 (37)
Cosmopol- 3 59 (19) 49 (41)
itanism 4 63 (24) 39 (24)
5- low 50 (8) 24 (8)
(parents) x^ = 2.31; df = 4; p = .68; V = .119; gamma = -.059
(students) x = 27.4; df = 4; p = .0000; V = .216; gamma = .321
(1) For the parent's column, the "Father's Level of Education" is
the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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be discussed shortly, seemingly was associated with increased political
inefficacy among students.
The analysis also revealed that while there were relationships
between some of the socio-economic variables and the student's efficacy
level, no significant association existed in the parent data. Among
the students the chi-square probability for father's level of education
and variable 31 was significant at .02 level. Of those students whose
fathers had a high level of education, 74 percent gave inefficacious
responses, whereas, 50 percent of the students whose fathers had low
education and 55 percent whose fathers had no education gave ineffica-
cious responses.
The chi-square probability for mother's education and level of
efficacy/inefficacy was just below significance at .06 level. The chi-
square probability for family income and variable 31 was significant at
.03 level for the students. The cross-tabulation analysis showed that,
of the students from high income families, 60 percent gave inefficacious
responses, whereas, 47 percent of the students from income families did
the same.
Finally, the chi-square probability for level of cosmopolitan-
ism and variable 31 among the students was significant at .0000 level.
Also, as indicated by the data, there was a significant association
(gamma = .321) between the two variables. Of the students from small
towns and rural areas, 24 percent responded inefficaciously , while 61
percent of the students from Tehran did the same. Higher level of
education and income, plus the living conditions in the more
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cosmopolitan areas, as discussed above, are perhaps responsible for
the negative association between cosmopolitanism and political effi-
cacy.
As indicated in Table 28, in contrast to variable 23, where
students with higher parental education had a higher level of political
efficacy, in variable 31 those with highest parental education and
income had the lowest level of political efficacy. Such a finding is
not all that unexpected since one would assume that individuals with
lower education level would have less understanding of politics and
government. On the other hand, those with a higher level of education
would anticipate a higher level of interplay with and response from
the system and would have more explicit demands on the system. They,
thus, would be less efficacious when measured by the statement "The
government pays no attention to what people think when it decides what
to do." Furthermore, there were several other reasons for such an
otherwise unexpected difference in orientation of students, most of
which have been discussed previously when resulting in similar circum-
stances. They include heightened idealism among students, particularly
among those from more educated backgrounds. The disparity in parent-
student orientation, particularly among the well-to-do, has already
been noted with references to Marshall Meyer's study of Harvard students
in the midst of the Vietnam war.^ In short, the more efficacious the
parents, that is the more highly educated with higher income, who inter-
act positively with the prevailing system, the more inefficacious the
students, who, at least during their youth, tended to become more
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socially and politically conscious and active. As a result, some
students emerged as inefficacious and dejected by the system functions.
This interplay, augmented by political repression in the country, may
have been greatly responsible for the drop in the efficacy rate from
parents to students among the high income groups. The opposite is
also true; some students from lower income families tended to favor
the system more than parents from similar groups since, having already
attained a level of education higher than their parents, they can
expect to reap better economic benefits than their parents. An obvious
example was the great number of lower and lower-middle class joining
the ranks of the armed forces, the national police, and the secret
police, SAVAK, as system support elements. Of course, such was not
the general orientation of either group, as suggested also by the data.
Those few who were coopted into the system, however, resulted in some
change in orientation pattern from parents to students as indicated by
the foregoing analysis. Furthermore, the assumption that the children
of the less educated and lower income groups with upward mobility drive
become more efficacious and support the system norms also seemed to be
relevant in this case. This aided the assumption that, either for
financial gains or lack of political convictions, there was a tendency
among those students with low parental education levels and lower
income to support the system functions in the hope of securing a posi-
tion within the system. For example, in recent years the ranks of the
armed forces and the national police have been filled with junior
officers who were mostly from very humble backgrounds. It was alleged
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TABLE 29
^'°"."nH^A;it^''°V^'^°^^^^:''^ Inefficacy,' Variable 31, with Passivea d Active Participation, Trust and Distrust Political items
Passive, active,
trust, and distrust
variables
"Over the years, the government has paid no
attention to what people like me think when
It decides what to do."
Agree
(inefficacy)
parents students
Disagree
(efficacy)
parents students
Variable 12:
Listening to
news
often
sometimes
seldom
total
80%
3
17
100% (94)
(parents) x ^= .52; df = 2; p = .78; V =
(students) x = .16; df = 2; p = .90; V =
68% 82% 74%
7 2 3
25 16 23
100% (318) 100% (67) 100% (259)
.060; gamma = -.008
.059; gamma = -.078
^/ariable 13:
Reading news-
papers
often
sometimes
seldom
total
59%
11
30
100% (93)
(parents) x^p= 2.24; df = 2; p = .30; V
(students) x^ = 2.8; df = 2; p = .23; V
67% 58% 64%
14 5 12
19 38 24
100% (317) 100% (66) 100% (265)
=
.199; gamma = .054
=
.134; gamma = .068
/ariable 14:
Talking about
politics
often
sometimes
seldom
total
(parents) yCr,= 7.8; df = 2; p
(students) x = 11.16; df = 2
34%
12
54
100% (92)
=
.022; V =
; p = .002;
40%
15 9 14
45 75 58
100% (315) 100% (65) 100% (262)
=
.261; gamma = .347
V = .254; gamma = .316
Variable 15: often 32% 40% 20% 30%
Thinking about sometimes 17 14 13 16
politics seldom 51 47 67 54
total 100% (93) 100% (316) 100% (66) 100% (263)
(parents) y^^= 4.4; df = 2; p = .11; V = .196; gamma = .252
(students) x = 5.27; df = 2; p = .062; V = .179; gamma = .232
Variable 30: Big agree 73% 71% 43% 63%
business influ- disagree 27 29 57 37
ences gov't total 100% (92) 100% (313) 100% (68) 100% (261)
(parents) x^p= 13.6; df = 1; p = .0002; phi = .304; r = .304; p = .0000
(students) x = 3.2; df = 1 ; p = .07; phi = .078; r = .078; p = .03
continued in next page
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TABLE 29 (continued)
Variable 35: Gov't agree 72% m m 'oZwastes our t.^y Hic:>r,v,^^ oo 29%ax disagree 28 51 32 i\
total 100% (92) 100% (313) 100% (67) 100% (262)
i/ariable 38: Some agree 93% "35% 64% fi7o/"""people in gov't disagree 7 n 3^ ^^^^
are crooked total 100% (94) 100% (317) 100% (67) 100% 9258)
pari able 40: Gov't agree 80% 71% 97% 69%""knows what is disagree 20 29 3 3?best for people total 100% (84) 100% (310) 100% (67) 100% (255)
(sLlen'ts)V^'3i'^ V \' ' -r^' P^^" = -2^2; r = -.352; p = .0000Utudents)^x^^-^ 4.5; df = 1; p = .OOOO; phi =.251; r =
-.251; p = .0000
Variable 42: People agree 63% 53% ""8"8% 81%in the gov't disagree 37 47 12 19
^•"^ ^"^^'^^ total 100% (84) 100% (311) 100% (68) 100% (254)
(parents) x^2= 11-2; df = l; p = .0008; phi = .286; r=- 286' p = 0002(students) x^ +46.6; df = 1 ; p = .0001; phi = .291; r=
-.291 ! p = ioOOO
that some had even been recruited out of orphanages. This changed the
traditional complexion of the armed forces and the police which had
previously been filled from the middle class. With the increased unpop-
ularity of the army after the fall of Mossadegh, particularly with the
army's participation in suppression of the June 1963 uprising, an army
career had become less enticing to the middle class. The economic boom
of the 1970s that benefited the middle class saw the children of the
middle class vying for professional careers outside the armed forces.
Thus, the ranks of the armed forces and the police began to be filled
with recruits from among the high school graduates of the low income
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families. Thus, it is not surprising to find a higher level of polit-
ical efficacy among those students who came from families with lower
incomes and from less cosmopolitan areas.
Cross-tabulations and Pearson's correlation analysis of variable
31 with "passive" and "active" political interests and the levels of
political interests and the levels of political trust/distrust in the
government also proved very useful in the understanding of political
eff i cacy/i neff i cacy
.
Although no significant association between "passive" political
interests and variable 31 was found, the analysis indicated a signifi-
cant chi-square probability in both samples between "talking about
politics," with variable 31 indicating a chi-square probability signif-
icant at .02 level for parents and at .022 level for students. There
were also significant associations between the two variables among the
parents (gamma =
.374) and among the students (gamma =
.316). Of the
efficacious parents, 16 percent often talked about politics and of the
inefficacious, 34 percent did the same. There was an increase of 18
percent in the number of inefficacious parents who often talked about
politics. Of the efficacious students, 16 percent often talked about
politics, whereas, of the inefficacious, 40 percent did similarly. This
was an increase of 24 percent in frequency of talking about politics
from efficacious to inefficacious students. Increased political "acti-
visim" among inefficacious, whether parents or students, was universal.
Despite the severe controls on public protest against the government
and its policies, political activism and anti-government agitation
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continued among the inefficacious adults and students. It happened
mainly by discussion of political issues with peers in school and by
participation in marches and demonstrations in the streets during the
1978-79 uprising.
The inefficacious adults, despite the controls and limitations,
also expressed their opinions to trusted friends, relatives, or cohorts.
These expressions took varying forms, including participation in
religious ceremonies or even associations with literary circles. Poetry
and anecdotes were often used to express opinions, especially since the
wealth of Persian literature provides an almost endless resource which
can be utilized for naked or veiled socio-political expressions (see
Chapter II).
The cross-tabulation of variable 31 with "thinking about poli-
tics," did not attain a significant chi-square probability for either
the parent or the student sample. However, the analysis of variable
31 with political trust/distrust variables suggested significant associ-
ations between them. Cross-tabulation analysis and Pearson's correla-
tion anaylsis were used to analyze the relationships. As in variable
23, the inefficacious respondents, both parents and students, indicated
distrust in government, while the efficacious respondents displayed a
greater level of trust in it.
In the analysis of variable 31 with variable 30, "The government
was influenced by a few big interests," there was a significant correla-
tion (r = .304) at .0000 level for parents. Of the efficacious parents,
43 percent agreed with the item, while 73 percent of the inefficacious
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parents did the same. This was an increase of 30 percent in government
distrust from efficacious to inefficacious parents. The analysis of
the student data, however, did not indicate a significant chi-square
probabi lity.
In regard to variable 35, "The government wasted our tax money,"
there was a correlation with variable 31 for parents (r =
.531), sig-
nificant at
.0000 level and for students (r =
.425) also significant
at .0000 level. Of the efficacious parents, 18 percent agreed with
the statement, while 72 percent of those labeled inefficacious agreed.
This was an increase of 52 percent in level of distrust in government
from efficacious to inefficacious parents. Of the efficacious students,
29 percent agreed with variable 31, whereas, 49 percent of the ineffi-
cacious responded in a similar manner. This was an increase of 20
percent in government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious
students.
In regard to variable 38, "Some people in the government are
crooked," there was a correlation with variable 31 for parents
(r = .355), significant at .0000 level. Of the efficacious parents,
64 percent agreed with the suggestion in variable 31, while 93 percent
of the inefficacious agreed. This was an increase of 29 percent in
government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious parents. Of the
efficacious students, 67 percent agreed with the suggestion, whereas,
89 percent of the inefficacious did the same. This was an increase of
22 percent in government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious
students.
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Levels of trust in the government, indicated by response to
the following two questions, further revealed the relationship between
trust in government and political efficacy. Stressing the assumption
that the inefficacious disapproved of system functions present in the
Shah's government, the efficacious approved of and interacted positively
with the system functions. Both variables 40 and 42 correlated signif-
icantly with variable 31, denoting political efficacy, at above .001
level for both parents and students.
In regard to variable 40, "The government knows what is best
for people," there was a significant correlation with variable 31 for
parents (r =
-.352), at ,0000 level of significance. Of the efficacious
parents, 98 percent agreed with the statement in variable 40, while 73
percent of the inefficacious did the same. Despite the indication that
the vast majority of the respondents displayed trust in government,
nonetheless, there was a decline of 25 percent in level of trust in
government from efficacious to inefficacious parents. The analysis of
the student data indicated a significant correlation (r =
-.251), sig-
nificant at .0000 level. Of the efficacious students, 84 percent agreed
with the statement in variable 40, while 61 percent of the inefficacious
did the same. There was a decline of 23 percent in government trust
from efficacious to inefficacious students.
The second item dealing with trust in government was variable
42, "People in the government are smart." There was a significant
correlation (r = -.286), at .0002 level of significance with variable
31. Of the efficacious parents, 88 percent agreed with the statement
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ca-
while 63 percent of the inefficacious did the same. There was a dec!
of 25 percent in level of government trust from efficacious to ineffi
cious parents. The student data indicated a significant correlation
(r = -.291) at .0000 level. Of the efficacious students, 81 percent
agreed with variable 42, while 53 percent of the inefficacious responded
similarly. Once again, there was a decline of 28 percent in government
trust from efficacious to inefficacious students.
As the above data indicates, there was a suggested association
between distrust of government and respondent's inefficacy. On the
average, there was an increase of 32 percent in government distrust
from efficacious to inefficacious parents and an increase of 18 percent
in government distrust from efficacious to inefficacious students. In
general, the students displayed a higher level of political efficacy
than the parents.
The data also indicated an increase in level of political
efficacy from parents to students in both variables 23 and 31 (see
Table 30). The table suggests that in all cases, except in the case
of variable 23 with variable 38, there was an increase in level of
efficacy, as high as 20 percent, from parents to students. This find
is similar to the Jenning and Niemi study of the American parents and
students, where there was a reported increase of 13 to 17 percent in
rate of efficacy from parents to students.'^ Similar findings were also
reported by Jack Dennis, in his study of the eleventh-graders and their
parents in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.^
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TABLE 30
Change in Level of Political Efficacy from Parents to Students*
Trust/distrust
variables
Variable 23; "Politics and"
government are complicated
for a person like me."
WW V/ V.UUV.|i I, J
Variable 31; "Government
pays no attention to what
people like me think."
—
. 1
efficacious responses
parents students change parents students change
i/ariable 30: Big
business influ-
ence gov't.
parents
students
66% 71% +5
r =
.168; p = .017
r =
.143; p = .0003
43% 63% +20
r =
.304; p = .0000
r =
.078; p = .03
i/ariable 35: Gov't
wastes our tax
money.
parents
students
52% 55% +3
r =
.083; p = .153
r =
.111; p = .004
18% 29% +11
r =
.531; p = .0000
r =
.425; p = .0000
1/ariables 38: Some
people in gov't
are crooked.
parents
students
85% 82% -4
r = .199; p = .006
r =
.155; p = .0001
64% 67% +3
r =
.355; p = .0000
r =
.204; p = .0000
i/ariable 40: Gov't
knows what is
best for people.
parents
students
20% 29% +9
r =
-.181; p = .014
r =
-.024; p = .28
27% 39% +12
r =
-.352; p = .0000
r =
-.251; p = .0000
/ariable 42: People
in the gov't
are smart.
parents
students
28% 35% +7
r =
-.097; p = .12
r =
-.047; p = .13
37% 47% +10
r =
-.286; p = .0002
r =
-.291; p = .0000
(*) Cross-tabulation analysis for the parents data between vari-
ables 23 and 35, 23 and 42, and in the students data between variables
23 and 40, 23 and 42, 31 and 30 did not achieve significant chi-square
probabilities.
330
It is proposed here that the higher level of political efficacy
among students indicated that the influence of the educational system,
whereby political efficacy was taught by the educational institutions
and through textbooks, resulted in some positive response to the govern-
ment. The fact that these students have not had a chance to test their
interactions with the government as of yet also contributed to their
higher level of political efficacy.
In contract, distrust of government and alienation among parents
resulted in lower efficacy. As noted previously, in some cases even
education was a factor in increasing the level of political inefficacy.
In this case, based on the nature of the question and the socio-
political situation under the Shah's rule, the demands of the educated
were more articulated and were perceived by the regime to be contrary
to its own best interests, since many such demands included basic polit-
ical reforms. These were thus less likely to materialize than demands
from the less educated and poorer citizens who desired such things as
higher wages and job security.
Parent-Student Similarities and Differences
In this chapter, more differences between parents and students
were encountered than similarities. While socio-economic status was of
some value in determining the attitudes of parents, it proved of more
value in determining the attitudes of the students. Parent's education,
family income, cosmopolitanism were all of major significance in the
shaping of student orientations. The data has shown that the majority
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of parents of students did listen to news on radio and watched news on
television. In contrast, the majority of the same respondents indicated
that they seldom thought or talked about political matters, displaying
a high degree of political inefficacy. An obvious consequence would
be a citizenry who at least appeared to be politically aloof, seldom
taking part in the political processes of the nation. This high rate
of political inefficacy impeded the aggregation of political demands
on the government. As a result, few grassroots political parties or
other such political institutions developed.
In short, "passive" political interest measures did not emerge
as significant in typifying either the student or the parent sample.
Both parents and students, regardless of their political mode, engaged
in "passive" political behavior equally.
Parental education emerged as one of the most significant
indicators of the likelihood that a student would engage in "active"
political behavior, and their own education was equally important in
determining the parent's behavior.
As noted earlier, parental education was of significance in
determining if the students would be politically efficacious, which in
turn influenced individual trust/distrust of the government. The
efficacy/inefficacy level of students, moreover, seemed to be influenced
by different variables for different groups. The efficacy level of
the students whose fathers had a higher level of education was lower
than the parents in the case of variable 31 and higher in the case of
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variable 23. Such an inverse relationship was due to the nature of the
question, it is proposed, and not a contradictory finding.
Parental education emerges as the most persistent determinant
of political efficacy/inefficacy, as seen in the case of those students
coming from families with high parental education. On the other hand,
those students who come from more humble backgrounds were more influ-
enced by their own education than by that of their parents. The data
also suggested that, at these levels, cosmopolitanism became a major
factor influencing the student's orientation. It is proposed here that
many students from smaller towns and rural areas, who also come from
families with low or no education background, found recruitment into the
system as a major avenue open to them for upward mobility, and were also
less politicized due to the more simple nature of their communities.
For this reason a perceptible increase in the level of political
efficacy among the students from the least cosmopolitan areas and with
lower than average parental education was observed. It should also
not be ignored that since the land reforms which increased the influence
of the central government in rural areas due to the removal of land-
lords, the regime had done its utmost to create a support foundation
for itself among the farmers. Although it has been suggested that this
policy failed in many cases, the government, as late as December 1978,
was able to muster support for the faltering Pahlavi regime from the
q
rural population.
Finally, it is presumed that in the absence of a strong familial
politicalization effect on students from families with low or no
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education, the apparent void was filled by other agents, namely peers,
or by the socialization and pol iticalization attempts undertaken by
the system, particularly through the educational system and mass commun-
ication. The result, as the data suggests, was a higher level of
political efficacy among the students, particularly among those whose
parents had lower education levels.
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CHAPTER IX
POLITICAL TRUST AND DISTRUST
In Chapter VIII it was discussed in detail that political
efficacy was positively associated with political trust; those who had
a higher level of political efficacy also had a higher level of trust
in the government. However, the data had suggested that not all the
efficacious respondents trusted the government. There were many
efficacious respondents who did not trust the government and there were
many inefficacious respondents who had indicated trust in the govern-
ment (see Tables 27 and 28). In this chapter, the aim is to discuss
the attributes of those individuals, both parents and students, who
trust or distrust the government. Furthermore, attempts will be made
to explore the similarities and dissimilarities between the parent and
the student populations.
The five items in this chapter, as displayed in Table 31, are
ordered in a Guttman scale so that the top of the table is the highest
level of trust in government while the bottom of the table represents
the lowest level of trust in government among the respondents. The
responses of both parents and students have met our scaling requirements
in both cases. Due to the unique situation and differing circumstances
in each case study, different scaling methods have been utilized than
those used in other research studies of a similar kind.^ In Guttman
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TABLE 31
Level of Trust in Government and Change from Parents to Students (*)
Trust/distrust
variables
parents
%
The government usually knows
what is best for people
(variable 40)
agree 83
People running the government
are smart and usually know
what they are doing
(variable 42)
agree 74
The government wastes needless-
ly alot of the money we pay
in taxes
(variable 35)
disagree 51
Some people believe that the
government is influenced by
a few big interests
(variables 30)
disagree 40
I think some people in the
government are crooked
(variable 38)
disagree 19
students
%
71
66
48
33
21
change
%
-12
-3
-7
+2
(*) For variables 40 and 42, levels of agreement are regarded as
trust in the government, whereas, for variables 30, 35 and 38, levels
of disagreement are regarded as such.
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scaling, it is stipulated that those who respond favorably, for example,
to item 3 also will respond favorably to items 1 and 2^, but not
necessarily favorably to items 4 and 5. In Table 31, whilo negative
responses for items 1 and 2 were regarded as a level of distrust,
positive responses for items 3 through 5 were regarded as such.
Adjustments were made in the computations so all items were scaled in
one slope. Thus, item 5 measured the lowest level of trust, while
item
1 measured the highest level. The coefficient of reproducibility
For parents' data was .91 and for students' data it was .93.
The simplo data analysis in the Table 31 indicates a decline in
government trust from parents to students in all cases, except in one.
The increase of two percent was in the case of variable 38, measuring
the lowest level of trust and the highest level of distrust. The
higher level of trust among parents, apparent from Table 31, is contra-
dictory to the studies of American parent-student attitudes. Jruinings
and Niemi found that students trusted the government twice as often as
parents, giving the students, rather than parents, a higher level of
trust in government.^ Thus, further analysis of the data is needed
to establish a pattern and also identify causes of a somewhat higher
level of distrust among the students.
Govemnent^ For analysis purpose, we shall, however, start
from variable 38 wfiich received the highest level of answers indicating
distrust in government. As tii(> following graph (fig. 9) suggests,
while there was a rather similar disagreement level among parents and
students when viewed in a six- level continuum (I ig. 9), there was a
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Figure 9
Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 38 i
Level Continuum
n a Six
.10
.20
.30
-3
-2
-1 +1 +2 +3
agree
disagree
substantial difference in frequencies of agreement. While the students
were rather evenly divided between the three frequencies of agreement,
the parents showed a rather assertive orientation, mostly agreeing
(^2) or strongly agreeing (+3) with the statement that "some people in
the government are crooked."
The cross- tabulation analysis of socio-economic status with
variable 38 revealed no significant relationship for either the parents
or the students. None of the nine cross-tabulations (see Table 32)
attained a significant chi-square probability.
The question itself, suggesting that only " some people in the
government were crooked," instead of many
, most or aV\_, is greatly
responsible for bringing out such a vehement response agreeing with the
statement, since even in the more idealistic societies there certainly
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TABLE 32
Cross-Tabulation of So.e people in the government are crooked"
^vanaDie 38} With Socio- Economic Status
Socio-economic
status
"Some people in the government are crooked."
Agree (distrust in government)
parents students
Sex f 81% (106) 790^ (249)female gO (28) (2I3)
-^!-!"^!^.'..:.:°°^:_^!.:_!:.p ^ -^^^ = -^^^^ 9« = -o^^
Father's
^^^J} 84% (31) 87"(42r
Level of f^i"'" 80 (48) 79 ({07
Education ^ 81 (39) 73 212
(1) "0 education 80 (16) 79 (88)
(parents) x22=
-23; df = 3; p = .97; V = .038; gamma = -.045(students)
- 2.4; df = 3; p = .49; V =
.065; gamma = :.059
Mother's "^^^h - 86% (6)
Level of "1^'^''''^ " 86 (67)
Education ^ — 79 (201)
no education - 75 (175^
(students) X = 2.5; df = 3; p = .46; V = .066; gamma = -.129
Family high 74% (37) 81% (153)'
Income medium 73 (44) 77 (^24)
Level low 72 (49) 77 (175)
(parents) x22= 2.5; df = 2; p = .28; V = .124; gamma = .149
(students) X = 1.3; df = 2; p = .53; V = .045; gamma = -.086
1-high 79% (44) 81% (268)
Level of 2 71 (15) 79 (53
Cosmopol- 3 88 (29) 78 (74
itanism 4 82 (32) 70 (44
5-low 87 (14) 68 (23)
(parents) X ^= 2.97; df = 4; p = .56; V = .134; gamma = -.144
(students) X = 7.2; df = 4; p = .12; V = .111; gamma = .192
(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education"
is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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are some individuals in the government who are crooked. The question
was intended to approach the feeling of distrust in respondents rather
cautiously and thus sense the most widespread feeling of some distrust
in the government. As a result, a feeling is revealed that seemingly
cuts across all levels of education, income and cosmopolitanism.
Certainly those respondents who disagreed with variable 38 are the most
trustful of the government. With variable 30, the second item in our
scale of distrust, suggesting that "Some people believe that the govern-
ment is pretty much influenced by a few big interests looking out for
themselves," once again we find an overwhelming rate of approval. Some
three out of five parents and two out of three students agreed with the
statement. More parents had disagreed with the statement than students,
thus showing a higher level of trust in government. When viewed in a
six-level continuum (see Fig. 10), the parent-student responses
followed a rather similar pattern. The graph, once again, suggests a
slightly more assertive attitude among the parents than among the
students. As in the past graphs and, as we shall see in the future
graphs, the parents display assertive attitudes, indicating a strong
favor or disfavor for statements more often than the students. This
pattern, perhaps, is indicative of their general attitude towards the
issues which by this time and age is more crystallized that it is among
students who still have most of their socio-political experiences
before them.
The cross-tabulation analysis of variable 30 with the socio-
economic status of parents and students did not reveal any major
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Figure 10
Comparison ol Parent-Student Responses to Variable 3U i
Level Continuum
si<jni(i(;,inl. relationships. Only ono ol the socio-economic, v.iri.ihlo'.
,
LiUicr's (>duc.il.ion Irwcl proved iqn i fi ciril. in i nil ucnc iri(j l.hc l.udcni.
'
s
'''vcl ol diM.ru-.l. in U.." (jovfriiiiicn I, (l.thle 33). The chi
-sciu.irv proha-
l)iiit.y was significant at .02b lovol, nonoLho loss , t.h(> associa 1. i on
between parcni.al education and sLudents' level of disl.rusl. did not
emerge as significant (gamma .10')).
I roiii Lti(. third item in our scale ol |)olitic<il trust, vari.ibh*
3b, a very (,los(^ agreem{>nt l)(>twe(>ri both parents and tlie students on the
(|iiestion, "I he ()over'riiiien t wastes needlessly <i lot ol our tax money,"
emerges. Almost hall ol tli(.' p.irent and the studcnit samples agrecul with
the statement. Those parents and students who disagreed with the
stateiiKMit displ.iycnl a similar fre(|ueri(:y in their level o\ di sagre(.'men t.
Those parents wlio agre(?d with th(.' stateiinnit, ds indicated in I ig. II,
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TABLE 33
^'^''"^'^'Mii^? influenced by big business"
Socio-Economic
Status
"Some People believe that the government is
very much influenced by a few big interests
looking out for themselves."
Agree (distrust in government)
parents students
Sex
^^'^^
female
0
59% (75)
65 (22)
66°/ (?^?\
68 (191)
parents) x p= .202; df = 1 ; p = .65; phi
(students) x^ =
.179; df = 1; p = .67; phi
=
.051; gamma = -.129
=
.020; gamma = -.044
Father's
^'^J}
Level of ^^^^^""^
Education
.
no education
62% (21)
62 (37)
55 (27)
63 (12)
72% (35)
75 (104)
62 (175)
IK) \/o)
(parents) x^o= 68- df =
(students) x = 9.3; df
"5
• n = 9,9.' \l -o J p — . oo , V — .
= 3; p = .025; V =
068; gamma = -.045
.126; gamma = -.105
Mother's ^^^h
Level of f^i^'"
Education '^'^
.
no education
71% (5)
77 (59)
69 (175)
63 (149)
(students) x^ = 5.9; df = 3; p = .117; V = .100; gamma = -.146
Family high
Income medium
Level low
62% (29)
56 (28)
63 (39)
67% (129)
71 (117)
64 (148)
(parents) x p= .60; df =
(students) x = 2.23; df
2; p = .74; V = .
= 2; p = .32; V =
061; gamma = .029
.062; gamma = -.064
1- high
Level of 2
Cosmopol- 3
itanism 4
5- low
54% (30)
60 (12)
55 (17)
60 (24)
87 (14)
69% (231)
71 (46)
72 (73)
56 (35)
53 (19)
(parents) x^= 6.4; df =
(students) x"^ = 8.3; df
4; p = .17; V = .
= 4; p = .078; V =
198; gamma = -.217
.118; gamma = .110
(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education'
is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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Figure 11
Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 35 in a Six-
Level Continuum
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once again displayed a more assertive level of distrust in the govern-
ment. Of those parents who agreed with the statement, 20 percent
agreed stongl.y (+3), whereas only 13 percent of the students did.
The cross-tabulation analysis revealed significant chi-square
probability between the students socio-economic status and their
responses to variable 35, except in the case of family income level.
In the parents' data, on the other hand, only education level attained
a significant chi-square probability in cross- tabulation with variable
35.
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The data revealed that the chi-square probability between
the students' sex and distrust in government (variable 35) was signif-
icant at .0018 level. It indicated that there was a higher level of
trust among the male respondents than among the female students
(gamma = .261). The difference in male/female student orientation,
as noted in the previous chapter, was due to a direct relationship
between higher parental education among the female student respondents
and the fact that parental education, most often, had been an influence
on the student orientations.
The chi-square probability for father's education and variable
35 was significant at .001 level and was also associated at a signif-
icant level (gamma =
.251). Of those students whose parents had a
high education level, some 70 percent of them indicated distrust in
the government, as measured by variable 35, whereas, of those students
whose parents had no education, some 45 percent of them concurred. As
indicated by the data, there was an increase of 25 percent in the
level of trust in the government from those students whose parents
had a high level of education to those whose parents had no education
at all.
The chi-square probability of mother's education level was
also significant at .002 level and was associated with variable 35
at a significant level (gamma = .269). The cross-tabulation sug-
gested a decline in the level of support for the government as the
level of education increased. While 71 percent of the students with
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TABLE 34
Cross-Tabulation of ''Government Needlessly Wastes Out Tax Money'(Variable 35) with Socio-Economic Status
Socio-Economic
Status
"I think the government wastes needlessly alotof the money we pay in taxes."
Agree (distrust in government)
parents students
Sex male
female
.2
m (68) 46% (143)
56 (18) 59 (i5oj
sL'denlLV^-f '\ ' ''Ik.'.'' - ''"'-^ 9amma - -.193^ tudents) X
-
9.77; df = 1 ; p = .0018; phi =
.132; gamma =
-.261
Father's ^^^h
Level of 'I'^^^'^'"
Education ^ ^.
(1
J no education
67% (24)
50 (29)
34 (16)
45 (9)
70% (32)
62 (84)
48 (131)
45 (50)
(parents) X = 8 8; df = 3; p = .03; V = .234; gamma =
-.304(students) X = 15.7; df = 3; p = .001; V = .166; gamma = -.251
Mother's 71% (5)
Level of f^^^"^ " 64 (49)
Education
„ .
55 (139)
no education 43 [gg)
(students) x^ = 14.97; df = 3; p = .0018; V = .164; gamma = -.269
Family high 52% (25) 56% (103)Income medium 52 (26) 55 (88
Level low 44 (26) 45 (104
(parents) x22=
-94; df = 2; p = .62; V = .077; gamma = -.113
(students) X = 5.4; df = 2; p = .065; V = .097; gamma = -.148
, ,
^
1- high 59% (33) 63% (210)
Level of 2 57 (12) 44 (29
Cosmopol- 3 42 (13) 37 (36)
itanism 4 35 (13) 21 (13)
5- low 44 (7) 44 (15)
(parents) x^^= 6.4; df = 4; p = .17; V = .199; gamma = .256
(students) x = 49.8; df = 4; p = .0000; V = .291; gamma = .432
(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education"
is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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a high level of mothers' education distrusted the government, a total
of 43 percent of those with a lower level of education also mistrusted
the government.
The level of distrust (variable 35) among parents also had a
significant chi-square probability at the .03 level with their educa-
tion level. The two items were also associated at a significant
level (gamma = .304). Of those parents who had a high education level
67 percent of them distrusted the government, while 34 percent of
those with a low education level also mistrusted the government.
The cross-tabulation of cosmopolitanism with variable 35
revealed the impact of city of residence on the students' attitudes.
The two items had a chi-square probability significant at the .0000
level and were associated at a significant level (gamma = .432).
Of the students who lived in Tehran, 63 percent of them indicated a
distrust in the government, whereas, 65 percent from the least cos-
mopolitan areas also had a distrust for the government. Aside from
the urban-rural dichotomy, discussed several times previously as
reasons for a higher level of support for the government in rural
areas, and a lower level of support in the major urban areas due to
a combination of factors, the responses in this case were perhaps
influenced by the nature of the question--i .e.
,
payment and waste of
the taxpayers' money. The fact that the burden of direct taxes is
mostly on the shoulders of those living in the major cities, particu-
larly Tehran due to a much higher level of income, makes the question
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of taxes become rather academic for those people who live in the
less urban and rural areas of the country and who have the lowest
income levels. If the phrase oiijionex could have been used instead
of the phrase tax money,, perhaps it would have created a different
impression and would have solicited a far different response. Due
to the implications present in the expression of oil money
, and
the possible problems in securing permission for the administration
of the questionnaires in the schools, the less explosive connotation
of tax money was used.
Trusting the government
. The next two items, variables 40 and 42,
as noted previously, were stated in a positive manner in the ques-
tionnaires. Therefore, a favorable response to either of these
questions indicated a level of trust in the government. These two
items, as displayed in Table 31, were fashioned in a manner which
would attract the highest level of distrust in the government from
the respondents. These two items are in contrast to variable 38 and
are intended to measure the broadest level of trust in the govern-
ment.
Almost three out of four parents agreed with variable 42, "The
people running the government are smart and usually know what they are
doing." Only two- thirds of the students agreed with the statement,
indicating a higher level of distrust among students than among parents.
The parent-student responses, viewed in a six-level frequency continuum,
differed substantially (Fig. 12). As i n the earl ier i terns , the parents
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Figure 12
Comparison of Parent-Student Responses to Variable 42 in a Six
Level Continuum
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displayed a more assertive attitude in their responses than the students
did. While 23 percent of the parents agreed stongly (+3) or disagreed
strongly (-3) with the statement in variable 42, only 18 percent of the
students responded in a similar assertive fashion.
The cross-tabulation analysis of the parents' socio-economic
status with variable 42 suggested no significant relationship, while
the cross-tabulation analysis of the student data suggested significant
chi-square probability for students' sex and cosmopolitanism (Table 35).
The chi-square probability for students' sex and trust in
government (variable 42) was significant at .012 level; the two items
had a relationship signficant at gamma = .223. Of the male students,
71 percent indicated trust in the government while 61 percent of the
female students had similar feelings.
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Socio-Economic
Status
TABLE 35
Cross-Tabulation OfPeople 1„ the Government are Smart"
^variable 42) with Socio-Economic Status
"People running the government are smart and
usually know what they are doing."
Agree ( trust in government)
parents students
Sex
"J^^^, 76% (93) 7^^ (oa)
^?Stl)V%-^^i;V=^V=-'oi2^^i,i :°^?55^« =
'
' ' P .Ui , pt\i -
.106; gamma = .223
Father's ^'^^ 71% (14) 51% (12)
Level of 68 (41) 70 ( 34
Education ^ 85 (40) 67 (98
(1) no education 70 (20) 66 (24)
(parents) X = 4.7; df = 3; p = .19; V =
.174; gamma = .150(students) x^ = 5.5; df = 3; p = .142; V =
.097; gamma =044
Mother's '^^5- "" 57% (4)
Level of f^^""^ - 57 (47)
Education
.
" 65 (164)
no education - 71 f^gij
(students) X = 6.8; df = 3; p = .078; V =
.109; gamma = .186
Family high 70% (44) 63%"(116)
Income medium 75 (37) 70 112
Level low 75 (31) 71 (158)
(parents) X ^= .34; df = 2; p = .84; V = .04; gamma = .066
(students) X = 2.01; df = 2; p = .36; V = .059; gamma = .067
1- high 68% (34) 59% (196)
Level of 2 65 (13) 73 (50
Cosmopol- 3 77 (24) 74 73
itanism 4 81 (30) 79 (49
5- low 87 (14) 73 (25)
(parents) x^ = 3.98; df = 4; p = .41; V = .160; gamma = -.242
(students) x = 18.8; df = 4; p = .002; V = .168; gamma = -.291
(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education"
is the mother's level of Education when she was the respondent.
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The chi-square probability for level of cosmolitanism was
significant at
.002 level. Once again the data suggested that the
students from Tehran had the least trust in the government, whereas,
those students from the least cosmopolitan areas had the most trust in
the government (gamma
-
.291). Of those students from Tehran, 59 per-
cent indicated trust in the government, while those from small towns
and rural areas had a 77 percent trust in the government, as indicated
by the statement in variable 42.
The last item in this section, variable 40, states that "The
government usually knows what is best for people." While a positive
response indicated support for the government, a negative response was
the manifestation of the least trust in the government. As displayed
in Table 31, while 17 percent of the parents indicated that they did
not trust the government as measured by this item, 29 percent of the
students had similar feelings. There was an increase of 12 percent in
level of distrust from parents to students. When viewed in a six-level
continuum (Fig. 13) over 32 percent of the parents had agreed strongly
(+3) with the statement, indicating an assertive response favoring the
government, while only 18 percent of the student sample had done simi-
larly. This further supported the previous assertion that the parents
had been resolute in their political opinion whether pro or anti-
government. Such a response pattern indicates that the parents had
already arrived at certain conclusions in regard to the government in
Tehran. The students, on the other hand, were less resolute than the
parents. Many students held to the middle ground--i
. e. , somewhat agreed
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Figure 13
Comparison of Parent-
-Student Responses to Variable 40 in a Six-
Level Continuum
.40
parents
.30 / ^
.20
/ V
.10
/
/
—
disagree
^
-1 +1 +2 +3
agree
(+1) or somewhat disagreed (-l)--more frequently than the parents. The
students, as measured by the trust/distrust variables in this chapter,
in general trusted the government somewhat less than the parents.
As in the last item, cross-tabulation of socio-economic vari-
ables with variable 40 revealed no significant chi-square probability
for the parents (see Table 36). Parental education, family income and
cosmopolitanism displayed significant chi-square probabilities with
variable 40 for the students.
The chi-square probability of father's education level with
variable 40 was significant at .0002 level. The two items also were
associated at a significant level (gamma - .234). Of those students
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TABLE 36
Cross-Tabulation of "Government knows what is best for peopT(Variable 40) With Socio-Economic Status
Socio-Economic
Status
"The government usually knows what is best fo»people."
Agree (trust in government)
parents students
Sex ^^^^ 81% (100)
female 91 (30)
(parents) l.l; df = 1; p = .29; phi
(students) = 1.2; df = 1; p = .26; ph 1 =
73% (235)
69 (189)
105; gamma = -,394
.049; gamma = .108
Father's ^^3^
Education f^^^"^
Level
no education
parents) 6,67; df = 3; p = ,083; V
(students) x = 19.6; df = 3; p = .0002;
68% (16)
88 (42)
87 (53)
80 (19)
42% (88)
71 (200)
72 (100)
79 (21)
=
.206; gamma = .190
V = .184; gamma = .234
Mother'
s
Education
Level
high
medium
low
no education
J
(students) x = 12.1; df = 3; p = .0075; V =
43% (3)
61 (49)
73 (185)
74 (169)
.144; gamma = .175
Family high 83% (48)
Income medium 82 (40)
Level low 84 (39)
(parents) x^^= .12; df = 2; p = .94; V =
(students) x = 11.34; df = 2; p = .0035
63% (117)
79 (127)
74 (172)
.029; gamma = .034
; V = .140; gamma = .168
85% (41)
70 (14)
1- high
Level of 2
Cosmopol- 3 81 (26)
itanism 4 87 (35)
5- low 87 (14)
(parents) x^p= 3.51; df = 4; p = .47; V =
(students) x = 18; df = 4; p = .001; V =
66% (221)
70 (47)
78 (76)
90 (57)
70 (24)
15; gamma = -.050
174; gamma = =.270
(1) For the parents' column, the "Father's Level of Education"
is the mother's level of education when she was the respondent.
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whose fathers had had a high level of education, 42 percent indicated
trust in the government, whereas, of those students whose fathers had
no education, only 79 percent responded in a similar manner.
The chi-square probability of mothers' education with variable
40 was significant at
.0075 level. The data also indicated trends simi-
lar to the impact of father's education level. Of those students whose
mothers had a high level of education, 43 percent trusted the govern-
ment, while of those students whose mothers had no education, 74
percent did the same.
The chi-square probability of family income with variable 40
was significant at .0035 level. According to the data, the students
from high income families had a lower level of trust in government than
those from lower income groups. The relationship, however, was not
statistically significant (gamma =
.168). Of those students from high
income families, 63 percent indicated trust in government, whereas, of
those from low income families, 74 percent responded similarly.
Level of cosmopolitanism also proved significant in delineating
the students' response pattern. The indication was that the students
from the larger cosmopolitan areas had a higher level of distrust in
the government, while those from the lesser cosmopolitan areas had a
higher level of trust in the government. The probability of chi-square
for variable 40 and cosmopolitanism was significant at .001 level and
the two items were associated at a significant level (gamma = .270).
Of those students who lived in Tehran, 66 percent trust the government.
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While 90 percent of those students who lived in smaller towns (level 4)
trusted the government to a similar degree.
SMimar^. The cross-tabulation analysis so far in this chapter has
indicated some relationship between certain socio-economic variables
and frequencies of trust/distrust in the government. Some socio-
economic variables have proved significant in certain levels and not
so indicative of the attitudes of the respondents in other levels.
While the female students trusted the government less than the
male students (Tables 34 and 35), the chi-square probability for
parents' sex was not significant. The causes for the female student
orientation were situational. As discussed several times already, the
unique position of female students contributed to the great difference
in their orientation. They usually came from families where parents
had a higher level of education. In a traditional male oriented society
such as Iran, where women in many cases have been relegated a second
class role, and, as attested by the data in Appendix II (Table 42),
only half as many female students as male students are enrolled in high
schools, these female students are certainly a special breed. The fact
of their parents' higher education level resulting, perhaps, in a more
broad-minded perspective on socio-political affairs than that of the
male students should result, as witnessed, in a tangible difference in
male/female student orientation. The association of female students'
responses with that of individuals with higher education is witnessed
throughout the preceding chapters. The higher level of familial
education in the female students' families makes them rather unique
355
individuals, compared to the male students, and their attitudes are
decidedly more open-minded.
The two most important variables found to associate signifi-
cantly, on several occasions, with levels of trust/distrust in govern-
ment among the students are parental education and cosmopolitanism.
The level of education had little impact on the parents' attitudes, but
it did have an influence on the students' orientations. The data and
the analysis often revealed a relationship between high level of educa-
tion and distrust of the government (see Tables 33, 34 and 36). High
level of education associated positively with high level of distrust in
the government in regard to variables 35 and 40, while low level of
education at the same time associated with high level of trust in the
government. The level of distrust among the students from highly
educated families, as indicated by the data, usually exceeded that of
the parents. Even the students whose fathers had low educational level
often superseded their parents in level of government distrust. Fathers'
low level of education was seemingly responsible for the students' lower
level of distrust in the government (see Tables 34, 35 and 36). The
data provides no clue for the disparity of influence of education,
particularly so far as the high level of parental education helping to
increase the level of distrust in the government. Marshall Meyer's
study of Harvard students in the midst of Vietnam War, as already noted,
attempts to explain the emergence of inefficacy among such students.^
The educated parents, in general, provide their children with better
social and educational circumstances resulting in their higher level of
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awareness and broader socio-political perspective. Consequently, many
of these students, aware of the socio-economic conditions and the state
of deprivation that many of their countrymen live in, coupled with the
prevalent idealism of youth, have an increased level of inefficacy.
The reverse, as suggested by the same indicators, is true among some
students who display a higher level of efficacy, perhaps as an indica-
tor of upward socio-economic mobility, and who come from low education,
low income background and live in the lesser cosmopolitan areas of the
country.
Cosmopolitanism also seems to influence the behavior of the
responding students. Detailed analysis of cosmopolitanism, however,
at first resulted in some confusion. The question was raised as to
whether cosmopol i tanism was causing attitudinal changes in the respon-
dents or was there some intrinsic problem with the data? It was found
that the students from larger urban areas came from families where the
parents, in general, had higher levels of education. This finding in
itself conforms with the national statistics of Iran. There is a higher
percentage of educated in larger urban areas, particularly in Tehran,
whereas, there are fewer educated individuals in less urban and in rural
areas. The parents' data was also in conformity with this norm. Thus,
it could be stated that cosmopolitanism, as an independent variable,
denotes that those living in larger urban areas also have a higher
education level, and, due to the cause and effect relationship between
education and income, the residents of the more cosmopolitan areas also
have a higher level of income.
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As indicated in the previous chapters, there was a substantial
lifetime migration among the parents rendering their present city of
residence of little value in determining any attitudinal changes. The
data in this chapter has not indicated a strong association between
parents' level of cosmopolitanism and their orientations. The students
data, on the other hand, in most cases, has associated cosmopolitanism
with change in their attitudes towards trust/distrust in government.
The data has indicated that the students from larger urban areas have
less trust in government than the students from small towns and rural
areas.
Politi cal Participation and Trust/Distrust in Government
The data, also has indicated a strong relationship between
political participation and frequencies of trust/distrust in the govern-
ment. The data analysis was accomplished through Pearson's correlation
analysis. For the analysis, the four items measuring political partici-
pation were recorded into two values: high and low participation,
while the trust/distrust variables along with the other political and
social variables (variables 16 through 46) had already been collapsed
into agree/disagree categories.^
Parents. The analysis of "passive" political participation variables,
indicated by "listening to news" and "reading newspapers," revealed no
significant association with trust/distrust variables among parents.
On the other hand, "active" political participation, measured by items
"thinking about politics" and "talking about politics," showed some
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significant associations with trust/distrust variables. "Thinking
about politics" correlated at r -
.290, significant at .001 level,
with variable 35, stating that "The government needlessly wasted a lot
of the taxpayer's money."
"Talking about politics," on the other hand, correlated at
r = .266, significant at .001 level with variable 30, stating that
"The government was influenced by a few big interests." It was also
correlated negatively wUh variable 42 that stated "People running the
government are smart" at r =
-.333, significant at .001 level. In
short, there was a rather apparent association between high level of
"active" political participation and distrust in the government, while
the oppositie was also correct. Those who talked little about politics
had a higher level of political trust in the government.
^^"^^"^ts
.
The data revealed that there was a significant correlation,
r = .151, significant at .001 level, between "reading newspapers and
variable 35, suggesting that "The government wasted a lot of the tax
money needlessly." The correlation, however, may be an indirect result
of association between "reading newspapers" and parental education
(gamma =
.302), on the one hand, and the association between the latter
and the habit of "reading newspapers" (gamma = .251), on the other,
rather than a direct causal link between reading newspapers and distrust
in the government. In other words, those who are more educated are more
likely to read newspapers and are also more likely to have a distrust
in government because of the disparity between the educated man's
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perception of what government should be and the Shah's handling of the
affairs of state.
The "active" political participation items, "thinking about
politics" and "talking about politics," associated at significant levels
with items measuring distrust in government, variables 35 and 38, and
negatively with items measuring trust in the government, variables 40
and 42 (see Table 38). The analysis indicated that those who thought
and talked more often about politics had a high distrust of the govern-
ment, whereas, those who indicated that they seldom thought or talked
about politics had a high level of trust in the government.
"Thinking about politics" correlated at r = .176 with variable
35, suggesting that "government wasted a lot of the tax money need-
lessly," and with variable 38, suggesting that "some people in the
government are crooked" at r = .276, both significant at .001 level.
It also correlated negatively with variable 40, stating that "government
knew what was best for people" at r = -.152 and with variable 42,
stating that "people running the government are smart and know what
they doing" at r =
-.252, both significant also at .001 level.
"Talking about politics" correlated at r = .211 with variable
35, and at r = .231 with variable 38, both measuring distrust in the
government and both significant at .001 level. It also correlated
negatively with variable 40 at r = -.187 and with variable 42 at
r = -.254, indicating trust in government, both also significant at
.001 level.
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Thus far the impact of socio-economic status and political
participation on both parents and students has been analyzed and
discussed. At this juncture, it would be helpful to group the political
variables together to determine their impact on trust/distrust orienta-
tion of the respondents. This would help in observing the association
of such issues as efficacy, public policy orientation vis-a-vis polit-
ical trust/distrust. Pearson's correlation and factor analysis will be
used to assist in typifying the respondents as to their political
posture. This will aid in analysis of variables, whereby the items
denoting a political factor would be grouped together indicating the
strength in the relationships.
Parents. An assumption, verified by the data, is that the parents'
behavior is more complex than the students due to facts such as age
and experience. Thus, the change in parents' behavior pattern stems
from a more differentiated set of circumstances. For example, the
factor analysis of the parents' data produced six- factors above 1.0 of
Eigenvalue, while for the students there were only four factors for the
same range.
The parents' data (Table 37) indicated that no significant
associations existed between variable 18, denoting government control
and authoritarianism, and other political variables. However, variable
26, which measured the level of political intolerance, indicated pos-
itive correlation with variable 40 (r = .309) and with variable 42
Jb I
CO
Sex
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Variable
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Variable
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Variable
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Variable
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(r
= .294), specifying trust in the government, both significant at
.001 level. The same item correlated negatively with variables "talking
about politics" (r =
-.302) and "thinking about politics" (r =
-.262),
measuring "active" political interest, and with variable 35 (r =
-.262),
indicating political trust, all significant at .001 level.
Furthermore, variable 21, stating a public policy issue
encouraging government aid to the unemployed, correlated only with
political inefficacy, variable 23 at r =
.256, significant at .001
level. Variable 41, measuring religious tolerance, also did not corre-
late positively or negatively with any of the political indicators.
While the variables measuring political distrust, variables 30, 35 and
38, correlated positively together, variables 40 and 42, measuring trust
in the government, correlated together also. Moreover, the variables
measuring political distrust correlated negatively at .001 level of
significance with variables measuring political trust, indicating that
those distrusting the government consistently responded in that manner,
while those trusting the government also persisted in their responses.
The factor analysis of the political variables was another
method of indicating a consistency in method of responses and it also
proved of aid in the grouping of the significant variables. As the
diagram in Fig. 14 indicates, while the variables indicating political
distrust, inefficacy, rel-gious tolerance and government aid to the
unemployed were grouped together at one end of the diagram, at the
opposing end the variables indicating political trust in the government
and authoritarianism also were grouped together. The data, as the
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diciyram di-.pl.iys, indicates that thoso parents who havo a hicjh Lv.!
of Lrusl. in l.f,.
.jovrnmonl aro also i„ favor o( an authoritarian sys Lorn
wherohy t,t„. (joverninent has control ovor Lho cILizons' ov.-ryday lif(>,
<n-d that sud, individuals am also inl.olorant. of other soci o-po 1 i Li cal
systems and lu-liovo Lhat their system is superior Lo Lho oLher existing
systems. As the correlation analysis and cross-Labu laLion, discussed
in doLail earlier, had noqated any association hoLwoen oducaLion and
distrust, the factor analysis also failed Lo note education as a con-
LribuLinq factor to distrust of government amony parents.
As it was assumed earlier, the factor analysis indicated that
those parents who seldom think or talk about politics are also the
individuals who hav(> a hiyti level of trust in the cjoverrmienL, are
politically iriLoleratiL, and favor an authoritarian political system.
As noted in the last chapter, poliLical itu^fficacy, as measured
hy variables 23 and 31, correlated positively and was factored wiLli
variables denoting political distrust in the government. In oLher
words, the inefficacious parents also were distrustful of Lh(> govern-
ment, wfiile the efficacious trusted the government.
Students
.
In the correlation analysis of the political indicators in
the student sample, thoro wf^re more correlations than in Lhe parent
sample. This perhaps supports the prior assumption that there are more
complex variables responsible for the change in the parents' attitudes,
whereas, many of the indicators present in this study explain the
reasons for Lhe change in the students' attitudes. For example, educa-
tion of parents has been of considerable inf luence in Lh(} development
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of a general pattern of orientation among the students. Other vari-
ables, such as cosmopolitanism, have also been of aid in understanding
some of the determinants of student attitudes. Other orientations,
such as traditionalism are also good indicators of student orientations.
Such relationships, however, seldom occur in the parents' data leading
one to presume that more complex indicators influence the parents'
attitudes.
Variable 18, indicating government control and authoritarianism,
correlated at r = .220 at .001 level of significance with variables
40 and 42, indicating political trust in the government, at r = .344
and r = .294, respectively, both significant at .001 level of signifi-
cance. Variable 18 correlated negatively with variable 31 (r =
-.186),
measuring political inefficacy, and with variables 35 (r =
-.303) and
38 (r = -.159), indicating political distrust in the government, both
significant at .001 level. In short, those students who favored strong
government control were also politically intolerant and felt that their
socio-political system should be a blueprint for all other nations to
follow. These same students also had a high level of trust in the gov-
ernment control over the citizens were politically tolerant and did
not subscribe to the system norms--i.e., they were politically ineffi-
cacious. They had a high distrust of the government. These correla-
tions demonstrate the sources of support and opposition to the Pahlavi
regime. On one hand, the students displayed their trust in the politi-
cal approach of the Shah, where opposition is not tolerated and it is
affirmed that the monarchical regime is the ideal and divine form of
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Fig. 14. Scatter plot of political factors influencing
parents' orientations.
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government. On the other hand, the students opposing the government
display a high level of distrust in the political process and demon-
strate an openness to other ideals by discounting the Iranian system
as the best in the world. These same students also agree with an open
and democratic government where polity would have a control over govern-
mental policy formulations.
As in the parents' data, variable 26, which measured political
intolerance, correlated positively at r = .273 with variable 40 and
at r = .261 with variable 42, denoting political trust in the govern-
ment, both significant at .001 level. Variable 26 also correlated
negatively with variable 31 (r =
-.194), indicating political ineffi-
cacy. These associations pointed out that those students who have a
high level of political intolerance are those who have a high level
of trust in the government. On the other hand, those who are politi-
cally tolerant have a high level of distrust in the government and are
not responsive to political system functions.
Variable 21, suggesting government aid to the unemployed,
correlated positively with variable 35, denoting political distrust in
the government (r = .230), significant at .001 level. This suggested
that those who favored government aid to the unemployed were also dis-
trustful of the government.
The item dealing with religious intolerance, variable 41,
correlated positively with variable 31, measuring political inefficacy,
at r = .183, and with variable 38, indicating distrust in the govern-
ment, at r = .339, both significant at .001 level. In short, those
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students who indicated that they would not oppose speeches in their
communities against religion did not subscribe to the system norms and
were also somewhat distrustful of the political system.
As previously discussed in the section dealing with political
efficacy, variables 23 and 31 have significant positive associations
with political distrust and negative associations with political trust.
Those students who were efficacious were trusting of the government,
while those students who were inefficacious were distrustful of the
government.
Finally, as expected, the variables denoting political distrust
correlated positively together against the two variables indicating
political trust in the government. This once again confirmed the con-
sistency of the student responses to these political questions.
Parent-student similarities
. The factor analysis of the students'
political indicators revealed a pattern very much like that of the
parents'. The variables indicating political trust in the government,
variables 40 and 42, and the items denoting political intolerance,
variable 26, and political authoritarianism, variable 18, were grouped
together in one extreme of the factor matrix. The variables indicating
political distrust in the government, variables 30, 35 and 38, and
variables denoting political inefficacy, variables 23 and 31, plus items
measuring aid to the needy, variable 21, and religious tolerance, vari-
able 41, were grouped together at the other extreme of the factor
matrix (see Fig. 14 and 15). In addition, the students who had indi-
cated that they often read newspaper and magazine articles for their
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Fig. 15. Scatter plot of political factors influencing
students' orientations
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political reports and those who had noted that they often thought and
talked about political matters were placed with the "anti-government"
group.
The implications of the above data analysis are that the
political posture of the respondents, both parents and students, are
divided into two very distinct orientations. One orientation is char-
acterized by traditional political modus operandi, where the authority
of the ruler is supreme and the government controls all aspects of
life. This mode is also held to by the Islamic tradition where polit-
ical and religious life are considered one in all, and the khaliph or
the imam, as the divine representative, is the unquestioned authority.
The opposing orientation is a more Western-oriented political attitude,
where the authoritarian approach and idea is negated and distrusted
with a broad-minded approach to political and social approach indicated.
It was in the first category--i .e. , the traditional-conservative
mode--that there could have existed a basis of support for a style of
government as conceived and idealized by the Shah. It is the same
sentiments that give rise to the popular support for Ayatollah Kho-
meini's rule, where traditional political approach and Islamic puritan-
ism are merged to give rise to a philosopher king who is expected to
bring about the Iranian Utopia. By the same token, those who opposed
the Shah's authoritarian rule and his disdain for a democratic form of
government also would oppose Ayatollah Khomeini's charismatic grip on
the process of government.
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TABLE 39
Factor Analysis of Indicators of Political Trust/Distrust
parent ^"^^^ political indicators student index
.669 (variable 42) People running the government
are smart AnH iis;iip11\/ i/noiw iiu-^-i- +.u~oMi i 0 aiiu ubudiiy Know What they are doing
.674
.555 vvar iduie tu; ine government usually knows
what is best for people.
.607
.381 (variable 26) Our socio-political system should
oe a Diueprint for all other nations in the world
.320
.240 (variable 18) The government should have plenty
ui fjuwer ana intiuence over people s lives.
.383
(*) (variable 2) Age of student (16 or less)
.141
(*) ^variable 13) I often read newspapers and
magazine articles about political and social
matters of our country.
.203
-.276 vvariaoie dL) I he government should give money
and food to the unemployed.
.157
-.278 vvdriaoie it a person wanted to make a
speech against religion in this community, he
should be allowed.
.200
-.307 vvariaoie c6) sometimes politics and government
seem so complicated that a person like me can't
really understand what is going on.
.197
-.356 (variable 14) I often think about the political
and economic condition of our country.
.450
-.439 (variable 30) I think that the government is
pretty much influenced by a few big interests
looking out for themselves.
.211
-.444 (variable 15) I often talk about political and
economic matters of our country with my friends.
.451
(variable 38) I think some people in the govern- -
ment are crooked.
.569
-.655 (variable 31) Over the years, the government has -
paid no attention to what people like me think
when it decides what to do.
continued . . . .
.567
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TABLE 39 (continued)
IpLlf ? I ^^'"^ t*'^ government wastes - 709
"gedlessly alot of the money we pay in taxes.
(*) These indexes were not significant for the parents.
wMiiih:°Cr*^:rrs3s^fiy^-?hTL.*s^5r:^7ofX-???x--^-
There were a total of 34 political correlations in the two
samples that were significant at above .005 level. Of these, 16 corre-
lations were shared by both samples. There were 17 correlations that
were significant in the students' data that were not present at a
significant level in the parents' data. There was only one correlation
(variable 21 with variable 23) that attained a significant level in the
parents' data and not in the students' data. One item that emerged
twice in the student correlation analysis and attained a level of sig-
nificance was the seemingly high level of religious tolerance. This
item did not correlate with socio-economic status, namely parental
education, family income or cosmopolitanism. As indicated above,
variable 41 correlated positively with distrust in government and,
as such, is perhaps a by-product of open-mi ndedness
,
brought about by
secular education, among the students.
In the past few pages, correlations of political indicators for
both samples were discussed. The above discussions enabled us to
observe the positive and negative relationships between the different
political indicators. It also made it possible for us to observe the
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similarities and dissimilarities between the parents' and the students'
samples. The factor analysis, furthermore, assisted in grouping the
political indicators. It displayed the clusters of emerging political
indicators and the strength of the relationships. The combined factor
analysis of the socio-economic variables along with the political indi-
cators, in a sense, summarized all the discussions in the last three
chapters. The factor analysis indicated that those respondents dis-
trustful of the government are likely to be politically tolerant, have
religious tolerance, have a high level of political inefficacy, favor
government assistance to the unemployed, and have active political
interests (see Table 39). These matched with totally contradictory
inclinations on the opposite end of the spectrum.
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FOOTNOTES
T
2
141-44.
''"^^'^
^"^ discussion in Jennings and Niemi
, pp.
N„to
^"^'"^?all Meyers, "Harvard Students in the Midst of Crisis- ANote^on the Source of Leftist, Soaol03t^O<i,cMM;2 (^^
4,
factor anal^f^^^n^Jhl^H 1°™' correlation analysis andr a ysis, all the data used for statistical observations were
DO an? m^" n^Jf"" ^^"^ation, age. income o^L
DO t?c ^'and J^u?^
to news," reading newspapers," "thinking about
^e'th'rough 45) dTclolZ * °' agree/disagree (variables
CHAPTER X
SOCIAL-CULTURAL ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
As the first segment of analysis, an examination of the impact
of socio-economic status of the respondents and their political orien-
tations was undertaken (Chapters VII, VIII and IX). It was assumed
that there would be associations between the two and that certain
political attitudes were the result of differing socio-economic status.
In this chapter, however, an examination of socio-cultural attitudes
and political orientations will be undertaken to see whether there are
significant associations between the two.
Impact of Soc io-Cultural Attitudes on Parents and Students
The analysis of socio-cultural data revealed few significant
associations to political orientations among parents, while a substan-
tial number of such associations were found among students. There were
a total of 13 correlations signficant at above .005 level among the
parents' data, while there were 51 such correlations among the students'
data. Only three of these correlations were shared by both samples
(see Tables 40 and 41). This finding suggested that while there was a
considerable association between socio-cultural attitudes and political
perspective among students, there were less such associations among
parents.
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Parents. The data revealed that determinism, variables 17, 43 and 44,
^
and collectivity, variables 20 and 22, were the more significant indi-
cators of political orientation. Other significant indicators included
traditional norms-variables 19 and 25, impulse-variable 16, and hard
work--variable 46.
Variable 17, suggesting that "When a man is born, the success
he is going to have is already in the cards so he might as well accept
it and not fight against it,'" correlated at a significant level with
variable 18 which measured authoritarianism (r =
.271), significant at
.001 level. Variable 17 correlated negatively at r = -.219 with
frequency of listening to news. The relationship suggested that those
individuals favoring determinism seldom listen to news on the radio.
Another indicator of determinism, variable 43, stating that "Planning
makes a person unhappy since plans hardly ever work out anyway," corre-
lated negatively with "thinking about politics" (r =
-.292) at .001
level of significance. The relationship suggested that those parents
who are deterministic seldom think about politics. Variable 43 also
correlated at a significant level with political inefficacy, variable
23, at r = .227, indicating that the parents who believe in determinism
are also politically inefficacious. The last indicator of determinism,
variable 44, suggesting that "Nowadays with world conditions the way
they are, the wise person lives for today and lets tommorow take care
of itself," correlated with the parents' habit of listening to news at
r =
-.244, indicating that parents believing in determinism seldom
listen to news on radio.
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The importance of friendship, as measured by variable 22,
"There is no satisfaction in any good deed without a companion," cor-
related with political inefficacy, variable 23, at r = .337 at a very
significant level. The correlation suggested that those inclined to
join in cooperative undertakings with friends were politically ineffi-
cacious. The data also indicated a significant correlation between
variable 22 and education level. The parents who had a low level of
education agreed more with the statement in variable 22 than did those
with high education. Another variable which actually more represents
peer pressure, with bearing on collectivity, is variable 20, "The nega-
tive opinion of others often keeps me from seeing a movie or a play
that I had planned to attend," correlated negatively ( r = -.272) with
frequency of listening to news at .001 level of significance. The
association suggested that parents who are influenced by peer pressure
seldom listen to news on the radio. Variable 20 also correlated with
variable 21, suggesting government aid to the unemployed (r = .224) at
.003 level of significance. The relationship implied that parents
influenced by peer pressure are also supportive of government support
for the needy.
Traditional norms as indicated by variable 19, "There is hardly
anybody lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude
and respect for his parents," correlated with variable 21, measuring
political authoritarianism, (r = .266) at .001 level of significance.
The relationship indicated that those parents believing in unequivocal
respect for parents supported a system of government which held power
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and influence over people. Traditional norms, as indicated by variable
25, "Respect is due an older man no matter what kind of a person he
is," also correlated with variable 21, political authoritarianism, at
r = .217, significant at .005 level. The association reflected the tie
between political authoritarianism and traditional cultural values in
Iranian society.
Hard work for the sake of hard work, as measured by variable
46, "I often do something just to prove to myself that I can do it,"
correlated with variable 21, suggesting government aia to the unemployed,
at r = .217, significant at .005 level. It also correlated with polit-
ical inefficacy, variable 23 (r =
.267), at .001 level of significance.
The relationships indicated that those parents who believe in hard
work approve of government assistance to those who are out of work,
yet indicated that these same parents are politically inefficacious.
The only other significant correlation in the parents' data
was between impulse control, variable 16, "If you get bad news, it is
better to hide your emotions and behave as if you do not care," and
parental age (r =
-.278), significant at .001 level. The relationship
indicated that parents who are older approve of hiding their emotions
when confronted with bad news.
In short, the analysis of parental socio-cul tural attitudes
revealed few associations with their political perspectives. Of partic-
ular importance was that determinism had a significant association with
political authoritarianism. Other attitudes such as collectivity and
peer pressure had significant relationships with political inefficacy
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and a feeling that government should aid the unemployed. Traditional
cultural norms, upholding elders and parents in unquestioned high
esteem, also was associated with political authoritarianism, which in
itself has been a manifestation of Iranian culture.^
Students. As noted above, there were a substantial number of signifi-
cant associations between various soci o-cul tural attributes and the
political orientation of the students. The most significant attributes
were determinism (variables 17, 43 and 44), traditional values
(variables 19, 25 and 39), collectivity (variables 22 and 45), hard
work (variables 32 and 46), particularism (variables 24 and 34), impulse
control (variable 16), peer pressure (variable 28), importance of time
(variable 29), respect for children (variable 33), and risk taking
(variable 37).
Impact of Socio-Cultural Attitudes on Political Orientation
.
The only orientation that had any significant impact on political par-
ticipation was determinism as manifested in Variable 17. Variable
17, "When a man is born, the success he is going to have in life is
already in the cards," correlated negatively with "reading news-
papers" (r =
-.154), with "thinking about politics (r =
-.220), and
with "talking about politics" (r = -.131), all significant at .001
level. The association suggested that students believing in deter-
minism were the least interested in reading newspapers, think about
politics, or talking about politics.
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^^^^^^^^-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Determinism in
this analysis is measured by variables 17, 43 and 44, which all corre-
lated significantly with the political attitudes of students. 3 Variable
17, "When a man is born, the succes he is going to have in his life is
already in the cards," correlated at a very significant level
(r = .317) with variable 18, denoting acceptance of political author-
itarianism. Variable 17 also correlated with variable 40 (r =
.221)
and variable 42 (r = .259), both indicating political trust in govern-
ment, both significant at .001 level. Variable 17 also correlated with
variable 21, suggesting that government should aid the unemployed
(r =
.130), significant at .001 level.
Variable 43, "Planning only makes a person unhappy since plans
hardly ever work out anyway," correlated with variable 30 at r = .146,
with variable 31 at r = .148, and with variable 38 at r = .124,
indicating political inefficacy and distrust in government.
Variable 44, "Nowadays with world conditions the way they are,
the wise person lives for today and lets tomorrow take care of itself,"
correlated with variable 18, indicating acceptance of political author-
itarinaism at r = .125, significant at .003 level, with variable 21,
supporting aid to the unemployed at r = .186, and with variable 31,
measuring political inefficacy at r = .148, both significant at .001
level
.
In short, determinism was significantly associated, in particu-
lar, with political inefficacy, support for an authoritarian govern-
ment, and a belief that government should aid the unemployed. Such
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associations presumably agree with the general assumptions of determin-
ism where government is accepted just because it is there, although
its interworkings may not be clear to the public. It is also along
the same line of thought that the determinists urge government support
for the unemployed, since their misfortune is beyond their control.
^^^^^^^^-^^-^^^^^i^^ Tradi-
tional norms were measured by variables 19, 25 and 39. ^ Traditional
norms are such values as respect for parents, elders and friends which
have a national/cultural consistency, while other values such as deter-
minism and particularism are more philosophical preferences.
Variable 19, "There is hardly anybody lower than a person who
does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for his parents,"
correlated with variable 26, suggesting political intolerance,
(r = .140) significant at .001 level. Variable 19 also correlated
negatively with variable 41, suggesting religious toleration,
(r = -.153) at .001 level of significance. Furthermore, it correlated
with political trust (r = .119) at .004 level of significance. Those
who believed in respect for parents, as indicated by the data, also
believed tnat their socio-political system was the best in the world
(variable 26) and had little tolerance for anyone making a speech
against religion in their community. These same students also had
trust in the government.
Variable 25, "Respect is due an older man no matter what kind
of a person he is," correlated with variable 18, indicating acceptance
of political authoritarianism at r = .191, significant at .001 level.
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Variable 25 also correlated with variable 26, measuring political
intolerance at r = .162, significant at .001 level. Furthermore,
variable 25 correlated with variables 40 and 42, indicating political
trust in government at r =
.203, significant at .001 level, and at
r = .131, significant at .002 level, respectively. Once again, a
measure of traditionalism displayed significant correlations with accep-
tance of political authoritarianism, political intolerance, and trust
in the government. There is a trend that trust in the government-
i.e., the Pahlavi regime-and acceptance of political authoritarianism
correlate with the acceptance of traditional values.
Variable 39, although ranked along with other items in this
section as a traditional norm, is, nonetheless, tinted with philosoph-
ical interpretation. It states that "No sane, decent person would
ever think of hurting a close friend." The idea of respect for friends
is ideally applauded in the Iranian tradition, but it does not reach
the magnitude of respect for parents and elderly. Perhaps it is for
this reason that variable 39 correlated significantly with another
humanitarian gesture, variable 23, which suggested aid to the unemployed.
Variables 39 and 23 correlated at r = .142, significant at .001 level.
Variable 39 also correlated with variables 30 and 38, measuring distrust
in the government at r = .139, significant at .002 level, and at
r = .122, significant at .003 level, respectively. Perhaps it is the
humanitarian nature of variable 39 that emerges as the more significant
indicator rather than its status as a measure of traditionalism. This
explains its association with distrust in government as indicated
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through such statements as "The government is controlled by a few
interests looking after their own," and that "Some people in the
government are crooked."
In short, traditionalism seems to associate closely with the
feeling that the Iranian socio-political system is far superior to
other systems in the world and with a significant degree of trust in
the political system of Mohammad-Reza Shah.
ImRa^Lol^lectivity on political nripnt.tinn jwo of the
items, variables 22 and 45, as measures of collectivity had significant
associations with students' political orientations. 5 While variable 45
was associated with political orientation of students only on one
occasion, variable 22 was related to political attitudes on six differ-
ent levels. Variable 22, "There is no satisfaction in any good without
a companion," correlated with variable 21, measuring aid to the unem-
ployed at r = .218, significant at .001 level. Those students believing
in collective action also believed that the government should aid the
unemployed. Variable 22 also correlated with variables 23 and 31,
measuring political inefficacy at r = .129, significant at .002 level,
and r = .151, significant at .001 level, respectively. The students
subscribing to collective action, according to the data, also were
politically inefficacious. Furthermore, the same students displayed
distrust in the government. Variable 22 correlated with variables 30
and 38 at r = .142 and r = .142, respectively, both significant at .001
level, indicating that belief in collectivity also was associated with
distrust in the government. Variable 45, "It is better to go without
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something than to ask for a favor from somebody, "a negative measure of
collectivity, or an indicator of individualism, correlated at r =
.128
with variable 38, indicating distrust in the government, at .003 level
of significance. This association was rather unexpected, or at least
a negative correlation would have been more in line with the findings
in variable 22. It is presumed that variable 45 was measuring an atti-
tude somewhat different than variable 22, and, for this reason, no
significant association between the two variables existed.
As suggested by variable 22, collectivity was associated with
political inefficacy and distrust in government. It also had a signif-
icant relationship with the feeling that government should aid the
unemployed.
Impact of belief in hard work on political orientation . Two
items denoting "hard work," variables 32 and 46, emerged with signifi-
cant bearing on the political orientation of the students
. Variable 32,
"I set difficult goals for myself which I attempt to reach," correlated
at r = .147, significant at .001 level, with variable 38, indicating
political distrust in the government. There were five significant
correlations between variable 46 and political orientation items.
Variable 46, "I often do something just to prove to myself that I can
do it," correlated with variable 21, suggesting government aid to the
unemployed at r = .131, significant at .002 level. The association
clearly reflected the attitude that public welfare was supported by
individuals who had a belief in hard work. Variable 46 also correlated
with variable 31, denoting political inefficacy at r = .137, significant
389
at
.001 level, thus, those students believing in hard work also were
politically inefficacious. Furthermore, variable 31 correlated at a
significant level with variables 30, 35 and 38, all indicating political
distrust in government at r =
.165, r - .146 and r =
.146, respectively,
all significant at the .001 level. The association indicated that
those who believed in hard work had a high level of distrust in the
government. The correlation between variable 32 and political distrust,
on the one hand, and variable 46 and items denoting political distrust,
on the other, clearly signifies the association between those who
believe in hard work and feelings of distrust towards the government.
Such feelings are perhaps enforced by the notion that the government
was corrupt and that hard work and perserverance were not rewarded prop-
erly. Only those with connections and a willingness to become a part
of a system that thrived on bribery and corruption were able to advance
within its ranks. The association between hard work and political
inefficacy, further, supports such a surmise.
Impact o f "particularism" on political orientation
. Particular-
ism here is defined as the opposite of "uni versal i sm" which aims to
develop norms that are equal ly appl ied to al 1 ; particularism tends to sup-
press the ideal of universalism. Variable24, "There are some people like
great artists and musicians who can be forgiven for not being consider-
ate of others, kind to poor, etc.," correlated with variable 18,
measuring political authoritarianism at r = .177, significant at .001
level. Variable 24 also correlated at r = .145, significant at .001
level, with variable 40, indicating political trust in the government.
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The associations reveal the impact of particularism which in fact i:
form of social determinism that supports authoritarianism and, thus,
the Shah's government. The association between particularism and
support for the government is enforced by the close association between
determinism and particularism.
The second item dealing with particularism was variable 34, "A
man with money cannot really learn how to behave among dignified people
if he has not had a proper up-bringing." Although both variables 24
and 34 seem to suggest a notion of particularism, the responses from
the students did not bear this out. While variable 24 indicated
feelings of trust and support for the Shah's government, those students
agreeing with variable 34 displayed exactly the opposite. The differ-
ence apparently was the result of an association between variable 34
and those variables indicating traditionalism, such as variables 19
and 27. The responding students thus saw a clear relationship between
variable 34 and socio-cul tural traditional values, whereas, variable
24 was perceived as approving exemption from certain rules for the
benefit of the more famous citizens. Although the questions stated
"artists and musicians" as the example, the intention was actually
intended to refer to politicians. Although this was not expressly
stated, the response of the students seems to bear out that they, in
fact, did make the association. From the analysis, a correlation
between variable 34 and political distrust emerges. The two items cor-
related at r = .152, significant at .001 level. Variable 34 also
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correlated with variable 23, denoting political inefflcacy at r =
.144,
significant at .001 level.
In short, particularism, as an expression of the socio-cultural
tradition of the country, seems to be supported by those students who
have an efficacious orientation. These students did not agree with
granting exemptions from the rules for certain individuals.
Qtheiijocialjjorms influen
_cing political orientat/ion . The data
analysis also indicated there were significant associations between var-
iable 29, "It would irritate me to have a watch or clock which was off
by several minutes everyday," and the political attitudes of students.
Those students bel ieving in the importance of time displ ayed a high degree
of distrust in the government, as indicated by variable 30. The two
variables correlated at r = .199, significant at .001. Variable 29
also correlated with variables 23 and 31, both indicating political
inefficacy, at r = .128, significant at .002 level, and r = .116,
significant at .005 level, respectively.
The associations seem to indicate that those students believing
in the significance of time were politically inefficacious and distrust-
ful of the government. Variable 29 was associated with variables
indicating belief in hard work,^ indicating that those who believed in
importance of time also believed in hard work and perseverance. As
noted earlier, there were strong associations between belief in hard
work, distrust in government, and political inefficacy. Therefore, the
association between those who believe in importance of time and distrust
in government should have been expected.
392
Variable 37 attempted to measure the relationship between
belief in chance and political attitude. It stated that "I enjoy a
race or a game better when I bet on it." Variable 37 was closely
associated with determinism and belief in traditional values. ^ Vari-
able 37 correlated with belief in authoritarianism, itself also an
extension of determinism, at r =
.186, significant at .001 level, and
with variable 40, denoting trust in the government at r =
.132, sig-
nificant at .002 level. In short, the associations seem to further
indicate the relationship between determinism and trust in the Pahlavi
government with approval of its style of government.
Summar^^. The items dealing with policy issues, favoring authoritarian
political process and political intolerance displayed significant
levels of association with traditional system values-determinism,
particularism, and fate. Although the students' data displayed a much
higher frequency of association, nonetheless, both sets of data had
basic similarities.
Political inefficacy, according to the data of both samples,
displayed associations with collective orientation, hard work, and
determinism. Political inefficacy was also associated with belief in
importance of time among students.
Levels of political trust in the Pahlavi government were posi-
tively associated with traditional system values--determinism, fate and
particularism, while political distrust was positively related with
hard work, collective orientation, importance of time and self-esteem.
Although distrust in government was also associated with determinism
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and respect for friends, it is inevitable that noms would be encoun-
tered which were shared by people fro. two opposing political perspec-
tive, since traditional socio-cultural norms seem to be present in most
individuals to differing degrees.
factor_Anal;^s^^
ons
Aside from the political factors displayed in the analysis of
the parents' and the students' data as discussed in Chapters VIII and
IX, two major factors with "determinism" and "traditionalism" as the
main factors with above 1.0 Eigenvalue have emerged as a result of the
data analysis. The factor labelled here as traditionalism includes
religious intolerance, familialism and institutional norms as its main
components.
Mgliminism. The impact of determinism on political attitudes of
parents is displayed in Fig. 16. The table displays that determinism,
as measured by variables 17 and 44, is associated with traditional
values as signified by variable 19, promoting respect for parents, and
with variable 25, stating that elders, irrespective of their accomplish-
ments, should be respected. Determinism is closely associated with low
family income, as well as with political inefficacy and distrust in
government as measured by variables 23 and 38, respectively.
The impact of determinism on the political orientation of the
students (Fig. 17) was more varied. The variables measuring determin-
ism were closely associated with several items also displayed in the
parents' data, namely respect for elders, particularism (variable 24)
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/-^iJ^' ^^^^^^^ plot of items associated with determin-ism that influence parents' orientations.
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collective orientation (variable 2?1 anH i„, f1 oi di)
,
and low family income. Although
-
the factor analysis of the parents' data determinis™ was associated
With political inefficacy and distrust in the govern^nt, the student
data revealed the opposite. Determinism in the student data was
Closely associated with trust in the government, as ^asured by vari-
ables 40 and 42. Furthermore, variable 18, measuring authoritarianism
was closely associated with determinism among the students.
Determinism among the students was also negatively associated
with political participation. Those students who scored high on deter-
niinism seldom read newspapers, listened to radio or watched news on
television. Furthermore, they seldom thought or talked about political
issues and matters. Another factor associated with determinism among
the students was a low level of parental education. Another interesting
find was the low level of determinism among the female students. Actu-
ally the female gender, as displayed in the graph, was associated with
a non-deterministic orientation.
Determinism among the students was also closely associated with
a favorable attitude towards government aid to the unemployed (variable
21). As anticipated, the students' attitude towards fate, as measured
by variable 37, was significantly associated with determinism.
In short, determinism is responsible for some traditional orien-
tations such as respect for age and particularism among both parents
and students. However, determinism, while associated with inefficacy
and distrust of the government among parents, is associated with trust
in the government among the students.
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iraditlonam.. Another set of variables e^rging f™™ the factor
analysis was the traditional factor, indicated by such ite^s as respect
for parents (variable 19), for elderly (variable 25) and for friends
(variable 39), and particularism (variable 34).
Traditionalism was positively associated with pride in the
socio-political system of the country, as measured by variable 26, and
was also negatively associated with govern^nt aid to the unemployed
(variable 21) among parents. Traditionalism was also negatively
associated with chance, betting, or gambling, as the case may be, as
measured by variable 37. and also with religious tolerance, as measured
by variable 41. The traditional Indicators were also closely associ-
ated with such attitudes as respect for children (variable 33). hard
work (variable 36), and importance to time, as measured by variable 29
(see Fig. 18).
Among the students, the same traditional indicators as mentioned
above were associated with pride in the socio-political system of the
country (variable 26) yet also with political distrust, as measured by
variables 30 and 38, and political inefficacy, as measured by variable
23. It was clear that those traditional elements among the students
who had pride In their socio-political system were rather dissatisfied
with the prevailing political administration and had a high degree of
distrust in the political process.
Among the parents, the norms labeled here as traditional were
also closely associated with such attitudes as hard work, as measured
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Fig 18 Scatter plot of items associated
with traditional
system values that influence parent's
orientations
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Fig. 19. Scatter plot of items associated with traditionalsystem values that influence students' orientations
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by variables 32, 36 and 46; respect for rhnn.-T children, as measured by vari-
able 33; collectivity and group action, as measured by variable 22-
and importance of time, as measured by variable 29. This factor aiso
revealed a close association between traditionalism, as indicated by
the designated variables, and sex of the responding students, namely
the male students. While female students were closely associated with
non-determinism, the male students were closely associated with tradi-
tional ism.
While there is no conclusive data here to reveal the differences
between the male-female student samples perhaps the apparent "modernity
among the female students, as indicated in the previous chapters, is
the result of their being a select group of students. As indicated in
Appendix II, since only a third of the high school population of the
country is female, they represent a group that is more cosmopol i tan^
than male students. Their parents are more educated^^ and family income
tends to be somewhat higher than that of male students. ""^
Summary. Although there is an association between "traditionalism" and
pride in the socio-political system among both parents and students,
the student sample displayed a noticeable distrust in the political
process of the government under the Shah's regime. The combination of
traditionalism and anti-government orientation is perhaps indicative
of the political posture of many who took part in the uprising against
the Shah's government during 1978 and early 1979 and their support for
the traditionalist elements, namely the clergy.
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The association between dete™inis.. traditionalism and
PolUica, trust see.s to contradict the association between tradition-
alls, and pCitica, distrust, as stated earlier. These see.in,„
contradictor, relationships reveal the socio-political complexities of
Iranian society. As also displayed in the factor analysis of both
samples, the sa„. variables are shared by different or even opposing
groups.
The data analysis also reveals that the parents' orientations
are .ore complex and have been influenced by a wider variety of vari-
ables, many of which were not included in the questionnaire. This is
evident particularly from the looser association between the variables
in the correlation analyses. This was expected since the age and
therefore, longer life experience of parents exposed them to a greater
variety of socio-cultural and political influences. This results, in
turn, in more sophisticated individuals with greater nurt,er of values
influencing perception and orientation.
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The correlation of cosmopolitanism with student sex was r -
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CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing inquiry has passed through three stages of
analyses with varying emphasis but a unified focus: political insti-
tutions and their place in the Iranian political system. If one
believes that the future is a fairly valid reflection of the past,
given the socio-cultural continuity of a nation, the study of Iranian
political institutions of the past 70-years and the socio-cultural
milieu of the nation should shed some light on our path witn which one
may theorize about future developments. Although the Iranian socio-
political posture at present is in an extremely fluid state, our access
to the past history and some of the prevailing socio-cultural norms
ought to enable us to predict some likely future trends and problems on
the road to political development.
This present analysis began by eliciting theoretical help from
Lucian Pye who proposes three themes as necessary for the actualization
of political development in any society: equality, capacity and differ-
entiation. As was noted in presenting Pye's view, equality connotes
popular participation in the political process. It also infers that
performance and achievement standards should be used as qualification
for recruitment into the political system rather than ascriptive con-
siderations. Lastly, the ideal of equality assumes that laws will be
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applied equan. to an and have a universalistic nature.
,.an1an cul-
ture has always had so.e semblance of class structure, nevertheless
this inclination was seldo. a barrier to upward social mobility.
Iranian history is replete with examples of those who have cli.bed the
ladder of financial success fro. humble beginnings. The Pahlavis are
a case in point. Reza Shah was a simple soldier; his father, a farmer
Transition fro. financial equality to political equality, the borders
of which at times become very blurred, however, was not as easily
accessible. Political institutions of the nation were recreated or
subverted to serve the purpose and objectives of the ruling monarchs.
Loyalty to the throne and aggrandizement of the tradition of Iranian
mnarchy were the hallmarks of a successful politician. There was
no application of performance and achievement standards nor of equal
protection under the law. Those who favored the regime were favored
by it; those who opposed it suffered from it. Although traditionally
a high level of education and professionalism were considered to
facilitate one's entry to the ranks of the political elite, many
politicians had few such merits but were, more Importantly, loyal to
the person of the Shah. Upward political mobility was granted only
because one supported the regime. Certainly those with a high level of
education and. at the same time, loyalty to the regime got a large
share of the political power. At medium levels of bureaucracy, favor-
itism and nepotism traditionally have determined recruitment rather
than acievement and performance.
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In short, the Iranian political institutions were generally
and the institution of monarchy and at the lower levels by those placed
through nepotism and favoritism.
The concept of equality basically arises from the belief in
individual rights and the idea of social contract. Both of these ideas
were dealt with in the Constitution of 1906-07. In fact, this consti-
tution was the the first such contract agreed to between the people
and their soverign. Many of the proponents of the constitution, how-
ever, had been moved by goals which were in opposition to the merits
of the constitution. The liberals had hoped for a democratic system
emulating European democracies where individual rights, equal protec-
tion of the law, and many freedoms were guaranteed. The clergy had
hoped, by reliance on popular support and blessing, to stop the growing
tide of Westernization and. along with It. the secularization that was
submeriging their traditional hold and influence on the political
process of the nation. The ulama, under the leadership of Sheikh
Nuri, vied to install Shana (relgious laws) as the law of the land in
the face of the propositions by the Western-oriented constitutionalists
who favored a secular civil code.
In short, to the ulama. democracy became a vehicle by which they
could prevent the infiltration of Western-secular ideals to the Shiah
state, the majority of whose citizens were illiterate, poor, living in
rural areas and very religious. Thus, the modern ideals such as social
contracts, individual rights and equal protection of the law were
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generations, if not centuries, away fro. the thoughts of the over-
whelming majority. Due to do^stic circumstances and foreign pressure
the constitution was guaranteed. The inevitable conflict between the
Western-oriented intellectuals and the ujama led to the civil war
(1908-1909), from which the moderates emerged victorious. Their
victory Signalled the beginning of a new era. Modernization and sec-
ularization became the dominant then^. These ideals had to be forced
on a largely traditional society. Values, norms and mores had to be
altered and changed. The strains nf thic cfnii t3 >ic b u OT ms still linger on after 70
years since the inception of the constitution.
Although education greatly enhanced the introduction and accep-
tance of modernization, the socio-cul tural environment still retained
a great deal of influence over the socialization process which in turn
made the application and infusion of these ideals a very difficult
task. Familialism still dominated the cultural perspective of most
Iranians. As such, individuals were not freed from customs, traditions
and consensus. As noted by Robert Lane, individual freedom and cogni-
tive complexity are required to enable one to think for himself. Indi-
vidualism and, thus, the concept of equality were stages above the
prevailing socio-political sentiments. A constitution and forced
modernization could not result in changes overnight, particularly
during a century where political stability was shortlived.
Although the data analysis suggested that the students were
more secular-minded (variable 41) than the parents, the students, none-
theless, displayed a strong institutional and traditional preference
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(variables
,7. ,9.24. 25 and 34) si.1,ar to that of the parents
So^e traditional values which were contrary to the e^ualit. then., such
as the unquestionable Hght of authority, were present in the textbooks
Most often the entries in the ele^ntary and particularly m the
guidance school texts were borrowed fro. traditional Persian literature
™any of which stressed the wisdo™ and compassion of Mngs,
.ulers and
'
governors for their subiect^; in ;.n ^Djects. In all, over one-quarter of the entries
in these texts stressed some noble authority as the main figure
seldom did any of the entries portray the attitudes of the authority
figure as anything less than benevolent. In the few cases where the
authority acted in error or wickedness, a higher authority emerged as
benevolent and corrected the wrongdoing. Few stories showed overt
challenges of established authority.
Historically, when the system faltered, the desire for adjudi-
cation was replaced with fatalism. As discussed previously, the history
of the nation with its experiences of invasions, the physical harshness
of the land, and natural disasters all contributed to the birth of a
man who feels insecure and fatalistic. Most writers on Iran have
discussed the high level of distrust present among the people. Famil-
ialism encourages the individual's isolation from other members of the
society and thus does not encourage mutual cooperation between the
citizenry. As a result, attributes such as hard work, achievement,
affect and thoughtful ness
,
and self-discipline blossom and benefit
family and kin, with their outcome only on occassion spilling over to
the society in general to the benefit of others.
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Distrust of the government was very much in evidence from the
parent-student questionnaires. At the same time, however, there were
high demands on the government. It was expected that the government
Should aid the poor and needy. The most interesting point, however was
the amount of power that was delegated to the government (variable 18).
The trend confirmed persistence of the traditional perception of the
role of government-that it ought to do ^ood and deliver ^ood things
to the public. The distrust of a particular leader-i.e., the Shah-
however, did not seem to have caused much change in the people's per-
ception of the authority of the government.
The Western contractual form of government has evolved through
certain historical molds that had no similar counterparts in the Iranian
experience. Reformation, for example, settled the tension between the
secular and ecclesiastical forces in Europe. Following the industrial
revolution, the conflict between the ruling class and the middle class
was resolved by social contracts. In Iran, on the other hand, the king
remained absolute and autocratic. Such was demanced and such was the
role of the sovereign. The king, since the rise of Shi 'ism during the
Safavid period, personified the aggregation of political as well as
religious sentiments. It was only with the threat of Western influence
and the increasing humiliation of the Shiah State at the hands of the
imperial powers of Russia and Britain that there was a challenge to the
authority of the monarch by checking the absolute powers of the monarchy.
For a political system to operational ize the theme of equality,
first and foremost the individual and his rights must be recognized.
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In a society where individual recognition is largely dependent on
familial, clan.and tribal association, universalis, as a basis of its
operation would be difficult, if not impossible, to undertake.
The editors of the Farsi readers, besides the customary and
required lip service to the Shah and his family, attempted to put out
texts Which intended to instill orientations and attitudes in students
which would be conducive to the goals of development.
The shortcomings of the entries were basically a projection of
the complexity of the cultural environn^nt which has surrounded the
life of Persian literature. Although equality is often enumerated as
virtue and praised as a merit, in practice, it has been often neglected.
The strong influence of spiritualism and mysticism which is sustained
by the Platonic vision of man, manifested in Sufi philosophy, comprises
a part of Iranian literary tradition which confutes the other part of
this tradition which is nourished by Western realist tradition, embodied
1n the teachings of Islam. Such realism is most visible in the excerpts
from Saadi in the textbooks. They emphasize supremacy of education,
actualization of skill and knowledge, equality, impulse control, con-
tentment, moderation, philanthropy and love for human kind, social
responsibility and self-reliance.
Despite the overwhelming influence of culture and tradition,
there seemed to be factors that were influencing the student's orienta-
tion which were conducive to the idea of equality. Such a tendency was
evident in the students' responses to the idea of speech against
religion (variable 41). Almost twice as many students as parents seemed
to s.ppon the i.ea of speech against
.e,1,1o„,
,„ ,
be construed as belief 1„ u.UUu., Hghts and f.eedo. of speech
Through a cuestion as controversial as the one 1„ variable 41, it was
evident that a traditional and fundamentalist society such as Iran
over t1.e, could conform to values and norms conducive to the them^ of
equal ity.
In pre-Const1tut1onal Iran, the govern^nt consisted of a small
number of departments staffed with a scant number of employees With
the advent of constitutional government and Western-style governmental
-stuutlons. the number of bureaucrats multiplied rapidly. Despite
the extensive growth In the number of offices and people working for
the government, the effectiveness and efficiency of government perfor-
mance remained minimal. A strong ruler, such as Reza Shah, who reigned
from 1925-1941 was the main guarantor of performance. He personally
-ade the decisions that were carried through by the bureaucracy and he
personally checked every aspect of the performance. As a result, the
bureaucracy was left with little power. It was Reza Shah who delivered
services to the public. The government and all other Institutions were
there to perform their duties as Instructed by the monarch. Reza Shah
was feared. Any public servant who was unable to deliver results on
an assignment would certainly feel the wrath of the king. Thus, the
governmental Institutions were primarily motivated by the dictate to
perform to satisfy the king's objectives In order to avert the harsh
results of failure-a relationship similar to that of a student and
teacher In the traditional maktab (school). The bureaucracy remained
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e as
totally dependent on the person of the Shah. As s.ch, 1t only super-
ficially resembled its Western counterparts in Europe. Thus, the
institutional modernization claimed by the Pahlavis was superimposed
and artificial.
The effectiveness of the bureaucracy remained unquestionabl
long as the king remained in power. The authority of the central
government reached the remotest corners of the nation. A conscript
army was organized and put into operation for the first time in Iranian
history. Furthermore, new civil codes were drawn and put into effect
which were secular in nature and influenced by similar European codes.
Following the forced abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, however,
the institutions of government and bureaucracy experienced chaos and
total disarray. The army almost disintegrated and, as a result, chal-
lenges to the government's authority from many regions of the country
were raised. The ineffectiveness of government control and influence
was very much evident. This was the obvious and natural consequence of
a political administration that had depended on one man as the control-
ling influence. The system was effective and able to deliver as long
as the captain remained on the keel. The overdependence of the polit-
ical administration on the directives of the Shah was catastrophic for
the system. At the same time, many of the reforms imposed on the system
were undone either due to neglect or lack of faith.
Perhaps the overriding factor keeping the nation together was
the presence in Iran of the contending allied forces (1941-1946) which
took charge of security in their respective zones and deemed it in their
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own best interest to resurrect the Majlis as an arena for their respec-
tive political aspirations. As a result, the traditional forces of
the web system soon emerged and the traditional tensions of the polit-
ical system gave rise to a period of relative political freedom with
the Constitution as the compelling force of the system. Despite the
many prevailing weaknesses, the Majlis was able to deliver several
important legislative bills which were to affect Iran's political and
economic posture for many years to come.
The lessons of Reza Shah, however, were lost to his son,
Moharmiad-Reza Shah who took power in 1941. He committed the same mis-
takes by making the system, once again, dependent on royal directives,
mainly to secure the hold of the monarchy. Parliament and political
parties were created in the royal image. All political institutions
and national bureaucracies were dependent on orders from the sover-
eign. The bureaucracies, by now, were many times bigger than under
Reza Shah and employed hundreds of thousands of people. Inefficiency,
ineffectiveness and corruption were rampant. The system of checks and
balances had broken down. Civil servants took no restponsibi 1 i ty for
any action lest they suffer the consequences in a growing government
paranoia. Thus, paperwork and red tape increasingly gave rise to a
frustrated and a dejected public. Unlike the Reza Shah period, however,
there were no serious investigations or threats against civil servants
for job failure, wrongdoings, or inefficiency. Civil service positions,
in fact, were sought after since one could do almost nothing while
earning a living at a very secure job.
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The distrust of government displayed by both parents and
students, coupled with a relatively high level of political inefficacy
as reflected in the questionnaires, supported the above argu„«nts that
few people felt satisfaction with government's performance. A vast
n.ajority of parents and students thought that the governnent was influ-
enced by a few big interests and that many people in the government
were crooked. Moreover. so„^ half of the respondents in both samples
indicated that the government needlessly wasted a lot of money.
Apparently, the respondents had great doubts concerning the governtrent's
effectiveness and efficiency.
The ethical tradition of kingship perpetuated the concept of an
ideal ruler who ought to deliver^ things and lead the nation on the
right course. The expectations that a king be pious, just and compas-
sionate, among other things, was reflected in the books of statecraft
already referred to in the main text. These expectations, reflected
in many of the entries in the textbooks, certainly promoted this concept
of the ruler's responsibility and his capacity to deliver. Kings are
traditionally perceived as the highest authority and as responsible for
the performance, effectiveness and efficiency of their administrations.
Subordinates are responsible to the kings. Kings have an ethical
responsibility to the people and moral responsibility to God for the
performance of their duties; a just king is seen as the shadow of God
on earth.
The political administration of the nation in recent decades
seemed to have had as its highest priority the preservation of the
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Pahlavi system not by tending to the inadequacies of the system with
its inefficiency and ineffectiveness, but by silencing any criticism of
the systems inadequacies. This should be viewed against the traditional
expectations of the ruler. The system suffered from severe ca^
problems, where its institutions were not capable of performing their
duties, thus resulting in failures and impotence in the execution of
public policies. The system suffered from criticism on the one side,
by those who had high traditional expectations from their ruler, and,
on the other side, from those who saw the failure of the political
system as the result of the Shah's meddling in the integrity of the
political institutions conceived by the Constitution
Furthermore, the system faced a variety of challenges. With
the highest priority of the government being the preservation of the
Pahlavi rule, to enable the rule to continue and, perhaps, to prosper,
economic development was perceived as a tangible course whereby some
support for the system would be gained. Due to the nature of inequality
present in the system, those who benefited most from the system were
those who were connected with the system already. The widening gap
between the rich and the poor, so evident in recent years, became a
severe handicap and a cause of bitter complaints. With the rising
expectations following the flow of petro-dol 1 ars , the system's inad-
equacies became more pronounced. The government was unable to deliver
some of the most basic demands such as piped water and electricity to
city dwellers, many of whom were recent migrants from farms. Reforms
to correct the system's ineffectiveness and inefficiency were either
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late or totally absent. The systen, had beco» dependent on approval
and even initiative for all projects of consequence on the person of
the Shah and. with the increase in spending, the Shah was hardly ahle
to keep up With the pace. The syste. structure, at the sa^ ti™e. had
made it rather impossible for anybody else to take responsibility or
initiative. Furthermore, with huge government revenues, the Shah had
become more interested in extravagant projects than in those which
in^proved the public lot. ,n short, the political system was handi-
capped by its lack of capacity to perform in either the traditional
orientation or the modern mode.
Closely related to system capacity is "differentiation and
specialization of system structure" which is perceived by Lucian Pye
to be the third theme of political development. The constitution had
perceived three separate but equal branches in the organization of the
government. They included executive, legislative and judiciary.
Although the concept was basically aimed at reducing the power of the
rulers, creating checks and balances on the process of political admin-
istration and safeguarding the individual's rights, it also gave rise
to differentiation and specialization in the structure of government in
the macro sense. Furthermore, the division of government responsibil-
ities into as many as 24 ministries and seven ministers without port-
folio, in recent years, reflected the modern and Western concept of
role specificity and job differentiation. However, the ministries
performed little independent planning on their own. The ministries
were relegated the job of actualization of the plans and projects
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envisioned and dictated at tne highest policy
.akin, level. It would
be, however, far fro. the truth to say that the Shah hi.self conceived
an Plans and projects. He relied heavily on his advisors for policy
direction and at times supported, for implementation, certain plans
conceived by his ministers. Such plans could not reach a policy state
unless they were supported by the Shah or made into one of his "pet"
projects. Again the Shah's role symbolized that of a medieval king
who initiated all plans and projects and the public servants were there
to carry them out and to make sure that they were actualized.
Another shortcoming of Shah Mohammad-Reza' s administrative
approach was his reliance on a few loyal diehard politicians who per-
formed many different and even opposing roles. Such job rotation did
not imply that these men had administrative capability, outstanding
performance, or brilliance but only that they had the loyalty and
submission to serve the Shah at any position. Such job rotation also
served to prevent any politician from developing a strong power base
from wnich he might conceivably pose a threat to the Shah. Of course,
there were a few who exibited a course independent from that of the
throne's approach to political and economic affairs. Such individuals,
on suspicion of wavering loyalty, would be cast into either political
oblivion or into exile where many would join the ranks of the opposi-
tion.
The concept of renaissance man who is capable of undertaking
all roles is still very strong, both among those who have a college
education and among those who claim experience. There is little
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understanding or appreciation for the concept of role differentiation
and job specialization In
.ost Iranian ™inds. Differentiation and
specialization 1.pl, that a group of individuals «ould, for a co^on
purpose. con,e together to strive to reach a proposed co™,on goal each
by taking part In the section of the project that falls within his
specialty. Insecurity, self-preservation and distrust render Inoperable
the concept of Interdependence which would initiate a free flow of
Ideas fro. one sector of the government or economy to another. Extreme
jealousy, envy and lack of cooperation governed the relationships
between the different segments of the administration. It was rather
usual to learn about similar projects going on in several ministries
without one department knowing about the project of the other depart-
ment. Most reports on projects, without any rational reason, would be
stamped "secret" and thus out of circulation. So, specialization and
differentiation in Iranian political structure meant fragmentation and
isolation of different components of the government from each other.
These pieces came together only at the highest levels of decision
making.
Although there is role specificity and job differentiation
explicit in the Iranian tradition, reflected in the establishment of
guilds, there is no functional differentiation reflected in the struc-
ture of political administration. This could be attributed to the
tradition of divine right of kings in which the king was seen as the
ultimate source of decisions. Though sometimes advice was sought from
confidants, there was no obligation on the part of the king to demand
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or use such help. Traditional political systems operated on such a
premise: some tribal primitive cultures still do. In the latter cases,
the autocratic ruler has the capacity to deliver due mainly to the
simple nature of such societies. As societies modernize and public
expectations grow, need for differentiation and job delegation becomes
a necessity. In short, a modernizing society cannot function within a
traditional framework; such a system, sooner or later, is doomed to
fai 1 ure.
In summary, the tradition of political institutions in Iran, as
discussed here, does not meet any of the criteria put forth by Lucian
Pye as essential to political development. The political tradition
remains one dominated by particularism based on a system of rewards,
nepotism and loyalty. The political system, due to the nature of divine
rule and one man's domination of the total political process, had been
rendered incapable of delivering to a large and complex society its
needs and wants and, thus, remained ineffective and inefficient. Initi-
ation of all major policies by the monarch at the highest level of the
government prevented the institutions of government from functional
specificity and specialization of structure that was foreseen as
necessary by the constitution. The control and influence by the throne
rendered the three but equal branches of the government into the inef-
fectual domain of the monarch.
The analysis of parent-student orientations also revealed a
strong preference among the vast majority for a traditional political
system with high popular expectations from the government. There was
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acceptance of so.e social inequality by „,ost respondents, in similar
proportions among parents and students. Furthermore, there was a
basic trust of the professional capabilities of government employees
However, there existed a high level of political inefficacy and dis-
trust of the government suggesting widespread dissatisfaction regarding
its capabilities to deliver ^ood things. The data suggested that
distrust of the government a«Bng parents was not only by those who had
a high level of education, who very likely favored a democratic and
Western style government, but also by those who preferred the tradi-
tional Iranian concept of administration, as discussed earlier, whereby
the ruler is bestowed by a divine right to rule and is bound by ethical
and moral obligations to his subjects. In other words, the Shah had
failed to gain the support of the democraticly oriented segment of the
population because of his autocratic and undemocratic rule and, at the
same time, had failed to attract the support of the traditional elements
who would have supported his traditional approach to political adminis-
tration.
The textbooks reflected the ideal circumstances of a political
system where justice and compassion prevailed. Most of the entries
depicted a traditional framework of administration where kings were
responsible, ethical and moral in fulfilling their duties. The rulers
took responsibility for the actions of the bureaucracy and corrected
its wrongs. With such expectations from the system transferred to the
minds of the youth and with increasing demands put on the system for
delivery of goods due to rapid modernization, the traditional
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orientation put all responsibility on the monarchy-1
.e.
, the Shah
The individuals responsibility. 1„ retrospect, «as only to be obedient
to a just ruler.
The insufficiency of the political system to deliver on its
presumed duties, its lack of cohesi veness
, rampant corruption and
subservience to international superpowers were all in dire contrast
to notions developed and nurtured by the presentations in the textbooks.
Perhaps, a kind of political confusion and schizophrenia was developed
among the polity by the heralded glory of the past in contrast with the
realities of the present. The textbooks were filled with the details
of innovations and achievements in ancient Iran and the accomplishments
in the West during the past few centuries while recent Iranian history
was devoid of similar major achievements. The constant stress on the
glorious accomplishments of the past, particularly with the attempted
connections to the ancient Persian Empire by the Pahlavi monarchs,
emulated in the concept of "Great Civilization," contrasted with the
inability of the system to deliver on such promises, resulting in public
frustration and alienation. The raised expectations remained high,
reaching even higher levels with the surge in oil income after 1973.
In the face of unrealized goals and unkept promises, the level of
distrust in government and political inefficacy, as displayed in the
data analysis, was certainly understandable.
Education seemed to cause little difference in parent orien-
tation. Parent's education, on the other hand, was of some significance
in increasing the level of political awareness among students. Although
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the student's traditional orientation was perhaps son^what altered by
his own education or that of his parent, nevertheless, it remained
strong among all respondents (see Table 41). The persistence of many
traditional perspectives such as determinism (variables 19, 43 and 44),
respect for age despite the qualitative aspects of an individual
(variable 25), respect for friends (variables 27 and 39), and respect
for social standing (variable 24) was posited as discouraging to the
Idea of political development. It was partly these attitudes that gave
rise to inequality and particularism in the application of political
laws and rules. These orientations, furthermore, reduced the capactity
of the political system to perform effectively and efficiently despite
the high level of training and skill at the disposal of the political
bureaucracy.
The authoritative rule of kings, particularly during the Pahlavi
era, had in fact prevented the development of political institutions if
one is to uphold Huntington's view of the process of political develop-
ment. In his view, political institutions develop as a result of
competing social conflicts, and institutions take the form of arenas
for resolving such disagreements. Since the Pahlavis resolved all
problems, made all the decisions and allocated all the resources from
the top, there was little or no conflict to be passed down to the
institutions devised by the constitution for decision making purposes.
The duty of political institutions remained two-fold--to given an aura
of constitutionality and thus legitimacy to the process of decision
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making and to act as channels for dissemination of news and information
from the top of the pyramid to the public at the bottom.
The web system, inherent in the traditional political structure
of the nation could have been of great service in the development of
political institutions. The web system traditionally transcended the
tension between the competing centers of political influence. It
proved its viability during the parliamentary periods when the insti-
tutions of the government remained populist and the national interest
was the overriding goal in decision making. Despite the ovemhelming
presence of the aristocracy and the landowners, or their representa-
tives, in institutions such as the Majlis, the parliamentary system
did not spur on any feeling that the parliamentary system was a stumping
ground for the oligarchy.
With the addition of new segments to the web system, such as
the military, a strong bureaucracy, and a new economic elite, the
tension became even more balanced. The web system seemed more ready
than ever before to assume its role in the political life of the nation.
In contract, there was an added hesitation by the monarch to share
power and the decision making process. With the suppression of all
opposition organizations, including the moderates and traditional ele-
ments, and denial of a safety valve for the accumulating political
demands, frustrations and dissent finally resulted in political
violence. The government sponsored political institutions— i .e. , the
political parties and the Majlis--as means of political modernization
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were too anificial and. thus, were unsuccessful 1n gaining legitimacy
or grassroots support.
Cultural environment is constantly evolving and, in a sense
is organic. Although it is rooted in the past and inspired by long-
held beliefs and customs, it cannot exist in isolation due to new and
modern developments in communication techniques. A nation consequently
is impressed by a great many factors from outside its own environment.
Thus, it would be a great mistake to assume that cultures-or nations-
have a uniform vision of a political system throughout their history.
The people-culture cycle evolves and so do their demands on the polit-
ical system. Nowadays the people have definite demands from their
government. These demands include moral and ethical responsibility
(variables 30, 31 and 38) and explicit economic demands (variables 21
and 35). With the complexities of the socio-economic situation,
economic demands may-or have-become more crucial than before. The
public awareness, as shown by the data, is increasing from generation
to generation, and as such it will continue to expand. Education may
be greatly responsible for increased public conscience and responsibil-
ity (variable 41), but pride in nation and tradition remain high.
Culture and tradition certainly are not isolated phenomena. They are
influenced by a great variety of agents, including education. As such,
education and culture act in a sort of symbiotic relationship. The
textbooks certainly reflect this relationship. However, emphasis of
certain norms, while de-emphasizing certain others deemed not helpful
for the development process, should show some results in the long term
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supporting Of the emphasized no™s. Institutions such as education
however, are challenged in their socialization influence by formidable
counterparts such as family. The hope regains that education will
influence parents which In turn will influence the children, which in
turn.over time, will be absorbed and become part of the cultural tra-
dition. Such a procedure was somewhat evident among the students whose
fathers had a high level of education. It will be a while, however,
before any appreciable change conducive to political development can
be detected and examined among the general public.
Nevertheless, since the educated people tend to compose most
of the political elite and the politicized public, the impact of edu-
cation on the behavior of the polity should be evident in short to
mid-term. Rationality, equality and efficiency are among the traits
of such a political elite. The present modicum of government in Iran,
however, may suggest an opposite view leaning in the direction of irra-
tionality, fanaticism and isolationism. Lessons of the past history,
however, are a prescription for tomorrow. Excesses of the Pahlavi
regime, particularly in the undermining of traditional political ten-
sions, resulted in total demise of that system. Ignoring history and
the contending social and political forces and subjegation of web
members to the will of one force, in any administration, is the first
and major step in the direction of instability. Not only will the
system operate ineffectively, but it will not gain legitimacy. To con-
tinue to Impose its will on the public, especially the politicized
public, the government will have to resort to repression which Is the
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second, and p.oba.,, the ,ast step
.efo.e its doo.-i„ a ™„„e. si.ila.
to the Pahlavi experience.
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The following 1s the translation of the original questionnaire
which was in Farsi. The format and the design follow exactly the
original questionnaire.
Part One
1) Sex
1. [ ] Male
2. [ ] Female
2) Age
1. [ ]
2. [ ]
3. [ ]
4. [ ]
25 years or less
26 to 30 years old
31 to 35 years old
36 to 40 years old
5. [ ] 41 to 45 years old
5. [ ] 46 to 50 years old
7. [ ] 51 to 60 years old
8. [ ] More than 60 years old
3) Marital Status
1. [ ] Single
2. [ ] Married
3. [ ] Divorced
4. [ ] Widowed
4) Number of Children
1. [ ] No children
2. [ ] One or two children
3. [ ] Three or four children
4 [ ] Five or more children
5) Religion
1
. [ ] Shi a Moslem
2. [ ] Sunni Moslem
3. [ ] Zoroastrian
4. [ ] Orthodox Christi an
5. [ ]
6. [ ]
7. C ]
[ ]
Catholic or Protestant
Jewish
Other religions (please
specify)
6) Education (specify highest achievement)
1. [ ] No educational training 7. r i
[ ] Traditional education
[ ] Few years grade school
[ ] Sixth grade
[ ] 7th to 9th grade 11
[ ] 10th to 12 grade 12
2,
3,
4.
5.
6.
[ ]
9. [ ]
9- [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
High school diploma
Few years college or AA
Bachelors or equivalent
M.A. or equivalent
M.D, or equivalent
Ph.D. or equivalent
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7) Your Job
"I- C ] Professional or techni-
cal
2. [ ] Administration or manage
ment
3. [ ] Clerical or related
4. [ ] Sales or related
5. [ ] Service sector
6. L J Farmer or farm related
7. [ ] Production worker or
dri ver
8. [ ] Military or police
9. L J Housewife
10. [ ] Other (Please specify)
8) Average monthly family income
1. [ ] Less than 30,000 rials
2. [ ] 30,000 to 49,999 rials
3. [ ] 50,000 to 74,999 rials
4. [ ] 75,000 to 99,999 rials
5. [ ] 100,000 to 124,999 rial
6. [ ] 125,000 to 149,999 rials
7. L J 150,000 to 199,999 rials
8. [ ] 200,000 to 249,999 rials
9. [ ] 250,000 to 299,999 rials
10. [ ] More than 300,000 rials
9)
a. Your place of birth
b. Your city of residence
c. How many years have you been ri si ding in this place'?
1. [ ] Less than one year 4. [ ] 10 to 15 years
I r 1 11"" ^n^^^''^ 5- ^ ^ 15 to 20 yearsJ. L J b to 10 years 6. [ ] More than 20 years
10) From what country did you receive your last degree?
1. [ ] Iran (name of the city or university?)
^-
^ ] U.S.A. 6. [ ] Great Britain
3. [ ] Canada 7. [ ] other European countries
4. [ ] France 8. [ ] Other Asian countries
5. [ ] Germany 9. [ ] other countries
Part Two
12) Some people often listen to the news on the radio or TV, how about
you?
1. [ ] I 1 is ten to the news everyday
2. [ ] I 1 is ten to the news a few times a week
3. [ ] I 1 is ten to the news a few times a month
4. C ] I 1 isten to the news once every few months
5. [ ] I seldom 1 isten to the news
6. [ ] I never listen to the news
462
13) Some people often read newspaper and magazine articles about polit-ical and social matters, how about you? ^
I read them everyday
I read them a few times a week
I read them a few times a month
I read them once every few months
I seldom read them
I never read them
14) Some people often converse about the political and economic issuesof our country with their friends, how about you?
I talk about such issues everyday
I talk about such issues a few times a week
I talk about such issues a few times a month
I talk about such issues once every few months
I seldom talk about such issues
I never talk about such issues
15) Some people often think about the political and economic condition
of our country, how about you?
I think about it everyday
I think about it a few times a week
I think about it a few times a month
I think about in once every few months
I seldom think about such conditions
I never think about such conditions
Part Three
16) If you get bad news, it is better to hide what you feel and behave
as if you don
' t care.
1. [ ] I agree strongly 4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
2. [ ] I agree 5. [ ] I disagree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat 6. [ ] I agree stongly
17) When a man is born, the success he is going to have is already in
the cards, so he might as well accept it and not fight against it.
1. [ ] I agree strongly 4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
2. [ ] I agree 5. [ ] I disagree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat 6. [ ] I disagree strongly
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18) The government should have
people's lives.
1. C ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
plenty of power and influence over
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
19) There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel agreat love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.
1. [ ]
2. [ ]
3. [ ]
I agree strongly
I agree
I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
20) The negative opinion of others often keeps me from seeing a movieor play I had planned to attend. ^
^
1. C ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3- C ] I agree somewhat
[ ] I disagree somewhat
[ ] I disagree
[ ] I disagree strongly
21) The government should give
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
money and food to the unemployed.
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
5. [ ] I disagree strongly
22) There is no satisfaction in
1
. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
any good without a companion.
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
23) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person
like me can't really understand what is going on.
1. [ ] I agree strongly 4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
2. [ ] I agree 5. [ ] I disagree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat 6. [ ] I disagree strongly
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24) There are some people like arp^t ;»rtic+c .r.A
forgiven
^0. „^tVl„,t„\7^eVa\T:^^?Se'.r^r1*^3^1
1. [ ]
2. [ ]
3. [ ]
I agree strongly
I agree
I agree somewhat
4.
5.
6.
[ ] I disagree somewhat
[ ] I disagree
[ ] I disagree strongly
25) Respect is due an older man no matter what kind of a person he is
1- [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3- [ ] I agree somewhat
[ ] I disagree somewhat
[ ] I disagree
[ ] I disagree strongly
^- [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3- [ ] I agree somewhat
[ ] I disagree somewhat
[ ] I disagree
[ ] I disagree strongly
''^iVL'mrtances.''
^^endship; friends don't change with
1. [ ]
2. [ ]
3. [ ]
I agree strongly
I agree
I agree somewhat
[ ] I disagree somewhat
[ ] I disagree
[ ] I disagree strongly
28) My political opinion is not
papers.
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
easily swayed by what I read in the
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
29) It would irritate me very much to have a watch or clock which was
off by several minutes everyday.
1. [ ] I agree strongly 4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
2. [ ] I agree 5. [ ] I disagree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat 5. [ ] I disagree strongly
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30) Some people believe that the government is overly influenced hva few big interests looking out for themselves
'""'^"'^^
1.
2,
3,
[ ]
L J
[ ]
I agree strongly
I agree
I agree somewhat
4. [ J
5. [ ]
6. [ ]
I disagree somewhat
I disagree
I disagree strongly
31) Over the years, the government has paid no attention to wh.t th«people think when it decides what to do.
^° ^'^^^ the
1- [ ]
2- [ J
3. L ]
I agree strongly
I agree
I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
32) I set difficult goals for myself which I attempt to reach,
I agree strongly
I agree
I agree somewhat
4. [ ]
5. [ ]
6. [ ]
I disagree somewhat
I disagree
I disagree strongly
[ ] I agree strongly
[ ] I agree
L J I agree somewhat
4. [ ]
5. [ ]
6. [ ]
I disagree somewhat
I disagree
I disagree strongly
34) A man with money cannot really learn how to behave in a polite
society if has not had the proper upbringing.
1. [ J I agree strongly 4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
2- L ] agree 5. [ ] I disagree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat 6. [ j I disagree strongly
35) I think the government wastes needlessly a lot of the money that
pay in taxes.
1. [ ] I agree strongly 4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
2. [ J I agree 5. [ ] I disagree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat 6. [ ] I disagree strongly
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''^
' theVesuUs!
'''''''''''
'
^^^^^^^^
-til I a. satisfied with
1.
2.
3.
[ ] I agree strongly
[ ] I agree
[ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
37) I enjoy a race or game better when I bet on it.
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2- [ ] I agree
3- [ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
38) I think some people in the government are crooked.
1.
2.
3.
[ ] I agree strongly
[ ] I agree
[ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
39) No sane, decent person would ever think of hurting a close friend,
1 • [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3- [ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
40) The government usually knows what is best for people.
1- [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
41) If a person wanted to make a speech in this community against
religion, he should be allowed.
1.
2.
3.
[ ] I agree strongly
[ ] I agree
[ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
42) People running the government are smart people who usually know
what they are doing.
1
. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
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1- C ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
4- [ ] I disagree somewhat
3- L J I disagree
6- t ] I disagree strongly
44) Nowadays with world conditions the wav thev arp th. •lives for today and lets tomorrow take care of I'tseTf!'
1. [ ]
2. [ ]
3. [ ]
I agree strongly
I agree
I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5- L ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
"soraebod^''
'° '° ""^'"'"^ to
^ f^vor from
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ]
5. [ ]
6. [ ]
I disagree somewhat
I disagree
I disagree strongly
46) I often do somethi ng just to prove to myself that I can do it.
1
.
[ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
4.
5.
6.
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
I disagree somewhat
I disagree
I disagree strongly
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itudent_^uestionna^
The following 1s the translation of the original questionnaire
Which was in Farsl. The format and the design follow exactly the
original questionnaire.
1) Sex
1. [ ] Male
2) Age
1,
2.
3.
4.
[ ]
L ]
[ ]
L J
Less than 14 years
Fourteen years old
Fifteen years old
Sixteen years old
3) Education
1. [ ]
2. [ ]
9th grade
10th grade
4) Father's education
2. [ ] Female
5. [ ]
6. [ ]
7. [ ]
8. [ ]
[ J
[ ]
[ ] No educational training 7.
[ ] Traditional education 8.
[ ] Few years grade school 9.
[ ] Sixth grade lo
[ ] 7th to 9th grade 11
'
[ ] 10th to 12th grade 12
5) Number of children in your family
1. [ ] One or two
2. [ ] Three of four
Seventeen years old
Eighteen years old
Nineteen years old
Twenty or more years old
11th grade
12th grade
[ ] High School diploma
[ ] Few years of college or AA
[ ] Bachelors or equivalent
[ ] M.A. or equivalent
[ ] M.D. or equivalent
[ ] Ph.D. or equivalent
[ ] Five or six
[ ] Seven or more
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6) Where do you stand in age among the children in your family?
1. [ ] Oldest child
2. [ ] Second child
3. C ] Third child
4. [ ] Fourth child
5. [ ] Fifth child
6. C ] Youngest
7. [ ] Other (please specify)
7) Your place of birth
8) Your place of residence
9) Mother's education
No educational training 7.
Traditional education 8.
Few years grade school 9.
Sixth grade lo.
7th to 9th grade n*
10th to 12th grade 12
High school diploma
Few years college or AA
Bachelors or equivalent
M.A. or equivalent
M.D. or equivalent
Ph.D. or equivalent
10) Your father's job
1. [ ] Professional or
technical
2. [ ] Administration or
Management
3. [ ] Clerical or related
4. [ ] Sales or related
5. [ ] Service sector
6. [ ] Farmer or farm- related
7. [ ] Production laborer or
driver
8. [ ] Armed forces or police
9. [ ] Other (please specify)
11) Your family's average monthly in
1. [ ] Less than 30,000 rials
2. [ ] 30,000 to 49,999 rials
3. [ ] 50,000 to 74,999 rials
4. [ ] 75,000 to 99,999 rials
5. [ ] 100,000 to 124,999 rials
6. [ ] 125,000 to 149,999 rials
7. [ ] 150,000 to 199,999 rials
8. [ ] 200,000 to 249,999 rials
9. [ ] More than 250,000 rials
10. [ ] Mot available
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Part Two
12) Somejople often listen to the news on the radio or TV, how about
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
listen to the news everyday
listen to the news a few times a week
listen to the news a few times a month
listen to the news every few months
seldom listen to news
never list to news
13) Some people often read newspaper and magazine articles about
political and social matters, how about you?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
read them everyday
read them a few times a week
read them a few times a month
read them once every few months
seldom read them
never read them
14) Some people often converse about the political and economic i
of our country with their friends, how about you?
I talk about such issues everyday
I talk about such issues a few times a week
I talk about such issues a few times a month
I talk about such issues once every few months
I seldom talk about such issues
I never talk about such issues
15) Some people often think about the political and economic condition
of our country, how about you?
1. [ ] I think about it everyday
2. [ ] I think about it a few times a week
3. rL ] I think about it a few times a month
4. [ ] I think about it once every few months
5. [ J I seldom think about such conditions
6. [ ] I never think about such conditions.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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Part Three
16) If you get bad news, it is
as if you don't care.
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
r to hide what you feel and behave
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
17) When a man is born, the success he is going to have is alread inthe cards, so he might as well accept it and not fight agains? it.
1. [ ]
2. [ ]
3. [ ]
I agree strongly
I agree
I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
18) The government should have plenty of power and influence over
people's lives.
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
4- t ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
19) There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a
great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.
1. [ ] I agree strongly 4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
2. L ] I agree 5. [ ] I disagree
3. L ] I agree somewhat 6. [ ] I disagree strongly
20) The negative opinion of others often keeps me from seeing a movie
or play I had planned to attend.
1. [ ] I agree strongly 4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
2. [ ] I agree 5. [ ] I disagree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat 6. [ ] I disagree strongly
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21) The government should give money and food
1- C 3 I agree strongly
2. L ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
to the unemployed.
I disagree somewhat
I disagree
I disagree strongly
22) There is no satisfaction in any good without a companion,
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
I agree strongly
I agree
I agree somewhat
4. t ] I disagree somewhat
5. L -I I disagree
6. C ] I disagree strongly
23) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a personlike me can't really understand what is going on.
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3- [ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
24) There are some people like great artists and musicians who can beforgiven for not being considerate of others, kind to poor, etc.
"1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
25) Respect is due an older man no matter what kind of a person he is,
1.
2.
3.
[ ] I agree strongly
[ ] I agree
[ ] I agree somewhat
4,
5,
6.
[ ] I disagree somewhat
[ ] I disagree
[ ] I disagree strongly
26) Our socio-political system should be a blueprint for all other
nations in the world.
1
. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
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''™'"'"' ^endship; friends don't change with
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ]
5. [ ]
6. [ ]
I disagree somewhat
I disagree
I disagree strongly
28) My political opinion is not
papers,
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
easily swayed by what I read in the
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
29) It would irritate me very much to
off by several minutes everyday
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
have a watch or clock which was
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. C ] I disagree strongly
30) Some people believe that the government is overly influenced bfew big interests looking out for themselves.
1. [ ] I agree strongly 4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
2. [ ] I agree 5. [ ] I disagree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat 6. [ ] I disagree strongly
31) Over the years, the government
people think when it decides
1
. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
has paid no attention to what the
what to do.
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
32) I set difficult goals for
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
myself which I attempt to reach.
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
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34) A man with money cannot really learn how to behave in a oolitesociety If he has not had the proper upbringing
1. [ ] I agree strongly 4. [ ] I disagree so„.what
o r -i T 0. L J I disagree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat 6. [ ] i disagree strongly
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5. [ ] I disagree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat 6. [ ] I disagree strongly
36) I work very hard at everything I
the results.
1- ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
undertake until I am satisfied with
4- L J I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
37) I enjoy a race or game better
1
.
[ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
when I bet on it.
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
38) I think some people in the
1- [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
government are crooked.
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
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39) No sane, decent person would
1 • [ ] I agree strongly
2- [ ] I agree
3- [ ] I agree somewhat
ever think of hurting a close friend.
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5- [ ] I disagree
6- [ ] I disagree strongly
40) The government usually knows what is best for people.
[ ] I agree strongly
[ ] I agree
[ ] I agree somewhat
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6- [ ] I disagree strongly
41) If a person wanted to make a speech in this community against
religion, he should be allowed.
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
4,
5,
6.
[ ] I disagree somewhat
[ ] I disagree
[ ] I disagree strongly
42) People running the government
what they are doing.
1
. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
are smart people who usually know
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
43) Planning only makes a person
out anyway.
1
. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
unhappy since plans hardly ever work
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
44) Nowadays with world conditions the way they are, the wise person
lives for today and lets tomorrow take care of itself.
1. [ ] I agree strongly 4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
2. [ ] I agree 5. [ ] I disagree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat 6. [ ] I disagree strongly
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45) It is better to go without
somebody.
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
something than to ask for a favor from
4. C ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6- [ ] I disagree strongly
46) I often do something just to
1. [ ] I agree strongly
2. [ ] I agree
3. [ ] I agree somewhat
prove to myself that I can do it.
4. [ ] I disagree somewhat
5. [ ] I disagree
6. [ ] I disagree strongly
APPENDIX II
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
ON THE ANALYSIS OF PARENT-STUDENT DATA
Part Three, which consists of Chapters VI through X, consists
of primary and secondary material. The theoretical literature is drawn
from the works of David C. McClelland, ILe_Achje^nn^^ David
Easton and Jack Dennis, Ch jj.dren in the Politic^al^v^^ M. Kent
Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, The Political Characte^r j^l^Hnlp^^
Fred I. Greenstein, MJdrerLjM_Pom^ Richard Dawson and Kenneth
Political Sociajjzation; and Robert D. Hess and Judith V.
'^^^^^^y^ The Developme nt of Political Attitudes in Children
.
The theoretical data has been supplemented by statistical data,
generated by questionnaires administered to a randomly selected nation-
wide sample of students and parents. During fall 1977 and winter 1978,
a questionnaire composed of three parts-socio-economic status, commun-
ication habits and socio-political attributes--was drafted. Almost all
the items in the questionnaire were borrowed from socio-political
studies intended for purposes similar to this inquiry. The items in
the major part of the questi onnai re--i
. e. , socio-political attributes-
were drawn from the "four country study" reported by McClelland, and
from studies by Jennings and Niemi, and David Easton and Jack Dennis.
Some difficulty was encountered in the translation of the items
into Farsi. Several tests were made to insure the accuracy and cultural
adaptability of the items. For example, in the part dealing with
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pub policy issues, an item stating, "If a communist were legally
elected to some public office around here, the people should allow him
to take office," was put aside since the Communist Party (Tudeh) in
Iran was illegal and underground at that time. Moreover, "legal elec-
tions" were a non-existent entity during most of the Pahlavi period.
Some other standard items had to be modified to fit the Iranian socio-
cultural milieu. In general, however, the items were so basic that
their cross-cultural transplantation posed few problems. Some problems
were detected after the questionnaire had been admininstered. For
example, item 37, "I enjoy a race or a game better when I bet on it,"
was too closely associated with gambling to give an indication of
"risk taking," as originally was hoped. Since gambling is a cardinal
sin among Moslems, it was on this basis that our respondents probably
viewed this item.
The questionnaires for parents and students were alike except
for some changes in the first part dealing with socio-economic status.
Unlike the McClelland and Jenni ngs-Niemi studies, the parents and the
students did not come from the same families. Both samples were
selected independently of each other, althougn the ostans (provinces)
used in both samples were the same. Ten ostans
, out of a total of
twenty- two, were selected randomly for the sampling out of a bag con-
taining the names of all the ostans . It was decided in advance that in
case the Central Ostan, which includes Tehran, was not selected by the
ninth draw, due to its significance in population and number of students
(see Table 42), at the tenth round it would be automatically selected.
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The Central Ostan, however, was the fiftn selection and no special
attempt was necessary.
Ihe_student_^^ There were approximately 350,000 high
school students who attended classes in the ten selected ostans. Some
70 percent of these attended schools in the Central Ostan. The major-
ity of them were enrolled in schools in the city of Tehran. From
among the cities in each osta_n, a random selection of cities was made.
Based on the population of the city, questionnaires were apportioned.
Seven-hundred- twenty-fourstudents, or l/500th of the 350,000 students
in the ten ostans, were to receive the questionnaires which were dis-
tributed to randomly selected school(s). Although the sample ostans
showed balanced representation of the nation, the urban population was
disproportionately represented. This resulted from the fact that almost
all the high schools were located in urban areas. Since the question-
naires were intended for high school students and were to be adminis-
tered, for the most part, by the schools themselves, invevitably, the
urban population was overly represented. Nevertheless, as the sample
reveals, some of the high school students were from rural areas,
attending schools in urban areas and living, presumably, with relatives
or friends. Moreover, it was not the intention of this inquiry to
undertake a survey analysis of teenagers and their parents. A compar-
ative analysis of intergenerational transfer of socio-political norms
from parents to high school students is the main focus of this study.
Since, inevitably, these are the ones, by the nature of their educa-
tion, who will be the main force behind the future socio-political
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scene in Iran, it is, therefore, intended to study their orientations,
attributes and attitudes toward socio-political norms with an eye to
political development.
The questionnaires for areas outside of Tehran, which consit-
tuted about 50 percent of the total sample of students, were mailed
to the principals of the randomly selected schools who were asked to
distribute them to one student from each class with the first letter
of his/her last name that wnich had previously been randomly selected.
The principals were also requested to supervise personally or through
a representative, the administration of the questionnaire, watching
that all students be gathered in the same room and be given about 15
minutes for its completion.
For the schools in Tehran and vicinity, the questionnaires were
personally administered by a group of three people under my personal
supervision. The same method of student selection as above was used
and the students were gathered in a classroom or an office where they
were given approximately fifteen minutes to complete the questionnaires.
The rate of return for the student questionnaires was very
impressive. A total of 624 questionnaires, or about 86 percent, were
completed and returned. The response and acceptance by schools was
partly due to letters of introduction from the Ministry of Science and
Higher Education, the Ministry of Education, the Tehran Education Office
and the district education offices.
At first it was planned that the parents of the students who
responded to the student questionnaire would also be selected as the
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parent saniple. Later, however, this plan was dropped since 1t was
thought that there may be son^ concurrence between students and their
parents in the responses to the questions, particularly due to the
fact that the parent's questionnaire could not be personally adminis-
tered and had to be taken ho^ by students for their parents to
complete. Moreover, it was thought that further involve,«nt with the
same students might create, or further, any sense of suspicion about
our intentions. They already had been assured that no records of their
names had been kept. Given the political situation in Iran at that
time, it was important that this be true if we were to get real
responses.
Jh^jarent questionnaire. Although it was deemed useful to test the
values and norms of the parents of the students being sampled, due to
problems noted above, a new sample had to be created for the analysis
of parental norms and values. A new city sample survey in the same 10
ostans was conducted. From these cities, elementary, guidance and high
schools were randomly selected. While 63 percent of the new sample
were high schools, 9 percent were guidance and 28 percent were elemen-
tary schools. All the selected high schools were, in fact, present in
the student sample. The change from high schools only, in the student
sample, to include all levels of schools in the parent sample was
undertaken to broaden the parent representation and to include a wider
age range and, hopefully, more varying perspectives among parents,
since the parents of high school students would at least be 35 years
old, and more likely 40 and over.
Sample
provinces
responding
Sample
provinces
not responding
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The sa.e pattern as 1n the student selection was applied for
selection of students whose parents would be asked to complete the
questionnaires. School principals were again requested to assist in
distribution and return of the questionnaires. Son. 700 questionnaires
were mailed or hand-carried to 84 schools in the sample ostans The
return was not to
.atch the success we had had with the student ques-
tionnaires due to several reasons. The questionnaires were
.ailed in
late April, shortly before the period for final exams. The school
preoccupation with exams considerably affected their success in locating
the preselected students whose parents were to respond to the questions.
Furthermore, the accelerating political turmoil, which was becoming
also commonplace in high schools, resulted in a further slowdown of
school responses.
Another attempt was made in October 1978 with additional ques-
tionnaires sent to the schools that had not yet responded. By December
1978, some 170 questionnaires, or 25 percent of the total, had been
completed and returned. It was deemed that the heightened political
turmoil and the onset of the revolutionary atmosphere was preventing
a high return rate of parent questionnaires. Consequently, the 170
completed parent questionnaires were used in the survey analysis. Alto-
gether, responses had been received from 26 schools, 16 of which, or
62 percent, were from high schools. Since many of the schools were
the same in the parent and student samples and since the process of
picking students in both samples remained the same, it was likely that
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Of the parents of the students who had completed the questionnaires
were among the parent sample.
-^»2^ite_toIookj^^
Students. The sample was somewhat evenly divided between the sexes
About 54 percent were male and 46 percent were female in a national
high school population that is two-thirds male. This was basically
due to the presence of high school students from the Central Ostan,
where female students composed 42 percent of the total high school
enrollment in 1977. The female representation was further amplified
by the fact that 56 percent of the students in the sample were from
Tehran, where male and female students are rather evenly represented.
The sample was made up of 22 percent ninth graders, 27 percent tenth
graders, 30 percent eleventh graders and 21 percent twelfth graders.
The mean age of respondents for both sexes was 17 years. The students
came mostly (59 percent) from families that had 5 or more children,
higher than the average of 3.9 children per family.
Level of literacy among fathers typified that of the urban male
population: some 20 percent had had no education; less than 12 percent
had had traditional education-i
.e.
, non-formal maktab education; 37
percent had had some grade school education; 24 percent had some high
school education; and less than 8 percent had had at least some exposure
to college education.
The sample also represented varying backgrounds in parental
job outlook. Professional and managerial represented the smallest
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group, each 5 percent; clerical and sales represented the largest group
each 19 percent; production laborers followed closely at 15 percent-
farmers and military were represented at 8 and 7 percent respectively.
Income followed closely the job description: about 40 percent
of respondents had noted that they had a family income of less than
$425 per month; 43 percent bringing in between $425 to $1,235 per
month; and the remaining 17 percent had income of over $1,235 per
month. The high income level is rather surprising, since average
national income per capi ta per year for 1977 was $1 ,950. It may be
asserted that the students did not have a clear notion of their family
income and put down an amount that they thought was correct. However,
it must be noted that the sample does not represent the average national
family. It is obvious that the high school students were not average
Iranian youths of between 15 to 19 years of age. They are rather a
minority of youth in their age bracket. They necessarily came from
families with above average education and income, since at least a
moderate income was necessary to abate pressure on youth so they could
continue their education instead of taking a job to help with family
finances.
Although the students in the sample lived in 30 different cities
and towns in eight ostans
, they had been born in 97 different localities
in 20 different ostans
. As such, they represented almost all the
ostans.
Parents
.
Unlike the student sample, almost 80 percent of the responding
parents were male and the remaining 20 percent were female. It was the
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intention of this inquiry that the head of household respond to the
questionnaire. Since fathers usually are household heads, therefore.
ove™heln,ing numbers of fathers responding was to be expected. The
mean age of responding father was in his 40s. with female respondents
somewhat younger.
Large families with five or more children made up 45 percent of
the parent sample. This was in contrast to 59 percent of students
coming from large families. This resulted from several factors. The
parents in the parent sample were younger, since it included parents
of students in all grades. This is presuming that younger parents are
still in an early stage of reproductive capability and will probably
have more children. On the other hand, the student sample included
only students above age of 14. This would put their parents in a
higher age bracket than that of the parents in the parent sample, and,
therefore, in a later stage of reproductive capability. Furthermore,
there was a definite and significant association between number of
children and level of education with parents with high education having
fewer children (students: chi-square = 55.6; df = 12; p = .0000;
gamma =
-.379). Also, the higher level of education among parents in
the parent sample than among the parents of the student sample could
also explain the difference.
The sample was composed of 11 percent who had some exposure to
college education, 35 percent who had had some high school education,
24 percent with some grade school education, less than 6 percent with
traditional ma k tab education and 12 percent who had had no education
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A Summary Table
Sample
ostan s
Bushehr
Central (Tehran)
East Azarbaijan
Hormozgan
Kerman
Kohkiloyeh and
Boyer Ahmadi
Semnan
Sistan and
Baluchistan
Yazd
Zanjan
total
TABLE 43
n %
10 1.4
485 67.0
95 13.1
10 1.4
48 6.6
6
.8
18 2.5
12 1.7
28 3.9
12 1.7
724 100.0%
455 73.5
82 13.1
30 4.8
6 1.0
18 2.9
1
.2
17 2.7
12 1.9
624 100.0%
n %
17 2.4
335 47 ft
160 22.8
23 3.2
55 7.8
12 1.7
15 2.1
33 4.7
20 2.8
30 4.3
700 100.0%
n %
1 4.1
73 42.9
51 30.0
8 4.7
5 2.9
13 7.6
5 2.9
8 4.7
170 100.0%
at an. The responding parents, on the average, had a much higher
level of education than the fathers of the responding students. Since
the parents in this sample are younger than the parents in the student
sample, and since it is assumed that there is an association between
high level of education and younger age, therefore, there is a progres-
sive increase in the number of educated as the age of the adults
declines. Some of the discrepency could be explained by the presence
of parents of elementary and guidance school students, who in general
would be younger than the parents of the high school students.
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Parents' job descriptions closely follows that of the students'
responses, except in the professional category comprising 14 percent,
which may reflect the increased number of of younger parents. On the
other hand, 8 percent of parents had stated their employment as pro-
duction worker or drivers, whereas, 15 percent of the students had
stated that their parents had similar employment. This, furthermore,
amplifies the impact of education on parent's employment. Clerical
and sales represented the largest groups, 21 and 15 percent respec-
tively. Service sector employees were the smallest group with 3.5 per-
cent, followed by military and police, farmers and managerial, each
apprximately 6 percent. Production workers made up about 8 percent of
the sample, 10 percent indicated that they were housewives.
Despite a higher level of education reported by the responding
parents coupled with increased percentage of professionals among them,
the parents reported a lower level of income than the responding stu-
dents. On the other hand, there were fewer parents who had low income
compared to the student sample. Some 36 percent had family income of
$425 per month; 50 percent reported $425 to $1 ,235; and the remaining
14 percent nad averaged about $1,235 a month. Assuming an association
between high level of income and high level of education, the income
level reported by the responding parents should have been above that of
the income reported by the responding students for their families.
Since the parents in general have reported a lower income level, it
could be assumed that there may have been some exaggeration or simple
lack of knowledge about family income by responding students, or that
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due to taxation fear, the parents may have understated their actual
income. However, it is noteworthy to indicate that 56 percent of the
responding students lived in Tehran, compared to 34 percent of the
responding parents. Since Tehran has the highest income and the highest
cost of living, the income level reported by the parent sample and the
student sample may indeed be an accurate estimation.
Taking into consideration the fewer number of responding
parents, this sample well represented the national character. Respon-
ding parents had been born in 80 different localities in 15 different
ostans, with some 12 percent having been born in rural areas. Only 15
percent of the responding parents were born in Tehran, compared to 34
percent residing there at the time of this survey. Some 22 percent had
received some of their education in Tehran. Most of the respondents
(54 percent) had lived in their present city of residence for 20 years
or longer. Almost all the respondents who had education were educated
in Iran except for two individuals who had been educated in Germany.
The great majority of respondents were Moslem: 93 percent were
Shiah and 6.5 percent were Sunni. Only one responded with "other"
religion.
Although neither sample typified the population of the country,
or even that of the urban population, nevertheless, given the facts and
surmises above, they perhaps can fulfill our intentions for the analysis
of intergenerational transmission of values and provide indications of
each group. As noted above, this universe is not typical of the
country. Illiteracy and absence of adequate educational facilities are
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a major problem in Iran. Presently, over 60 percent of the population
is illiterate. High school education and parents who deem education
as a significant vehicle for achievement are a rarity in a system that
has made high school education as inaccessible as college education in
European countries. Only 15 percent of the high school age population
of our sample pstans were enrolled in high schools. Of course, the
high ration in the Central Ostan, 21 percent, overloaded the average.
As is evident in Table 42, normally around 7 percent of the high school
age students in the sample ostans attended high school in 1977. Thus,
it could be safely assumed that the sample of our high school students
is certainly a sample of the next generation of Iranian elite who will
have above average participation and influence in the socio-political
affairs of the nation.
APPENDIX III
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PARENT-STUDENT DATA
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APPENDIX III
Frequency Distribution of Parent-Student Data
Psi^ents students
n % n %
Sex (respondents' sex)
male
female
total
Age (respondents' age)
Less than 14 years old
14 years old
15 years old
16 years old
17 years old
18 years old
19 years old
20 years or older
25 years or less
26 to 30 years old
31 to 35 years old
36 to 40 years old
41 to 45 years old
46 to 50 years old
51 to 60 years old
Not available
total
Marital Status
135 79 4 ooO CD "700.7
35 20 6 AC O46.3
170 100 at 1 AO AO/iUU.0%
2 O
. O
22 3.5
79 12.7
149 2"^ 4
165 26.4
157 25.2
29 4.6
9 1.4
2 1.2
5 2.9
34 20.0
36 21.2
29 17.1
25 14.7
1 .6
15 2.4
170 100.0% 624 99.9%
single 3 1.8
married 148 87.1
divorced 1 .6
wi dowed 3 1.8
Not available 15 8.8
total 170 100.1%
;r of Children in the Famil y
No children 5 2.9
One or two children 29 17.1 39 6.3
Three or four children 54 31.8 190 30.4
Five or more children 69 40.6 369 59.1
Not available 13 7.6 26 4.2
total 170 100.0% 624 100.0%
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Parents' Education
No education
Traditional education
Few grades
Sixth grade
7th to 9th grade
10th to 12th grade
High school diploma
Few years of college
B. A. or equivalane
M. A. or equivalent
M. D. or equivalent
total
Fathers' Education
No education
P^^^ents students
n %
n %
d.\ 12.3
9 5.3
11 6.5
30 17.6
17 10.0
cc 12.9
23 13.5
6 3.5
25 14.7
5 2.9
1
.6
170 99.8%
Traditional education ^70 }?'p
Few grades 80 12:8
23.1
56 9.0
Sixth grade
7th to 9th grade
10th to 12th grade 33 53
High school diploma 55 3*3
Few years of college 9 ^'4
B. A. or equivalent 27 43
M. A. or equivalent 8 1*3
M. D. or equivalent 4 '5
Not available 21 3*4
total 624 99.9%
Mothers' Education
No education 254 39.4
Traditional education 50 8!l
Few grades IO7 i7]2
Sixth grade IO4 15!
7
7th to 9th grade 42 6.7
10th to 12th grade 13 2!l
High school diploma 26 4.2
Few years college 5 *.8
B. A. or equivalent 5 .8
M. A. or equivalent 2 .3
M. D. or equivalent 2 .3
Ph. D. or equivalent 1 .2
Not available 21 3.4
total 624 100.2%
496
parents students
n % n %
Education
9th grade
10th grade ]lt ^1.4
nth grade 26.4
12th grade ^5 29.7
Not available 20.2
624 100.0%
total
Country of Education
Iran 139 81.8
Germany 2 1*2
Not available 29 17^0
total 170 100.0%
Job (For parents; the responding parent's employment is stated, and forthe students, the head of household's employment is stated)
Professional or
technical
Administration or
management
Clerical and related
Sales and related
Service sector
Farmer and farm related
Production worker or
driver
Military or police
Housewifes
Other/not available
total
Family Income (In 1978, 70 Rials—abbr
Less than 39,000 Rls.
30,000 to 49,999 Rls.
50,000 to 74,999 Rls.
75,000 to 99,999 Rls.
100,000 to 124,999 Rls
125,000 to 149,999 Rls
150,000 to 199,999 Rls
200,000 to 249,999 Rls
More than 250,000 Rls.
Not available
total
24 14.2 34 5.4
11 6.5 32 5.1
37 21.8 120 19.2
26 15.3 117 18.7
6 3.5 49 7.8
11 6.5 52 8.3
14 8.2 95 15.2
11 6.5 46 7.4
17 10.0
13 7.7 89 12.7
170 100.0% 624 100.0%
i s-- br,
. Rls.-equalled $1.00).
62 36.5 240 38.5
53 31.2 174 27.9
23 13.5 89 14.3
13 7.6 39 6.3
6 3.5 28 4.5
3 1.8 14 2.2
1 .6 7 1.1
2 1.2 6 1.0
5 2.9 8 1.3
4 2.4 19 3.0
170 100.2% 624 100.1%
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parents
students
Place of residence
Tehran
Cities of over 100,000
Cities with population
from 25,000 to 99,999
Cities with population
from 5,000 to 24,999
Places with a population
of less than 5,000
Not available
total
Years at the city of residence
Less than one year
1 to 5 years
5 to 10 years
10 to 15 years
15 to 20 years
Over 20 years
Not available
total
Province of residence
Central incl. Tehran
Guilan
East Azarbaijan
West Azarbaijan
Kerman
Khorasan
Baluchistan
Bushehr
Zanjan
Yazd
Kohkiloyeh &
Boyer-Ahmad
Semnan
total
Rel igion
Shi ah
Sunni
Not available
n
57
20
3"^ R
11.7
352
69
56.4
11.1
33 19.4 103 16.5
41 24.1 64 10.3
16
3
9.4
1.8
36 5.8
170 99.9% 624 100.1%
7 4.1
17 10.0
16 9.4
16 9.4
1 7 in r\iu. (J
91 53.5
D 3.5
170
71 41.8 455 72.9
2 1.2 3
.5
50 29.4 83 13.3
1
.6
9 5.3 30 4.8
1
.6
12 7.1 1
.2
7 4.1
8 4.7 11 1.8
4 2.4 10 1.6
10 1.6
5 2.9 21 3.4
170 100.1% 624 100.1%
158 92.9
11 6.5
1
.6
total 170 100.0%
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parents
^
students
n % n %
'^'ofIboit^our f"?s?en *° "^"^ - - television.
Few times amonth 3 10
Once every few months 1 \ f'^
Seldom 25 u 7 iU ol-^
Never ^^'^ i 2 .0
Not available 2 112 2
total 170 100.1% 624 100.0%
^^nI?ilL!?"
^""'^ people read newspaper and magazine articles about
hveryday 54 31^3 157 25 2Few times a week 43 25.3 247 39 6Few times a month 10 5.9 64 10 1Once every few months 3 18 20 3 ?Seldom 25 14;7 107 17'2
mT' -1 Ki 3° 17.6 26 4:1Not available 5 2.9 3 5
total 170 100.0% 624 100.1%
Variable 14: Some people think about political and economic condition
of our country, how about you? I think about it:
Everyday
Few times a week
Few times a month
Once every few months
Seldom
Never
Not available
total
Variable 15: Some people talk about political and economic condition of
25 14.7 114 18.3
18 10.6 104 16.7
16 9.4 58 9.3
12 7.1 32 5.1
45 26.5 181 29.0
50 29.4 128 20.5
4 2.4 7 1.1
170 100.1% 624 100.0%
Everyday 19 11.2 88 14.1
Few times a week 25 14.7 122 19.6
Few times amonth 15 8.8 54 8.6
Once every few months 3 1.8 36 5.8
Seldom 50 29.4 203 32.5
Never 55 32.3 118 18.9
Not available 3 1.8 3 .5
total 170 100.0% 624 100.0%
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P^^^"ts students
^ n %
Ind'^IL^ras^L^hlnHL ^ ^^^^^ ^^'^e one's feeling
Agree strongly 45 *
,5.5 134 ,,.3
Agree somewhat 19 226 36.2
Disagree somewhat 6 \ r ^2.4
.^l^^g^ee 1^ 55 8.8
Disagree strongly 4 0*0 7? 6-9
Not available 2 i.l {2
^'^
total
100.0% 624 99.9%
Variable 17: When a man is born, the success he is aoinaready in the cards, so he mav as wpII
it.
Agree strongly 25
Agree 34
Agree somewhat 24
Disagree somewhat 7
Disagree 40
Disagree strongly 34
Not available 6
total 170
accept it and not fight against
14.7 54 8.7
20.0 114 18.3
14.1 78 12.5
4.1 33 5.3
23.5 170 27.2
20.0 160 25.6
3.5 15 2.4
99.9% 624 100.0%
65 38.2 169 27.1
47 27.7 197 31.6
26 15.3 121 19.4
8 4.7 46 7.4
16 9.4 50 8.0
5 2.9 18 2.9
3 1.8 23 3.7
170 100.0% 624 100.1%
Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total
Variable 19: There is hardly anybody lower than a person who does not
teel a great love, gratitude and respect for his parents
Agree strongly 75 44.1 300 48 1
Ag>"ee 44 25.9 165 26.4
Agree somewhat 25 14.7 65 10 4
Disagree somewhat 3 1.3 22 3*5
Disagree 11 6.5 31 5!o
Disagree strongly 10 5.9 29 4.7
Not available 2 1.2 12 l!9
total 170 100.1% 624 100.0%
500
parents
n %
Variable 20: The negative opinion of others often
a movie or a play I had planned to attend
Agree strongly 13 75
students
n %
keeps me from seeing
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total
23
23
15
55
24
17
170
13.5
13.5
8.8
32.4
14.1
10.0
99.9%
32
116
140
55
203
56
22
624
5.1
18.6
22.4
8.8
32.5
9.0
3.5
99.9%
Variable 21
ed.
Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
The government should give money and food to the unemploy-
47
36
15
16
29
25
2
27.7
21.2
8.8
9.4
17.1
14.7
1.2
171
130
81
48
101
80
13
27.4
20.8
13.0
7.7
16.2
12.8
2.1
total 170 100.1% 624 100.0%
Variable 22: There is 1no satisfaction in any undertaking without a
companion.
Agree strongly 40 23.5 149 23.9
Agree 54 31.8 175 28.0
Agree somewhat 16 9.4 89 14.3
Disagree somewhat 5 2.9 31 5.0
Disagree 33 19.4 108 17.3
Disagree strongly 19 11.2 57 9.1
Not available 3 1.8 15 2.4
total 170 100.0% 624 100.0%
Variable 23: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated
a person like me can 't really understand what is going on.
Agree strongly 44 25.9 102 16.4
Agree 55 32.4 222 35.6
Agree somewhat 29 17.1 165 26.4
Disagree somewhat 9 5.3 36 5.8
Disagree 14 8.2 49 7.8
Disagree strongly 5 5.3 25 4.0
Not available 10 5.9 25 4.0
total 170 100.0% 624 100.0%
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n
P^'^e^ts students
% 0
Agree strongly
A .
. 16
Agree 47
Agree somewhat 22
Disagree somewhat 14
Disagree 42
Disagree Strongly 23
Not available 6
total 1/0
9.4
27.7
12.9
8.2
13.5
13.5
3.5
99.9%
48
147
127
61
141
77
23
624
7.7
23.6
20.4
9.8
22.6
12.3
3.7
100.1%
Variable 25: Respect is due an older man no matter what kind of a person
Agree strongly 53
Agree 43
Agree somewhat 19
Disagree somewhat 4
Disagree 32
Disagree strongly 10
total 170'
31.2 196
28.2 156
11.2 101
2.4 56
18.8 67
5.9 41
100.1% 624
31.4
25.0
16.2
9.0
10.7
6.6
100.0%
55 32.4 182 29.2
51 30.0 187 30.0
19 11.2 109 17.5
10 5.9 37 5.9
19 11.2 65 10.4
8 4.7 26 4.2
8 4.7 18 2.9
170 100.1% 624 100.1%
Variable 26: Our socio-political system should be a blue-print for allother nations in the world. ^ ^"
Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total
Variable 27: Real friendship
change with circumstances.
Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total
is permanent friendship; friends don't
77 45.3 268 43.0
56 32.9 201 32.2
8 4.7 62 9.9
4 2.4 29 4.7
17 10.0 36 5.8
3 1.8 13 2.1
5 2.9 15 2.4
170 100.0% 624 100.1%
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parents
students
" /o n
'"nlJl newsXe?^'"^^ --''^ -^ed by what I read
Agree st^ong,, 41 ,4.1 io5 15.8
Agree somewhat 33 ?q1 ?J3 35.1
Disagree somewhat 3 ir "5 23.2
Disagree 9 t^'t 8.5
Disagree strongly 4 ?i ?2 ^^'l
Not available 14 21 3.4
624 100.0%
total 170 100.0%
''[h^t^^afoff\r^Iiirr!?!! - -^..-^^ to have a watch or clock
Agree strongly 27 ISQ mo/ 43 ^5': 3' •Agree somewhat 32 I8.8 09 17*5Disagree somewhat 17 10. 0 75 {onDisagree 33 19.4 133 pt*?Disagree strongly 12 7 1 H Ti'V
Not available - - - ^^'^
10 1.6
^otal 170 100.0% 624 100.0%
^ nol^.f: ^^'^^
people believe that the government is pretty much in-fluenced by a few big interests looking out for themselvesAgree strongly 25 14.7 85 3 6*
^S"^^^
,
43 25.3 181 29 0Agree somewhat 29 17.1 133 22 1
Disagree somewhat 22 12.*9 55 3*8
Disagree 32 18. 8 113 18 1Disagree strongly 11 6.5 29 4*7
Not available 8 4.7 23 37
total 170 100.0% 624 100.0%
^^^ll^^^t °lf^r
the government has paid no attention to
wnat people like me think when i+ Mcr^-iA^^^ ...u^-t- 4.^ j„
Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total
28 16.5 77 12.3
36 21.2 128 20.6
30 17.7 113 18.1
12 7.1 73 11.7
38 22.4 137 22.0
18 10.6 56 9.0
8 4.7 40 6.4
170 100.2% 624 100.1%
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P^i^ents students
r\ % n %
Variable 32: I set difficult go<
Agree strongly 37
Agree 51
Agree somewhat 28
Disagree somewhat 17
Disagree 24
Disagree strongly 7
Not available 6
total 170
Variable 33: A child should nev(
told why he is asked to do it,
Agree strongly 80
Agree 67
Agree somewhat 10
Disagree somewhat 3
Disagree 5
Disagree strongly l
Not available 4
total 170
34: A wealthy person cannot really learn how to behave in a
er up-bringing.
351 56.3
191 30.6
20 3.2
7 1.1
18 2.9
7 1.1
30 4.8
624 100.0%
Variable 35: I think the government wastes needlessly alot of the money
we pay in taxes.
for myself which I attempt
115 18.4
30.0 216 34.6
16.5 134 21.5
10.0 54 8.7
14.1 62 9.9
4.1 13 2.1
3.5 30 4.8
100.0% 624 100.0%
be asked to do anything unl
47.1 356 41.0
39.4 247 39.6
5.9 45 7.2
1.8 18 2.9
2.9 19 3.0
.6 5
.8
2.3 34 5.6
100.0% 624 100.0%
Agree strongly 100 58.8
Agree 51 30.0
Agree somewhat 6 3.5
Disagree somewhat 3 1.8
Disagree 6 3.5
Disagree strongly 3 1.8
Not available 1 .6
total 170 100.0%
Agree strongly 32 18.8 81 13.0
Agree 29 17.1 115 18.4
Agree somewhat 18 10.6 107 17.2
Disagree somewhat 13 7.7 60 9.6
Disagree 44 25.9 148 23.7
Disagree strongly 25 14.7 76 12.2
Not available 9 5.3 37 5.9
total 170 100.1% 624 100.0%
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n
parents
^'^ij^le 36: I work hard at everything Iwith the results. ^-xniy i
Agree strongly 94
Agree 57
Agree somewhat 3
Disagree somewhat 1
Disagree 1
Disagree strongly 1
Not available 3
students
n %
undertake until I am satisfied
55.3
39.4
1.8
.6
.6
.6
1.8
total 170
Variable 37: I enjoy a race or
Agree strongly 8
Agree 24
Agree somewhat 7
Disagree somewhat 9
Disagree 74
Disagree strongly 38
Not available 10
total 170
100.1%
247
270
59
7
6
3
32
624
a game better when
4.7
14.1
4.1
5.3
43.5
22.4
5.9
100.0%
30
41
40
43
231
213
26
624
39.6
43.3
9.5
1.1
1.0
.5
5.1
100.1%
I bet on it,
4.8
6.6
6.4
6.9
37.0
34.1
4.2
100.0%
Variable 38: I think some people in the government are crooked.Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total
Variable 39: No same ai
close friend.
Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total
56
56
22
7
18
6
5
170
32.9
32.9
12.9
4.1
10.6
3,5
2.9
99.8%
169
159
134
40
62
23
37
624
27.1
25.5
21.5
6.4
9.9
3.7
5.9
100.0%
100 58.8 327 52.4
45 26.5 212 34.0
5 2.9 26 4.2
1
.6 16 2.6
3 1.8 13 2.1
3 1.8 4 .6
13 7.7 26 4.2
170 100.1% 624 100.1%
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parents students
n
Variable 40: The government usually knows what is best for peopleAgree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total
50 29.4 110
56 32.9 192
23 13.5 123
11 6.5 66
9 5.3 76
7 4.1 28
14 8.2 29
170 99.9% 624
17.6
30.8
19.7
10.6
12.2
4.5
4.7
100.1%
^^rl!?l!4.^i:iJ!,-LPur^?P wanted to^make a speech in this community
13.5
18.4
12.7
7.4
21.8
20.7
5.6
100.1%
Variable 42: People running the government are smart people who usually
know what they are doing.
inst religion he should be allowed.
Agree strongly 15 8 .8 84
Agree 15 8 .8 115
Agree somewhat 13 7 .7 79
Disagree somewhat 3 1 .8 46
Disagree 39 22 .9 136
Disagree strongly 66 38 .8 129
Not available 19 11 .2 35
total 170 100 .0% 624
Agree strongly 31 18.2 66 10.6
Agree 49 28.8 156 25.0
Agree somewhat 35 20.6 171 27.4
Disagree somewhat 12 7.1 87 13.9
Disagree 16 9.4 79 12.7
Disagree strongly 13 7.7 35 5.6
Not available 14 8.2 30 4.8
total 170 100.0% 624 100.0%
ible 43: Planning only makes a person unhappy since plans
'k out anyway.
Agree strongly 16 9.4 52 8.3
Agree 49 28.8 122 19.6
Agree somewhat 23 13.5 160 25.6
Disagree somewhat 18 10.6 92 14.7
Disagree 27 15.6 122 19.6
Disagree strongly 24 14.1 45 7.2
Not available 13 7.7 31 5.0
total 170 100.0% 624 100.0%
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n
parents students
n %
Variable 44: Nowdays with world condition the wav it ic: tho ,mc
Agree strongly 15
Agree 21
Agree somewhat 12
Disagree somewhat 14
Disagree 53
Disagree strongly 35
Not available 15
total 170
8.8
12.4
7.1
8.2
34.1
20.6
8.8
100.0%
54
93
58
70
193
124
32
624
8.7
14.9
9.3
11.2
30.9
19.9
5.1
100.0%
Agree strongly
Agree
Agree somewhat
Disagree somewhat
Disagree
Disagree strongly
Not available
total
45 26.5 152 24.4
58 34.1 238 38.1
16 9.4 86 13.8
9 5.3 30 4.8
21 12.4 55 8.8
2 1.2 18 2.9
19 11.2 45 7.2
170 100.1% 624 100.1%
Variable 46:
them.
I often do something just to prove to myself that I can do
Agree strongly 29 17. 1 109 17.5
Agree 42 24. 7 197 31.6
Agree somewhat 26 15. 3 106 17.0
Disagree somewhat 8 4. 7 60 9.6
Disagree 38 22. 4 94 15.1
Disagree strongly 12 7. 1 28 4.5
Not available 15 8. 8 30 4.8
total 170 100. 1% 624 100.1%

